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Abstract  
Section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 outlines the scope 
of judicial authority as encompassing the resolution of any dispute that can be resolved 
by the application of law. The courts in South Africa have developed several 
justiciability canons that restrain when courts may adjudicate disputes, such as 
standing, mootness, ripeness, and the prevention of advisory opinions. These 
justiciability canons emanate from constitutional considerations such as respect for 
separation of powers and the proper role and scope of judicial review in a constitutional 
democracy. 
 
This study focuses on another justiciability canon - the political question doctrine. This 
doctrine arises from the principle of separation of powers and, in the main, provides 
that certain questions of constitutional law are allocated to the discretion of the elected 
branches of government for resolution. As a result, such questions are non-justiciable 
and require the judiciary to abstain from deciding them because not doing so intrudes 
into the functions of the elected branches of government. The underlying theme is that 
such questions must find resolution in the political process. 
 
Through a comparative lens, the study examines the origins and current application of 
the political question doctrine in selected countries with a view to obtain lessons 
therefrom. It examines the origins of the doctrine, by placing particular emphasis on 
the early application of the doctrine by the US Supreme Court. The study also 
examines the modern application of the doctrine in the constitutional jurisprudence of 
several countries, including Ghana, Uganda and Nigeria. It advances the view that 
while the doctrine exists in the South African jurisprudence, the Constitutional Court 
should articulate and develop it into a clear doctrine taking into account lessons from 
those countries. The study offers some recommendations in this regard.  
 
The study submits that the political question doctrine is an appropriate legal 
mechanism through which the South African judiciary can address the recent problem 
of the proliferation of cases brought to the courts that raise non-justiciable political 
questions and threaten to delegitimize the role of the courts in a democracy.  
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___________________________________________________________________ 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
Section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter as the 
Constitution or the Constitution 1996) outlines the scope of judicial authority as 
encompassing the resolution of any dispute that can be resolved by the application of 
law. The courts in South Africa have developed several justiciability canons that dictate 
when courts may adjudicate disputes, such as standing,1 mootness,2 ripeness,3 and 
                                                          
1  See, Ferreira v Levin 1996 1 BCLR 1 (CC) [162-169, 223-238]; Albutt v Centre for the Study of 
Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 293 (CC) [32-35]; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Prut NO 
1996 4 SA 318 (E); New Party of South Africa v Government of the Republic of South Africa 
1999 3 SA 191 (CC) [106]; Kruger v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 1 SA 417 
(CC) [20-27]; Bio Energy Afrika Free State v Freedom Front Plus 2012 2 SA 88 (FB) [13-18]; 
Currie I and de Waal J The Bill of Rights (Juta Cape Town 2013) 72-84. See also, Motala Z and 
Ramaphosa C Constitutional Law: Analysis and Cases (Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 
2002) 103 (arguing that the Constitution adopts different standards on standing depending on 
whether the plaintiff’s case is based on a mere claim of wrongdoing on the part of the defendant, 
versus a claim of wrongdoing which affects rights protected in the bill of rights, and noting that 
in the former instance the standards are more rigid while as in the latter instance the standard 
for standing are more flexible). 
2  See, National Coalition of Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 1 
(CC) [21]; S v Dlamini 1999 4 SA 623 (CC) [27]; Janse van Rensburg NO v Minister of Trade 
and Industry 2001 1 SA 29 (CC) [9-10]; President of the Ordinary Court Martial v Freedom of 
Expression Institute 1999 4 SA 682 (CC) [7-8]. See also, Motala and Ramaphosa Constitutional 
Law 115-116 (noted that mootness is not fully developed in South Africa and is unlikely to mirror 
the American approach because even if an issue becomes moot, South African courts might 
still need to consider some aspects of the merits. Further noting that despite the fact that 
Constitutional Court in JT Publishing v Minister of Safety and Security considered mootness as 
a barrier to adjudication, it is unlikely that the barrier will be absolute); and Wiese v Government 
Employees Pension Fund 2012 6 BCLR 599 (CC) [21-24] (holding that the issues between the 
parties were moot due to recent legislative interventions). 
3  See, National Coalition of Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs [21]; Chairman, 
State Tender Board v Digital Voice Processing (Pty) Ltd 2012 2 SA 16 (SCA) [16-21]; Ritcher 
v Minister of Home Affairs 2009 3 SA 615 (CC) [40]; S v Friedland 1996 8 BCLR 1049 (W); 
Transvaal Agricultural Union v Minister of Land Affairs 1997 2 SA 621 (CC); Minister of 
Education v Harris 2001 4 SA 1297 (CC) [19]; Legal Aid South Africa v Magidiwana 2014 4 All 
SA 570 (SCA) [17-18]. Motala and Ramaphosa Constitutional Law 113 (noting that Justice 
Kriegler in Ferreira v Levin [199] described ripeness as serving the useful purpose of 
highlighting that the business of a court is generally retrospective, it deals with situations or 
problems that have already ripened or crystalized and not with prospective hypothetical 
problems). 
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the prevention of advisory opinions.4 These justiciability canons emanate from 
constitutional considerations, such as respect for separation of powers and the proper 
role and scope of judicial review in a constitutional democracy.5 To illustrate the 
significance of these issues, in 2010, President Jacob Zuma made an important 
speech in Parliament at the farewell of the former Chief Justice Sandile Ngcobo, where 
he discussed, among other things, the limits of judicial review, the principle of 
separation of powers and its effects on the resolution of political questions or disputes. 
Zuma said the following:  
 
We reiterate our view that there is a need to distinguish the areas of responsibility 
between the judiciary and the elected branches of the state, especially with 
regards to policy formulation. The executive, as elected officials, has the sole 
discretion to decide policies for government. The principle of separation of 
powers means that the encroachment of one arm of the state on the terrain of 
another should be discouraged, and there should be no bias in this regard. We 
respect the powers and role conferred by our Constitution on the legislature and 
the judiciary. At the same time, we expect the same from these very important 
institutions of our democratic dispensation. The executive should be allowed to 
conduct its administration and policy-making work as freely as it possibly could. 
The powers conferred on the courts could not be regarded as superior to the 
powers resulting from a mandate given by the people in a popular vote. To 
provide support to the judiciary and free the courts to do their work, it would help 
if political disputes were resolved politically.6 
 
                                                          
4  National Coalition of Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs [21]; S v Friedland 
1996 8 BCLR 1049 (W); Radio Pretoria v Chairman, Independent Communications Authority of 
South Africa 2005 1 SA 47 (SCA) [15]; Rand Water Board v Rotek Industries (Pty) Ltd 2003 4 
SA 58 (SCA) [26]. 
5  See generally, National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance 2012 6 SA 223 (CC) 
and Magidiwana v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 11 BCLR 1251 (CC). See 
also Okpaluba C and Mhango M “Between Separation of powers and Justiciability:  
Rationalising the Constitutional Court’s Judgement in the Gauteng E-tolling Litigation in South 
Africa” 2017 Law Demoracy Development 1-24. 
6  “Judiciary must respect separation of powers – Jacob Zuma” 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/judiciary-must-respect-separation-of-powers--jacob. 
(Date of use: 2016-11-10). See also, Editorial “SA Is Courting Abuse”  2016-07-07 Business 
Day http://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/editorials/2016-11-22-editorial-sa-is-courting-
abuse/ (2016-07-07)(behind this bewildering number of cases lies a deep constitutional issue, 
the notion of a separation of powers between the operational, legislative and judicial arms of 
government.  Increasingly, the courts are being called upon to settle disputes that, arguably, 
should be dealt with by other constitutional or political institutions, and that the courts should 
not be the port of call in a political dispute). 
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The above statement is perhaps the most recent reference to the theme of the political 
question doctrine by a politician in South Africa.7 However, the first reference to the 
notion of the political question doctrine in South Africa is found in Brown v Leyds NO.8 
In that case, the Supreme Court of the Transvaal had to consider whether or not the 
court had the power to test the validity of acts of the legislature. The court relied heavily 
on American authorities and found that it had the power of judicial review or testing 
rights, but recognized that such power was not absolute.9 In other words, while 
accepting the power of judicial review, the court rejected the proposition that the 
judiciary was capable of deciding every question brought before it and noted that “if 
any proposition may be considered as a political axiom, this we think, may be so 
considered.”10  
 
The political question doctrine arises from the functionality of the principle of 
separation of powers and, in the main, provides that certain constitutional questions 
are constitutionally allocated to the discretion of elected branches of government for 
                                                          
7  For a discussion about former South African President Paul Kruger’s views on judicial review 
and the notion of the political question theory see, Dugard J Human Rights and the South 
African Legal Order, (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1978) 14-36 (commenting on the 
decision in Brown v Leyds NO, 4 Off Rep 17 (1897) which applied the concept of judicial review, 
Kruger said the Court is free as a fish is free to swim in a net. Kruger is known for his 
controversial and critical views concerning the power of judicial review and is said to have 
characterised the principle of judicial review as a principle of the devil and warned judges not 
to follow the devil. Given his critical views of the power of judicial review, it is more than likely 
that Kruger would have supported the political question doctrine for South Africa since it 
represents the judicial effort to ensure that courts do not hamper the functioning of the political 
branches). See also, Endicott, A “The Judicial Answer? Treatment of the Political Question 
Doctrine in Alien Tort Claims” 2010 Berkeley Journal of International Law 538 (arguing that the 
political question doctrine represents a judicial effort to ensure that the courts do not hamper 
the functioning of the political branches); and O’Regan K “A Forum for Reason: Reflections on 
the Role and Work of the Constitutional Court” 2012 South African Journal on Human Rights 
132 (arguing that courts in South Africa must exercise restraint and not impede the functioning 
of government because the legislature, and indirectly, the executive are democratically elected 
arms of government, whose office is determined by popular vote. In support for the proposition 
that courts should exercise restraint in the area of policy formulation, she argues that courts 
are institutionally ill placed to make the complex decisions that policy requires because they 
have no experience in the field of policy formulation). 
8  Brown v Leyds NO 4 Off Rep 17 (1897). 
9  Brown v Leyds NO 29-31. For further discussion of the Brown v Leyds NO and its effects 
including how American authorities influenced that judgment see, Barrie GN “Impeachment on 
the Highveld: The Dismissal of Chief Justice Kotze by President Kruger on 16 February 1898, 
2014 TSAR 817. 
10  Brown v Leyds NO 29-30. 
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resolution.11 As a result, such questions are non-justiciable and require the judiciary 
to abstain from deciding them because failure to do so intrudes into the functions 
reserved for the political branches of government.12 The underlying theme is that such 
questions must find resolution in the political process.13  
 
In the above statement, Zuma called for the development of a political question 
doctrine (without mentioning it by name) for South Africa. There is authority and 
general support for the political question doctrine in South Africa generally and 
abroad.14 One notable authority and support (although not directly addressing Zuma) 
                                                          
11  See, United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2017 (8) 
BCLR 1061 (CC)[64] (holding that the Constitution allocated to the National Assembly the 
discretion to determine the voting procedure in a motion of no confidence in the President); 
Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2016 (3) SA 580 
(CC)[93] (holding that the Constitution allocates excusively to the National Assembly the 
discretion to decide how to hold the executive to account); Redish M “Judicial Review and the 
Political Question” 1984 Northwestern Law Review 1031; Breedon K “Remedial Problems at 
the Intersection of the Political Question Doctrine, the Standing Doctrine and the Doctrine of 
Equitable Discretion” 2008 Ohio Northern University Law Review 523 (explaining that the 
purpose of the political question doctrine is twofold. The first, rooted in the Constitution's 
separation of powers, is to ensure proper judicial restraint against exercising jurisdiction when 
doing so would require courts to assume responsibilities which are assigned to the political 
branches. The second is to ensure the legitimacy of the judiciary by protecting against issuing 
orders which courts cannot enforce); Wechsler H Principles, Politics, and Fundamental Law 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1961) 11-14; Yoshino K “Restrained 
Ambition in Constitutional Interpretation” 2009 Willamette Law Review 557-559 (arguing that 
the political question doctrine is a doctrine of justiciability, noting that other such doctrines 
include standing, ripeness, mootness, and the bar on advisory opinions; that the justiciability 
doctrines underscore the idea that there can be rights without judicially enforceable remedies); 
LaTourette S “Global Climate: A Political Question?” 2008 Rutgers Law Journal 219 (arguing 
that the political question doctrine is a function of the separation of powers); and Martin v Mott 
12 Wheat 29, 25 US 19 (1872) (endorsing the proposition that certain questions of constitution 
law are exclusively allocated to the political branches of government). 
12 Redish 1984 Northwestern LR; Breedon 2008 Ohio Northern; Wechsler Principles 11; Yoshino 
2009 Willamette LR; LaTourette 2008 Rutgers LR. See also, Economic Freedom Fighters v 
Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2016 (3) SA 580 (CC)( where the Court 
abstained from deciding the question of whether the National Assembly failed to hold the 
executive to account in relation to a Public Protector’s report finding that it was not open to the 
judiciary to pescribe to Parliament how it should hold the executive to account).  
13  Redish 1984 Northwestern LR; Breedon 2008 Ohio Northern; Wechsler Principles 11; Yoshino 
2009 Willamette LR; LaTourette 2008 Rutgers LR. 
14  For South African authorities on the subject, see Ngcobo S “Why Does the Constitution  
Matter?” 2016 Gallagher Estate, Johannesburg, available at  
http://www.hsrc.ac.za/uploads/pageContent/7058/HSRC%20Public%20Lecture%20(FINAL)  
21-22 (generally supportive of the political question doctrine and arguing that the political  
question doctrine is a useful starting point in considering limits on the power of judicial review  
in South Africa); Mazibuko, Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly v Speaker of  
the National Assembly 2013 4 SA 243 (WCC)(where, like Zuma, the high court problematizes  
the use of courts to resolve political disputes short of calling for a political question doctrine.  
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for the political question doctrine is obtained from the US Supreme Court case in 
Marbury v Madison, where Chief Justice Marshall held that “the province of the court 
is not to inquire how the executive or executive officers perform duties in which they 
have discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution 
and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.”15 Chief Justice 
Marshall reasoned that since some conduct by the political branches is judiciary 
examinable and others not, the judiciary must develop a rule of law to guide courts in 
the exercise of its jurisdiction in those appropriate cases.16 He emphasized the need 
                                                          
The high court, based on separation of powers concerns, abstained from determining whether  
parliament should have allowed opposition parties to move a motion of no confidence against  
the president suggesting that that was a political question); United Democratic Movement v.  
President of the Republic of South Africa 2002 11 BCLR 1179 (CC) (explaining that political  
questions are of no concern to the Court); In re: Certification of the Constitution of the  
Republic of South Africa 1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC) (pronouncing that the court has no  
mandate to express any view on the political choices made by the framers of the  
Constitution); Mazibuko, Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly v Sisulu MP  
Speaker of the National Assembly 2013 (6) SA 249 (CC) (2013) [83] (Jafta J minority opinion)  
(where the dissenting opinion agreed with the high court in Mazibuko and without mentioning  
the political question doctrine suggest that political disputes should not be resolved in courts  
but rather find resolution in the process process); and Okpaluba C “Justiciability,  
Constitutional Adjudication and the Political Question in a Nascent Democracy: South Africa”  
2003 and 2004 South African Public Law 331 (part 1) and 131 (part 2) (advocating for the  
political question doctrine in South Africa).  
 
For foreign authorities see, Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch 1803) 137; Luther v  
Borden 48 US 1 (1849); Balarabe Musa v Auta Hamza (1983) 3 NCLR 229 (applying the  
political question doctrine in Nigeria); Onuoha v Okafor (1983) NSCC 494 (applying the  
political question doctrine in Nigeria); Nwauche E “Is the End Near for the Political Question  
Doctrine in Nigeria?” in Fombad C and Murray C (eds), Fostering Constitutionalism in Africa,  
(Pretoria University Law Press, Pretoria 2010) 31-60 (discussing the political question  
doctrine in Nigeria); Ghana Bar Association v Attorney General [2003-2004] SCGLR 250  
(holding that the appointment of a Chief Justice was a political question); Attorney General v.  
Major General David Tinyefuza Const Appeal No.1 of 1997 (SC) (unreported) (holding that  
the political question doctrine prevents courts from deciding questions involving military  
policy); Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General, Constitutional Petition No 16 of  
2011; Bickel A The Least Dangerous Branch (Yale University Press, New Haven 1962)  
(advocating for the prudential political question doctrine); Imam I et al, “Judicial Activism and  
Intervention in the Doctrine of Political Questions in Nigeria: An Analytical Exposition” 2011  
African Journal of Law and Criminology 50 (advocating for the political question doctrine in  
Nigeria); Mulhern P “In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine” 1988 University of  
Pennsylvania Law Review (defending the political question doctrine); Scharpf F “Judicial  
Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis” 1966 Yale Law Journal 517;  
Tushnet M “Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and  
Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine” 2002 North Carolina Law Review 1203.  
15  Marbury v Madison 170. 
16  Marbury v Madison 165. See also, Cole J “The Political Question Doctrine: Justiciability and 
the Separation of Powers” 2014 https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43834.pdf (Date of use: 15 
January 2017); Story J Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States With A 
Preliminary Revie of the Constitutional History of the Colonies and States, Before the Adoption 
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for such a rule by recognizing that the executive is endowed with certain important 
political powers, which it has to apply using its own discretion, and is only politically 
accountable.17 As Marshall noted, to aid the executive in the performance of its duties, 
the head of the executive is expressly permitted to appoint certain office bearers, who 
serve at his pleasure.18 Further, Chief Justice Marshall made an important observation 
that when office bearers are appointed by the head of the executive to aid him fulfill 
his constitutional tasks “whatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which 
executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no power to control 
that discretion. The subjects are political…, and, being entrusted to the executive, the 
decision of the executive is conclusive… The acts of such an officer, as an officer, can 
never be examinable by the courts.”19 As will be shown later in the study, Chief Justice 
Marshal’s pronouncements are applicable in South Africa. In the final analysis, Chief 
Justice Marshall concluded by establishing the following rule:  
 
where the heads of departments are the political or confidential agents of the 
Executive, merely to execute the will of the President, or rather to act in cases in 
which the Executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can 
be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable. But 
where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the 
performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers 
himself injured has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.20 
 
The above reasoning and holding from Marbury v Madison gave birth to what will in 
later years be commonly known as the political question doctrine.21 Since Marbury v 
                                                          
of the Constitution, (Hilliard Gray & Co, Cambridge 1833) 346-347 (arguing that question that 
are confided exclusively to the political branches are not judiciary examinable); and Cooley TM 
A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the 
States of the American Union, (Little, Brown & Co, Boston 1868) 41 (arguing that where the a 
constitutional question is constitutionally addressed to the discretion of one department of 
government, a rule must prevail that a decision made by that department is final and not 
examinable by any other department or tribunal).  
17  Marbury v Madison 165; and Cole (2014). 
18  Marbury v Madison 165; and Cole (2014). 
19 Marbury v Madison 166. 
20  Marbury v Madison 166. 
21  Some commentators have suggested that the political question theory may have originated     
from the earlier cases in Ware v Hylton 3 US (3 Dall) 199 (1796); Martin v Mott 25 US (12 
Wheat) 19 (1872). See, Peitzman L “The Supreme Court and the Credentials Challenge Cases: 
Ask a Political Question, You Get a Political Answer” 1974 Califonia Law Review 1350, fn 31. 
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Madison was decided, Story has said, with great emphasis in support of the classical 
political question proposition, that: 
 
…in measures exclusively of a political, legislative or executive character, it is 
plain, that as the supreme authority, as to these questions, belongs to the 
legislative and executive departments, they cannot be re-examined elsewhere. 
Thus, congress having the power to declare war, to levy taxes, to appropriate 
money, to regulate intercourse and commerce with foreign nations, their mode 
of executing these powers can never become the subject of re-examination in 
any other tribunal...yet cases may readily be imagined, in which a tax may be 
laid, or a treaty made, upon motives and grounds wholly beside the intention of 
the constitution. The remedy, however, in such cases is solely by an appeal to 
the people at the elections… but where the question is of a different nature, and 
capable of judicial inquiry and decision, there it admits of a very different 
consideration.22 
 
And to add to this, Cooley has, with equal force and brevity, remarked that:  
 
..every department of the government and every official of every department may 
at any time, when a duty is to be performed, be required to pass upon a question 
of constitutional construction. Sometimes the case will be such that the decision 
when made must, from the nature of things, be conclusive and subject to no 
appeal or review, however erroneous it may be in the opinion of other 
departments or other officers; but in other cases the same question may be 
required to be passed upon again before the duty is completely performed. The 
first of these classes is where, by the constitution, a particular question is plainly 
addressed to the discretion or judgment of some one department or officer, so 
that the interference of any other department or officer, with view to the 
substitution of its own discretion or judgment in the place of that to which the 
constitution has confided the decision, would be impertinent and intrusive. Under 
every constitution cases of this description are to be met with; and though it will 
sometimes be found difficult to classify them, there can be no doubt, when the 
case is properly determined to be one of this character, that the rule must prevail 
which makes the decision final.23 
 
 
Since these remarks were made, United States federal and State courts have 
consistently adhered to the rule that the judiciary is barred from reviewing cases that 
revolve around discretionary policy choices and value determinations constitutionally 
delegated, for resolution, to the elected branches of government.24 There is also 
                                                          
22  Story Commentaries 346-347. 
23  Cooley A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 41.  
24  See, Corrie v Caterpillar 503 F 3d 974 (9th Cir 2007) 980 (holding that courts have no charter 
to review and revise legislative and executive action); Vieth v Jubelirer 541 US 267 (2004) 
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support for the political question doctrine in the case law from Uganda, Nigeria and 
Ghana. These cases provide the basis for the view that the final resolution of political 
questions, which are constitutionally allocated to the discretion of the elected branches 
of government, rests with those branches.25 Further, the political question doctrine 
finds support in, among others, Tushnet, a renowned advocate of the political question 
doctrine, who has rightly argued that the judiciary should be restrained from resolving 
issues that other branches are better suited to resolve.26  
 
Proponents of the political question doctrine have dismissed detractors, whose 
opposition, according to Mulhern, is largely premised on two connected assumptions: 
that the judiciary is the only institution with authority and capacity to interpret the 
Constitution; and that to limit such judicial monopoly threatens the rule of law in conflict 
with the supremacy of the Constitution.27 Instead, proponents defend the political 
question doctrine on the basis that the judiciary shares responsibility for interpreting 
the Constitution with the elected branches of government and deem the doctrine as 
one of the devices the judiciary employs to define this division of or shared 
responsibility.28  
 
                                                          
(holding that the judicial department has no business entertaining the claim because the 
question is entrusted to one of the political branches or involves no judicially enforceable 
rights.); and Japan Whaling Assoc v American Cetacean Society 478 US 221 (1986). 
25  Barkow R “More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the political Question Doctrine and the Rise 
of Judicial Supremacy” 2002 Columbia Law Review 237. 
26  Tushnet 2002 North Carolina LR 1232; Bickel The Least Dangerouns; Scharpf 1966 Yale LR; 
and Wechsler Principles. See, also Jaffe J “The Political Question Doctrine: An Update in 
Response to Recent Case Law” 2011 Ecology Law Quarterly 1037. 
27 See, Mulhern 1988 University of Pennsylvania  LR 99-100; Rautenbach IM “Policy and Judicial 
Review - Political Questions, Margins of Appreciation and the South African Constitution” 2012 
TSAR 28; Reddish 1984 Northwestern LR 101. 
28  Mulhern 1988 University of Pennsylvania  LR 101; Currie I and de Waal J The Bill of Rights 
Handbook (Juta, Cape Town 2005) 394 n184 (arguing that courts are not solely responsible for 
interpreting the Constitution); and Imam et al 2011 African Journal of Law; Fisher L and Devins 
N Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law (West Publishing, St Paul, Minnesota 1992) 10 
(arguing that the elected branches have both the authority and the competence to engage in 
constitutional interpretation); Attorney General v Tinyefuza (holding that the judiciary is not the 
only constitutional organ with interpretive power); United States v Butler, 297 US 1 (1936) 87 
(Stone J dissenting) (arguing that courts are not the only agency of government that must be 
assumed to have the capacity to govern); and Story Commentaries 345-347. 
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It is important to mention that prior to 1994, South Africa was governed under the 
system of parliamentary supremacy in which the judiciary enjoyed limited review 
powers. In reviewing legislative acts, judicial powers were limited to determining 
whether Parliament had complied with its legislative procedures and not the substance 
of its acts. The judiciary could not invalidate the conduct of government on the basis 
that it violated basic human rights because there was no bill of rights. This is because 
under the system of parliamentary supremacy courts are required to abide by the 
wishes of the political majority in Parliament.29 Hence, the major constitutional change 
that occurred in South Africa during 1994 is that parliamentary supremacy was 
replaced with the system of constitutional supremacy, where the judiciary enjoys 
express and wide judicial review powers, and is commanded to enforce the 
Constitution by striking down decisions or conduct of the executive or the political 
majority in Parliament.30 
 
1.2  Theoretical framework 
 
1.2.1 Meaning of the Classical Political Question Doctrine31 
 
The classical political question doctrine is one of two versions of the doctrine that has 
emerged since Marbury v Madison was decided. It is predicated on the theory that the 
existence of the political question doctrine hangs solely on the Constitution’s text or 
structure. It requires courts to focus on the language of the Constitution itself and 
determine whether that language assigns some interpretive discretion or deference to 
any of the political branches.32 In other words, under the classical political question 
doctrine, there has to be an explicit constitutional provision on the basis on which the 
                                                          
29  Currie I and de Waal J The New Constitutional and Administrative Law, (Juta, Cape Town 2001) 
64. 
30  Currie I and de Waal J The New Constitutional 64. 
31 Sometimes referred to as the textualist view or the traditionalist view of the political question 
doctrine. 
32  Barkow 2002 Columbia LR 333-334; Shemtob Z “The Political Question Doctrines: Zivotofsky 
v Clinton and Getting Beyond the Textual–Prudential Paradigm” 2016 The Georgetown Law 
Journal 1017-1019; Wechsler Principles 7-15; Story Commentaries 345-347; and Cooley  
Cooley A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 41 (emphasizing a textual basis for the 
political question doctrine). 
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doctrine may be invoked by a court to abstain from adjudicating a matter in absolute 
deference to the relevant political branch’s interpretive power or decision.33 Because 
of its constitutional source, the classical political question doctrine is not discretionary 
but rather a command of the Constitution.34 If the text of the Constitution does not 
provide a basis, the political question doctrine can never be invoked. No scholar has 
comprehensively investigated the merits of the classical political question theory than 
Professor Wechsler. In articulating the essence of the classical political question 
theory and what it entails, Wechsler has strongly remarked that all “what is the political 
question doctrine can defensibly imply is that the courts are called upon to judge 
whether the Constitution has committed to another agency of government the 
autonomous determination of the issue raised.”35 If a textual commitment is found to 
exist, then the courts are bound not to hear the case.36  
 
1.2.2  Meaning of Prudential Political Question Doctrine 
 
The prudential political question doctrine theory generally encompasses self-imposed 
restraints that arise at the judiciary’s discretion rather than by the command or the text 
of a constitution.37 The prudential political question theory is predicated upon an 
examination of the likely consequences of a court asserting its jurisdiction and 
prevents the judiciary from interfering in matters in which it lacks institutional 
competence to protect its legitimacy and avoid conflicts with the political branches.38 
Unlike the classical theory, the prudential theory is not based on an interpretation of a 
constitutional provision.39  While prudential considerations in the application of the 
                                                          
33  Barkow 2002 Columbia LR 333-334. 
34  Scharpf 1966 Yale LR; Wechsler Principles 8; Warth v Seldin 422 US 490 (1975) 499-500; 
Corrie v Caterpillar 403 F.Supp.2d 1019 (2005); and Corrie v Caterpillar (2007) 979. 
35  Wechsler Principles 7-8. In support of Wechsler’s proposition, see, Story Commentaries 345-
347; and Cooley A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 41. 
36  Shemtob 2016 The Georgetown LJ 1017 fn 127 (stating that Wechsler found comfort in the 
following dicta from Cohens v Virginia 19 US (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) “it is most true that 
this court will not take jurisdiction if it should not; but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction 
if it should.”). For examples of cases applying Wechsler’s understanding of the political question 
doctrine see Massachusetts v Laird 400 US 886 (1970) (Douglas J dissenting); and Roudebush 
v Hartke 405 US 15 (1972) 30 (Douglas J dissenting). 
37  See, Warth v Seldin 499-500; and Corrie v Caterpillar (2007). 
38  Barkow 2002 Columbia LR 253, 333-334; Shemtob 2016 The Georgetown LJ 1013-1017. 
39 Barkow 2002 Columbia LR 253. 
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political question doctrine have been applied since the judgment in Luther v Borden, 
these considerations became prominent following the decisions in Colegrove v Green 
and Baker v Carr.40 Justice Powell was one of the few advocates of the prudential 
political question. His view was that “the political-question doctrine rests in part on 
prudential concerns calling for mutual respect among the three branches of 
government.”41  The courts have highlighted Powell’s view to point out that the first 
three factors established under Baker v Carr (discussed below) focus on the classical 
version of the doctrine, whereas the final three factors are prudential considerations 
that counsel against judicial intervention.42 
 
1.2.3  Separation of Powers 
 
The political question doctrine is often and correctly deliberated upon as part of the 
larger debate on the legitimacy of the institution of judicial review and separation of 
powers.43 Hence, the discussion around the objectives, legitimacy, justifications and 
scope of the power of judicial review and the separation of powers are premised on 
the general understanding that, in the absence of an express authorization for judicial 
review, there is a rich body of jurisprudence which justifies judicial review and restraint 
                                                          
40 Bickel The Least Dangerous 111 (justifying the prudential version of the political question 
doctrine); Nixon v United States 506 US 224 (1993) (where Chief Justice Rehnquist ignored 
the prudential considerations and merged the first two factors in Baker v Carr 228 noting that 
“the concept of a textual commitment to a coordinate political department is not completely 
separate from the concept of a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving it”). See also, Oregon v Mitchel 400 US 112 (1970) (where on the question of courts 
could determine whether Congress had exceeded its powers by enfranchising eighteen-year-
olds and establishing residency requirements for presidential elections, Justice Harlan 
dissented claiming such questions were inappropriate for judicial resolution because they lay 
beyond the institutional competence of the judiciary and were thus best left for congressional 
determination); See Reynolds v Sims 377 US 533 (1964) 589-592 (where in his dissenting 
opinion Justice Harlan emphasized prudential considerations). 
41  Goldwater v Carter 444 US 996 (1979) 1000 (Powell J concurring). See also Nixon v United 
States, 506 US 224 (1992) (Souter J concurring) (noting that applying the political question 
doctrine requires case-by-case attention to prudential concerns); Wang v Masaitis 416 F 3d 
992 (9the Cir 2005) (discussing Justice Powell's approach). 
42  Goldwater v Carter 998-111; Wang v Masaitis 996-1006; and Corrie v Caterpillar (2007). 
43  Ngcobo 2016 Gallagher Estate 23; Thomas M and Johnson C “Note, A Dialogue on the Political 
Question Doctrine” 1978 Utah Law Review 523; Hand L The Bill of Rights (Harvard University 
Press, Massachusetts 1958) 715-716; Bickel The Least Dangerous 183-98. 
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on courts from deciding some category of questions.44 What is also clear in this debate 
is that the existing body of case law in favor of the political question doctrine points to 
the fact that the doctrine is simply a separation of powers’ issue concerning the scope 
of the powers of the political branches vis a vis the judiciary.  
 
As one former Chief Justice of South Africa has correctly observed, the role of the 
judiciary under the Constitution must be understood in the context of the principle of 
separation of powers.45 The latter principle is often traced to the theories of John Locke 
and Baron de Montesquieu.46 In his Second Treatise of Civil Government, Locke 
justified the separation of powers and wrote that “it may be too great temptation to 
human frailty, apt to grasp at power, for the same person who has the power to make 
laws, to have also on their hands the power to execute them.”47 Decades later, 
Montesquieu proposed the principle of the trias politica or separation of powers 
between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. The 
motivation for his proposal was that:  
 
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, there 
can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or 
senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical manner. 
Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the 
subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the 
legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all 
the violence of an oppressor.48 
 
                                                          
44  Premier of the Eastern Cape v Ntamo 2015 6 SA 400 (ECB); and Certification of the KwaZulu-
Natal Constitution 1996 11 BCLR 1419. 
45  Ngcobo 2016 Gallagher Estate 23. 
46 Mubig U “At the roots of European legal culture: Crossborder influences of Locke and 
Montesquieu” 2009 Fundamina: A Journal of Legal History 119-120 (arguing that “from 
Montesquieu’s citing of Locke, one should not infer an intention to adopt Locke’s separation of 
legislative and executive powers. The reference to chapter 12 of Locke’s The Second Treatise 
of Government should also not induce an overestimation of the reception of Locke in 
Montesquieu’s main work. Montesquieu’s ideal of a distribution of powers and Locke’s call for 
a separation of powers are distinct). 
47  Locke J “Second Treatise of Government” in Cohen M and Fermon N (eds) Princeton Readings 
in Political Thought: Essential Texts since Plato (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1996) 
243. 
48  Montesquieu B The Spirit of the Laws 163 (1748) (translated by Anne Cohler, Cambridge 
University Press, New York 1989). See also, Madison J, Hamilton A and Jay J The Federalist 
Papers (Kesler C and Rossiter C eds) (Signet Classic, New York 1961) 300. 
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Montesquieu’s work has had a profound influence in the constitutional development of 
many countries in the world such as the United States and South Africa before and 
after 1994.49 In the United States, Montesquieu’s thesis greatly influenced the framers 
of the United States Constitution during the drafting of that constitution.  
 
In his contributions to the Federalist Papers, which defended the proposed United 
States Constitution, Madison, one of the framers of that constitution, heavily cited and 
discussed Montesquieu’s theories with approval and asserted: 
 
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and judiciary, in the 
same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-
appointed or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of 
tyranny.50  
 
While Madison was persuaded by Montesquieu’s proposition of separation of powers, 
he understood and reasoned that it did not entail that “the legislature, judiciary and 
executive should be wholly unconnected with each other.”51 In this respect, Madison 
stated that: 
 
The conclusion I am warranted in drawing from these observations is that a mere 
demarcation of parchment of the constitutional limits of the several departments 
is not a sufficient guard against those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical 
concentration of all the powers of government in the same hands.52 
 
Madison’s conclusion above was a clear revelation in his understanding that while 
separation of functions was an accepted notion, more was needed to guard liberty. 
This led to a deficit in Montesquieu’s theory and the modern refinement of principle of 
separation by incorporating the notion of checks and balances as a fundamental 
                                                          
49  See Brown v Leyds NO. 
50  Madison, Hamilton and Jay The Federalist Papers 298. 
51  Madison, Hamilton and Jay The Federalist Papers 305. See also, Story Commentaries 8-13 
(noting that the framers of the constitution understood that strict separation cannot be 
maintained). 
52 Madison, Hamilton and Jay The Federalist Papers 310. 
24 
 
 
 
feature of separation of powers.53 There is another fundamental feature that was born 
out of Madison’s understanding of Montesquieu’s theory and that is the institutional 
aspect of judicial review, which Madison understood as being essential. In articulating 
his view on the role of the judiciary in a government in which the different branches 
are separated, Madison powerfully observed that:  
 
It is far more rational to suppose that the courts were designed to be an 
intermediate body between the people and the legislature in order, among other 
things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The 
interpretation of the law is the proper and peculiar province of the courts.54 
 
The above views and theories have had a profound influence on the judiciaries’ 
interpretation of these and related questions, particularly the separation of powers and 
its related concepts of checks and balances and judicial review, in the countries under 
this study.55 
 
1.2.4    Judicial Review  
 
The seminal case on judicial review is Marbury v Madison.56 There, the court held that 
“it is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the 
                                                          
53  See, Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC); 
[109]. 
54  Madison, Hamilton and Jay The Federalist Papers 466. 
55  See, Dr. James Rwanyarare and Another v Attorney General [2000] UGCC 2; Centre for Health 
Human Rights & Development & 3 Ors v Attorney General [2012] UGCC 4; Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 [109]. 
56  See, Corbett M “Judicial Review and the Problems of Southern Africa” 1981 Loyola University 
Chicago Law Journal 181 (arguing that although judicial review was, in a sense, the product of 
an evolutionary process of thought, the special contribution of Marbury v Madison and the 
subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court entrenching and diversifying the system of judicial 
review in America is that they first established it as a working reality, and rendered possible 
and effective the protection of rights granted by a written constitution against not only executive 
and administrative acts, but also against parliamentary legislation. Since then, in many 
instances inspired no doubt by the American examples, about 60 countries throughout the world 
have adopted some form of judicial review). See also, Cappelletti M Judicial Review in the 
Contemporary World (Bobbs-Merril, Indiana 1971) 25 (acknowledging the influence of Marbury 
v Madison in other common law countries noting that our own time has seen the burgeoning of 
constitutional justice, which has in a sense combined the forms of legal justice and the 
substance of natural justice. Desirous of protecting the permanent will, rather than the 
temporary whims of the people, modern states have re-asserted higher law principles through 
written constitutions. Thus, there has been a synthesis of three separate concepts: the 
supremacy of certain higher principles, the need to put even the higher law in written form, and 
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law is.”57 With these words, Marbury v Madison laid the foundation for the exercise of 
judicial review in modern democracies across the common law world, including South 
Africa.58 Despite Marbury v Madison and the growth of the institution of judicial review, 
there is sufficient authority that recognizes that the power of judicial review is not 
absolute59 and for others illegitimate.60 In her study, Barkow observed that the above 
phrase in Marbury v Madison “could be read in isolation to establish limitless 
constitutional authority in the US Supreme Court to answer all constitutional 
questions.”61 To the contrary, Barkow argues that this eloquent excerpt from Marbury 
v Madison cannot be taken out of context or absolutely; that the duty “to say what the 
law is” does not necessarily imply a judicial monopoly on constitutional interpretation.62 
For Barkow, this duty leaves room for absolute deference to the constitutional 
interpretation by the political branches because a constitution may contain provisions 
that dictate an interpretive role or discretion for the political branches.63 In this regard, 
she contends that Marbury v Madison itself contains the seeds for the view that the 
                                                          
the employment of the judiciary as a tool for enforcing the constitution against ordinary 
legislation. This union of concepts first occurred in the United States, but it has since come to 
be considered by many as essential to the rule of law anywhere). 
57  Marbury v Madison 177. 
58  Marbury v Madison contributed to the development of the concept of judicial review in South 
Africa during the late 1800s. See, Brown v Leyds NO (where relying on Marbury v Madison the 
Supreme Court of the Transvaal declared that it had the power of judicial review); and Dugard 
Human Rights 18-25. 
59  See, Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 6 SA 416 
(CC); International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2012 4 
SA 618 (CC); Ghana Bar Association v Attorney General ; National Treasury v Opposition to 
Urban Tolling Alliance 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC); De Lange v Presiding Bishop of the Methodist 
Church of Southern Africa for the time being and Another 2016 2 SA 1 (CC); Luther v Borden ; 
Zivotofsky v Clinton 132 S Ct 1421; Balarabe Musa v Auta Hamza; Onuoha v Okafor ; Ferreira 
v Levin; and Attorney General v Major General David Tinyefuza. 
60  See, Hutchinson A “A Hard Core Case Against Judicial Review” 2008 Harvard Law Review 64; 
Kramer LD The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (Oxford 
University Press, New York 2004); Tushnet M Taking the Constitution Away From the Courts 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton 1999); Waldron J “The Core Case Against Judicial 
Review” 2006 Yale Law Journal 1353. 
61  Barkow 2002 Columbia LR 239. See also, Paulsen M “Judging Judicial Review: Marbury in the 
Modern Era” 2003 Michigan Law Review 2706. 
62  Barkow, 2002 Columbia LR 239. See also, Currie and de Waal The Bill of Rights 394; and 
Fisher and Devins Political Dynamics 10. 
63  Barkow, 2002 Columbia LR 239; and Fisher and Devins Political Dynamics 10. See also, 
Monaghan H “Marbury and the Administrative State” 1983 Columbia Law Review 7-9. 
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authority to answer some constitutional questions rests entirely with the political 
branches.64  
 
Similarly, Post and Siegel in their commentary on the notion of popular 
constitutionalism,65 which is the idea that people assume active and ongoing control 
over the interpretation and enforcement of constitutional law, offer another explanation 
for the proposition of the shared responsibility on constitutional interpretation among 
the three branches of government. They view “elections as critical moments for 
expressing the people’s active, ongoing sovereignty…. [which] authorize Congress 
and the President to speak for the people.”66 In this way, they argue, popular 
constitutionalism can be understood to entail a stringent form of departmentalism - 
namely that each of the three branches of government possesses independent and 
coordinate authority to interpret the constitution.67  
 
This study examines the development and the current status of the political question 
doctrine and theory in South Africa. It does this through a comparative discussion of 
the application of this doctrine in the United States, Ghana, Uganda and Nigeria. The 
purpose of this comparative examination is two-fold: the first is to gain insight into the 
origins, theory, trends and classical application of the political question doctrine. The 
second is to gain insight into the challenges and best practices around the application 
of the political question doctrine in those countries. The study chose to examine the 
experiences in the United States because that country is the first, among the common 
law countries, to articulate a coherent political question doctrine as a constitutional 
limitation of the power of judicial review, hence it is important for this study to examine 
its early and most recent application of the political question doctrine in the United 
                                                          
64  Barkow, 2002 Columbia LR 239; and Fisher and Devins Political Dynamics 10. See also, 
Monaghan H “Marbury and the Administrative State” 1983 Columbia Law Review 7-9; and 
Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1 (1958) (noting that even the US Supreme Court has the last say 
only for a time because being composed of fallible men, it may err. But revision of its errors 
may be done by legislation or constitutional amendments) (Frankfurter concurring). 
65  This term coined by Larry Kramer. See, Kramer The People Themselves; and Kramer L 
“Popular Constitutionalism” 2004 California Law Review 959. 
66  See, Post R and Siegel R “Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism and Judicial 
Supremacy” 2004 California Law Review 1027 at 1031. 
67  Post and Siegel 2004 California LR. 
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States. Moreover, as Okpaluba has correctly pointed out in the context of his study of 
justiciability in the Commonwealth, the United States of America, a common law 
country with the oldest written constitution, is the conventional starting point for any 
enquiry into the study of judicial review and its limitations.68  
 
Additionally, South African courts in both the pre and post democratic dispensation 
eras have relied on the proposition of the power of judicial review enunciated in 
Marbury v Madison, which it is submitted has to include the limitation of judicial review 
articulated in that case. For example, as already explained, in Brown v Leyds No, the 
court endorsed the fundamental principle in Marbury v Madison (including the inherent 
limitation of judicial review) and other authorities that a law repugnant to a constitution 
is void and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument; 
that courts have authority to enforce this principle.69 Despite expressly providing for 
the power of judicial review in the Constitution, courts in post democratic South Africa 
have continually cited with approval the proposition in Marbury v Madison. In 
Certification of the KwaZulu-Natal Constitution,70 the Constitutional Court refused to 
certify a constitution for the province of KwaZulu-Natal. The court approvingly cited 
Marbury v Madison for the proposition that a court of law has the authority to strike 
down or invalidate legislation and administrative action even when such power of 
review is not expressly granted in the Constitution or the Bill of Rights concerned.  
 
Similarly, in Premier of the Eastern Cape v Ntamo,71 the Eastern Cape High Court 
justified the power of judicial review by approvingly citing Marbury v Madison. The 
court reasoned that “it is the constitutional function of the judicial arm of government 
to determine and resolve justiciable disputes between parties. That function includes 
deciding disputes as to whether the executive or legislative arms of government, or 
other organs of state, have acted within or beyond the powers conferred on them by 
                                                          
68  Okpaluba C “Justiciability and standing to challenge legislation in the Commonwealth: a tale of 
the traditionalist and judicial activists approaches” 2003 CILSA 30. 
69  Brown v Leyds NO 29-31. 
70  Certification of the KwaZulu-Natal Constitution 1996 (11) BCLR 1419. 
71  Premier of the Eastern Cape v Ntamo. 
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law.”72 The court noted that this is a function that has, in the jurisprudential tradition of 
which our Constitution is part, always been entrusted to the courts since the landmark 
case of Marbury v Madison, and that to the extent that it may be suggested that this 
jurisdiction offends the doctrine of the separation of powers, it is an intrusion into the 
terrain of the other branches of government that is permitted, expressly, by the 
Constitution.73 
 
The further reasons for focusing on Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda are that: (a) all these 
countries have some common heritage as recipients of the English common law. And 
all have constitutionally adopted, among other things, the institution of judicial review 
and separation of powers that imitate the American system instead of the British 
system, and the courts from these countries have relied on American authorities such 
as Marbury v Madison, in their adjudication of these constitutional concepts.74 Given 
the fact that in Marbury v Madison and other authorities have recognised the political 
                                                          
72  Premier of the Eastern Cape v Ntamo [1]. 
73  Premier of the Eastern Cape v Ntamo [1]. See, also Dada v Unlawful Occupiers of Portion 41 
[2008] ZAGPHC 48 [24] (justifying judicial review by relying on Marbury v Madison). Other 
judiciaries in the Southern African region have cited Marbury v Madison with approval see, See, 
Lekotholi v Attorney-General [1994] LSCA 153 (noting that for guidance in respect of laws that 
collide with the Constitution reference should be made to cases of  Marbury v Madison); S v 
Cloete [2008] NAHC 116 (citing Marbury v Madison on the power to declare laws invalid); 
African Personnel Services v Government of Namibia [2008] NAHC 148 (citing Marbury v 
Madison on power to declare law invalid); and Cowigan (Pty) Ltd & Others v Thwala [2012] 
SZSC 25 (discussing judicial review as articulated in Marbury v Madison). 
74  See, Certification of the KwaZulu-Natal Constitution [19] (where the South African  
Constitutional Court refused to certify the KwaZulu-Natal’s provincial constitution, and in the 
process approvingly cited Marbury v Madison); Premier of the Eastern Cape and Others v 
Ntamo [1] (justified the power of judicial review by approvingly citing Marbury v Madison); Dr. 
James Rwanyarare  v Attorney General (Constitutional Petition No. 5 of 1999) [2000] UGCC 2 
(holding that under our Constitution, the courts are given jurisdiction to exercise judicial power 
and nothing else. In a famous United States case of Marbury v Madison, the US Supreme Court 
held that since the original jurisdiction (of the US Supreme Court) is derived from the 
Constitution, it follows logically that congress can neither restrict it nor enlarge it. In Uganda, 
the sole source of the jurisdiction is the constitution. It therefore logically follows the jurisdiction 
can only be restricted, reduced, or enlarged through an amendment to the constitution and not 
otherwise. Parliament is empowered to create courts, tribunals panels etc., but if they are 
constituted by judicial officers, Parliament has no power to vest in them jurisdiction that goes 
outside the exercise of judicial power); Centre for Health Human Rights & Development & 3 
Ors v Attorney General (Constitutional Petition No. 16 OF 2011) [2012] UGCC 4 (noting that 
the doctrine of political question emanated from the concept of separation of powers. This 
doctrine was a creation of court in the case of Marbury v Madison as part of the broader concept 
of justification- whether or not it is appropriate for court to review the business of other branches 
of government); H Mensah v Attorney-General [1996-97] SCGLR 320. 
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question doctrine as a necessary limitation to the institution of judicial review, it was 
significant for this study to adopt a comparative approach in light of their common 
features. This leads to a further point that was equally made by Dennison in the context 
of Uganda, that if the legal borrowing of the notion of judicial review from the United 
States by the judiciary in these countries is considered fitting, the legal borrowing of 
the political question doctrine as a corollary to separation of powers should equally be 
fitting.75 What is more, the comparative study of African countries that have borrowed 
doctrines, such as the political question doctrine, should be useful in identifying 
common trends and problems associated with any potential legal borrowing.  While 
embarking on this comparative study, one is mindful of what courts in South Africa 
have said about reliance on foreign authorities in the interpretation of the Constitution. 
In this respect, this study draws attention to what Justice Kriegler once remarked in 
Bernstien v Bester that.76 
  
The second reason is that I wish to discourage the frequent - and, I suspect, 
often facile - resort to foreign authorities. Far too often one sees citation by 
counsel of, for instance, an American judgment in support of a proposition 
relating to our Constitution, without any attempt to explain why it is said to be in 
point. Comparative study is always useful, particularly where courts in exemplary 
jurisdictions have grappled with universal issues confronting us. Likewise, where 
a provision in our Constitution is manifestly modelled on a particular provision in 
another country’s constitution, it would be folly not to ascertain how the jurists of 
that country have interpreted their precedential provision.77 
 
Almost a decade later, Kriegler’s counterpart Justice Van der Westhuizen 
in Mashavha v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others78 dismissed an 
argument (premised on foreign authorities) put forward by the provincial government 
of KwaZulu-Natal, that:  
 
South Africa is a huge country with a land mass equivalent to much of mainland 
Europe.  The division into nine provinces recognizes that different areas have 
vastly different needs that can be dealt with differently in the same way as France 
and Poland or Denmark and Austria deal with certain matters, including social 
                                                          
75  Dennison B “The political question doctrine in Uganda: A reassessment in the wake of 
CEHURD” 2014 LDD 280. 
76  Bernstien v Bester 1996 2 SA 751 (CC) [133]. 
77  Bernstien v Bester [133]. 
78   Mashavha v President of the Republic of South Africa 2005 2 SA 476 (CC). 
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assistance, differently. In India relief of the disabled and unemployable and the 
payment of state pensions are matters of exclusive legislative competence for 
the states in terms of items 9 and 42 of List II in Schedule 7 to the Constitution. 
Under section 94A of the Canadian Constitution the Parliament of Canada can 
make laws in relation to old age pensions and supplementary benefits, including 
disability grants, but no such law shall affect the operation of any law present or 
future of a provincial legislature in relation to any such matter. In other words, 
there is dual competence subject to a provincial override.79  
 
The above argument was advanced to persuade the Constitutional Court to interpret 
section 126(3)80 of the Interim Constitution of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 to prevent 
the national government from overriding the power of provinces to regulate social 
assistance matters. In dismissing the argument, Justice Van der Westhuizen reasoned 
that: 
 
                                                          
79  Mashavha v President of the Republic of South Africa [48]. 
80  Section 126 of the Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993 provided: 
 Legislative competence of provinces 
 126. (1) A provincial legislature shall, subject to subsections (3) and (4), have 
concurrent competence with Parliament to make laws for the province with regard to 
all matters which fall within the functional areas specified in Schedule 6. 
 (2)  The legislative competence referred to in subsection (1), shall include the 
competence to make laws which are reasonably necessary for or incidental to the 
effective exercise of such legislative competence. 
 (3) An Act of Parliament which deals with a matter referred to in subsection (1) or (2) 
shall prevail over a provincial law inconsistent therewith, only to the extent that— 
 (a) it deals with a matter that cannot be regulated effectively by provincial 
legislation; 
 (b) it deals with a matter that, to be performed effectively, requires to be regulated 
or co-ordinated by uniform norms or standards that apply generally throughout the 
Republic; (c) it is necessary to set minimum standards across the nation for the 
rendering of public services; 
 (d) it is necessary for the determination of national economic policies, the 
maintenance of economic unity, the protection of the environment, the promotion of 
inter-provincial commerce, the protection of the common market in respect of the 
mobility of goods, services, capital or labour, or the maintenance of national security; 
or 
 (e) the provincial law materially prejudices the economic, health or security interests of 
another province or the country as a whole. 
 (4) An Act of Parliament shall prevail over a provincial law, as provided for in subsection 
(3), only if it applies uniformly in all parts of the Republic. 
 (5) An Act of Parliament and a provincial law shall be construed as being consistent 
with each other, unless, and only to the extent that, they are, expressly or by necessary 
implication, inconsistent with each other. 
 (6) A provincial legislature may recommend to Parliament the passing of any law 
relating to any matter in respect of which such legislature is not competent to make 
laws or in respect of which an Act of Parliament prevails over a provincial law in terms 
of subsection (3). 
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The submissions put forward on behalf of the fifth respondent ignore the political, 
social and economic history of South Africa. There are countless vast differences 
between this country and the other countries referred to by the fifth respondent. 
The way social assistance is structured and administered in Denmark and 
Austria, or even Canada, or India, can hardly be compared to the South African 
situation. Our history is well known. It is one of colonialization, apartheid, 
economic exploitation, migrant labour, oppression and balkanization.  Gross 
inequalities were deliberately and legally imposed as far as race and also 
geographical areas are concerned. Not only were there richer and poorer 
provinces, but there were homelands, which by no stretch of the imagination 
could be seen to have been treated on the same footing as ‘white’ South Africa, 
as far as resources are concerned. These inequalities also applied to social 
assistance – an area of governmental responsibility very closely related to 
human dignity. The history of our country and the need for equality cannot be 
ignored in the interpretation and application of section 126(3).81   
 
However, unlike the concerns against the reliance on foreign case law expressed in 
the above authorities, the issues and problems ventilated in this study are universal 
and shared among all modern constitutional democracies, whose constitutions are 
founded on the separation of powers, and courts in the countries being compared to 
have grappled with them in the same way as South African courts have attempted.82 
Moreover, as mentioned, the concepts that form the essence of this study - separation 
of powers and judicial review - were all manifestly modelled on the American system, 
which renders it suitable for us to ascertain how the jurists of these countries have 
dealt with these universal issues. These countries have also relied on each other’s 
case law to interpret their respective constitutions. 
                                                          
81  Mashavha v President of the Republic of South Africa [51]. For other cases where the   
Court warned against transplanting into South African jurisprudence legal doctrines from other 
countries where the constitutional provisions are different from South Africa’s. See, Prinsloo v 
Van der Linde and Another 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) [18-20]; S v Lawrence, S v Negal; S v 
Solberg 1997 (10) BCLR 1348 (CC); 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC) [141-142]. 
82  See, Mazibuko, Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly v Sisulu MP Speaker of the 
National Assembly 33 (criticizing the use of courts to fight political issues and commenting that 
“I regret the need to emphasise this point, but it appears to me to be vital to the future integrity 
of the judicial institution. An overreach of the powers of judges, their intrusion into issues which 
are beyond their competence or intended jurisdiction or which have been deliberately and 
carefully constructed legally so as to ensure that the other arms of the state to deal with these 
matters, can only result in jeopardy for our constitutional democracy.”). On appeal see 
Mazibuko v Sisulu 2013 6 SA 249 (CC) [83] (Jafta J minority opinion) (noting at the outset that 
"political issues must be resolved at a political level; that our court should not be drawn into 
political disputes, the resolution of which falls appropriately within the domain of other fora 
established in terms of the Constitution"). 
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(b) the African countries being examined have all adopted supreme constitutions since 
the last fifty years or so. Although these constitutions are similar in design to South 
Africa’s Constitution, the courts in those countries have already considered, developed 
and applied the political question doctrine in determining political controversies on a 
number of occasions that offer a useful analogy. In this regard, the study examines 
the origins and current application of the political question doctrine in these countries 
with a view to obtain lessons.  
 
The study advances the view that while the political question doctrine theory exists in 
the South African jurisprudence; this has not yet matured into a clear and transparent 
doctrine. The study calls on the judiciary to develop a clear doctrine for South Africa 
and makes recommendations in this regard. The need for such a development could 
be illustrated by the following hypothetical questions. Suppose for a moment that a 
citizen of South Africa brought an action seeking judicial review of the recent decisions 
of the President of South Africa to cause South Africa to enter into a treaty establishing 
the India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA)83 and later the Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa (BRICS),84 under the theory that the decisions were irrational because 
they have not produced economic benefits for or made in the interest of South Africans 
in whose name and welfare the powers of government should be exercised.  
 
In such a challenge would the judiciary have a judicial or legal standard to determine 
the dispute? If not, what would be the justification for a decision that the judiciary 
should not determine the dispute? If the judiciary were to decide to hear the dispute 
would it not impermissibly interfere with the functioning of the executive and 
legislature, who are constitutionally entrusted with the powers and discretion to enter 
into treaties? Wouldn’t the judiciary be correctly accused of pronouncing on matters of 
policy or substituting its own notions of what is wise and politic with that of the 
executive or legislature? Does the power of judicial review, under the Constitution, 
                                                          
83  Which was formalized by the Brasilia Declaration of 6 June 2003. 
84  See, the Contingent Reserve Arrangement Treaty of the BRICS countries was signed on July 
15, 2014. 
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authorize the judiciary to sit in judgment of the wisdom of what the legislature and 
executive branches do in their respective constitutional areas of expertise? Wouldn’t 
the political question doctrine assist the judiciary to avoid the temptation to 
impermissibly intrude into the terrain of the political branches that the then President 
Chaskalson warned about in Ferreira v Levin?85 These are some of the concerns that 
President Zuma probably had in mind in his statement quoted above. These questions 
must be understood in light of, among others things, section 231 of the Constitution, 
which delegates, to the political branches, the discretion to negotiate and enter into 
international agreements. Noticeably, under the Constitution the decision to enter into 
international agreements is exclusively delegated to the discretion of the political 
branches of government.86 
 
The literature and authorities from the United States, Ghana, Uganda, Nigeria and 
other jurisdictions, suggests that the answer to the above hypothetical questions is 
that a court would invoke the political question doctrine or some other similar principle 
and abstain from intervening in the matters. In South Africa, the problem is that the 
law is uncertain and the cases that have reflected on similar questions do not provide 
a clear answer. It is not clear whether or when a court in South Africa would hear and 
pronounce substantively on a matter involving political questions which the 
Constitution delegates and grants discretion over such matters to the political 
branches. In this study, political questions are understood to be those questions that 
have, through the text of the Constitution, been allocated, for resolution, to the 
discretion of the elected branches or those questions for which there is no judicial 
standard to determine them. In other words, the question cannot be resolved through 
the application of the law. A non-justiciable political question has a similar meaning in 
this study.  
 
                                                          
85  Ferreira v Levin [183] (warning courts against a broad construction of certain provisions of the 
Constitution so as not to overshoot the mark and trespass upon the terrain that is not rightly for 
the courts). 
86  See, President of the Republic of South Africa v Quagliani, President of the Republic of South 
Africa v Van Rooyen and Another; Goodwin v Director-General, Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development 2009 4 BCLR 345 (CC); and Glenister v President of the Republic 
of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC). 
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The uncertainty over how to resolve these questions in South Africa is exacerbated by 
the fact that the Constitution expressly granted the courts the power of judicial review. 
It is submitted that the effect of this is that the courts have been less inclined to 
organically develop the institution of judicial review, including the determination of its 
scope and limitations, like courts in other countries have done. While the Constitutional 
Court had recognized the limits of the power of judicial review in the context of 
separation of powers cases such as the landmark case of Doctors for Life International 
v Speaker of the National Assembly and Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the 
National Assembly,87 it has omitted to devise a rule of law to be applied in future cases 
to give effect to this recognition. 
 
Notwithstanding this uncertainty, recent cases such as Economic Freedom Fighters v 
Speaker of the National Assembly and National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling 
Alliance reflect a new sign of maturity in South Africa’s approach to the theory of the 
political question doctrine. In National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance, 
the Constitutional Court lifted an interdict against a controversial government policy, 
and emphasized that the duty to formulate and implement public policies lies at the 
heartland of executive function and domain.88  The Constitutional Court in that case 
observed that courts are not well suited to make decisions of that nature because such 
decisions are constitutionally delegated to the coordinate political branches.89 In his 
                                                          
87  Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly [93]; United  
Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others [59-64]. 
88  National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance [67]. 
89  National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance [68]. See also, Arakaki v Lingle 305 F 
Supp 2d 1161 (2004); Corriee v Caterpillar 980; State of Idaho v Freeman 529 F Supp 1107 
(1981); Nzelibe J “The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs” 2004 Iowa Law Review 941; Seidman L 
“Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine” 2003 John Marshall Law Review 442-443; 
Choper J “The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria” 2005 Duke Law Journal 1457; 
El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co v US 607 F 3d 836 (2010) (holding that the political 
question doctrine is essentially a function of the separation of powers, and excludes from 
judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value 
determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines 
of the Executive Branch); Banner S and May J “American Electric Power Company Inc et al, 
Petitioners v State of Connecticut, et al, Respondents” 2012 Valparaiso University Law Review 
459 (arguing that the Constitution's text commits certain tasks to branches other than the 
judiciary); Native Village of Kivalina v ExxonMobil Corp 663 F Supp 2d 863 (2009) (noting that 
the political question doctrine serves to prevent the federal courts from intruding unduly on 
certain policy choices and value judgments that are constitutionally committed to Congress or 
the executive branch); Oetjen v Central Leather Co 246 US 297 (1918) (holding that the conduct 
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concurring opinion in National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance, 
Froneman J found that it is a breach of separation of powers for a court to intrude, by 
granting an interdict against government, upon the formulation and implementation of 
policy, a matter that resides in the heartland of national executive function.90 He went 
on to declare that “courts of this country do not determine what kind of funding should 
be used for infrastructural funding of roads and who should bear the brunt of that cost. 
The remedy in that regard lies in the political process.”91 It is submitted that Justice 
Froneman’s opinion is a confirmation that the text of the Constitution envisages 
political discretion rather than judicial accountability when it comes to certain political 
or policy questions, and is another reminder of the need for the judiciary to develop a 
coherent theory to implement its obligation to ensure that the courts are conscious of 
their vital limits.  
 
Lastly, the judgment in Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National 
Assembly is another important contribution to the theory of the political question 
doctrine discourse in South Africa. There, the Constitutional Court endorsed the above 
principle – that the Constitution envisages political discretion rather than judicial 
                                                          
of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and 
legislative departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the 
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision); United States v 
Belmont 301 US 324 (1937) (emphasizing the exclusive competence of the executive branch 
in the field of foreign affairs). 
90  National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance [84]. There are other matters in the 
Constitution that are committed to the elected branches of government. See, President of the 
Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 6 BCLR 708 (CC) (recognizing that the exercise of pardon 
powers is committed to the executive branch). In addition, sections 206(1) and 207(2) of the 
Constitution commit policing matters to the executive branch such that it is free to structure the 
South African Police without judicial scrutiny. See, Glenister v President of the Republic of 
South Africa [162] (holding that the elected branches of government are free to decide where 
to locate a specialized corruption-fighting unit. In this case the elected branches had decided 
to locate such unit within and not without the South African Police Service as previously was 
the case). 
91  National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance [95]. See also Chief Enyi Abaribe v 
the Speaker Abia State House of Assembly & Ors (2003) 14 NWLR (pt788) 466; Schneider v 
Kissinger 412 F 3d 190 (2005) (In addressing concern about the effects of leaving political 
questions to the political process, the court reasoned that the lack of judicial authority to oversee 
the conduct of the executive branch in political matters did not leave executive power 
unchecked because political branches effectively exercise checks and balances on each other 
in the area of political questions); and Story Commentaries 346-347 9arguing that when political 
branches act in areas where they have discretion, their acts are only examinable via an appeal 
to the people at the elections). 
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accountability when it comes to the resolution of certain political questions – in relation 
to its determination of whether the National Assembly breached its constitutional 
obligation to hold the President to account in the manner in which it handled the Public 
Protector’s report titled “Secure in Comfort”.92 In addressing this question, the 
Constitutional Court unanimously observd that the Constitution neither gives details 
on how the National Assembly is to discharge the duty to hold the executive to account 
nor are the mechanisms for doing so outlined in the Constitution.93 As a consequence, 
the court reasoned that the National Assembly must be construed as having “been 
given the leeway to determine how best to carry out its constitutional mandate.”94 
Further, the court held that:  
 
It falls outside the parameters of judicial authority to prescribe to the 
National Assembly how to scrutinize executive action, what mechanisms to 
establish and which mandate to give them, for the purpose of holding the 
Executive accountable and fulfilling its oversight role of the executive or organs 
of State in general.  The mechanics of how to go about fulfilling these 
constitutional obligations is a discretionary matter best left to the National 
Assembly.  Ours is a much broader and less intrusive role.  …these are some of 
the vital limits on judicial authority and the Constitution’s design to leave certain 
matters to other branches of government.95 
 
In the above rulings, the Constitutional Court seems to identify the basic contours of 
judicial review.96 The effect of the above Constitutional Court’s judgment is that a rule 
of law has emerged, which says that where the Constitution grants power to a political 
branch of government without imposing how the power should be exercised, that 
branch of government has discretion on how to discharge that power, and that the 
                                                          
92  See, ‘Secure In Comfort’ Report No 25 of 2013/2014,  
http://www.publicprotector.org/library%5Cinvestigation_report%5C201314%5CFinal%20Repo
rt%2019%20March%202014%20.pdf (Date of use: 15 September 2016). 
93  Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly [43]. 
94  Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly [87]. 
95  Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly [93]. 
96  Ngcobo 2016 Gallagher Estate 23; Mhango M “Is It Time for a Coherent Political Question 
Doctrine in South Africa? Lessons from the United States” 2014 African Journal of Legal 
Studies 471. Redish 1984 Northwestern LR 5-10; and Doctors for Life International v Speaker 
of the National Assembly [26]. 
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courts may not dictate to that branch how to discharge such power.97 This is precisely 
what the classical political question theory stands for.98 
 
1.3 Existing literature on the political question doctrine 
 
A few studies have been conducted on the theory of the political question doctrine in 
South Africa with the majority of them arguing against its adoption or use. Firstly, in 
his critical discussion of the application of the doctrine, Professor Rautenbach 
dismisses the doctrine and describes it as an American concept.99 He observes that 
“in its land of origin it is highly controversial and has after more than two hundred years 
not produced clear guidelines on how it must be applied.”100 Another of Rautenbach’s 
main objections to the political question doctrine is that its application in South Africa 
would be in conflict with the supremacy of the Constitution, as contemplated by section 
2 of that Constitution.101 He argues that the supremacy clause does not permit the 
exclusion of any action or conduct from judicial review.102 Rautenbach advances a 
final attack on the political question doctrine by contending that it would make no sense 
to adopt it in South Africa because of the critical remarks of Professor Henkin.103 In his 
1976 article, Henkin maintained that the political question doctrine does not exist.104 
According to Henkin, the political question doctrine is an unnecessary packaging of 
                                                          
97  Mhango 2014 AJLS 471; Redish 1984 Northwestern LR 5-10; and Economic Freedom Fighters 
v Speaker of the National Assembly [93]. Recently, in United Democratic Movement v Speaker 
of the National Assembly and Others[59-69] the Constitutional Court reiterated that the absence 
in the Constitution of a prescribed voting procedure for a motion of no confidence in the 
President means that National Assembly has the discretion to determine the voting procedure 
in a particular instance. It found that that discretion has been delegated to the Speaker of the 
National Assembly. See also, Economic Freedom Fighters and Others v Speaker of the 
National Assembly and Another 2018 (3) BCLR 259 (CC) [252-255] (Mogoeng dissenting) 
(emphasizing the need for the court to adhere to the political question theory-based principle in 
Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and United Democratic 
Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others). 
98  Story Commentaries 345-347; Marbury v Madison. 
99  Rautenbach 2012 TSAR 28. 
100  Rautenbach 2012 TSAR 28. 
101  Section 2 of the Constitution provides that “this Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; 
law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled”. 
102  Rautenbach 2012 TSAR 28. 
103  Henkin L “Is There a Political Question Doctrine?” 1976 Yale Law Journal 597–625. 
104  Henkin 1976 Yale LJ 598–599. 
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several established doctrines, and that it is no more than the sum of its parts and 
courts should do away with them.105 
 
Secondly, in his public lecture delivered at the Georgetown Law Center in 2013, former 
Deputy Chief Justice Moseneke discussed the political question doctrine as applied in 
the United States, and noted that the judiciary in South Africa has not adopted such a 
doctrine.106 Moseneke characterizes the political question doctrine as a threat and 
challenge to the South African constitutional order. In his critical views about the 
doctrine, he explained that in the South African context, if a dispute is properly raised 
as a constitutional question, the Constitutional Court is not free to take refuge in the 
political question doctrine despite the political implications arising from the dispute. In 
further explaining why the political question doctrine is not suitable in South Africa, 
Justice Moseneke maintained it is because the Constitutional Court has a duty to 
resolve disputes despite the potential political implications thereafter; that the 
Constitution has installed the Constitutional Court as the final arbiter that will give full 
voice to our constitutional norms.107 
 
A few other commentators have written about the political question doctrine in South 
Africa, without necessarily taking a strong position one way or another as this study 
has done. Others have advocated for the need for an appropriate theory of deference, 
which is a description of a court’s appreciation of the legitimate interests, expertise of 
administrative agencies in policy matters, and the granting of their interpretations of 
fact and law due respect.108 The courts have described the need for deference as 
                                                          
105  Henkin 1976 Yale LJ 622. 
106  Moseneke D “A Journey from the Heart of Apartheid Darkness Towards a Just Society: Salient 
Features of the Budding Constitutionalism and Jurisprudence of South Africa” 2013 
Georgetown Law Journal 749. 
107  Moseneke 2013 Georgetown Law Journal. But see, Story Commentaries 345-347 (arguing  
that the judiciary is not a final arbiter in relation to questions where the political branches have 
discretion); and Cooley A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 41 (arguing that where 
elected branches have constitutional discretion, their decisions are final). 
108  Hoexter C “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” 2000 SALJ 484; 
See also, Democratic Governance and Rights Unit “Has the South African Constitutional Court 
Over-Reached? A Study of the Court’s Application of the Separation of Powers Doctrine 
Between 2009 and 2013” http://www.dgru.uct.ac.za/news/has-south-african-constitutional-
court-over-reached-study-court%E2%80%99s-application-separation-powers (date of use: 15 
39 
 
 
 
emanating from the principle of separation of powers.109 While there is some similarity 
between the notion of deference and the political question doctrine, given that both 
concepts are concerned with the general need to identify principles to guide the courts' 
intervention and non-intervention in certain matters, the notion of deference is different 
from the political question doctrine in that the former is limited to the administrative law 
context while the latter is broad in its scope.110 However, there is one similarity 
between this study and these authors, which is that they all agree that South African 
courts need to develop a coherent principle to guide them on how to decide cases 
involving political questions, or questions that are not appropriate for judicial review, 
in the future. As this study shows, there are a number of cases in which South African 
courts have acknowledged the necessity to abstain from deciding certain political 
questions.111 What is missing is a coherent principle to guide the courts on how to 
resolve similar questions in the future. Seedorf and Sibanda appear to agree with this 
assessment in their study of separation of powers and the political question doctrine 
in South Africa.112 While reflecting on the opinion of Chaskalson P in Ferreira v Levin, 
they argue that the Constitutional Court has followed the United States model in so far 
as it has accepted that its power to decide a case may be limited by a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards, which is political question theory 
terminology from Baker v Carr.113  
 
Further, they argue that the case law also validates the view that there are some 
questions which courts cannot decide, such as political or moral questions, but have 
not abstained from deciding these questions when brought to them as would be the 
                                                          
December 2016) 9; and Cachalia F “Judicial Review of Parliamentary Rulemaking: A 
Provisional Case for Restraint” 2015 New York Law School Law Review 379. 
109  Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 
(CC). 
110  See generally, Hoexter 2000 SALJ and Cachalia 2015 New York LR. 
111  Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa [244]; Ferreira v Levin [183]; Mazibuko v 
Sisulu [83]; United Democratic Movement v. President of the RSA [11]; National Treasury v. 
Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance; Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National 
Assembly [93]; and United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and 
Others [63-69]. 
112  Seedorf and Sibanda Separation 12–50. 
113  Seedorf and Sibanda Separation 12–53. 
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case in other jurisdictions.114 Seedorf and Sibanda argue that “it is necessary that the 
courts themselves formulate, articulate and apply principles for guiding the limits of 
their own powers and prevent their abuse.”115 In the main, Seedorf and Sibanda 
appear to accept that while some elements of the political question theory exist in 
South African jurisprudence, there is a need for the development of clear doctrine. 
This study concurs with the observations of Seedorf and Sibanda that the problem is 
that the courts have not clearly articulated a coherent political question doctrine and 
its purpose. It is not clear from the case law whether and when the courts will hear or 
dismiss a matter involving political questions that the Constitution contemplates 
political rather than judicial accountability. It is equally ambiguous whether courts in 
South Africa will intervene or abstain in a dispute involving an issue that the 
Constitution grants complete discretion to the political branches to deal with, and if so 
what justifications will be offered.116 
 
Thirdly, Professor Okpaluba also believes in the benefits of developing a clear political 
question doctrine for South Africa.117 He has suggested that for a matter raising a 
purely political question to emerge, it must be clear that judicial intervention lacks 
constitutional foundation,118and that “that is a political question over which a court 
cannot assume jurisdiction, entertain its cause of complaint or grant any relief in any 
exercise of judicial authority.”119 He concludes that “such a matter, whether it is 
expressed in the language of the political question doctrine of American vintage, or 
simply dismissed for being unamenable to the judicial process as the common law 
                                                          
114  Seedorf and Sibanda Separation 12–52. 
115  Seedorf and Sibanda Separation 12–55. 
116  See, United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others;  
Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others; Democratic 
Alliance v President of the Republic of S A; In re: Democratic Alliance v President of the 
Republic of S A and Others 2017 (4) SA 253 (GP); and Democratic Alliance v President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Another [2017] ZAWCHC 34. 
117  Okpaluba 2004 SAPL 114–131. See also Democratic Governance and Rights Unit 2014 22 
(citing Okpaluba for the proposition that it is impossible to implement a political question 
doctrine in South Africa). 
118  Okpaluba 2004 SAPL 331–348. 
119  Okpaluba 2004 SAPL 331–348. 
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courts would put it, is non-justiciable in a South African court as it is in the courts of 
the United States, Australia, Canada, England and Nigeria.”120 
 
Lastly and more recently, former Chief Justice Ngcobo has called for the development 
of a coherent theory of judicial review that is rooted in the principle of separation of 
powers, which will guide the courts on whether to accept or reject political disputes 
brought before them.121 Ngcobo suggests that in the development of such a theory, 
the following propositions of law should be accepted:  
 
First, our Constitution contemplates three co-equal branches of government; an 
all too powerful judiciary is a threat to our constitutional democracy in which 
government is based on the will of the people just as an all too powerful executive 
or legislature is a threat to our democracy.  
 
Second, the very principle of separation of powers which forms part of our 
Constitution, presupposes that there are limitations on the exercise of the power 
of judicial review and requires the judiciary to observe the vital limits on the 
exercise of this power.  
 
Third, limitations must be sought in, and be derived from the Constitution; and 
 
Fourth, while concepts such as the principle of deference or margin of 
appreciation or political question doctrine provide a useful starting point in 
considering limits on the power of judicial review, it is important to bear in mind 
that the principle to be developed must be informed by our Constitution and be 
anchored in our constitutional democracy which gives courts the central role in 
upholding and protecting the Constitution.  
 
Fifth, as the Constitutional Court has recently emphasized, it must be informed 
by the need to allow space to the political branches of government to discharge 
their constitutional obligations unimpeded by the judiciary save where the 
Constitution permits it.122  
 
This study intends to consider the above literature, among others, in its examination 
of the issues.   
 
1.4 Significance and originality of the study 
                                                          
120 Okpaluba 2004 SAPL 131. 
121  Ngcobo 2016 Galagher 22. 
122 Ngcobo 2016 Galagher 22-23. 
42 
 
 
 
 
The case law in South Africa shows that courts recognize certain political questions in 
certain instances and the limits of the courts’ power to deal with those questions. At 
the same time, they proceed to adjudicate those cases instead of abstaining to allow 
their resolution in the political process.123 However, the growths of the case law 
demonstrate that some elements of an underdeveloped political question doctrine 
exist in South Africa. Just as Cowper and Sossin have observed in the Canadian 
context, in South Africa the political question doctrine has been advanced and 
considered, but in a gradual manner without being recognized as an element of a lucid 
doctrine.124 There are a number of cases in which South African courts have 
acknowledged the necessity to abstain from deciding certain political questions.125 
What is missing is a clearly stated and acceptable principle to guide the courts to 
decide similar questions in the future. The courts have frequently failed to clarify, such 
that it is not clear from the existing case law, whether the courts are abstaining from 
determining the issues because of political question theory-based considerations or 
merely giving deference to the political branches in their resolution of political 
questions. What accounts for this lack of clarity? What would prompt a court to be less 
clear about the nature of its ruling when it uses political question terminology? Does 
this lack of clarity reflect uncertainty in our judges’ own minds about the proper role of 
the judiciary in our constitutional order? This is a major challenge to the development 
and implementation of the political question doctrine in South Africa. Although there is 
some potential for a coherent body of jurisprudence to coalesce around the recent 
Constitutional Court judgment in Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the 
                                                          
123  Endicott 2010 Berkeley Journal IL 538 (arguing that the political question doctrine represents a 
judicial effort to ensure that the courts do not hamper the functioning of the political branches). 
124  Cowper G and Sossin L “Does Canada Need A Political Questions Doctrine?” 2002 Supreme 
Court Law Review 347. 
125  Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa [244]; Ferreira v Levin NO [183]; Mazibuko 
v Sisulu [83]; United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic South Africa [11]; 
National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance; and De Lange v Presiding Bishop of 
the Methodist Church of Southern Africa for the time being and Another; Economic Freedom 
Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others; Democratic Alliance v President of 
the Republic of S A; In re: Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of S A and Others 
2017 (4) SA 253 (GP); and Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Another [2017] ZAWCHC 34. 
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National Assembly,126 the judgment itself does not resolve all the difficulties inherent 
in the lack of a coherent political question doctrine.127  
 
This study focusses on extrapolating certain propositions, theories and principles from 
existing case law with a view to derive a consistent political question doctrine. In other 
words, the thesis focuses on analysing the reasoning and principles behind judicial 
opinions and holdings, where political question doctrine theories, arguments and 
thinking were employed, to extract notions that can be utilized to explain or develop a 
full-fledged political question doctrine in South Africa. Despite the fact that these 
judicial opinions or holdings may not have mentioned the political question doctrine by 
name or contemplated it, they are, nevertheless, relied upon throughout this study as 
authorities for the political question doctrine theory in South Africa and elsewhere. The 
study adopted this approach because those authorities are predicated on the political 
question doctrine theory or advance the objectives of the doctrine as articulated in this 
thesis. In that sense, this study is not fixated on whether the political question doctrine 
is mentioned by name or not, but on the reasoning and principles that informed every 
judicial opinion or holding being analysed or relied upon. 
 
Additionally, the thesis focuses on the case law analysis to determine the types of 
cases that the courts have applied some form of political question terminology. It seeks 
to develop this area of law by deriving and providing coherence and structure to the 
legal discourse around the political question doctrine in South Africa. Undoubtedly, 
this wil be of benefit to both the legal community as well as the political branches of 
government. The primary objective of this research is to contribute to the development 
of a distinct separation of powers framework that incorporates a coherent political 
question doctrine, which will assist both the courts, political branches of government 
                                                          
126  Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly. See also, United Democratic 
Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others [63-69]. 
127  This is due to lack of consistency in applying the principle that emerged in Economic Freedom  
Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others. See, United Democratic Movement v 
Speaker of the National Assembly and Others; Economic Freedom Fighters and Others v 
Speaker of the National Assembly and Another (Mogoeng dissenting) [223-278]. 
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and lawyers alike to enhance responsible government based on the will of the people 
and clarify the proper role of the judiciary in South Africa.  Another benefit of this study 
is that it will aid to address the potential to delegitimize the judiciary or promote 
unnecessary criticism of judicial overreach by ensuring the development of a rule of 
law that will be applied to dispose of cases that cannot be resolved through the 
application of law, but which invite judges to literary become raw political players.128 
 
The study identifies key factors that ought to be considered by courts when 
determining the application of a political question doctrine. It also identifies factors that 
are germane to determining the proper limits of the power of judicial review. While the 
Constitution Court has consistently held that courts must be conscious of the vital limits 
on judicial authority and the Constitution’s design to leave certain matters to other 
branches of government, no rule of law has been developed to give effect to this 
statement of the law. The thesis, therefore, examines how the courts may give effect 
to this statement of the law. In keeping with what the Constitutional Court has said in 
cases, such as De Lange v Smuts,129 International Trade Administration Commission 
v Scaw South Africa (Pty) Ltd130 and other cases, about the need to develop a distinct 
separation of powers, the thesis will make recommendations, taking this into account, 
towards the development of a comprehensive political question doctrine for South 
Africa.   
 
                                                          
128  See, Mogoeng M “Judicial Overreach” a speech presented at the Cape Town Press Club on  
25 October 2017 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xGAe_zHg9dw (Date of use: 29 October 
2017) at 14:18-17:08. See also, Economic Freedom Fighters and Others v Speaker of the 
National Assembly and Another [235] (cautioning that “this Court is the guardian of our 
constitutional democracy and the final arbiter of all constitutional or legal disputes.  It is… a 
stabilising, tension-dissolving and potentially unifying force – the non-partisan and much-
needed voice of reason, particularly when a constitutional crisis looms large or has already set 
in.  Its impartiality must therefore never be open to reasonable doubt.  For, its moral authority 
without which it would cease to enjoy legitimate public confidence and ready compliance with 
its decisions by all, owes its existence to its predictable and self-evident execution of its 
mandate without any apparent fear, favour or prejudice”). 
129  De Lange v Smuts [1998] ZACC 6 [60]. 
130 International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd [91]. 
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At present, this area of the law is quite unsettled and it is hoped that this thesis will 
make a significant contribution to the development of a framework within which the 
application of a lucid political question doctrine could be considered. It also hoped that 
this study will bring clarity to the thorny issue of finding proper limits on the power of 
judicial review (including its justification beyond what is obtained in the Constitution) 
and how this can coexist with the proposed lucid political question doctrine.   
 
In recent years, tensions have arisen among the various branches of government. On 
27 August 2015, members of the judiciary held an unprecedented meeting with 
members of the executive to, among others things, improve their relationship. In a joint 
statement issued by the two branches, they agreed to respect the separation of 
powers.131 This study intends to contribute to the envisaged improved relations among 
the three branches.  
 
1.5 Research questions   
 
The following are some of the key questions that will inform this research: 
▪ Is there a political question doctrine in South African jurisprudence?  
▪ What is the nature, scope and limit of judicial authority under the 
Constitution?  
▪ How should courts in South Africa jurisprudentially give effect to the vital 
limits on judicial authority and Constitution’s design for courts to leave 
certain matters to other branches of government?  
▪ Can the principle of separation of powers, under the South African 
Constitution, be developed to incorporate a coherent political question 
doctrine? 
▪ Can a political question doctrine be developed as a part of the principle 
of separation of powers just like the principle of legality was developed 
from the concept of the rule of law in the Constitution?  
                                                          
131   For a joint Statement issued by the two branches, see http://www.gov.za/speeches/president-
jacob-zuma-meeting-national-executive-and-judiciary-28-aug-2015-0000 (Date of use: 15 
November 2015).  
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▪ Is there sufficient authority from existing jurisprudence to sustain a view 
that the authority to resolve certain constitutional questions rests with the 
political branches?  
▪ Does the text of the Constitution contemplate political rather than judicial 
accountability in relation to the resolution of certain constitutional 
questions? If so, how should the judiciary give effect to this constitutional 
imperative when approached to resolve such questions?    
▪ Does the Constitution contemplate limits of the power of judicial review 
in relation to questions that the Constitution or law gives discretion to the 
political branches?  
 
The objective of this study is to examine existing case law and to demonstrate that the 
political question doctrine exists, but that it is not properly developed. The study, 
through comparative analysis, recommends how the courts can develop a coherent 
political question doctrine for South Africa. 
  
1.6  Methodology 
 
The research methodology involves desk top research, legal and comparative 
analysis. It provides an interpretation as well as a critical analysis of key case law and 
constitutional provisions in South Africa and the countries under review. As stated 
above, the problem in South Africa is that the courts have not developed a consistent 
political question doctrine. A critical analysis of existing body of case law, particularly 
the Constitutional Court cases, is undertaken to highlight the weaknesses in the 
current political question doctrine discourse in South Africa, and to make 
recommendations for the development of a lucid theory of judicial review, which 
incorporates a clear political question doctrine. The study analyzes foreign authorities 
such as case law and relevant constitutional provisions from Ghana, United States, 
Uganda and Nigeria on how the courts in those countries have considered and applied 
the political question doctrine within their respective constitutional systems. Finally, 
the study considers various seconrary sources on the subject of the political question 
doctrine.  
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1.7  Synopsis of the chapters of the study 
 
1.7.1 Chapter one: Introduction and background.  
 
 
Chapter one introduces the background to the study, including its aims and 
objectives. 
 
1.7.2 Chapter two: The genesis of the political question doctrine 
 
Chapter two examines the origins of the political question doctrine, thus, placing 
particular emphasis on the early constitutional commentaries and application of the 
doctrine (referred to as the traditional or classic political question doctrine) by the US 
Supreme Court. It also examines the modern application of the doctrine in the 
constitutional jurisprudence of the United States of America.132  
 
According to Marbury v Madison, the traditional application of the political question 
doctrine denotes that a case is dismissed when the text and structure of the 
Constitution demands it.133 However, in the early 1900 the US Supreme Court 
gradually began to apply prudential considerations to dismiss cases for both textual 
and prudential considerations.134 These prudential considerations became more 
pronounced when Baker v Carr was decided.  Baker v Carr merged textual and 
prudential considerations by introducing six factors for identifying cases that present 
a non-justiciable political question. 
 
1.7.3 Chapter Three: The application and evolution of the political question doctrine in Ghana 
 
                                                          
132  Marbury v Madison; MCulloch v Maryland 17 US (4 Wheat) 316 (1819); State of Georgia v 
Stanton 73 US 50 (1867); Luther v Borden; Taylor & Marshall v Beckham 178 US 548 (1900); 
Zivotofsky v Clinton 132 SCt 1421 (2012). 
133  Marbury v Madison; and Szurkowski C “The Return of Classical Political Question Doctrine in 
Zivotofsky Ex Rel. Zivotofsky v Clinton” 2014 Havard Journal of Law & Public Policy 347. 
134  Szurkowski 2014 Harvard JLPP 347. 
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Chapter three examines the application of the political question doctrine in Ghana. It 
seeks to determine the status of the political question doctrine, and whether the 
doctrine is firmly part of Ghanaian constitutional law.  The chapter examines the 
theoretical underpins of the courts embracing the political question in Ghana, including 
the validity of the jurisprudential justifications offered by the courts, with a view to 
deriving lessons for South Africa. 
 
1.7.4 Chapter Four: The Application and evolution of the political question doctrine in Uganda 
 
In Uganda, courts have considered and applied the political question doctrine since 
the 1960s as a function of the principle of separation of powers.135 This chapter 
examines the history, development and trends in the application of the political 
question doctrine in Ugandan jurisprudence. The objective is to develop lessons for 
South Africa.  
 
1.7.5. Chapter Five: The application and evolution of the political question doctrine in Nigeria 
 
This chapter examines the application of the political question doctrine in Nigeria. 
Since it is evident from the cases and academic commentaries that Nigerian courts 
adopted the political question doctrine as pronounced by the US Supreme Court in 
Baker v Carr and formulated a refined doctrine for Nigeria, the chapter examines 
recent case law in Nigeria and the United States to determine the current status of the 
political question doctrine in Nigeria. The chapter examines the theoretical underpins 
of the courts embracing the political question in Nigeria, including the validity of the 
justifications offered by the courts. Lessons will be drawn from Nigeria’s experience 
for possible application in South Africa.  
 
1.7.6. Chapter Six: The development and application of a comprehensive political question 
doctrine in South Africa 
 
                                                          
135  See, Redish 1984 Northwestern LR; Breedon 2008 Ohio Northern University LR; Wechsler 
Principles; Yoshino 2009 Williamette LR; LaTourette 2008 Rutgers LJ. 
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Chapter six discusses the development and current status of the political question 
doctrine in South Africa. The chapter departs from the premise that there exists a body 
of law which justifies judicial abstention from deciding some types of constitutional 
issues. It argues that while the doctrine or elements of it exists in South African 
jurisprudence, the Constitutional Court should articulate and develop it into a clear 
doctrine taking into account lessons from the countries under study. The study offers 
some suggestions in this regard and criticizes opponents of the political question 
doctrine in South Africa.  
 
1.7.7 Chapter seven: Conclusion and recommendations 
 
This chapter makes concluding remarks and recommendations. It also considers the 
effects of not developing a political question doctrine in South Africa.  
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__________________________________________________________________ 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE GENESIS OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the genesis of the political question doctrine. It traces the 
origins of the doctrine from the opinions of Alexander Hamilton, one of the framers of 
the United States Constitution, and Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v Madison.136 
The chapter focuses on the discussion on US Supreme Court jurisprudence. It divides 
the discussion into areas where the classical political question is applied as well as 
the prudential political question. Lastly, it separately surveys a number of federal and 
state court cases where the political question doctrine has been applied over the 
years. It concludes that the political question doctrine remains good law in the United 
States and will remain an important part of American legal culture where certain 
category of cases will be excluded from judicial review. This is despite the fact that in 
recent case law, there are some questions that remain unanswered concerning the 
future of the political question doctrine.  
 
2.2  Early application of the classical political question doctrine   
 
The political question doctrine is as old as the fundamental principle of judicial 
review.137 In the revered case of Marbury v Madison,138 Chief Justice Marshall first 
expressed the recognition by the judiciary of the existence of a class of cases 
constituting “political act belonging to the executive department alone, for the 
performance of which entire confidence is placed by our Constitution in the supreme 
executive; and for any misconduct respecting which the injured individual has no 
                                                          
136  Marbury v Madison 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
137  Antolok v United States 873 F 2d 369 (DC Cir1989) 379. 
138  Marbury v Madison 164. 
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remedy.”139 Further, Marshall announced what has now come to be known as the 
political question doctrine and held that: 
 
“that the province of the court is … not to inquire how the executive or executive 
officers perform duties in which they have discretion. Questions, in their nature 
political or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, 
can never be made in this court.”140  
 
Marshall’s reasoning was that since some conduct by the political branches is judiciary 
examinable and others not, it was important for the judiciary to develop a rule of law 
to guide courts in the exercise of its jurisdiction in those appropriate cases where they 
cannot intervene.141 He emphasized the need for such a rule by conceding to the fact 
that the executive is constitutionally endowed with certain important political powers, 
which it has to apply using its own discretion, and is only politically accountable.142 To 
add to this, Chief Justice Marshall made an important observation that when executive 
office bearers are appointed by the head of the executive to aid him fulfil his 
constitutional tasks “whatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which 
executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no power to control 
that discretion…[because] [t]he subjects are political…, and, being entrusted to the 
executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive… The acts of such an officer … 
can never be examinable by the courts.”143 Eventually, Chief Justice Marshall 
concluded by establishing the following rule that:  
 
where the heads of departments are the political or confidential agents of the 
executive, merely to execute the will of the president, or rather to act in cases in 
which the Executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can 
be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable. But 
where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the 
performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers 
himself injured has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.144 
 
                                                          
139  Marbury v Madison 164. 
140  Marbury v Madison 170. 
141  Marbury v Madison 165. See also, Cole (2014). 
142  Marbury v Madison 165. See also, Cole (2014). 
143 Marbury v Madison 166. 
144  Marbury v Madison 170 
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The above reasoning and holding in Marbury v Madison gave birth to the political 
question doctrine.145 With this holding, the Marbury v Madison Court instructed the 
judiciary to dismiss cases if the constitution’s text, structure, or theory signify that an 
issue should be decided by an elected branch of government.146 Further, based on 
this articulation, Marbury v Madison recognized a clear difference between legal 
questions that the judiciary must decide and political questions they must allow the 
political branches to remedy.147 As Fallon has commented, Marbury v Madison not 
only represents the fountainhead of judicial review having ruled that it is the duty of 
the judiciary to say what the law is, but also furnishes the canonical statement of the 
necessary and appropriate role of the judiciary in a constitutional system founded on 
the principle of separation of powers.148 It is for this reason that some commentators 
have defended the political question doctrine on separation of powers grounds arguing 
that the United States Constitution assigns responsibility for interpreting or enforcing 
certain constitutional provisions to the elected branches of government.149 The 
classical political question doctrine emanated from these pronouncements in Marbury 
v Madison, and forms part of any meaningful discussion of that case.150 Since Marbury 
                                                          
145  Some scholars have argued that the political question doctrine may have originated     
from the earlier cases in Ware v Hylton 3 US (3 Dall) 199 (1796); Martin v Mott 25 US (12 
Wheat) 19 (1872). See, Peitzman L “The Supreme Court and the Credentials Challenge Cases: 
Ask a Political Question, You Get a Political Answer” 1974 Califonia Law Review 1350, fn 31. 
146  Pushaw R “Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine: Reviving the Federalist 
Rebuttable Presumption Analysis” 2002 North Carolina Law Review 1192-93. 
147  See, Shrewsbury S “Marbury v. Madison: the Orgins and Legacy of Judicial Review” 2002 
Military Law Review 166; Stephens O “John Marshall and the Confluence of Law and Politics, 
2004 Tennesse Law Review 245; and Price L “Banishing the Specter of Judicial Foreign 
Policymaking: A Competence-Based Approach to the Political Question Doctrine” 2006 New 
York University Journal of International Law & Politics 331. 
148  See, Fallon R “Marbury and the Constitutional Mind: A Bicentennial Essay on the Wages of 
Doctrinal Tension” 2003 California Law Review 5. 
149  Chemerinsky R Constitutional Law, (Aspen Law & Business, New York, 2001) 77; Imam et al 
2011 African Journal of Law; Koohi v United States 976 F 2d 1328 (9th Cir 1992); and EEOC 
v Peabody W Coal Co 400 F 3d 774 (9th Cir 2005) 785. 
150  See, Story Commentaries 345-347; Cooley A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 41;  
Szurkowski 2014 Harvard JLPP 353 (explaining that in the years following Marbury v Madison, 
the US Supreme Court applied the classical version of the political question doctrine, under 
which courts have not only the ability, but also the obligation to decide cases or controversies 
that come before them, unless the Constitution has committed the power to decide the issue to 
another branch of government. Accordingly, early applications of the political question doctrine 
focused closely on constitutional text and structure); Scharpf 1966 Yale LJ 518 (noting that the 
compatibility with the logic of Marbury v Madison requires that the political question doctrine be 
understood as the command of the Constitution); Barkow 2002 Columbia LR 248-249 
(discussing that the classic political question doctrine has its roots from utterances of Alexander 
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v Madison, the US Supreme Court has refined and applied the classical political 
question doctrine in a number of cases.151 A few of these cases are significant and 
require some detailed discussion.  
 
No discussion of the application of the classical political question can be all-embracing 
without the consideration of Luther v Borden. This was a trespass case where the 
plaintiff challenged the Rhode Island charter government under the republican form of 
government in terms of the Guaranty Clause of the United States Constitution.152 
                                                          
Hamilton and Chief Justice Marshall in  Marbury v Madison noting that Hamilton recognized a 
constitutionally based political question doctrine, which has come to be known as the classic 
political question doctrine. She notes that Hamilton was not alone in acknowledging that 
resolution of certain constitutional questions belongs with the political branches. She 
acknowledges that Marshall also advocated the same view that some questions are committed 
by the Constitution to the absolute discretion of the Congress or the President and there is no 
place for judicial oversight. Unlike Hamilton, Madison identified key factors to identify political 
questions: the subjects are political; they respect the nation not individual; they involve areas 
which the Constitution vests the political branches with discretion. And that the two areas where 
this would apply were foreign affairs and nomination of candidates to the Senate). See also, 
Pushaw R “Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach” 1996 Cornell 
Law Review 424 (arguing that Hamilton foreshadowed the political question doctrine); Cole D 
“Challenging Covert War: The Politics of the Political Question Doctrine” 1985 Harvard 
International Law Journal 164 (recognizing three aspects of the political question doctrine: the 
classical or constitutional version, which is "the most important and most persuasive aspect of 
doctrine"). For Alexander Hamilton’s views about the political question doctrine see, Hamilton 
A “The Judiciary” in Rossiter (ed) The Federalist Paper No. 78 (Signet Classic, New York, 1999) 
466 (arguing that “If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges 
of their own powers and that the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the other 
departments it may be answered that this cannot be the natural presumption where it is not to 
be collected from any particular provisions in the Constitution”). 
151  See, Luther v Borden; M’Culloch v Maryland 17 US (4 Wheat) 316 (1819) 325 (where the court 
held that Congress, rather than the courts, determines the boundaries of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to the Constitution);  Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v Oregon, 223 
US 118 (1912) 141-142; Rhode Island v Massachusetts 37 US (12 Pet) 657 (1838)(Taney J 
dissenting)(holding that the powers given to the courts of the United States by the constitution 
are judicial powers; and extend to those subjects, only, which are judicial in their character; and 
not to those which are political. And whether the suit is between states or between individuals, 
the matter sued for must be one which is properly the subject of judicial cognizance and control, 
in order to give jurisdiction to the Court to try and decide the rights of the parties to the suit. 
Contests for rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction between states over any particular territory, 
are not the subjects of judicial cognizance and control, to be recovered and enforced in an 
ordinary suit; and are, therefore, not within the grant of judicial power contained in the 
constitution); Colegrave v Green 328 US 549 (1946); Gray v Sanders 372 US 368 (1963); 
Reynolds v Sims 377 US 533 (1964) (holding that some questions raised under the Guaranty 
Clause are non-justiciable); Wesberry v Sanders 376 US 1 (1964); Avery v Midland Country 
390 US 474 (1968); Wells v Rockefeller 394 US 542 (1969); and New York v United States 505 
US 144 (1992) 185 (holding that not all claims under the GuarantyClause present non-
justiciable political questions). 
152  United States Constitution Article IV, section 4. 
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When the lawsuit was launched, Rhode Island was still being governed under a charter 
established by King Charles II in 1663.153 As part of this lawsuit, the plaintiff challenged 
the charter government as a violation of the Guaranty Clause, which provides that the 
“United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican form of 
government.”154 The question before the US Supreme Court was which government 
was to be recognized as the republican government. The US Supreme Court, through 
Chief Justice Taney,155 declined to adjudicate the challenge to the Rhode Island 
charter by holding that the challenge was a political question because: 
 
Under this article of the Constitution, it rests with Congress to decide what 
government is the established one in a State. For as the United States guarantee 
to each State a republican government, Congress must necessarily decide what 
government is established in the State before it can determine whether it is 
republican or not. And when the senators and representatives of a State are 
admitted into the councils of the Union, the authority of the government under 
which they are appointed, as well as its republican character, is recognized by 
the proper constitutional authority. And its decision is binding on every other 
department of the government, and could not be questioned in a judicial 
tribunal.156 
 
Essentially, despite that the language in the Guaranty Clause textually assigns the 
guarantee of a republican government to the whole United States instead of a 
particular branch of government, the court adopted an interpretation that the clause 
assigns to the Congress the authority to determine the validity of the charter 
government.  The US Supreme Court reasoned that given that the Guaranty Clause 
had committed to Congress the determination of which government was the lawful 
state government, it declined to adjudicate the matter. 
 
                                                          
153  Luther v Borden 3, 35 and 48. 
154  United States Constitution Article IV, section 4. 
155  Following Marbury v Madison, Chief Justice Taney was the first to explicate the political 
question doctrine. See, Rhode Island v Massachusetts 752 (where in a dissenting opinion Chief 
Justice Taney explicated the political question doctrine. The court first accepted jurisdiction of 
a suit by one state against another involving a disputed boundary line. Taney dissented on the 
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55 
 
 
 
One of the significance of Luther v Borden is that it was the first case that applied and 
began to define the classical political question theory, by establishing the principle that 
matters assigned to the discretion of Congress could also present political questions. 
This was a significant pronouncement because Marbury v Madison, prior to that, had 
only established the principle that discretion constitutionally vested in the executive 
would present political questions. While Luther v Borden was decided on the basis of 
classical political question theory, the US Supreme Court observed some prudential 
considerations that weighed against the court’s exercise of judicial review, such as the 
chaos that would have erupted if the state government was invalidated.157 
Commentators have repeatedly cited Luther v Borden as another authority for the 
classical political question, and as a decision that has conventionally provided the 
classical expression of the distinction between non-justiciable political questions and 
justiciable ones.158 As elaborated in the discussion of the cases below, other 
commentators have observed that since Luther v Borden, the US Supreme Court 
began to inter-mingle classical and prudential considerations in the application of the 
political question doctrine.159 
 
In Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph v Oregon,160 the US Supreme Court was 
presented with another challenge arising from the Guaranty Clause. The following 
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in Kiernan v City of Portland 223 US 151 (1912) which involved a Guaranty Clause challenge 
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context is what gave rise to this case. During the late nineteenth century, state 
legislatures were perceived as corrupt and indebted to railroad companies and large 
corporations.161 To curb this problem, a number of states adopted measures imposing 
direct democracy in which laws could be enacted directly by the people.162 Oregon 
was one of the states at the forefront of this direct democracy movement. In 1902, the 
State of Oregon amended its constitution and adopted the initiative and referendum. 
This amendment, whilst it retained an existing clause vesting the exclusive legislative 
power in a General Assembly consisting of a Senate and House of Representatives, 
added to that provision the following: 
 
But the people reserve to themselves power to propose laws and amendments 
to the constitution and to enact or reject the same at the polls, independent of 
the legislative assembly, and also reserve power at their own option to approve 
or reject at the polls any act of the legislative assembly. 
 
As Williams has correctly noted, the effect of this amendment is that it empowered 
citizens to petition to have statutory or constitutional measures put on the ballot for 
adoption and approval directly by the people.163 
 
Pursuant to this constitutional amendment and legislative measures to give effect to 
this amendment,164 the people of the State of Oregon initiated a law which was voted 
on and promulgated by the Governor in 1906.165 The new law approved a two percent 
tax on the gross receipts of telephone and telegraph companies as a license fee for 
doing business within the State of Oregon.166 Pacific States Telephone, an Oregon 
corporation, refused to pay the newly initiated tax, and the State Oregon sued to collect 
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the unpaid taxes.  Pacific States Telephone defended the suit on, among other 
grounds, the basis that the initiated tax was unconstitutional because the process 
which gave rise to it violated the Guarantee Clause of the United States 
Constitution.167 The Oregon Supreme Court summarily rejected Pacific States 
Telephone’s constitutional claim.168 In Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph v 
Oregon, the US Supreme Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, holding that 
a constitutional challenge to the initiative and referendum power under the Guaranty 
Clause presented a non-justiciable political question. Justice White, who wrote for the 
unanimous court, began his analysis with a statement that almost suggested the 
outcome of the case. He said: 
 
We premise by saying that, while the controversy which this record presents is 
of much importance, it is not novel. It is important, since it calls upon us to decide 
whether it is the duty of the courts or the province of Congress to determine when 
a State has ceased to be republican in form and to enforce the guarantee of the 
Constitution on that subject. It is not novel, as that question has long since been 
determined by this court conformably to the practise of the Government from the 
beginning to be political in character, and therefore, not cognizable by the judicial 
power, but solely committed by the Constitution to the judgment of Congress.169 
 
Flowing this above statement, the US Supreme Court, after citing Luther v Borden as 
the judicial authority in this case, explicated why the issues as phrased by the Pacific 
States Telephone, were not justiciable. It noted that Pacific States Telephone did not 
argue that it could not be required to pay the impugned license tax or that it was denied 
an opportunity to be heard as to the amount for which it was taxed, or that there was 
anything inherent in the tax or involved intrinsically in the law which violated any of its 
constitutional rights.170 The US Supreme Court emphasized that “if such questions had 
been raised, they would have been justiciable, and therefore would have required the 
calling into operation of judicial power.”171 
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On the other hand, the US Supreme Court noted, the challenge on the impugned 
statute was of a different kind. In the US Supreme Court’s characterisation:  
 
its essentially political nature is at once made manifest by understanding that the 
assault which the contention here advanced makes it not on the tax as a tax, but 
on the State as a State. It is addressed to the framework and political character 
of the government by which the statute levying the tax was passed. It is the 
government, the political entity, which (reducing the case to its essence) is called 
to the bar of this court not for the purpose of testing judicially some exercise of 
power assailed on the ground that its exertion has injuriously affected the rights 
of an individual because of repugnancy to some constitutional limitation, but to 
demand of the State that it establish its right to exist as a State, republican in 
form.172 
 
Furthermore, in the course of its reasoning, Justice White noted a few prudential 
considerations that would have been brought to bear if the case was sustained. He 
observed that:  
 
the propositions each and all proceed alone upon the theory that the adoption of 
the initiative and referendum destroyed all government republican in form in 
Oregon. This being so, the contention, if held to be sound, would necessarily 
affect the validity not only of the particular statute which is before us, but of every 
other statute passed in Oregon since the adoption of the initiative and 
referendum. And indeed the propositions go further than this, since, in their 
essence, they assert that there is no governmental function, legislative or judicial, 
in Oregon, because it cannot be assumed, if the proposition be well founded, that 
there is at one and the same time one and the same government which is 
republican in form and not of that character.173 
 
Based on the above reasoning, Justice White held that the case presented by the 
plaintiff was not within the US Supreme Court’s jurisdiction and therefore dismissed 
the writ of error for want of jurisdiction. The interpretation of the Guaranty Clause in 
both Luther v Borden and Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph v Oregon has been 
criticised by academics for, among other reasons, imposing an absolute political 
question bar in all Guaranty Clause cases.174  
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Another criticism has come from Professor Williams, who has criticised the premise 
on which Luther v Borden (and subsequently Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph v 
Oregon) was decided; that the Guaranty Clause commits its enforcement to Congress 
and the President, not to the courts. Williams has remarked that there is no support 
for the view that the Constitution entrusts the enforcement of the Guaranty Clause 
exclusively to the political branches.175 He correctly points out that the text of the 
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Guaranty Clause, which should be the foundation of any textually demonstrable 
commitment of the issue, does not expressly (or exclusively) mandate the resolution 
of Guaranty Clause issues to the political branches.176 Relying on the language of the 
text, he further argues that the Guaranty Clause refers to the United States, not 
Congress or the President, as the guarantor of republican government, and there is 
nothing in the term United States that necessarily excludes the federal judiciary.177  
 
2.3  Early application of the prudential political question doctrine 
 
Following the judgment in Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph v Oregon, the US 
Supreme Court decided two other important Guaranty Clause cases where prudential 
considerations featured prominently. In Colegrave v Green,178 three persons who were 
qualified to vote in congressional districts of the State of Illinois, which had much larger 
populations than other congressional districts of that State, brought a lawsuit in a 
federal district court in Illinois to restrain officers of the State from arranging for an 
election, in which members of Congress were to be appointed. The lawsuit alleged 
that the congressional districts created by Illinois legislation lacked compactness of 
territory and approximate equality of population, and sought a declaration of invalidity 
under the United States Constitution and other laws. The district court dismissed the 
lawsuit. Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the judgement of the US Supreme Court, 
reasoned that: 
 
To sustain this action would cut very deep into the very being of Congress. Courts 
ought not to enter this political thicket. The remedy for unfairness in districting is 
to secure State legislatures that will apportion properly, or to invoke the ample 
powers of Congress. The Constitution has many commands that are not 
enforceable by courts, because they clearly fall outside the conditions and 
purposes that circumscribe judicial action… Violation of the great guaranty of a 
republican form of government in States cannot be challenged in the courts.179 
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With this reasoning, Justice Frankfurter dismissed the challenge on political question 
grounds. Justice Rutledge concurred in the main judgment and found the case to be 
justiciable, but concluded that the district court had equitable discretion to decline to 
exercise jurisdiction in light of the delicate relationship between Congress and the 
states in determining congressional districts.180 As Pushaw has noted, many cases 
followed Colegrove v Green in repelling constitutional attacks on state electoral laws, 
usually based on Justice Frankfurter's reasoning.181 The next important case affected 
by the Guarantee Clause is Baker v Carr. 
 
In Baker v Carr, the US Supreme Court was presented with the task to determine 
whether an equal protection challenge to the State of Tennessee’s malapportionment 
of the state legislature is a non-justiciable political question. In his majority opinion, 
Justice Brennan, undermined a century old line of precedent including Colegrove v 
Green and held that the question of state legislative reapportionment was justiciable, 
but did so under the Equal Protection Clause even though the case presented issues 
which fell squarely under the Guaranty Clause.182 As one commentator has correctly 
pointed out “not only did Baker upend Colegrove’s conclusions, but it also dramatically 
revised Colegrove’s reasoning.”183 The case of Baker v Carr184 is perhaps the most 
famous articulation of the criteria for determining what constitutes a non-justiciable 
political question. Justice Brennan persuaded a majority of the Justices to set out what 
is often described as the modern articulation of the political question doctrine.185 In his 
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analysis, Justice Brennan transformed the political question doctrine by basing it 
entirely on separation of powers grounds and not on federalism grounds as previous 
cases had done, and by urging a case by case analysis to determine its application.186 
In explaining the contours of the doctrine, Justice Brennan proclaimed that in the 
Guaranty Clause cases and in the other political question cases, it is the relationship 
between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government, and 
not the federal judiciary's relationship to the States, which gives rise to the political 
question.187 In this case, Brennan found that the question was “the consistency of state 
action with the Federal Constitution. We have no question decided, or to be decided, 
by a political branch of government coequal with this Court” to warrant the application 
of the doctrine.188 Justice Brennan, then announced six criteria for assessing when a 
case may be dismissed under the political question doctrine.189 These criteria are: 
 
• textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; 
• a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standard for resolving it; 
• the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind 
clearly for non-judicial discretion; 
• the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without 
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;  
• an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision 
already made; or 
• the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by 
various departments on one question.190 
 
According to Justice Brennan, the existence of one criterion is sufficient to invoke the 
political question doctrine. It has been strongly observed that the most important 
considerations were “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue 
to a coordinate political department and a lack of judicially discoverable and 
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manageable standards for resolving it.”191 However, Justice Brennan emphasized the 
limited reach of the political question doctrine so that it is used sparingly in the context 
of demonstrable political questions devoted to the elected branches and not simply to 
political cases.192 He noted that the the “mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a 
political right does not mean it presents a political question.”193  
 
Further, Justice Brennan explained that the benefit and purpose of the political 
question doctrine is to preserve the separation of powers principle and minimize claims 
that have the potential to undermine this principle.194 His counterpart Justice Douglas, 
who concurred in the judgment, agreed with Brennan’s separation of powers concerns. 
He put it differently by stating “where the constitution assigns a particular function 
wholly and indivisibly to another department, the federal judiciary does not 
intervene.”195 In the aftermath of Baker v Carr, some members of the United States 
federal bench have gone as far as to suggest that the classical political question 
doctrine serves to prevent the federal courts from intruding unduly on certain policy 
choices and judgments that are constitutionally committed to the United States 
Congress or the Executive branch.196 According to this view, a non-justiciable political 
question exists when, to resolve a dispute, a court must make a policy judgment of a 
legislative or executive nature, rather than resolve the dispute through the application 
of the law.197  
 
A further benefit of the political question doctrine is that it minimizes judicial intrusion 
into the operations of the other branches of government and allocates decisions to the 
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branches of government that have superior expertise in particular areas. Professor 
Scharpf is an advocate of this view and has argued, for example, that the US Supreme 
Court has rightly treated many constitutional issues concerning foreign policy as 
political questions because of the greater information and expertise of the other 
branches of government.198 Nearly four decades ago, Professors Bickel and Scharpf 
offered one of the most compelling academic defences of the political question 
doctrine. In their commentaries, Bickel and Scharpf treat the political question doctrine 
as one of the devices that the judiciary utilise to define their relationship with other 
branches and acknowledge that courts share responsibility for interpreting 
constitutional provisions with those branches of government.199 According to Bickel 
and Scharpf, entangling the judiciary with the other institutions of the political system 
in ways that would not benefit the nation is imprudent.200 For Bickel and Scharpf, the 
political question doctrine provides the judiciary with techniques for refraining from 
deciding cases on the merits when doing so would be unwise.201 Since Baker v Carr 
was decided, the US Supreme Court has dismissed a number of cases on the basis 
of the political question doctrine. In the discussion that follows, a few of these cases 
are discussed to demonstrate how the test in Baker v Carr was employed subsequent 
to being developed.  
 
2.4 Survey of US Supreme Court cases applying the political question doctrine 
 post Baker v Carr 
 
2.4.1 Powell v McCormack  
 
One of the first cases that applied the political question doctrine is Powell v 
McCormack.202 In this case, Adam Powell was denied by the House of 
Representatives to take up his seat in the House because he was under investigation 
for unethical and possibly illegal financial dealings.203 Powell challenged this refusal 
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on the basis that he had been duly elected by the voters of the 18th Congressional 
District of New York to the 90th United States Congress.204 It is important to mention 
that during the 89th Congress, the House Committee on Education and Labor was 
investigated for the expenditures of that committee during Powell's chairmanship.205 
The report surrounding the investigation concluded that Powell had engaged in 
improper expenditures including deceiving House of Representatives authorities about 
travel expenses and certain illegal salary payments to Powell's wife at his discretion.206 
However, no formal disciplinary action was taken against Powell and he was 
subsequently elected to the 90th Congress.207 Powell claimed that the House of 
Representatives could not deny him the right to seat because he met the constitutional 
qualifications for public office contained in Article 1, section 2 of the United States 
Constitution.208   
 
During trial, the House of Representatives argued that Powell's claim presented a 
political question because "there has been a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment to the House of the adjudicatory power to determine Powell's 
qualifications.”209 On the contrary, Powell advanced the argument that "the 
qualifications expressly set forth in the Constitution were not meant to limit the long-
recognized legislative power to exclude or expel at will, but merely to establish 
standing incapacities, which could be altered only by a constitutional amendment."210 
In his view, the House of Representatives simply decides whether a duly elected 
member satisfied the qualifications, but as to what these qualifications consisted of is 
not at the House of Representatives’ discretion.211 In conceding to Powell’s 
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proposition, the US Supreme Court held that the issue before it was not a non-
justiciable political question.212 It rejected the arguments of the House of 
Representatives that the Constitution vested Congress with the exclusive power to 
judge the qualifications of its own Members.213 The US Supreme Court found that the 
political question was not applicable in the case, and that whilst the House of 
Representatives possessed constitutional authority to determine whether a member 
met the minimum qualifications provided in the Constitution, it had no discretion to 
establish additional qualifications.214 
 
2.4.2 Gilligan v Morgan215 
 
Gilligan v Morgan is another important political question case. It arose from events on 
the campus of Kent State University, in which the Ohio National Guard was called in 
by the Governor of the State of Ohio to impose public order. The National Guard fired 
live bullets into an unarmed crowd, killing four students and injuring others.216 The 
plaintiffs filed a suit challenging the actions of the Governor by calling in the National 
Guard. They challenged the use of arms and sought, among other things, the US 
Supreme Court to develop standards for the training, kind of weapons and scope and 
kind of orders to control the actions of the National Guard and assume and exercise a 
continuing judicial surveillance over the National Guard to assure compliance with 
whatever training and operations procedures approved by that court.217 The US 
Supreme Court rejected the relief sought by the plaintiffs. It ruled that since the issue 
involved military training and procedures, it was textually committed to the political 
branches and therefore outside the US Supreme Court's scope of review.218 Relying 
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on the first two factors in Baker v Carr, the court held that the case involved non-
justiciable political questions. It reasoned that:  
 
It would be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of governmental 
action that was intended by the Constitution to be left to the political branches 
directly responsible--the Judicial Branch is not--to the electoral process. 
Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which 
the courts have less competence. The complex, subtle, and professional 
decisions regarding the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military 
force are essentially professional military judgments, always subject to civilian 
control of the Legislative and Executive Branch. The ultimate responsibility for 
these decisions is appropriately vested in branches of the government which are 
periodically subject to electoral accountability. It is this power of oversight and 
control of military force by elected representatives and officials which underlies 
our entire constitutional system.219 
 
Despite this reasoning, the US Supreme Court explicated that its decision did not 
mean that the “the conduct of the National Guard is always beyond judicial review or 
that there may not be accountability in a judicial forum for violations of law or for 
specific unlawful conduct by military personnel.”220 Instead, the US Supreme Court 
held only that no such questions were presented in this case to warrant judicial review. 
 
2.4.3 Nixon v. United States221 
 
In Nixon v United States, the US Supreme Court found a nonjusticiable political 
question. The case centred around a federal district court judge, Walter Nixon, who 
was impeached by the United States House of Representatives when he failed to 
resign after being convicted of perjury and therefore continued to collect his salary.222 
The Senate successfully instituted impeachment proceedings against him.223 The 
                                                          
219  Gilligan v Morgan 10. 
220  Gilligan v Morgan 10. 
221  Nixon v United States 506 US 224 (1993). See also, Blum J “How Much Process Is Due: The 
Senate Impeachment Trial Process after Nixon v United States” 1994-1995 Catholic University 
Law Review 243 (arguing that the trial-by-committee process challenged in Nixon v United 
States not only satisfies the Constitution's due process requirement, but, in light of severe time 
constraints on today's Senate, is necessary as the most efficacious process available). 
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judge was eventually convicted and removed by the full Senate.224 After his Senate 
conviction, Nixon brought a suit arguing that Senate Rule XI violated the constitutional 
grant of authority to the Senate to try all impeachments pursuant to Article I, Section 
3, Clause 6, of the United States Constitution. He argued that the impeachment 
proceedings in place under Senate rules, which had been adopted by the Senate to 
try impeachments before a committee and to forward the transcript of the proceedings 
to the whole Senate for a vote, fell short of the constitutional requirement that he be 
granted a trial.225 Essentially, Nixon maintained that the Senate was constitutionally 
obligated to give him a trial before the full Senate and not just a Senate committee. 
The US Supreme Court found that Nixon's claim was a non-justiciable political 
question. It held that if the judiciary “may review the actions of the Senate in order to 
determine whether that body tried an impeached official, it is difficult to see how the 
Senate would be functioning independently and without … interference."226 In applying 
the test formulated in Baker v Carr, the US Supreme Court reasoned that the 
constitutional text provided no standards that the judiciary could detect the limits of the 
word try, and as a result, the proceedings of the Senate were beyond judicial review.227  
 
The political question doctrine as formulated in Baker v Carr has been welcomed by 
some and criticised by other scholars and jurists.228 The major criticism is that despite 
the six factors that form part of the inquiry, the doctrine remains poorly defined.229 In 
her commentary, Breedon has critically observed that while Baker v Carr developed a 
six factor test for governing the existence of a political question, no lucid framework 
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225  Nixon v United States 238. 
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227  Nixon v United States 233-238 
228  For some critical comments against Baker v Carr see, Layman R “Aftermath of Baker v Carr” 
1963 William & Mary Law Review 93; Neal P “Baker v Carr: Politics in Search of Law” 1962 
Supreme Court Review 252. 
229  See, Zivotofsky v Clinton (noting that as this case illustrates, the proper application of Baker v 
Carr six factors has generated substantial confusion in the lower courts) (Sotomoyor 
concurring) at 1431; Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab Republic 726 F.2d 774, 803 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(Bork, J. concurring); U.S. ex rel. Joseph v Cannon 642 F.2d 1373, 1379 (1981) (noting that 
the political question doctrine's precise contours are ambiguous); District of Columbia v United 
States Dep't of Commerce 789 F. Supp. 1179, 1184 (DD Cir 1992) (demonstrating that the 
scope, rationale of the doctrine remain unclear); Nelson C “Originalism and Interpretive 
Conventions” 2003 University of Chicago Law Review 598. 
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for employing the test has emerged nor has the US Supreme Court explicated the 
terms that comprise the six factors.230 Breedon has identified the effect of the failure 
by the judiciary to articulate the doctrine’s contours and comprehensive framework 
arguing that some of the factors in Baker v Carr significantly overlap with other 
justiciability doctrines like standing, which permit courts to dismiss cases when certain 
circumstances are met.231 She urges that in the absence of a lucid doctrine from the 
judiciary delineating the precise limits of the political question doctrine in relation to 
other doctrines with overlapping interests lower courts may be more likely to misapply 
the doctrine.232  
 
In his study of the transformation of the political question doctrine, Professor Tushnet 
has also highlighted the problematic overlap between the doctrine and other 
justiciability doctrines like standing.233 Tushnet goes further to criticise Baker v Carr 
for its doctrinalization of the doctrine and its impossible attempt to convert into a set of 
legal rules an approach to adjudication that had been predicated on some judicial 
flexibility.234 In his view, this was a mistake because prudence cannot be captured in 
rules.235 For Tushnet, the effects of the doctrinalization of the political question doctrine 
substantially reduced the possibility of the US Supreme Court’s deploying the 
doctrine.236 It is because of similar concerns by Breedon and Tushnet that Barkow 
discouraged courts from the use of prudential political question because in her view it 
seeks to solve the same problem as standing and equitable discretion, but gives courts 
more flexibility.237 
 
As alluded to earlier, the political question doctrine as formulated by American courts, 
particularly in cases like Baker v Carr, has had a profound influence in the 
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development of constitutional jurisprudence of many countries especially those being 
examined in this study. Naturally, there is a need for this study to consider the possible 
implications that may arise from the fact that a number of countries, particularly 
Nigeria, Ghana and Uganda have considered, applied and developed well-established 
constitutional law jurisprudence around the political question doctrine. In some cases, 
this jurisprudence was influenced by Justice Brenna’s pronouncements in Baker v 
Carr. However, in the aftermath of Zivotofsky v Clinton the question for this study 
becomes; is it significant (especially to the judiciaries in those countries) that Baker v 
Carr has been partly undermined by Zivotofsky v Clinton to such an extent, that it may 
cause a diversion in the manner in which the six factors in that case should be applied? 
The jury is still out on this question. However, as Dennison has explained in the context 
of Uganda’s adoption of the doctrine, legal borrowing is more about political choices 
than importing legal innovations.238 
 
It is worth pausing to briefly explain the concept of legal borrowing. The concept has 
been described as the process of importing legal doctrines or rationales from other 
legal sources or domains in order to persuade someone to adopt a certain reading of 
a constitution.239 Among the benefits of legal borrowing, as commentators have noted, 
is that it helps to restore generality of law and promote rule of law values.240 Osiatynski 
once remarked that legal “borrowing is inevitable because there are a limited number 
of general constitutional ideas and mechanism.”241 Likewise, Dennison has drawn 
attention to the notion of legal borrowing in his discussion of the political question 
doctrine in Uganda. He has explained that Uganda adopted a framework of separation 
of powers and judicial review that imitates America’s system. He argues that in the 
context of this larger picture, Uganda’s endorsement of the political question doctrine 
makes sense adding that “at some point within common law systems the legal heritage 
of the courts becomes the law of the land … Origins cease to matter at some point.”242 
The suggestion by Dennison is that the political question doctrine has become part of 
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the constitutional law of Uganda, and it is less significant where the seeds of the 
doctrine were borrowed. Hence, Dennison would probably opine that the decision in 
Zivotofsky v Clinton, to the extent that it undermines Baker v Carr, will have no 
significant impact on Uganda’s continued application of the doctrine because the 
doctrine has assumed a life of its own under Ugandan jurisprudence. 
 
Further, Dennison would probably point out that since 1966, the political question 
doctrine has become part of the law of Uganda where courts have developed it 
consistent with particular circumstances of Uganda, and that it would be too simplistic 
to expect that Zivotofsky v Clinton would impact well established traditions that have 
developed since the doctrine was adopted in the 1960s. It is submitted that this would 
be a strong argument to make in the context of Uganda but also the rest of the 
countries being examined in this study. In fact, in Centre of Health Human Rights v 
Attorney-General243 the plaintiff cited Zivotofsky v Clinton for the proposition that the 
political question doctrine was disfavored. This was an attempt by the plaintiffs to 
persuade the Supreme Court of Uganda to overrule the validity of the political question 
doctrine in Uganda. Despite this, the Supreme Court in Centre of Health Human Rights 
v Attorney-General re-affirmed the usefulness and application of the doctrine in 
Uganda. Notwithstanding this study’s support for Denison’s views, it is not clear what 
the judiciary in Nigeria and Ghana would do if faced with a political question case in 
the post Zivotofsky v Clinton era. Nevertheless, even with these difficulties of 
determining when the political question doctrine should apply, federal cases in the 
United States reveal frequent application of the doctrine in federal constitutional 
adjudication.244 The next section provides a synopsis of the approach taken by federal 
courts in applying the political question doctrine. 
 
2.5  A survey of federal courts’ application of the political question doctrine 
 
                                                          
243  Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General, Constitutional Appeal 1 of (2013) 18 [10]. 
244  See, Mulhern 1988 University of Pennsylvanis LR 106 (noting that the political question doctrine 
is more prominent in the opinions of the lower federal courts); Doe v Bush 322 F 3d 109 (1st 
Cir 2003); Luftig v McNamara 373 F 2d 664 (DC Cir 1967). For a discussion of the application 
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One of the areas where the political question doctrine has often featured in lower 
federal court litigation is foreign affairs. In Gonzales-Vera v Kissinger245 the plaintiff, a 
victim and survivor of human rights abuses carried out by the Chilean government of 
General Pinochet, brought an action against the United States and former Secretary 
of State and National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, seeking damages for actions, 
including torture allegedly taken in support of the Pinochet regime.   The district court 
found that the plaintiffs' claims were justiciable but dismissed the action on the grounds 
that the United States had not waived its sovereign immunity, and that the plaintiffs 
had failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Dr. Kissinger.    
 
The United States Court of Appeals, cited as controlling its earlier and related decision 
in Schneider v Kissinger,246 affirmed that the plaintiffs’ claims were non-justiciable 
under the political question doctrine. In a judgment written by Judge Ginsburg, the 
court reasoned that to evaluate the legal validity of the drastic measures taken by the 
United States to implement its policy with respect to Chile, would require it to delve 
into questions of foreign policy textually committed to a coordinate branch of 
government.247 Ginsburg noted that like the plaintiffs in Schneider v Kissinger, the 
plaintiffs in this case alleged and challenged drastic measures taken by the United 
States and Kissinger in order to implement United States policy with respect to Chile.  
Ginsburg reasoned that for the court to evaluate the legal validity of those measures 
would require it to delve into questions of policy textually committed to a coordinate 
branch of government. The US Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari in this 
case.248 
 
                                                          
245  Gonzales-Vera v Kissinger 449 F3d 1260 (2006). 
246  Schneider v Kissinger 412 F 3d 190 (2005) (where the children of a Chilean general and his 
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In Arakaki v Lingle249, the plaintiffs were citizens of the State of Hawaii who alleged 
that various state programs preferentially treat persons of Hawaiian ancestry, in 
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
and the terms of a public land trust. They brought a lawsuit against the Department of 
Hawaiian Home Lands (DHHL), the Hawaiian Homes Commission (HHC), the Office 
of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), various state officers, and the United States.   They 
claimed standing to sue as taxpayers and as beneficiaries of the public land trust. In 
a series of orders, the district court held that Plaintiffs lacked standing to raise certain 
claims and that Plaintiffs' remaining claims raised a non-justiciable political question, 
and dismissed the entire lawsuit. The district court reasoned that the political question 
doctrine applied to bar the court’s review of the constitutional claim. The district court 
agreed that the political question doctrine barred it from reviewing controversies that 
revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for 
resolution to Congress or the executive branch. Additionally, the district court was 
persuaded not to exercise jurisdiction in the matter because the political status of 
Hawaiians was being debated in the United States Congress at the time the district 
court was considering the matter, and hence it reasoned that it would be improper for 
the court to intrude into that political process. 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed parts of the district court judgment, but reversed the 
district court's dismissal of the case on political question grounds.250 The court noted 
that it had recently addressed the political question doctrine in Kahawaiolaa v 
Norton251 in the context of a challenge to the executive's failure to recognize Hawaiians 
as federal Indian tribes. In that case, native Hawaiians had alleged that the 
Department of Interior had violated the equal protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment in regulations limiting recognition of new tribes to those American Indian 
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250  Arakaki v Lingle 423 F 3d 954 (2005) 977. 
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groups indigenous to the continental United States, which meant that native Hawaiians 
were excluded from eligibility to petition for tribal recognition under the regulations. 
 
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court that matters of tribal recognition 
raise nonjusticiable political questions. It found that the plaintiffs did not seek tribal 
recognition; rather, they wanted the Department of Interior to allow them to apply for 
recognition under the same regulatory criteria applied to indigenous peoples in other 
states, and therefore, it concluded that the plaintiffs' suit was not barred by the political 
question doctrine. The court found that its reasoning in Kahawaiolaa v Norton was 
applicable in this case. Further, it reasoned that a suit that sought to direct Congress 
to federally recognize an Indian tribe would be non-justiciable as a political question. 
The court found that no party in this case sought to compel Congress or the President 
to recognize the tribal status of Hawaiians, or invited the district court to exercise 
powers reserved to Congress or to the President.  It therefore dismissed the district 
court’s finding and ruling on political question grounds.252  
 
In Corriee v Caterpillar,253 the Court of Appeal dealt with an issue affecting foreign 
affairs. The case arose out of the conflict in the Middle East. Following the Six Day 
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2013 South Carolina Journal of International Law & Business 171-172 (commenting on Corrie 
v Caterpillar noting that while the courts ultimately dismissed the complaint against Caterpillar, 
75 
 
 
 
War in 1967, Israel occupied and took control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  The 
defendant, Caterpillar, is the world's leading manufacturer of heavy construction and 
mining equipment.   Among its customers is the Israeli Defence Force, which since 
1967 has utilized Caterpillar bulldozers to demolish homes in the Palestinian 
Territories. According to plaintiffs' complaint, Caterpillar sold the bulldozers to the 
Israeli Defence Force despite its actual and constructive notice that the Israeli Defence 
Force would use them to further its home destruction policy in the Palestinian 
Territories; a policy plaintiff contended violated international law.   Seventeen 
members of plaintiffs' families - sixteen Palestinians and one American-were killed or 
injured in the course of the demolitions.  
 
The family members of individuals, who were killed when the Israeli Defence Force 
used bulldozers to demolish houses in Palestinian Territories, brought an action 
against manufacturers of bulldozers alleging seven claims against Caterpillar for (1) 
war crimes;  (2) extrajudicial killing under the Torture Victim Protection Act  1991;  (3) 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;  (4) violations of the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 1961;  (5) wrongful death;  (6) public 
nuisance;  and (7) negligent entrustment. The gravamen of each claim is that 
Caterpillar provided the Israeli Defence Force with equipment it knew would be used 
in violation of international law, and thus aided and abetted those violations. The 
district court held that both the act of state and the political question doctrines 
precluded it from reaching the merits of the claims.  
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court decision that the political question 
doctrine barred it from hearing the matter. In justifying its decision, the court reasoned 
that allowing this action to proceed would necessarily require the judiciary to question 
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the political branch’s decision to grant extensive military aid to Israel. According to the 
court, it is difficult to see how it could impose liability on Caterpillar without, at least 
implicitly, deciding the propriety of the United States’ decision to pay for the bulldozers. 
Further, the court reasoned that it cannot intrude into the government’s decision to 
grant military assistance to Israel, even indirectly by deciding this challenge. It 
observed that the plaintiffs could succeed only if a court ultimately decided that 
Caterpillar should not have sold its bulldozers to the Israeli Defence Force. Yet, the 
court noted, these sales were financed by the executive branch pursuant to a 
congressionally enacted program calling for executive discretion as to what lies in the 
foreign policy and national security interests of the United States. The court went to a 
great length to discuss both classic and prudential considerations in the Baker v Carr, 
and noted that all the six factors in that case were implicated. For instance, in relation 
to the first factor in Baker v Carr, whether there is a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department, it 
explained that the conduct of foreign relations is committed by the Constitution to the 
political departments of the Federal Government; and that the propriety of the exercise 
of that power is not open to judicial review. And that whether to grant military or other 
aid to a foreign nation is a political decision inherently entangled with the conduct of 
foreign relations,254 and inappropriate for judicial resolution. Therefore, the Court of 
Appeals held that the district court did not err in dismissing the suit under the political 
question doctrine.    
 
Lastly, Schroeder v Bush,255centered around farmers who live and work within the 
territorial boundaries of the Tenth Circuit and who sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief against the President of the United States, the United States Secretary of 
Agriculture, the United States Secretary of the Treasury, and the United States of 
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America. The farmers sought an order requiring the defendants and their agents to 
maintain market conditions favourable to small farmers. The district court dismissed 
the matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, noting that "the complaint seeks to 
have this court determine political questions which are properly addressed by the 
elected branches of the government.”256 The district court held that it had no 
jurisdiction over the discretionary acts of either defendants, and that plaintiffs' 
remedies are at the polling place, not the courts.  
 
On appeal, the question for the Court of Appeals was whether a constitutional action 
brought by farmers and ranchers for declaratory and injunctive relief against the United 
States, seeking an order requiring the government to maintain market conditions 
favorable to small farmers, was barred by the political question doctrine.  The Court of 
Appeals agreed with the lower court that the issues presented were nonjusticiable 
political questions, and that plaintiffs must seek relief from the elected branches of 
government. The court reasoned that prudence, as well as separation of powers 
concerns, encourage courts to decline to hear political questions of this nature.257 In 
dismissing the appeal, the court noted that the relief sought enmeshes the court in the 
Baker v Carr threads; that no doubt this case presents textbook examples of political 
questions and thus was properly dismissed by the district court.  
 
The above survey of the cases demonstrates how federal courts have grappled and 
applied the test in Baker v Carr. In the section that follows, this study examines the 
application of the political question doctrine in state courts of the United States.  
 
2.6  A survey of the application of the political question doctrine by states 
 
 
A fundamental principle of the United States government is that the federal 
government may act only if there is express or implied power in the United States 
Constitution. On the contrary, the state governments may act unless that Constitution 
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prohibits them from acting.258 Two constitutional provisions succinctly capture this 
principle. Article I, section 1 of the United States Constitution, which creates the federal 
legislative authority provides that “all legislative Powers herein granted shall 
be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and 
House of Representatives.” The tenth amendment to the United States Constitution, 
on the other hand, provides that “the powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people.” The tenth amendment reserves a zone of activity to the States for 
their exclusive control, and the federal government is prevented from intruding.259 In a 
sense, as Chemerinsky has remarked, the tenth amendment provides protection to 
States’ rights and federalism.260 Since the United States Constitution comprises 
delegated powers from sovereign States, the development of State constitutional 
traditions has been influenced by this relationship between States and the federal 
government.261 
 
While State courts are guided by their respective State constitutions, laws and 
traditions when adjudicating cases, commentators have observed that the political 
question doctrine has not escaped the attention of State courts.262 The doctrine has 
been applied against the general document of limit principle that says State 
constitutions are documents that limit rather than grant powers.263 Given their distinct 
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political and constitutional traditions, one commentator has crisply noted that states 
courts have formulated their own political question doctrine.264 In this section, it is not 
intended to delve into a comprehensive examination of the different approaches of the 
political question doctrine in State courts. Instead, a brief overview of the judicial 
attitudes towards the doctrine by State supreme courts will suffice, including where 
applicable their application or rejection of the doctrine by examining the areas where 
the doctrine has been considered or applied. Similarly, a general examination of 
whether State courts apply the political question doctrine from time to time is 
undertaken. 
 
2.6.1  In which areas is the political question doctrine is applied by state courts? 
 
There is no doubt that the political question doctrine exists in state constitutional law. 
Three areas have seen frequent application of the doctrine. These include: areas 
involving the coordinate branches of government;265 areas involving conduct of and 
results of elections;266 and areas involving policy making.267 The study examines the 
application of the doctrine in these areas. 
 
2.6.1.1   Involving Coordinate Branches  
 
The separation of powers principle as reflected in State constitutions has urged State 
courts to encourage the coordinate branches of government to regulate themselves 
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with minimal interference from the courts.268 As Stern has noted from the practice of 
State courts in relation to the doctrine, only when a government action may violate an 
express constitutional prohibition is the issue detached from the scope of the political 
question doctrine. Otherwise, claims against government conduct have been 
dismissed on political question grounds.  
 
In Fuldauer v City of Cleveland,269 which involved a challenge to the city of Cleveland’s 
municipal charter for its breach of the federal constitutional guarantee of a republican 
form of government, the Ohio Supreme Court dismissed the challenge on the basis 
that the adoption of a city government plan raised “a political question, and not a 
judicial question, and cannot be challenged in the courts.”270 
 
Stern also observes that the political question doctrine has frequently been applied to 
cases involving a challenge to legislative decisions that are not impermissible on 
substantive grounds but are found wanting on procedural grounds. In other words, 
there is a line of cases where State courts have applied the doctrine to abstain from 
interfering in areas where the government is substantively permitted to act but the 
procedures might have not existed to regulate their conduct or been violated 
altogether.271 One of the cases that demonstrates this trend is Gilbert v Gladden.272 
The case involved an action against the constitutional provision governing the 
presentment of Bills to the Governor. Article V, section 1, paragraph 14 of the New 
Jersey Constitution of 1947 required that “every bill which shall have passed both 
houses shall be presented to the Governor.” If the Governor approves a Bill, the 
governor signs it and it becomes law. If the Governor disapproves, he or she may 
return it and the legislature may veto his actions by a two thirds’ majority.  
 
                                                          
268  Stern 1983 South Carolina LR 412. 
269  Fuldauer v City of Cleveland 290 NE 2d 546 (1972). 
270  Fuldauer v City of Cleveland 549-550. See also, Fuldauer v City of Cleveland 30 Ohio App 2d 
237 (1972). 
271  Stern 1983 South Carolina LR 414. See also, Gilbert v Gladden 87 NJ 275 (1975); Leek v Theis 
217 Kan 784 (1975); Maline v Meekins 650 P 2d 351 (1982). 
272  Gilbert v Gladden 87 NJ 275 (1975). 
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Within this framework there developed an unofficial custom of long duration, known as 
gubernatorial courtesy, whereby Bills passed in both houses of the Legislature would 
not be presented to the Governor for signature or veto powers exercised over them 
until the Governor requests them. Accordingly, when the request for a Bill is withheld 
and therefore presentation not made until forty-five days before the end of the second 
legislative session, the Governor can prevent the Bill from becoming law merely by not 
signing it, and at the same time the Legislature would have no opportunity to override 
that result.273 This scheme is what formed the basis of plaintiffs' lawsuit. The plaintiff’s 
main contention was that the practice of gubernatorial courtesy was unconstitutional. 
The government’s response was that the questions presented to the New Jersey 
Supreme Court concerning the manner and the times by which Bills passed are 
presented to the Governor are non-justiciable political questions.  
 
The Supreme Court found that the first criterion in Baker v Carr provided the basis for 
the conclusion that the case presented a non-justiciable political question doctrine.274 
It found that the textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the question of 
presentment of Bills to the Governor can be derived from proper consideration of two 
constitutional provisions, namely Article IV, section 4 paragraph 3 of the New Jersey 
Constitution, which gives the legislature authority “to determine the rules of its 
proceedings.”275 The Supreme Court also found that the Constitution of New Jersey 
did not limit the time frames within which presentment may be accomplished. As a 
consequence, the Supreme Court concluded that in the absence of constitutional 
standards, it is not the function of the judiciary to substitute its judgment for that of the 
legislature with regard to the rules it has adopted or procedures followed in giving 
effect to the constitutionally declared scheme.276 The Supreme Court further reasoned 
that since a State constitution unlike its federal counterpart is not a grant but a 
limitation of legislative power, the legislature is vested with all powers not 
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constitutionally forbidden.277 It held that timing of presentment of a Bill is a 
nonjusticiable political question that is committed to the legislature.  
 
As demonstrated in Gilbert v Gladden, State courts apply the criterion in Baker v Carr 
when invoking the political question doctrine.278 However, this is not always the 
case.279 Some State courts (as opposed to federal courts) in the fifty states of the 
United States have rejected to incorporate the political question doctrine as formulated 
in Baker v Carr. Backman v Secretary of the Commonwealth280 is a case in point. In 
this case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had to consider whether to 
restrain the Governor from putting a proposed constitutional amendment to the people 
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(1997) (rejecting political question argument and stating that  when a government action is 
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constitutional limits.); DeRolph v State 78 Ohio St 3d 193, 677 NE 2d 733 (1997) 737 (rejecting 
argument that school finance challenge presents nonjusticiable political question); Abbeville 
County School District State 335 SC 58, 515 SE 2d 535, 540 (1999) (Because it is the duty of 
this Court to interpret and declare the meaning of the Constitution, the trial court should not 
have used judicial restraint, separation of powers, and the political question doctrine as the 
bases for declining to decide the meaning of the education clause); Seattle Sch District No 1 v 
State, 90 Wash 2d 476, 585 P 2d 71, 84–87 (1978) (citing Marbury v Madison and stating that 
a finding of nonjusticiability would be “illogical”); Campbell County School District v State, 907 
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unconstitutional that which transgresses the state constitution). 
280  Backman v Secretary of the Commonwealth 387 Mass 549 (1982). 
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for a vote because of his failure to follow the constitutionally laid out procedures. The 
plaintiff’s basic assertion against the Governor was that the Governor acted contrary 
to the Massachusetts Constitution in purporting to call a joint session under Article 48 
of the Amendments without first calling the General Court into session pursuant to his 
powers under Part II, Article 5 of the Massachusetts Constitution. The argument 
advanced by government was that the issue presented to the Supreme Judicial Court 
was a non-justiciable political question. 
 
In responding to this argument, the Supreme Judicial Court noted that the political 
question doctrine was fully developed under the United States Constitution than under 
the Constitution of Massachusetts. Further, it acknowledged that despite being 
presented with political question doctrine-based arguments in a number of cases,281it 
has never explicitly incorporated the federal doctrine unto the state jurisprudence.282  
The Supreme Judicial Court declined again to adopt the federal political question 
doctrine in this case. In its view, the judiciary has an obligation to adjudicate claims 
that particular actions conflict with constitutional requirements.  
 
Turning to the present matter, the Supreme Judicial Court found that there was no 
explicit or necessarily implicit constitutional provision directing the manner in which the 
Governor must call the General Court into joint session and that, in the circumstances, 
where the members of the General Court in joint session accepted the Governor's call 
and the joint session acted on various matters, it was not for the Supreme Judicial 
Court to disturb the procedure adopted by the Governor and accepted by the 
Legislature.283 It held that since the Massachusetts Constitution does not prescribe the 
procedures to be followed it could not reject the means selected by the Governor to 
achieve a constitutionally permissible end where the legislature acquiesced in his 
determination.  
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2.6.1.2    Election Matters 
 
Another fertile ground for the possible application of the political question doctrine by 
state courts has been in the area of the conduct of elections. Like in the Nigerian 
context examined below, state supreme courts in America routinely resist requests to 
intrude in the election processes and determine election results. As Stern has found, 
state courts consider the election process as self-monitoring and hence their 
reluctance to intervene. 284 The Ohio Supreme Court in State ex rel Ford v Board of 
Election of Pickaway County justified its refusal to intervene in a election case by 
holding that “elections are a function of the political branch of government, are a matter 
of political regulation, and are not per se the subject of judicial cognizance.”285 
 
Like in Nigeria where the political question has typically been applied in election cases 
and has shown courts’ reluctance to determine outcomes of elections, United State 
supreme courts’ deference to the political branches in elections cases reaches its 
zenith when a challenge is raised in the aftermath of an election.286 The Iowa Supreme 
Court in State ex rel Turner v Scott,287 for example, rejected to intervene in a challenge 
against State Senator Scott, which sought to remove him from his seat as a State 
Senator. Mr Scott was elected to the Iowa senate from the 24th district in 1976. During 
the campaign, the incumbent Mr Winkelman contended as a campaign issue that Mr 
Scott was not qualified to represent the district because he did not meet the 
inhabitancy requirements of the Iowa Constitution. Following the elections, the Senate 
credentials committee determined that Mr Scott was qualified to assume the seat to 
which he had been elected.  
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The Attorney General challenged Scott’s right to hold office based on Article III, 5 of 
the Iowa Constitution, which states that the qualifications of residency and citizenship 
for House members apply also to Senate members.  Scott resisted the action arguing, 
among other things, that the Attorney General had no standing to bring the claim 
because the legislature held the sole power to judge the qualifications of its members. 
His argument was predicated on Article III, section 7 of the Iowa Constitution which 
provides that:  
 
Each house shall choose its own officers, and judge of the qualification, election, 
and return of its own members. A contested election shall be determined in such 
manner as shall be directed by law. 
 
Scott also argued that powers granted to the legislative branch cannot be exercised 
by the judicial branch of government. This argument was based on Article III, section 
1 which provides that: 
 
The powers of the government of Iowa shall be divided into three separate 
departments the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judiciary; and no person 
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments shall exercise any function appertaining to either of the others, 
except in cases hereinafter expressly directed or permitted. 
 
The trial court dismissed the case on the grounds that it lacked authority to interfere 
with the Senate’s determination of Scott’s qualifications unless a substantial violation 
of constitutional rights was established.288  
 
In resolving the dispute, the Iowa Supreme Court found that the question of whether 
the judicial branch has jurisdiction to hear and determine the case is linked to the 
question of whether the case presented a justiciable controversy. It further noted that 
in order for there to be a justiciable controversy there must exist a dispute that is 
capable of judicial resolution; that for a justiciable controversy to exist, a political 
question should not be involved.289 After approvingly citing Baker v Carr, the Supreme 
Court concluded that this case involved a non-justiciable political question the 
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resolution of which is properly left to the senatorial discretion. With this conclusion, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision to dismiss.  
 
A majority of academic commentaries in the United States on the political question 
doctrine has focused on the federal application of the doctrine. Few academic 
commentaries have been devoted to the study of the political question doctrine at the 
State court level. Existing literature on State court application of the doctrine shows 
that the doctrine forms part of a great number of state jurisprudence, and that despite 
the federalism imperatives that underpin American system of government, there is 
room for the political question doctrine in state courts. The literature also demonstrates 
that the doctrine has been applied both in its classical and prudential forms. Given the 
distinct constitutional traditions, it is understandable that the approaches by State 
supreme courts towards the doctrine will differ. Some state courts like Massachusetts 
have resisted applying the doctrine because of their unique constitutional traditions, 
while others have embraced the doctrine as formulated in Baker v Carr or in its 
classical form.  Like at the federal court level, the impact of Zivotofsky v Clinton is yet 
to be determined at the State court level as legal commentators wrestle with the 
question of what is left of the doctrine. The last section examines the most recent 
political question doctrine case decided by the US Supreme Court Zivotofsky v Clinton, 
which raises questions about its (the political question doctrine) future application 
leading some to argue that the case overruled some aspects of Baker v Carr.290 
 
2.7  What is left of the political question doctrine? Zivotofsky v Clinton 
 
Zivotofsky v Clinton is the most recent and significant case by the US Supreme Court 
on the political question doctrine. The case involved a dispute between Menachem 
Zivotofsky and the Secretary of State of the United States. The facts and procedural 
history of the case are as important as the law that developed therein.  
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To start with, Menachem Zivotofsky was born in Jerusalem in 2002. His parents were 
United States citizens. Shortly after his birth, his mother, pursuant to section 214(d) of 
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2003291 filed an application with 
the United States Embassy requesting that his United States passport list Jerusalem, 
Israel as his place of birth. The embassy officials refused to grant the request 
consistent with the policy of not acknowledging any State sovereignty over Jerusalem, 
and listed his place of birth as simply Jerusalem.292 In 2003, Zivotofsky brought a 
lawsuit against the Secretary of State in the federal district court, seeking to enforce 
section 214(d). That section directs the State Department to list Jerusalem born 
passport applicants’ birth as Israel upon request. 
 
The district court dismissed the claim holding that Zivotofsky lacked standing and 
found that the case presented a non-justiciable political question. It explained that 
resolving Zivotofsky’s claim on the merits would necessarily require the court to decide 
the political status of Jerusalem.293 The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling on 
standing and remanded the case for further development on the political question 
issue.294 On remand, the district court dismissed the case again, this time on the 
ground of a non-justiciable political question,295 and Zivotofsky appealed. 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. Judge Griffith, who wrote for the panel, 
illuminated that “courts may not consider claims that raise issues whose resolution has 
been committed to the political branches by the text of the Constitution.”296 He 
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observed that the Constitution grants the President the sole power to recognize foreign 
governments,297 and given that the claim by Zivotofsky sought to negate the 
President’s neutral stance toward Jerusalem, it was non-justiciable.298 In his view, 
section 214(d) was of no moment to the analysis; but justiciability was a threshold 
matter for the court to consider.299 While Judge Edwards concurred, he objected to the 
political question finding.300 For Edwards J, the relevant question was simply whether 
section 214(d) was constitutional or not. He would have reached the merits and 
invalidate section 214(d).301 
 
The US Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case to the lower court.302 Writing 
for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts elucidated that while the judiciary has the 
responsibility to decide cases properly before it, judicial precedent has identified a 
narrow exception to that requirement known as the political question doctrine.303He 
noted that the narrow exception applies where there is “a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack 
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.”304 It is important 
to note that these narrow exceptions are the first two factors in the test formulated in 
Baker v Carr, the significance of which will be reverted to in the course of this study. 
 
Roberts concluded that Zivotofsky's case did not meet any of the narrow exceptions 
established in Baker v Carr. He further noted that the Constitution did not commit the 
issue to another branch. For Roberts, the issue was not whether “to supplant a foreign 
policy decision of the political branches with the court’s own unmoored determination 
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of what United State policy towards Jerusalem should be.”305 Rather, the issue was 
whether Zivotofsky “may vindicate his statutory right … to have Israel recorded on his 
passport as his place of birth.”306 That issue, in Justice Roberts view, presented the 
familiar judicial exercise of interpreting section 214(d) and deciding whether it was 
constitutional.307 What is more, Justice Roberts observed that since the parties do not 
dispute the interpretation of section 214(d), the only real question for determination 
was whether the legislation was constitutional. He noted that since Marbury v Madison, 
it is trite that when an Act of Congress is challenged “it is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judiciary to say what the law is.”308 And while that duty will sometimes 
encompass political implications, the judiciary cannot avoid its responsibility to 
discharge that duty when called upon to do so.309 Roberts remarked that in this case, 
the inquiry into the validity of section 214(d) entailed deciding whether the legislation 
impermissibly intrudes upon Presidential powers under the United States Constitution. 
If so, he noted, the legislation must be invalidated and the claim dismissed.  
 
On the other hand, if it is found that the impugned legislation does not intrude into the 
President’s powers, then the Secretary of State must be ordered to issue Zivotosky a 
passport that complies with section 214(d). He emphasized that either way, the 
political question doctrine was not implicated because no policy underlying the political 
question doctrine suggests that Congress or the Executive can decide the 
constitutionality of a statute, noting that that is an issue for the judiciary to decide.310  
Justice Roberts also dismissed the lack of judicial standard argument advanced by the 
Secretary of State to coerce the finding of a political question as invalid.  
 
Justice Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion in which she sought to provide a 
demanding inquiry on the circumstances that are appropriate for invoking the political 
question doctrine under Baker v Carr.311 She analysed the six factors in Baker v Carr 
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around three distinct justifications: the courts lack of constitutional authority to decide 
the issue; cases implicating factors two and three require circumstances in which a 
dispute calls for decision making beyond the courts’ competence; and factors four 
through six which involve prudential considerations.312 For Justice Sotomayor, while 
the last three factors are parts of Baker v Carr's six-factor test, prudential 
considerations would render a case nonjusticiable only in rare and exceptional 
cases.313 She noted that often when prudential factors are implicated in a case 
presenting a political question, other factors identified in Baker v Carr will likewise be 
apparent.314   
 
Furthermore, on the future application of the doctrine, Sotomayor theorized that “it is 
not impossible to imagine a case involving the application or even the constitutionality 
of an enactment that would present a nonjusticiable issue.”315 In other words, 
Sotomayor suggested that it is possible for a future court to find a political question in 
the context of statutory application.316 
 
Justice Alito concurred in the judgment of Roberts. He stressed that the question 
presented was narrow and involved the power to regulate the contents of a passport, 
not whether the power to recognize foreign governments is exclusively the 
President’s.317 While holding that "determining the constitutionality of an Act of 
Congress may present a political question," Justice Alito found that the issue before 
the court was whether § 214(d) infringes on the power of the President to regulate the 
                                                          
312  Zivotofsky v Clinton 1431-32. 
313  Zivotofsky v Clinton 1431-1433. 
314 Zivotofsky v Clinton 1434. See, e.g., Nixon v United States 506 US 224 (1993) 236 (noting that 
in addition to the textual commitment argument, finding persuasive that opening the door of 
judicial review of impeachment procedures would expose the political life of the country to 
months, or perhaps years, of chaos); Baker v Carr 222 (explaining that the Court in Luther v 
Borden, 7 How 1 (1849), found present features associated with each of the three rationales 
underlying Baker’s factors). 
315  Zivotofsky v Clinton 1435. 
316  She makes the hypothetical point that “if Congress passed a statute, for instance, purporting to 
award financial relief to those improperly tried of impeachment offenses. To adjudicate claims 
under such a statute would require a court to resolve the very same issue we found 
nonjusticiable in Nixon v. United States.” Such an example is atypical, but they suffice to show 
that the foreclosure altogether of political question analysis in statutory cases is unwarranted. 
Zivotofsky v Clinton 1435. 
317  Zivotofsky v Clinton 1436. 
91 
 
 
 
contents of a passport.318 In his view, this narrow question does not constitute a 
nonjusticiable political question.  
 
The lone dissenter in the case was Justice Breyer. He found that the case presented 
nonjusticiable political questions on prudential grounds.319 He concurred with Justice 
Sotomayor's determination that abstention from adjudication due to prudence is 
appropriate only in rare cases, but Breyer, unlike Sotomayor, recognized Zivotofsky v 
Clinton as such rare occasion.320 Justice Breyer reached his decision by recognizing 
four sets of prudential considerations, taken together: first, he found that the case 
arose in the area of foreign affairs, where courts hesitate to make decisions.321 
Second, he found that the case required the court "to evaluate the foreign policy 
implications of foreign policy decisions."322 Third, the petition did not involve 
particularly weighty interests which courts have traditionally sought to protect or which 
vindicate a basic right.323Fourth, when the political branches have nonjudicial methods 
of working out their differences, the need for judicial intervention is 
diminished.324Justice Breyer concluded that Zivotofsky's claim was an unusual case 
exemplifying several prudential considerations, which, altogether, justified abstention 
from judicial intervention.325 
 
As one scholar, who has comprehensively studied the US Supreme Court ruling in 
Zivotofsky v Clinton and its aftermath, has noted it is difficult to draw any sweeping 
conclusions or declare any general trends following that judgment.326 Shemtob has 
further noted that the effects of Zivotofsky v Clinton in the lowers courts has been 
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uncertain and confusing noting that lower courts have so far resisted the court’s 
ruling.327 
 
This study agrees with Shemtob that the implications of the judgment in Zivotofsky v 
Clinton are yet to be seen, but it is clear that its effects will be felt beyond the borders 
of the United States. A few of these implications can be summarized as follows: Firstly, 
the judgment undermines all the prudential considerations in Baker v Carr and is 
emphatic that only the first two factors, which represent the classical political question 
considerations, will be relevant in the application of the doctrine. Another 
commentator, Szurkowski, has emphasized that Zivotofsky v Clinton represents the 
death of the prudential political question doctrine and the reaffirmation of the classical 
political question.328 To add to this, Shemtob correctly notes that Justice Roberts 
adopted the classical view previously adopted by his counterparts in Nixon v United 
States.329 There, Chief Justice Rehnquist excluded from his analysis all four prudential 
factors in Baker v Carr focusing solely on whether a textual demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department was 
available or whether a judicially manageable standard to resolve the issue was 
present.330 Roberts’ position in Zivotofsky v Clinton also appears to take a que from 
Justice Douglas’s classical approach to the doctrine. In Massachusetts v Laird,331 
Justice Douglas took a classical approach to the political question when he dissented 
from a motion for leave to file a bill of complaint. Justice Douglas also criticised the 
use of prudential considerations in determining the presence of a political question.332 
In his view, the duty of the US Supreme Court was to interpret the Constitution, and it 
was irrelevant whether that duty offended another branch of government.333 
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Secondly, given the narrow exceptions announced by Roberts from which a political 
question can be determined to be present or not, the judgment in Zivotofsky v Clinton 
suggests that the future application of the doctrine will be narrow and limited.334 
Nonetheless, as Gil has correctly observed, the doctrine's well-established roots in 
American jurisprudence have been, and by all signs shall continue, to keep several 
politically charged issues beyond the scrutiny of the courts.335 She notes that “more 
than in other fields of government conduct, foreign affairs and national security issues 
have been kept away from judicial review,”336 and this trend is likely to continue under 
Zivotofsky v Clinton.  
 
Thirdly, there is a strong possibility that Zivotofsky v Clinton may have implications in 
countries like Nigeria, Ghana and Uganda and perhaps other jurisdictions where the 
prudential political question as formulated in Baker v Carr was endorsed.337 Baker v 
Carr has also been criticised outside the United States. Dennison has offered a useful 
criticism in the context of his discussion of the issue of avoidance under the political 
question doctrine in Uganda. His critical comments arose out of his reaction to the 
Constitutional Court decision in Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General.338 
In Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General, the Constitutional Court found 
that it was barred by the political question doctrine from determining the 
constitutionality of government maternal health policies. In his reaction to this decision, 
Dennison accepts the court’s use of the political question doctrine but had a problem 
with the Constitutional Court’s use of the doctrine to avoid the determination of the 
central issue of whether there is a constitutional right to health in Uganda. For 
                                                          
senate seat’s recount should go forward or not. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Douglass 
advanced the classical political question arguing that all that mattered was whether there was 
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of such question to the Senate). 
334  Szurkowski 2014 Harvard JLPP. See also, Barron J and Dienes T Constitutionl Law in A 
Nutshell (West 1995).  
335  Gil 2014 Boston University Public Interest LJ 265. 
336  Gil 2014 Boston University Public Interest LJ 265, citing Haig v Agee 453 US 280 (1981) 292; 
Pauling v McNamara 331 F 2d 796 (DC Cir 1963) 799. 
337  See, Onuoha v Okafor; and Dalhatu v Turaki. 
338  Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General, Constitutional Petition No 16 of (2011)      
             UGCC 4. 
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Dennison, the avoidance of the issue by the Constitutional Court is “particularly 
disconcerting in a Ugandan environment where courts have a tendency to exercise 
extreme deference to the other branches of government.”339 His concerns about the 
inappropriate deference offered by the courts to the political branches are well 
documented.340 Intensifying this concern, Dennison observes, that it is the political 
question doctrine as formulated in Baker v Carr which legitimizes political expediency 
and the fear of political consequences as an appropriate legal consideration for 
employing the doctrine in a given case.341 To drive his point home, Dennison 
emphasized the following three factors in Baker v Carr:  
 
(1) the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without 
expressing lack of respect due to coordinate branches of government; (2) an 
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; 
or (3) the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements on 
one question.342 
 
In his view, given the history of extreme deference to the political branches, the above 
three prudential factors from Baker v Carr provide the legal license for Uganda’s 
judiciary to practice issue avoidance in sensitive matters as they did in Centre of Health 
Human Rights v Attorney-General.343 As a result, he is critical of the prudential 
considerations introduced in Baker v Carr and questions the usefulness of that test. 
Dennison’s major problem, which anyone who has studied the history of judicial review 
in Uganda would appreciate, is that prudential factors in Baker v Carr provide a fertile 
basis for “executive to be more politically volatile and reactionary with respect to 
judicial decisions, thus increasing the legal merits for the application of the political 
question doctrine.”344 Professor Barkow agrees with Dennison in pointing out one of 
the major weaknesses of the prudential political question, which is that it gives “an 
                                                          
339  Denisson 2014 LDD 283. 
340  See, Bussey E “Constitutional dialogue in Uganda” 2005 Journal of African Law 2. 
341  Dennison 2014 LDD 283. 
342  Dennison 2014 LDD 283. 
343  American courts have confirmed that these factors in Baker v Carr contain prudential 
considerations. See, Wang v Masaitis 416 F 3d 992 (9th Cir 2005); Corrie v Caterpillar 
Goldwater v Carter 444 US 996 (1979). 
344  Dennison 2014 LDD 283. See also Bussey 2005 JAL (discussing some of the reactions to court 
decision by President Museveni). 
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even more flexible escape hatch for a court that wishes to avoid deciding a tough 
case.”345 It is in this context that Dennison makes an observation that sheds light into 
the current legal position of the law in Uganda. He observes that in his formulation of 
the political question doctrine in Attorney General v Tinyefuza, Justice Kanyeihamba 
may have deliberately left out any meaningful discussion of Baker v Carr as a way of 
discrediting its rationale and by emphasizing the classical political question theory-
based approach.346 
 
It remains to be seen whether critics like Dennison would be persuaded by the views, 
which seek to salvage prudential considerations, expressed by Justice Sotomayor that 
the prudential considerations in Baker v Carr rarely justify the existence of a political 
question doctrine;347 that you require more than just prudential considerations to find 
a non-justiciable political question. These are the questions that are likely to occupy 
jurists in those jurisdictions other than the United States when considering the political 
question doctrine in the aftermath of Zivotofsky v Clinton.  
 
Lastly, the elevation of the first two factors under the six factors in Baker v Carr by 
Roberts J raises interesting questions for this study. What is the vitality of the 
remaining four factors in Baker v Carr? Are those factors good law after Zivotofsky v 
Clinton? What is the future status of the prudential political question doctrine? How 
significant is the decision in Zivotofsky v Clinton to the future application of the 
doctrine? Should Zivotofsky v Clinton be read as a rejection of prudential 
considerations all together and a return to the traditional or classical political question 
doctrine as others have opined? Time will tell the answers to these questions as the 
courts grapple with political question cases in the future.  
 
2.8  Conclusion  
 
                                                          
345  Barkow 2002 Columbia LR 334. 
346  Dennison 2014 LDD 283-284. 
347  Gill 2014 Boston University Public Interest LJ 264. 
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The political question doctrine is one of the oldest legal doctrines and remains good 
law in America. It has gone through transformation over the decades. Since its 
invention, the doctrine has been criticized by scholars and jurists over its incoherence. 
Based on the analysis of case law, it could be argued that the discourse around the 
political question doctrine among judges and academics has centered on ensuring a 
consistent application of the doctrine.348 While an unpredictable application of any 
legal principle is not desirable, it can be expected in the development and application 
of a complex concept like the political question doctrine.349 Courts always disagree 
and at times become unclear in the development and application of a significant 
number of legal principles but this does not entail those principles at issue are 
discredited or be abandoned.350 Due to its prominence, the political question doctrine 
has been adopted and applied by the judiciary in Ghana.  
 
 
 
                                                          
348 See, Finkelstein 1924 Harvard LR 344-45 (noting that there are certain cases which are 
completely without the sphere of judicial interference. They are called political questions); and 
Redish 1984 Northwestern LR 1031-1032 (arguing that academic debate on the political 
question doctrine has centred over the principled use of the doctrine; and that the doctrine is 
very much alive in Supreme Court decisions). 
349 See, Finkelstein 1924 Harvard LR 344-45 (noting that there are certain cases which are 
completely without the sphere of judicial interference. They are called political questions); 
Redish 1984 Northwestern LR 1033 (arguing that the political question doctrine is very much 
alive in Supreme Court decisions); Jaffe 2011 Ecology of Law 1043-1063 (discussing recent 
cases applying the political question doctrine). 
350 See, Rautenbach 2012 TSAR 28 (suggesting that the political question doctrine should not be 
adopted in South Africa because it is highly controversial in its land of origin). But for a 
discussion of disagreements among courts over the application of the doctrine of privity of 
contract or third party beneficiaries see, Perillo J The Law of Contracts (West Group, 
Minnesota, 1998) 641-666; Law Reform Advisory Committee for Northern Ireland, Privity of 
Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties, Report Nos. 4-6 (2006) (examining the 
historical origins and development of privity of contract and highlighting the practical problems 
that have resulted in the areas of construction, shipping, insurance, consumer law); Lavelle M 
“Privity of Contract and Third Party Beneficiaries” (2007) (reviewing the issue of privity of 
contract and third party beneficiaries for purposes of formulating a proposal for reform in 
Canada), online: Uniform Law Conference of Canada 
<http://www.ulcc.ca/en/poam2/Privity_of_Contract_and_Third_Party_Beneficiaries_En.pdf 
(Date of use: 8 June 2015). See also, Debnarayan Dutt v Ramsadhan AIR (1914) Cal 129 
(holding that the doctrine of privity of contract is not applicable in India and that the aim of the 
mofussil court of justice in British India is to do complete justice according to principles of justice, 
equity and good conscience); Jamna Das v Ram Autar (1911) 30 IA 7(where the privy council 
extended the doctrine to India and held that the person not party to the agreement cannot 
recover the amount due from one party) and Lawrence v Fox 20 NY 268 (1859). 
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___________________________________________________________________ 
CHAPTER THREE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION 
DOCTRINE IN GHANA 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
In most constitutional democracies, political disputes or contestations will likely end up 
in the courts. When this happens, judicial overreach can reasonably be perceived and 
judicial independence jeopardized. As one South African judge recently warned in 
Mazibuko, Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly v Sisulu MP Speaker of the 
National Assembly351 there is a threat to judicial independence when the judiciary is 
drawn in to resolve political questions that are beyond its competence or jurisdiction.352 
He further said that: 
 
An overreach of the powers of judges, their intrusion into issues which are 
beyond their competence or intended jurisdiction or which have been 
deliberately and carefully constructed legally so as to ensure that the other 
arms of the state to deal with these matters, can only result in jeopardy for our 
constitutional democracy. In this dispute I am not prepared to create a 
juristocracy and thus do more than that which I am mandated to do in terms 
of our constitutional model.353 
 
The difficulty that confronts democracies is how to jurisprudentially resolve political 
questions that end up in the courts while at the same time preserve the separation of 
powers and rule of law. In some democracies, notably Ghana, Uganda, Nigeria, United 
States and Israel, the judiciaries have developed what is commonly referred to as the 
                                                          
351  Mazibuko, Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly v Sisulu MP Speaker of the 
National Assembly. 
352  Mazibuko, Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly v Sisulu MP Speaker of the 
National Assembly 256E-J. 
353  Mazibuko, Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly v Sisulu MP Speaker of the 
National Assembly 256H-J. Also see Mazibuko, Leader of the Opposition in the National 
Assembly v Sisulu MP Speaker of the National Assembly 2013 (6) SA 249 (CC) (2013) [83] 
(Jafta J minority opinion) (noting that "political issues must be resolved at a political level; that 
our court should not be drawn into political disputes, the resolution of which falls appropriately 
within the domain of other fora established in terms of the Constitution"). 
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political question doctrine to resolve political questions and define their relationship 
with other branches of government in relation to those questions.  
 
This chapter examines the development and current status of the political question 
doctrine in Ghanaian jurisprudence. It discusses the application of the political 
question doctrine in Ghana with a view to drawing lessons for South Africa. It argues 
that while there are differences of opinion around the application of the political 
question doctrine, the doctrine is firmly part of Ghanaian constitutional law. The 
chapter observes that the differences of opinion among judges in Ghana is over the 
proper application of the doctrine rather than whether or not it forms part of Ghanaian 
constitutional law. The chapter also discusses another related issue, which is the 
constitutional status of Directive Principles of State Policy in chapter 6 of the 1992 
Constitution of Ghana (also refered to as the Constitution 1992) and whether or not 
these principles are justiciable. 
 
3.2  The application of the political question doctrine   
 
The political question doctrine has been considered by courts in Ghana since the early 
1980s.354 However, not only have courts and legal commentators disagreed about its 
wisdom and validity, they have also varied considerably over the doctrine's scope and 
rationale.355 In fact, they have even diverged over whether or not the doctrine is 
applicable under Ghanaian constitutional law, given the contested case authority that 
                                                          
354  It was first considered in Tuffour v Attorney-General 1980 GLR 637 at 651-652 (holding that 
"courts cannot enquire into the legality or illegality of what happened in Parliament. In so far as 
Parliament has acted by virtue of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, its actions 
within Parliament are a closed book."). 
355  See, Asare K “Can the Political doctrine Question Save MP Amoateng” (November 2006) 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=113967 (Date of 
use: 11 November 2015) (arguing against the application of the political question doctrine in 
Ghana); JH Mensah v Attorney-General 1996-97 SCGLR 320 (holding that the political question 
doctrine as applied in the United States is not applicable in Ghana); Amidu v President Kufuor 
2001-2002 SCGLR 138 at 152 (hereafter Amidu) (Kpegah dissenting opinion) (arguing that the 
political question doctrine is applicable to Ghana); Ghana Bar Association v Attorney-General 
2003-2004 SCGLR 250 (holding that the political question doctrine barred the Supreme Court 
from scrutinising the decision of the President to appoint the Chief Justice); New Patriotic Party 
v Attorney-General 1993-94 2 GLR 35 SC; Asare v Attorney-General (AP) unreported case 
number 21/2006 (15 September 2006). 
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adopted it.356 However, there is agreement that the political question doctrine is a 
function of the separation of powers principle enshrined in the Constitution 1992, and 
that its jurisprudential basis was influenced by case law from the US Supreme 
Court.357 Justice Kpegah, who was one of the strongest advocates of the doctrine on 
the Ghana’s Supreme Court, has offered the most comprehensive and convincing 
articulation of the basis of the political question doctrine under the Constitution of 
Ghana.  
 
In his dissenting opinion in Amidu,358 Justice Kpegah explains that the Constitution of 
Ghana is written and underpinned by the principle of the separation of powers. In his 
view, being a written Constitution, it has certain attributes. Among them is that the form 
of government envisages three important arms of government, namely the executive, 
legislature and judiciary.359 Another attribute, maintains Justice Kpegah, is that these 
various arms of government have their respective powers laid down with limits not to 
be infringed by any other arm of government.360 Justice Kpegah reminds us that these 
limits expressed in the Constitution of Ghana would be meaningless and serve no 
purpose if freely ignored or infringed by any arm of government.361 Constitutional 
commentators agree with Justice Kpegah's pronouncement, arguing that: 
 
… by simultaneously dividing power among the three branches and 
institutionalizing methods that allow each branch to check the other… the 
Constitution reduces the likelihood that one faction or interest group that has 
                                                          
356  See, Bimpong-Buta S Role of the Supreme Court In the Development of the Constitutional Law 
In Ghana (LDD thesis University of South Africa 2005) 129-130 (suggesting that there is no 
proper legal authority for the application of the political question doctrine in Ghana); Redish 
1984 Northwestern LR (making similar observations about the disagreements of the application 
of the political question doctrine in the United States context); Asare v Attorney-General (AP) 
(where the political question doctrine was most recently applied). See Wishik 1985 Washington 
Law Review (discussing that scholars disagree on whether the political question doctrine exists 
at all, and if it does exist, on whether it is constitutionally defined or is a flexible, prudential tool 
to protect the court's authority). 
357  See Ghana Bar Association (Hayfron-Benjamin J concurring opinion) (explaining that although 
in Tuffour, the Supreme Court did not use the term non-justiciable political question, they 
reached conclusions which accord with justice Brennan's dictum in Baker v Carr). 
358  Amidu 138. 
359  Amidu 153. 
360  Amidu 153. 
361  Amidu 153-54. 
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managed to obtain control of one branch will be able to implement its political 
agenda in contravention of the wishes of the people.362 
 
Justice Kpegah goes on to explain that while the Constitution of Ghana is expressed 
as the supreme law of Ghana, there is an inherent indication in the text that the policy 
which informs or should inform any legislation and the desire to enact such legislation 
are matters for the political branches of government to determine.363 On the other 
hand, Kpegah concedes that the interpretation and enforcement of the law passed by 
the legislature fall within the functions of the judiciary. In his view, the question of 
whether an Act of Parliament is constitutionally valid or not is not a political question 
and the judiciary is not barred from deciding it.364 He teaches us that when the judiciary 
examines whether Parliament has breached the constitutional limits on its legislative 
powers it is not engaging in determining political questions, because the judiciary has 
the power to make these determinations. For Kpegah, this distinction is important and 
must be maintained.365 One of Kpegah's colleagues on the bench, Chief Justice 
Archer, agreed with the importance of maintaining this distinction when he said that: 
 
The Constitution gives the judiciary power to interpret and enforce the 
Constitution and I do not think that this independence enables the judiciary to 
do what it likes by undertaking incursions into territory reserved for Parliament 
and the executive. This court should not behave like an octopus stretching its 
                                                          
362  See, Redish M and Cisar E “If Angels Were to Govern: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in 
Separation of Powers Theory” 1991-1992 Duke Law Journal 449 at 451; Magill E “The Real 
Separation in Separation of Powers Law” 2000 Virginia Law Review 1127 at 1152; Calabresi 
SG and Larsen JL “One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or Separation of Personnel” 
(1994) 79 Cornell Law Review 1052 ; Strauss PL “Formal And Functional Approaches to 
Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?” 1978 Cornell Law Review 488; 
Liberman L “Morrison v. Olson: A Formalistic Perspective on Why the Court Was Wrong” 1989 
American University Law Review 313; Bruff H “Presidential Powers and Administrative 
Rulemaking” 1979 Yale Law Journal 451; Calabresi SG and Rhodes KH “The Structural 
Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary” 1992 Harvard Law Review 1153; Farina C 
“Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative  State” 1989 
Columbia Law Review 452; and Redish 1984 Northwestern LR. 
363  Amidu 154. 
364  Amidu 154. 
365  Justice Ngcobo agrees with the need to maintain this distinction and explains that "when a court 
decides whether parliament has complied with its express constitutional obligation, such as a 
provision that requires statutes to be passed by a specified majority, it does not infringe upon 
the principle of separation of powers or determine a political question". Ngcobo maintains that 
"what the court is simply doing in such a case is to decide the formal question of whether there 
was the required majority". See Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National 
Assembly [25]. 
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eight tentacles here and there to grab jurisdiction not constitutionally meant 
for it. I hold that this court has no constitutional power to prevent the executive 
from proclaiming 31 December as a public holiday.366 
 
Clearly, Justice Kpegah and other Justices of the Supreme Court of Ghana are of the 
view that the political question doctrine did not evolve in American jurisprudence due 
to the fact that the courts were not expressly endowed with the power of judicial review 
in the United States Constitution.367 Instead, they view the doctrine as a necessary 
function of the universal principle of separation of powers.368 There are at least three 
Supreme Court decisions and one High Court decision that either openly applied or 
considered the political question doctrine in Ghana.  
 
3.3  A legislative decision to declare a public holiday  
 
The first Ghanaian case that considered the political question doctrine was New 
Patriotic Party v Attorney-General.369 The plaintiff in this case was the New Patriotic 
Party, the main opposition political party at the time. It brought a law suit seeking a 
declaration pursuant to section 2(1) of the Constitution 1992 that the planned public 
holiday and celebration of the coup d'état in Ghana on 31 December 1981 was in 
conflict with the Constitution 1992. In its defence the government invoked the political 
question doctrine as articulated in Baker v Carr to bar the Supreme Court from 
adjudicating the matter. It argued that the question of whether or not 31 December 
should be declared a public holiday was a non-justiciable political question. 
 
                                                          
366  Amidu 154 citing New Patriotic Party v Attorney-General 49. 
367  Amidu 154. 
368  Amidu 155. Also see Birkey S “Gordon v Texas and the Prudential Approach to Political 
Questions” 1999 California Law Review 1265-1281 (arguing that the political question doctrine 
is a function of the separation of powers doctrine); Reich Y “United States v AT&T: Judicially 
Supervised Negotiated and Political Questions” 1977 Columbia Law Review 466 (arguing that 
the judiciary's reluctance to decide political questions stems from its respect for the separation 
of powers between the judiciary and the elected branches of government); and Harvey DA 
“The Alien Tort Statute: International Human Rights Watchdog or Simply Historical Trivia” 1988 
John Marshall Law Review 356 (arguing that the political question doctrine is based on the 
separation of powers). 
369  New Patriotic Party v Attorney-General. 
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In a five to four decision, the majority of the Supreme Court led by Justice Adade 
rejected the government's argument. It reasoned that since the "... Constitution, 1992 
itself was essentially a political document because every matter of interpretation or 
enforcement which may arise from it was bound to have political dimension,"370 which 
fact cannot be a basis to deprive the Supreme Court of its judicial powers. Further, it 
explained that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to determine political questions in 
exercising its constitutional duty of enforcing or interpreting the Constitution under 
articles 2(1)371 and 130.372 According to the Supreme Court, the question whether the 
celebration of the 31 December seizure of power from the then Government of Ghana 
was in conflict with the Constitution 1992 and required an interpretation of the 
Constitution, which the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to determine. It held that the 
political question doctrine was not applicable in Ghana because the Supreme Court, 
as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution 1992 pursuant to articles 2(1) and 130, 
may lawfully decide controversies of a political nature. There is a general agreement 
among commentators that nothing prevents courts from deciding political 
controversies; however, cases that are too political fall within the political question 
doctrine.373 
                                                          
370  New Patriotic Party v Attorney-General 38 and 65. 
371  Section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992 provides as follows: "(1) A person 
who alleges that - (a) an enactment or anything contained in or done under the authority of that 
or any other enactment; or (b) any act or omission of any person; is inconsistent with, or is in 
contravention of a provision of this Constitution, may bring an action in the Supreme Court for 
a declaration to that effect." 
372  Section 130 of the Constitution provides in pertinent as follows: "The Supreme Court shall have 
exclusive original jurisdiction in - (a) all matters relating to the enforcement or interpretation of 
this Constitution; and (b) all matters arising as to whether an enactment was made in excess 
of the powers conferred on Parliament or any other authority or person by law or under this 
Constitution." 
373  See, LaTourette 2008 Rutgers LJ (arguing that the political question doctrine can be used to 
avoid deciding cases that are too complicated or politically charged); Fickes A “Private and 
Political Questions: A Critical Analysis of the Political Question Doctrine’s Application to Suits 
Against Private Military Contractors” 2009 Temple Law Review 525 (arguing that the Supreme 
Court's willingness to determine the most politically contentious issues in recent years 
demonstrates that the courts will not shy away from resolving legal disputes merely because 
they touch upon politically controversial issues); Chase C “The Political Question Doctrine: 
Preventing the Challenge of US Foreign Policy in 767 Third Avenue Associates v Consulate 
General” 2001 Catholic University law Review 1045;  Ekpu A “Judicial Response to Coup 
De’tat: A Reply to Tayyab Mahmud (From a Nigerian Perspective)” 1996 Ariz J Int’l & Comp 
Law 1; Free B “Waiting Does v Exxon Mobile Corp: Advocating the Cautious Use of Executive 
Opinions in Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation” 2003 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 467; and 
Willig S “Politics As Usual? The Political Question Doctrine in Holocaust Litigation” 2010 
Cardozo Law Review 723.  
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Throwing his weight behind the majority decision, Justice Amua-Sekyi made the 
following observation about the reach of the Supreme Court's powers under the 
Constitution of Ghana: 
 
It was also said that the issue is a political one that the plaintiff ought to have 
made its complaint to Parliament... However, there is nothing to stop it from 
making a legal issue of it and coming to this court for redress… As the 
fundamental or basic law, the Constitution,1992 controls all legislation and 
determines their validity. It is for the courts as the guardians of legality to 
ensure that all agencies of the state keep within their lawful bounds.374 
 
Evidently, Justice Amua-Sekyi views Supreme Court powers as broad enough to 
encompass political questions. On the other hand, the minority view was that the issue 
before the Supreme Court was a political question and more appropriate for the 
executive and legislature to determine. In her powerful dissenting judgment, Justice 
Bamford-Addo reasoned that "the fixing of a date for celebration as a public holiday is 
a policy decision of the government, an executive act and can be changed."375 
According to Justice Bamford-Addo, any government has the freedom to adopt a 
policy choice, through legislation, to scrap or insert 31 December from the list of public 
holidays in the legislation.376 Thus, since the fixing of 31 December was a policy 
choice, the minority view was that the political question doctrine barred the Supreme 
Court from deciding the matter as a means of demonstrating respect to the other arms 
of government. In his support for the minority views, Justice Archer defended the 
political question doctrine and reasoned that: 
 
I think if the order is granted, it would amount to judicial officiousness - 
poking our noses into the affairs of Parliament and intermeddling with the 
prerogative of the executive by directing the government not to spend 
moneys approved by Parliament. Such a move clearly amounts to a 
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers which is the core of our 
Constitution.377 
                                                          
374 New Patriotic Party v Attorney-General 130. 
375  New Patriotic Party v Attorney-General 153. 
376  New Patriotic Party v Attorney-General 153. 
377  New Patriotic Party v Attorney-General 52. 
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It is important to point out that whilst siding with the majority on the question of 31 
December celebrations, Justice Hayfron-Benjamin differed with the majority on the 
broad question of whether the political question doctrine was applicable in Ghana. 
Justice Hayfron-Benjamin confidently stated that:  
 
The whole principle of a non-justiciable political question is an American 
formulation. While it may be relevant to our situation because it is a 
development from a written democratic Constitution, I think there are so 
few parallels between the two Constitutions on this principle that its 
application to our Constitution, 1992 must necessarily be limited…It seems 
to me therefore that by the nature of our Constitution, 1992 the principle 
of a non-justiciable political question can only arise where the Constitution 
expressly commits a particular responsibility to some arm of government. A 
clear example may be the power of the President to appoint ambassadors 
under article 74(1) of the Constitution, 1992.378 
 
Despite the ruling in New Patriotic Party v Attorney-General, the Supreme Court in 
Ghana Bar Association v Attorney-General379 categorically held that the political 
question doctrine was applicable in Ghana.  
 
3.4  The appointment of a chief justice 
 
In Ghana Bar Association v Attorney-General, the President, acting under articles 
91(1)380 and 144(1)381 of the Constitution of Ghana, nominated Justice Abban as the 
Chief Justice for approval by Parliament. In turn, Parliament approved the nomination 
and Justice Abban was duly appointed by the President on 22 February 1995. The 
Ghana Bar Association (GBA) objected to this appointment. It brought a lawsuit before 
the Supreme Court in which it sought a declaration that Justice Abban was not a 
                                                          
378  New Patriotic Party v Attorney-General 178-179. 
379  Ghana Bar Association v Attorney-General. 
380  Section 91(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992 reads as follows: "The Council 
of State shall consider and advise the President or any other authority in respect of any 
appointment which is required by this Constitution or any other law to be made in accordance 
with the advice of, or in consultation with, the Council of State." 
381 Section 144(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992 reads as follows: "The Chief 
Justice shall be appointed by the President acting in consultation with the Council of State and 
with the approval of Parliament." 
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person of high moral character and proven integrity and thus not appointable as Chief 
Justice. The GBA also sought a declaration that the appointment of Justice Abban by 
the President as Chief Justice, as well as the advice of the Council of State and the 
approval by Parliament of his nomination, was unconstitutional.  
 
The government defended the case by challenging the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court to hear the matter. Anyone who is familiar with Barkow's work on the political 
question doctrine would understand that the reason the threshold question raised by 
the government was directed at the courts' jurisdiction is premised on the political 
question theory that “the judicial task at the outset of every case is to make a threshold 
determination as to whether the Constitution gives some interpretive authority to the 
political branches on the question being raised and to specify the boundaries of what 
has been allocated elsewhere."382 Barkow correctly argues that "just as a statute may 
give more or less interpretive power to agencies, the constitution also creates different 
degrees of interpretive power in the political branches. Similarly, just as a statute may 
commit a question entirely to agency discretion, so, too, does the constitution 
recognize that some questions rest within the absolute discretion of the political 
branches."383  
 
In line with Barkow's thinking, the government's main argument in Ghana Bar 
Association v Attorney-General was that by virtue of the principle of separation of 
powers enshrined in the Constitution 1992, the appointment of Justice Abban as Chief 
Justice was a non-justiciable political question specifically committed to the President, 
Council of State and Parliament. On the contrary, the GBA argued that the Supreme 
Court, pursuant to articles 295 and 125(3) of the Constitution, has the final judicial 
power to determine whether any person or authority has properly performed his, her 
or its functions under the Constitution or any other law. As a result, the political 
question doctrine was not applicable to Ghana.384 
                                                          
382  Barkow 2002 Columbnia LR 239. 
383  Barkow 2002 Columbnia LR 239. 
384 Defenders of the political question doctrine oppose arguments like this one raised by the GBA, 
which presuppose that the judiciary has the final say on the interpretation of a constitution. They 
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Justice Kpegah, who wrote for the majority, held that the political question doctrine 
was applicable to Ghana. He reasoned that the doctrine was implicit in the concept of 
the separation of powers, where certain functions are committed to a specific branch 
of government. In such a constitutional design, he reasoned, a political question 
cannot evolve into a judicial question.385 In support of Justice Kpegah, Weinberg has 
argued that "the interpretation of law cannot be confided exclusively to the judiciary” 
but must be understood as a shared responsibility.386 To a great extent, this view is 
shared by Barkow. In her view, “the political question doctrine reflects a constitutional 
design that does not require the judiciary to supply the substantive content of all 
constitutional provisions."387 Consistent with these views, Justice Kpegah held that 
article 144 of the Constitution committed the appointment of the Chief Justice to the 
executive branch and legislative branch, and that any attempt by the Supreme Court 
to claim a power to be able to declare null and void the appointment of the Chief Justice 
would justly be described as a usurpation of the constitutional functions of both the 
executive and legislative branches.388 Kpegah was convinced that by assuming the 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter, the Supreme Court would be entering upon policy 
determinations for which judicially manageable standards were not available.389 In 
other words, by assuming jurisdiction the Supreme Court would be supplying 
                                                          
argue that the judiciary shares interpretive authority with the other branches of government. 
See Mulhern 1988 University of Pennsylvania LR; Bickel The Least Dangerous 183-197. 
385  Ghana Bar Association v Attorney-General 294. 
386  See, Weinberg L “Political Questions and the Guarantee Clause” 1994 University of Colorado 
Law Review 889. 
387  Barkow 2002 Columbia LR 239. 
388  Ghana Bar Association v Attorney-General 301. 
389  In Nigeria appellate courts have taken a view similar to that of Ghanaian courts. See Onuoha 
v Okafor (holding that the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination of a political 
question is one of the dominant considerations in determining whether a question falls within 
the category of political questions); and Balarabe Musa v Auta Hamza 247 (holding that the 
impeachment of a State governor was a political question not appropriate for judicial review. 
Justice Ademola reasoned that "impeachment proceedings are political and for the court to 
enter into the political thicket as the invitation made to it clearly implies in my view asking its 
gates and its walls to be painted with mud; and the throne of justice from where its judgments 
are delivered polished with mire"). Also see Mhango M “Separation of powers and the 
application of the political question doctrine in Uganda” 2013 African Journal of Legal Studies 
249 (discussing the development and application of the political question doctrine in Uganda). 
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substantive content to the constitutional provisions concerning the appointment of a 
Chief Justice, which, in his view, was not permissible.390 
 
In addressing the general question of the applicability of the political question doctrine 
in Ghana, Justice Kpegah reasoned that there were sufficient local authorities to 
support its application,391 and since the political question doctrine was a concept that 
emanated from the notion of the separation of powers, the Supreme Court ought to 
endeavour to apply it. Justice Kpegah laid down three common characteristics by 
which to determine whether a case raises a political question, namely: (1) does the 
issue involve the resolution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution to a 
co-ordinate branch of government; (2) would a resolution of the question demand that 
a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise; and (3) do prudential considerations 
counsel against judicial intervention.392 
 
Justice Kpegah criticized and dismissed the proposition made by Justice Adade in the 
New Patriotic Party v Attorney General that the political question doctrine does not 
apply to the US Supreme Court, which reasoning Justice Adade had employed to deny 
the application of the doctrine in that case. In his view, Justice Adade's majority opinion 
in the New Patriotic Party v Attorney General took a very simplistic way to view a 
serious legal concept such as the political question doctrine.393 In support of Justice 
Kpegah, Justice Hayfron-Benjamin commented that the political question doctrine "… 
is certainly one of the grounds upon which the jurisdiction of this court may be 
ousted."394 He went on to observe that the judgment in Tuffour, which is cited as 
authority for the political question doctrine in Ghana, "… reached conclusions which 
accord with Justice Brennan's dictum in Baker v Carr."395 While Justice Kpegah in 
Ghana Bar Association v Attorney-General recognised the application of the political 
question doctrine in Ghana, he accepted the limits of its application and held that the 
                                                          
390  Barkow 2002 Columbia LR 239. 
391  Tuffour (Justice Sowah opinion); New Patriotic Party v Attorney-General (Archer opinion; and 
Jutice Hayfron-Benjamin opinion). 
392  Ghana Bar Association v Attorney-General 300. 
393  Ghana Bar Association v Attorney-General 294. 
394  Amidu 148, citing Ghana Bar Association v Attorney-General. 
395  Amidu 148, citing Ghana Bar Association v Attorney-General. 
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mere fact that a lawsuit seeks the protection of a political right does not mean that it 
presents a non-justiciable political question.396 The decision in Ghana Bar Association 
v Attorney-General was considered in Mensah v Attorney-General, in which the 
Supreme Court reached a different conclusion about the application of the political 
question doctrine in that case.  
 
3.5  Dismissal of a cabinet minister 
 
In Mensah v Attorney- General the term of office of President Rawlings had ended on 
6 January 1997. The next day, President Rawlings, who had been re-elected as 
President in the previous month, was sworn in as President for a second term of four 
years. Soon after the swearing in, it was announced that the President had decided to 
retain in office some of his previous ministers and deputy ministers. It was also 
announced that since the appointment of those retained ministers had been approved 
by the previous Parliament, there was no need for them to be reapproved by the new 
Parliament. That decision was opposed by the opposition party in Parliament. 
Subsequent to this announcement it was also announced that one of the retained 
Ministers, the Minister of Finance, would appear before Parliament to present the 1997 
Budget Statement. Before the Minister could do so the leader of the opposition political 
party Hon. Mensah filed a lawsuit in the Supreme Court. The Plaintiff asked the 
Supreme Court to declare, among other things, that the Constitution prevented anyone 
from acting as a Minister without the prior approval of the newly elected second 
Parliament. The government defended the lawsuit by arguing, inter alia, that the 
process by which Parliament exercised its powers such as the approval of ministerial 
nominations could not be questioned by the judiciary under the political question 
doctrine. 
 
The Supreme Court, as per Justice Acquah, held that every presidential nominee for 
ministerial appointment, whether retained or new, required the prior approval of 
Parliament. Justice Acquah reasoned that unlike the US Supreme Court, which 
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derives its power of judicial review through jurisprudential authority, the Supreme 
Court of Ghana derives its power of judicial review from articles 2 and 130 of the 
Constitution. Any limitation on that power, he argued, would have to find support in the 
language of those articles. On this point, Barkow has remarked that although judicial 
review is the norm, as Justice Acquah suggests, there are exceptions which are 
expressed in particular provisions in a constitution.397 In the American context, Barkow 
asserts that the Constitution carves out certain categories of issues that may be 
resolved as a matter of legislative or executive discretion.398 Under this view of the 
political question doctrine, judicial abstinence is seen as constitutionally required and 
not discretionary.399 
 
However, in his analysis Justice Acquah expressed some reservations about the 
political question doctrine. Specifically, he saw one potential interpretation of the 
doctrine which could be perceived as granting political immunity for breaches of the 
Constitution by the elected branches of government. In turn, he offered a preferred 
understanding of the doctrine which, in his view, complied with Ghana's constitutional 
design and structure. This study describes his preferred understanding as the 
compromised political question doctrine. He said that: 
 
If by the political question doctrine, it is meant that where the Constitution 
allocates power or function to an authority, and that authority exercises that 
power or function within the parameters of that provision and the Constitution 
as a whole, a court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the exercise of that 
function, then I entirely agree that the doctrine applies in our constitutional 
jurisprudence. For this is what is implied in the concept of separation of 
powers. But if by the doctrine, it is meant that even where the authority 
exercises that power in violation of the constitutional provision, a court has no 
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399  Barkow 2002 Columbia LR 247-248; Wechsler Principles 9 (arguing that the only judgment that 
may lead to an abstention from decision is that the Constitution has committed the 
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(arguing that the political question doctrine is a product of constitutional interpretation rather 
than judicial discretion). 
110 
 
 
 
jurisdiction to interfere because it is the Constitution which allocated that 
power to that authority, then I emphatically disagree.400 
 
It is submitted that Justice Acquah's statement above is a perfect expression of what 
Cowper and Sossin identified as the difficulty with the political question doctrine, which 
lies in the failure by some jurists to distinguish between "… questions which the 
judiciary must resolve, no matter how politically sensitive, and those cases where the 
judiciary should decline to address the issue on the basis that it is not a proper question 
for adjudication by the courts."401 It is possible that this study has given Justice Acquah 
an unfair reading, however it is submitted that there is a failure by some jurists to 
appreciate the significance of the distinction highlighted in Justice Acquah's reasoning 
above.  
 
In explaining the distinction that must be made in cases involving political questions, 
Redish offered a useful suggestion which (while made in the American context during 
the 1980s) addresses Justice Acquah's assertion above. Redish postulates that in 
those cases that raise separation of powers concerns and should be dismissed, the 
judiciary “is not abdicating its power to interpret and enforce a constitutional provision; 
rather it is simply holding that nothing in the Constitution directs the exercise as to how 
to make such determinations."402 Redish further maintains that "when the 
Constitution's framers intended that one of the political branches has discretion to act 
without principles, the document effectively says so, by vesting decisionmaking power 
in those branches without simultaneously indicating how that power must be 
exercised."403 In the South African case of Doctors for Life International v Speaker of 
the National Assembly Justice Ngcobo accepts the distinction advocated by Redish. 
Ngcobo J explains it this way: 
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It seems to me therefore that a distinction should be drawn between 
constitutional provisions that impose obligations that are readily ascertainable 
and are unlikely to give rise to disputes, on the one hand, and those provisions 
which impose the primary obligation on Parliament to determine what is 
required of it, on the other. In the case of the former, a determination whether 
those obligations have been fulfilled does not call upon a court to pronounce 
upon a sensitive aspect of the separation of powers.… It simply decides the 
formal question whether there was, for example, the two-thirds majority 
required to pass the legislation. By contrast, where the obligation requires 
Parliament to determine in the first place what is necessary to fulfil its 
obligation, a review by a court whether that obligation has been fulfilled, 
trenches on the autonomy of Parliament to regulate its own affairs and thus 
the principle of separation of powers.404 
 
If the political question doctrine can be understood in this way, it becomes easier to 
see the flaw in Justice Acquah's stance. In his pronouncement above, Justice Acquah 
addresses and accepts the application of the political question doctrine in 
circumstances where he claims the Constitution 1992 allocates power to the political 
branches and indicates the parameters for the exercise of such power. However, 
Justice Acquah fails to address the instances where the Constitution 1992 allocates 
power or discretion to the political branches without at the same time indicating the 
parameters of that discretion or power. By this failure Justice Acquah creates the 
impression that in those other instances the judiciary will have a final say concerning 
those constitutional questions. Barkow disagrees with this suggestion and correctly 
argues that the constitution's structure and the limited powers of the judiciary require 
political branches to decide constitutional questions in many instances, and in such 
instances, they have the same authority to make decisions as the judiciary itself has 
in other instances.405  
 
Perhaps Justice Acquah would find consolation in the classical political question 
theory, which views the political question doctrine as a product of constitutional 
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interpretation rather than of judicial discretion.406 In this regard, Professor Redish was 
correct in noting that it is: 
 
… vital to distinguish between appropriate substantive deference—in which 
the judiciary, while retaining power to render final decisions on the meaning of 
the constitutional limits, nevertheless takes into account the need for expertise 
or quick action—and unacceptable total procedural deference, where the court 
concludes simply that resort to the judiciary constitutes the wrong procedure, 
because the decision is exclusively that of the political branches.407 
 
To some extent, Redish's arguments and comments were directed towards the views 
of Justice Acquah and other like-minded jurists.  
 
Notwithstanding Justice Acquah's omission to distinguish between justiciable and non-
justiciable questions, there is something to celebrate about his perspective. There is 
no doubt that he endorses the political question doctrine in Ghana and accepts, like 
some commentators, that certain constitutional provisions require deference to the 
other branches, but has reservations about accepting that in cases involving political 
questions absolute deference is demanded.408 Justice Acquah's position could be 
described as a compromise political question doctrine because he accepts what has 
been described as the need to balance the judiciary's role in checking unconstitutional 
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government action with its duty not to usurp the political power exercised by the people 
through the executive and legislative branches.409 The problem, as this study attempts 
to demonstrate, is that Justice Acquah, at the time of his writing, had not yet fully 
thought out the practicalities of this balance, or may not have been convinced that the 
facts in Mensah v Attorney-General presented an opportunity to develop that balance. 
 
Justice Aikins agreed with Justice Acquah's opinion in Mensah v Attorney-General and 
wrote his own concurring opinion. Aikins dismissed the government's contention and 
held that the Supreme Court was entitled to decide questions of a political nature 
"since in Ghana it is the Constitution and not Parliament which is supreme."410 It is 
important to point out what Justices Acquah and Aikins do not propose or accept, 
which is that the Supreme Court has authority to determine cases raising political 
questions. Instead, they maintained that the Supreme Court is entitled to hear and 
determine questions of a political nature. There is a difference between the two 
positions. The determination of questions of a political nature or with political 
implications has never been barred by the political question doctrine. On the contrary, 
the political question doctrine is concerned with the determination of political 
questions, which cannot be answered by the application of the law. 
 
Further, Aikins held that any act of Parliament which is in conflict with the Constitution 
can be declared null and void even though the Act deals with a political question.411 
While the political question doctrine was dismissed by the majority as not applicable 
in the case of Mensah v Attorney General, in his concurring opinion Justice Aikins 
conceded that the doctrine was increasingly creeping into Ghanaian legal 
jurisprudence.412 To further enhance this concession and solidify the political question 
doctrine in Ghana, Aikins distinguished the judgment in Tuffuor, the first case that 
considered the political question doctrine in Ghana, from Mensah v Attorney-
General.413 This is an important development because as Bimpong-Buta has 
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observed, Tuffuor, together with the dicta from the opinions of Justices Archer and 
Hayfron-Benjamin in New Patriotic Party v Attorney-General, has been cited as 
authority in support for the application of the political question doctrine in Ghana.414 In 
other words, by distinguishing Mensah v Attorney-General from the judgment of 
Tuffuor, Justice Aikins' pronouncement can be read as bringing clarity in the law that 
the political question doctrine is indeed applicable in Ghana.  
 
3.6  A legislative decision to retain a member of parliament   
 
The above jurisprudence reflects the Supreme Court's efforts to formulate a consistent 
political question doctrine for Ghana.415 This jurisprudence has had influence in the 
lower court's application of the doctrine. One of the most recent lower court cases 
applying the political question doctrine is Asare v Attorney-General.416 In this case, a 
Member of Parliament Mr Eric Amoateng was arrested and detained in the United 
States for unlawfully importing narcotics into that country. Under the rules of 
Parliament, Mr Amoeteng sought leave of absence from Parliament, which was 
granted from 17 to 24 November 2005. Further, Parliament's Committee on Privileges 
considered the reasonableness of Mr Amoaeteng's absence from Parliament. On the 
strength of the criminal law principle that everyone is presumed innocent until proven 
guilty by a court of law, and the need to extend compassion to Amoaeteng due to the 
slow pace of his criminal trial in the United States, the Committee on Privileges 
recommended that Parliament allow Amoaeteng the required time to defend his 
criminal charges.  
 
After some debate, Parliament approved this recommendation and decided to grant 
Amoaeteng a dispensation to be absent from Parliament indefinitely. This decision by 
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Parliament was challenged by the plaintiff, Stephen Asare. The plaintiff's claim was 
that since the Speaker permitted Amoaeteng to be absent from 17 to 24 November 
only, Amoaeteng's seat became vacant by operation of law and neither the Speaker 
nor Parliament could grant any other dispensation. Therefore, the High Court, in this 
case, was seized to determine whether Parliament had the authority to grant a 
member of Parliament a dispensation to be absent from Parliament indefinitely.417 
 
Essentially, the High Court had to determine at least two important related questions: 
firstly, whether the parliamentary seat of Amoaeteng became vacant by operation of 
law, and secondly, whether Parliament's decision to grant Amoaeteng a dispensation 
to be absent indefinitely from Parliament could be called into question on legal grounds 
as being unreasonable and unlawful. Justice Ayebi held that the political question 
doctrine applied in this case. In endorsing Justice Acquah's opinion in Mensah v 
Attorney-General, Justice Ayebi reasoned that "it is Parliament which as the legislative 
arm of government which has been mandated by the Constitution to determine the 
reasonableness or otherwise of [Amoaeteng's] explanation through the Committee on 
Privileges."418 Justice Ayebi found that this is what Parliament had done in this case. 
In his view "the decision of Parliament … will stand the test of time. That apart this 
decision is a political question intravires the Constitution and therefore not subject to 
judicial scrutiny."419  
 
To best illustrate the suitability of applying the political question doctrine in this case, 
Justice Ayebi employed the following hypothetical scenario and said: 
 
… supposing [Amoaeteng] was involved in a fatal accident on this trip and he 
was only able to inform Mr. Speaker long after fifteen sittings of Parliament. 
Doctors attending to him determined that it will take sometime for him to 
recover. Should the court declare an indefinite dispensation granted 
[Amoaeteng] in such circumstances by parliament as unreasonable? 
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Consequent upon that, should the court declare the seat of [Amoaeteng] 
vacant? I think not.420 
 
In short, Justice Ayebi's reasoning was that since Parliament found Amoaeteng's 
reasons for absence reasonable and granted indefinite dispensation in the particular 
circumstances of this case, that decision should not be subjected to judicial scrutiny.  
 
While Asare v Attorney-General has been criticised, this criticism has centered on the 
perceived failure of Justice Ayebi to properly justify why the political question doctrine 
should have determined the case rather than on whether the doctrine is applicable in 
Ghana at all.421 In other words, Asare, who has expressed the most critical views 
against the decision in Asare v Attorney-General, agrees that the political question 
doctrine is applicable in Ghana, but that a court should offer convincing reasons for its 
application in any given case.422 What seems to ignite Asare's critical views on Asare 
v Attorney General is that Justice Ayebi's opinion, in his view, does not justify or 
explain the rationale for allowing the political question doctrine to swallow the court's 
explicit powers in article 99(1)(a) of the Constitution of Ghana.423 Further, Asare 
criticises Justice Ayebi's failure to apply the three-prong test announced in Ghana Bar 
Association v Attorney General to the facts in the case. Presumably, had this been 
done Justice Ayebi would have been forced to justify the application of the political 
question doctrine in the case.424 Asare's criticism is reflective of the prevailing 
discourse around the doctrine in Ghana, namely that it forms part of Ghanaian law and 
Ghana Bar Association v Attorney General articulates how it ought to be applied. 
Therefore, it seems clear from this discourse that the critical views against the recent 
application of the political question doctrine are not dismissive of the doctrine but are 
rather directed at what should be its proper application. 
 
3.7  The justiciability of directive principles and state policy  
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What is clear from the above analysis is that the application of the political question 
doctrine requires an acceptance that there are certain constitutional questions or 
provisions that are not justiciable. This is why the doctrine is controversial. However, 
the issue of the justiciability or not of certain provisions of the Constitution of Ghana 
has been contested since the advent of constitutionalism in Ghana.425 As constitutional 
commentators have observed, one of the areas where this issue has come to the fore 
is chapter 6 of the Constitution.426 In particular, commentators note that Article 34(1), 
the opening of chapter 6, creates some ambiguity.427 The article provides that:  
 
34 (1) The Directive Principles of State Policy contained in this Chapter shall 
guide all citizens, Parliament, the President, the Judiciary, the Council of 
State, the Cabinet, political parties and other bodies and persons in applying 
or interpreting this Constitution or any other law and in taking and 
implementing any policy decisions, for the establishment of a just and free 
society. 
 
The observation from scholars is that the ambiguity arose from the Consultative 
Assembly's reliance on the Report of the Committee of Experts on the Proposal for a 
Draft Constitution Ghana to conclude that the Directive Principles in chapter 6 should 
not be justiciable.428 The rationale for the inclusion of these Directives Principles in 
chapter 6 was explained by the Committee of Experts as follows: 
 
94. The NCD report speaks of the need to include in the new 
Constitution core principles around which national political, social and 
economic life will revolve. This is precisely what the Directive Principles 
of State Policy seeks to do. Against the background of the achievements 
and failings of our post-independence experience, and our aspirations 
for the future as a people, the principles attempt to set the stage for the 
enunciation of political, civil, economic and social rights of our people. 
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of use: 15 December 2016); and Atupare A “Reconciling Socioeconomic Rights and Directive 
Principles with a Fundamental Law of Reason in Ghana and Nigeria” 2014 Harvard Human 
Rights Journal 71. 
427  Quashigah http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/country_reports/ghana_country_report.pdf. (date 
of use: 15 December 2016); Atupare 2014 Harvard Human Rights J. 
428  Report of the Committee of Experts on the Proposal for a Draft Constitution Ghana (1991) 
(hereinafter as Committee of Experts) 97-97; New Patriotic Party v Attorney General 149. 
118 
 
 
 
They may thus be regarded as spelling out in broad strokes the spirit or 
conscience of the constitution. The Committee used Chapter Four of 
the 1979 Constitution as a basis for its deliberations on this subject. 
 
95. By tradition Directive Principles are not justiciable; even so, 
there are at least two good reasons for including them in a constitution. 
First, Directive Principles enumerate a set of fundamental objectives 
which a people expect all bodies and persons that make or execute 
public policy to strive to achieve. In the present proposals, one novelty 
is the explicit inclusion of political parties among the bodies expected to 
observe the principles. The reason for this is that political parties 
significantly influence government policy. A second justification for 
including Directive Principles in a constitution is that, taken together, 
they constitute, in the long run, a sort of barometer by which the people 
could measure the performance of their government. In effect they 
provide goals for legislative programmes and a guide for judicial 
interpretation. 
 
96. On the basis of the foregoing considerations, the Committee 
proposes as follows: The Directive Principles of State Policy are for the 
guidance of Parliament, the President, the Council of Ministers, Political 
Parties and other bodies and persons in making and applying public 
policy for the establishment of a just and free society. The Principles 
should not of and by themselves be legally enforceable by any Court. 
The Court should, however, have regard to the said Principles in 
interpreting any laws based on them.429 
 
According to some scholars, the problem is that the final text of the Constitution 1992 
omitted to expressly declare that the Directive Principles are non-justiciable, which left 
open the question of whether or not that omission points to the conclusion of non-
justiciability.430 Indeed, that omission has attracted distinct judicial pronouncements 
about the constitutional status of the Directive Principles in Ghana. In this section, 
these pronouncements and how they relate to the application of the political question 
doctrine in Ghana are examined.  
 
One of the earliest judicial pronouncements on the constitutional status of the Directive 
Principles was made in the New Patriotic Party v Attorney General. As Atupare has 
observed, the judgment in the New Patriotic Party v Attorney General on the 
                                                          
429  New Patriotic Party v Attorney General 149. 
430  Quashigah http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/country_reports/ghana_country_report.pdf. (Date 
of use: 15 December 2016); and Atupare 2014 Harvard Human Rights J 95. 
119 
 
 
 
justiciability of the Directive Principles was less dynamic.431 On the part of the majority, 
only Justice Adade openly tackled the issue and said that:  
 
I do not subscribe to the view that chapter 6 of the Constitution,1992 is not 
justiciable: it is. First, the Constitution,1992 as a whole is a justiciable 
document. If any part is to be non-justiciable, the Constitution,1992 itself 
must say so. I have not seen anything in chapter 6 or in the Constitution 
generally, which tells me that chapter 6 is not justiciable. The evidence to 
establish the non-justiciability must be internal to the Constitution,1992 not 
otherwise … we cannot add words to the Constitution,1992 in order to 
change its meaning...The very tenor of chapter 6 of the Constitution,1992 
supports the view that the chapter is justiciable… As far as the judiciary is 
concerned, I ask myself the question: How do the principles guide the 
judiciary in applying or interpreting the Constitution if not in the process 
of enforcing them?432 
 
What is more, Justice Adade took issue with the conclusion by the Committee of 
Experts that Directive Principles are traditionally non-justiciable. In his view, under 
chapter 4 of the Constitution 1979, Directive Principles were justiciable.433 Adade 
noted that while the debates in the Consultative Assembly may demonstrate some 
intention to make the Directive Principles non-justiciable, he concluded that "the 
intention was not carried into the Constitution,1992. The debates themselves are 
inadmissible to contradict the language of the Constitution."434  
 
On the other hand, two justices wrote minority opinions on the justiciability of the 
Directive Principles in the New Patriotic Party v Attorney General. Justice Abban found 
that the Directive Principles were not relevant to the subject matter before the court, 
and that reference to them was totally misconceived.435 Furthermore, in her opinion, 
Justice Bamford-Addo unambiguously pronounced and reasoned as follows 
concerning the Directive Principles that they: 
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are not justiciable and the plaintiff has no cause of action based on these 
articles. Those principles were included in the Constitution, for the 
guidance of all citizens, Parliament, the President, judiciary, the Council 
of State, the cabinet, political parties or other bodies and persons in 
applying or interpreting the Constitution,1992 or any other law and in 
taking and implementing any policy decisions, for the establishment of a 
just and free society. The judiciary is to be guided, while interpreting the 
Constitution, 1992 by only the specific provisions under chapter 6.436 
 
Based on the above pronouncements, Atupare correctly commented that "an 
important tension arises from the observance of Directive Principles as legal duties of 
all government agencies and public officials while courts are unable to directly enforce 
them."437 Atupare is critical of the fact that no clear majority or minority view on the 
justiciability of Directive Principles emerged in the New Patriotic Party v Attorney 
General because several justices addressed or omitted to address the issue. He 
correctly points out that "it is unclear whether members of the majority subscribed to 
the open declarations of Justice Adade that Directive Principles are justiciable or if 
Justice Bamford-Addo's rebuttal of that claim was supported by the other members of 
the minority."438 Beneath Atupare's criticism is the notion that the issue of the 
justiciability of Directive Principles remained uncertain after the New Patriotic Party v 
Attorney General. This is clear from his submission that "with Justice Adade and 
Justice Bamford-Addo acting alone in advancing their respective views, the case did 
not reach a determination of whether the Directive Principles are justiciable."439  
 
While this study appreciates Atupare's concerns, these concerns were short-lived 
because later, in New Patriotic Party v Attorney General (CIBA),440 the Supreme Court 
revisited the issue of the justiciability of Directive Principles and clarified the law. In 
New Patriotic Party v Attorney General (CIBA) the Supreme Court ruled that Directive 
Principles are not justiciable. Justices Ampiah and Akuffor, who wrote concurring 
opinions, openly found that Directive Principles are not justiciable, whereas Justice 
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Atuguba described them as mere rules of construction.441 Justice Bamford-Addo, who 
wrote for the majority, had a slightly nuanced view to the proposition that Directive 
Principles are not justiciable. She reasoned that: 
 
... there are particular instances where some provisions of the Directive 
Principles form an integral part of some of the enforceable rights because 
either they qualify them or can be held to be rights in themselves. In those 
instances, they are of themselves justiciable also. Where those principles are 
read in conjunction with other enforceable provisions of the Constitution, by 
reason of the fact that the courts are mandated to apply them, they are 
justiciable. Further where any provision under chapter Six dealing with the 
Directive Principles can be interpreted to mean the creation of a legal right, ie 
a guaranteed fundamental human right as was done in article 37(2)(a) 
regarding the freedom to form associations, they become justiciable and 
protected by the Constitution.442 
 
While the judgment in New Patriotic Party v Attorney General (CIBA) has been 
welcomed by some commentators,443 Atupare has criticised the decision arguing that 
the majority opinions were indecisive about the justiciability of the Directive 
Principles.444 In other jurisdictions, the position is unambiguous that Directive 
Principles are not justiciable both in terms of the express terms of the relevant 
constitutional provisions but also in terms of judicial pronouncements. For instance, 
one of the leading cases on point is Baitsokoli and Another v Maseru City Council445 
where street vendors in the Kingdom of Lesotho challenged a government decision to 
remove them from the main street in the City of Maseru on the grounds that it violated 
their rights to life and livelihood, which form part of the principles of state policy. The 
High Court dismissed the case and held that the scope of the right to life being the 
most important and precious human right as guaranteed under section 5 of the 
Constitution of Lesotho 1993 is limited to physical biological existence of people as 
                                                          
441  New Patriotic Party v Attorney General (CIBA) 787, 791-803; Atupare 2014 Harvard Human 
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homo sapiens and should not, unless circumstances warrant, be extended to include 
right to livelihood. The court also held that in Lesotho, the socio-economic and cultural 
rights are not justiciable. In effect, the High Court correctly interpreted the necessary 
intendment of section 25 of the Constitution of Lesotho, which provides that: 
 
The principles contained in this Chapter shall form part of the public policy of 
Lesotho. These principles shall not be enforceable by any court but, subject to 
the limits of the economic capacity and development of Lesotho, shall guide the 
authorities and agencies of Lesotho, and other public authorities, in the 
performance of their functions with a view to achieving progressively, by 
legislation or otherwise, the full realisation of these principles.446 
 
Unlike Atupare, this study finds that the judgment in New Patriotic Party v Attorney 
General (CIBA), read together with the wisdom of the minority views in the New 
Patriotic Party v Attorney General, clarified the constitutional status of Directive 
Principles. According to this study, the judgment in New Patriotic Party v Attorney 
General (CIBA) brought clarity to the law by holding that Directive Principles are in 
general not justiciable except when read with other justiciable provisions of the 
Constitution 1992. As Justice Bamford-Addo puts it, the effect of this judgment is that 
"having regard to the test of justiciability of any particular provision under chapter 6 of 
the Constitution, it is my view that each case would depend on its peculiar facts."447 
This is because the general rule is that Directive Principles are not justiciable and the 
court will have to determine, in every case, whether the exception as pronounced in 
New Patriotic Party v Attorney General (CIBA) applies. In fact, despite his criticism of 
that judgment, Atupare concedes that the judgment was clearer than that in the other 
New Patriotic Party v Attorney-General case on the question of the constitutional 
status of Directive Principles.448  
 
Needless to say, if the judgment in New Patriotic Party v Attorney General (CIBA) is 
not sufficiently clear on the issue of the justiciability of Directive Principles, as 
suggested by Atupare, the Supreme Court decision in Ghana Lotto Operators 
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Association & Others v National Lottery Authority449 provides further clarity. In Ghana 
Lotto Operators Association, the Supreme Court considered the question of whether 
chapter 6 was justiciable or not. Justice Date-Bah, who wrote for the majority, 
reasoned that the "starting point of analysis should be that all provisions in the 
Constitution are justiciable, unless there are strong indications to the contrary in the 
text or context of the Constitution."450 However, Justice Date-Bah further explains that: 
 
…there may be particular provisions in chapter 6 which do not lend 
themselves to enforcement by a court. The very nature of such a particular 
provision would rebut the presumption of justiciability in relation to it. In the 
absence of a demonstration that a particular provision does not lend itself to 
enforcement by courts, however, the enforcement by this court of the 
obligations imposed in chapter 6 should be insisted upon and would be a way 
of deepening our democracy and the liberty under law that it entails...This 
court will need to be flexible and imaginative in determining how the provisions 
of the chapter 6 are to be enforceable.451 
 
While the ambiguity concerning the justiciability of the provisions of chapter 6 has been 
definitively addressed in the above paragraph, Justice Date-Bah posits that there are 
certain provisions that do not lend themselves to enforcement by the judiciary.452  
 
Justices Date-Bah and Bamford-Addo's pronouncements in Ghana Lotto Operators 
Association and New Patriotic Party v Attorney General (CIBA) respectively are 
important ways by which Ghana's Constitution can be understood to recognize the 
application of the political question doctrine. This study submits that both Justice Date-
Bah and Justice Bamford-Addo had in mind the applicability of the political question 
doctrine to Ghana's constitutional circumstances when they made their 
pronouncements above. In other words, the philosophical consideration which 
informed their pronouncements opens the door for the potential application of the 
political question doctrine. This is because both justices accept the possibility of the 
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existence of a constitutional provision, which may not be judiciary enforceable. This is 
essentially what happens when a classical political question doctrine is applied. 
 
There is another point that needs to be highlighted about the pronouncements by 
Justices Date-Bah and Bamford-Addo, which further demonstrates why Atupare's 
criticism is no longer germane. Their pronouncements have brought clarity in the law 
as to whether Directive Principles are justiciable or not. The difference between their 
pronouncements is that Justice Date-Bah holds that there is a presumption of 
justiciability of the Directive Principles, which can be rebutted, while Justice Bamford-
Addo holds that the Directive Principles are presumed not justiciable unless read with 
other justiciable provisions of the Constitution. In essence, the two legal positions are 
not in conflict with each other because both of them recognize the potential that certain 
provisions of the Constitution may not be justiciable. To address the potential criticism 
from those who might argue that these pronouncements are in conflict with each other 
or indecisive about the constitutional status of Directive Principles, Justice Date-Bah 
explains that: 
 
The two positions are convergent in that, if a particular provision of chapter 6 
does not lend itself for enforcement by action in court, then in our preferred 
approach, the presumption of justiciability would be rebutted; while, similarly, 
the case by case approach of Bamford-Addo JSC would result in the court 
finding that the provision in question does not create an enforceable right. The 
advantage of the presumption of justiciability is that it provides a clear starting 
rule that is supportive of the enforcement of fundamental human rights. 
 
Therefore, it is clear that the question of the constitutional status of Directive Principles 
is no longer uncertain in Ghana, and that certain categories of constitutional issues 
may be resolved as a matter of legislative or executive discretion. This is why the 
political question remains relevant and part of Ghanaian law. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that the holding by the Supreme Court in Ghana 
Bar Association v Attorney General that the political question doctrine is applicable to 
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the Constitution of Ghana has never been overruled.453 Ghana Bar Association v 
Attorney General and the wisdom in Mensah v Attorney General and the New Patriotic 
Party v Attorney General demonstrate that the political question doctrine forms part of 
Ghanaian constitutional law and, as in other countries where it is applied, does not 
apply to every political case.454 The Supreme Court has discretion (through 
interpretation) to determine which matters are committed to the political branches and 
can be discarded on that basis. It is submitted that Ghana Bar Association v Attorney 
General is a case in point where the Supreme Court found that the questions in that 
case were properly committed to the political branches and decided to exercise judicial 
restraint by applying the political question doctrine.  
 
However, it is clear from the case law that courts acknowledge the importance of the 
political question doctrine in Ghana's constitutional democracy, which is underpinned 
by the principle of the separation of powers. It is also clear in these cases and 
academic commentaries that judges disagree on philosophical grounds about which 
questions are most appropriate for the doctrine’s application. In other words, the 
debate among judges in Ghana is not whether or not the political question doctrine 
forms part of Ghanaian constitutional law; rather, it is whether or when the doctrine 
should apply in a particular case. It is therefore pointless to question, as others have 
done,455 the validity of Tuffour and other local judicial authorities that have been used 
to justify the political question doctrine in Ghana. 
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__________________________________________________________________ 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE APPLICATION AND EVOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE IN 
UGANDA 
  
4.1  Introduction  
 
In Uganda, courts have considered and applied the political question doctrine since 
the 1960s.  Like in Ghana and Nigeria, the development and application of the political 
question doctrine in Uganda has been influenced by legal developments in the United 
States and from within. This chapter examines the history, case law development, and 
trends around the application of the political question doctrine in Uganda with a view 
to draw lessons for South Africa. It explores how courts have employed the political 
question doctrine to settle some of the major constitutional disputes in Uganda. The 
chapter also deals with the legitimacy questions around the political question doctrine 
because the doctrine has been contested in Uganda.  Notwithstanding this 
contestation, it is argued that the political question doctrine is undoubtedly part of the 
constitutional law of Uganda, and that the classic political question theory is likely to 
inform the future application of the doctrine.  
 
4.2  Constitution-making 
  
The Uganda High Court sitting as a Constitutional Court considered and adopted the 
political question doctrine in Uganda v Commissioner of Prisons Ex Parte Matovu.456 
In Ex Parte Matovu, the plaintiff, Michael Matovu, was arrested under the Deportation 
Act on 22 May 1966, and then released and detained again on 16 July 1966 under the 
Emergency Powers Act and the Emergency Powers (Detention) Regulations 1966, 
which had come into force after his initial arrest. Before proceeding with an 
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examination of what transpired in this case, it is important to briefly highlight the 
prevailing political circumstancesat the time of Mr Matovu’s arrest. 
 
Between 22 February and 15 April 1966, a series of events took place, including a 
declaration of a state of emergency in the region of Buganda. These events resulted 
in a unilateral suspension of the Constitution of 1962, which had established a federal 
system of government between the Kingdom of Buganda and the Republic of 
Uganda,457by the then Prime Minister Milton Obote. By this act, Prime Minister Obote 
had effectively taken over all powers of the government of Uganda by depriving the 
ceremonial President and Vice-President of Uganda, contrary to the Constitution of 
1962, of their offices and vested their authorities in the Prime Minister and the Cabinet 
through the imposition of a new Constitution of 1966. 
 
Commentators refer to the Constitution of 1966, which was imposed on Uganda when 
Parliament adopted it on 15 April 1966,458 as the pigeon hole Constitution because it 
is said that the members of Parliament found copies of the Constitution in their 
pigeonholes for them to approve.459 The Commission of Inquiry into Violations of 
Human Rights described these developments of 1966 as follows:  
 
In February 1966, the Prime Minister suspended the 1962 Constitution. This was 
a unilateral action taken without consulting either Parliament or the people of 
Uganda. For a couple of months, Uganda was literally governed without a 
Constitution. The 1966 Constitution was put in the pigeonholes of the Members 
of Parliament and they were asked to approve it even before reading it, and they 
did. In other words, this Parliament suddenly, and without consulting anybody, 
constituted themselves into a Constituent Assembly. They enacted and 
promulgated a Constitution whose contents they did not even know.460 
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 According to one legal commentator the political arrangement under the Constitution 
of 1962 was an attempt to achieve the impossible and inevitably led to the coup of 
1966.461  
 
Following his arrest under the above circumstances, the plaintiff in Ex Parte Matovu 
sought an order for his release. One of the issues that had to be determined by the 
Court in Ex Parte Matovu was whether the Emergency Powers Act of 1963 and the 
Emergency Powers (Detention) Regulations 1966 are ultra vires the Constitution to 
the extent that the Act and Regulations enabled the President to take measures that 
may not be justifiable for purposes of dealing with the situation that existed during a 
state of emergency. Since there were two constitutions before the Ex Parte Matovu 
Court, being the Constitution of 1962 and Constitution of 1966, the Court on its own 
accord raised the question of the validity of the Constitution of 1966. When questioned 
by the Court in Ex Parte Matovu, counsel for the plaintiff observed that he was in some 
doubt as to the validity in law of the Constitution of 1966.  
 
On the other hand, the government submitted that the Court in Ex Parte Matovu had 
no jurisdiction to enquire into the validity of the Constitution of 1966 because, among 
other reasons, the making of a constitution is a political act and outside the scope of 
the functions of the Court. According to the government’s argument, since there are 
three arms of government, it was the duty of the legislature and the executive to decide 
the validity of the Constitution, the issue being a political one; that the duty of the Court 
was to accept that decision and merely interpret the Constitution of 1966 as presented 
to it. It was also the government’s submission that the members of the legislature, who 
passed the Constitution 1966, did so as representatives of their constituencies to 
which they must account. Further, it pointed out that since judges were not elected but 
appointed and represented no specific constituencies to which to give account of their 
stewardship, the Court in Ex Parte Matovu would be usurping the functions of the 
legislature if it undertook to enquire into and pronounce on the validity or otherwise of 
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the Constitution of 1966. In support of this submission, the government referred the 
Court to the US Supreme Court cases in Luther v Borden,462 Marbury v Madison,463 
and Baker v Carr,464 and the concept of the political question as discussed in those 
cases. In addressing the government’s submissions on the political question doctrine, 
the Court in Ex Parte Matovu said the government’s “exposition of legal principles 
cannot be faulted. It is a sound doctrine.”465 
 
To fully appreciate the judgment in Ex Parte Matovu, it is imporant to briefly discuss 
what transpired in Luther v Borden. Commentators consider Luther v Borden as a 
classical representation of the earliest application of the political question doctrine that 
was first developed in Marbury v Madison.466 In Luther v Borden, the US Supreme 
Court had to determine whether it had the power to legitimize the popular dissolution 
of an entrenched state government. The plaintiff, Martin Luther, had been arrested 
after the declaration of martial law but before the enactment of the Rhode Island 
Constitution of 1843. The plaintiff was arrested by martial law troops after they had 
entered his home and damaged his property and harassed his elderly mother.467 The 
plaintiff later sued the martial law troops for trespass. The defendants, admitting an 
otherwise tortious breaking and entering, sought to justify their action on the ground 
that they were agents of the established lawful government of Rhode Island, which 
State was then under martial law to defend itself from active insurrection; that the 
plaintiff was engaged in that insurrection and that they entered his premises under 
orders to arrest the plaintiff.468  
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The case arose out of the political differences that agitated the people of Rhode Island 
between 1841 and 1842, and which had resulted in a situation wherein two groups laid 
competing claims to recognition as the lawful government.469 Plaintiff’s lawsuit against 
the troops depended on which was the lawful government of Rhode Island at the time 
of his arrest, namely the government under the royal charter or the one under the 
people’s Constitution.470 The lower court's refusals to hear argument on that issue, its 
charge to the jury that the earlier established or charter government was lawful, and 
the verdict for the defendants were affirmed upon appeal to the US Supreme Court.471  
 
Chief Justice Taney, who wrote the majority opinion in Luther v Borden, framed the 
issue in institutional terms and focused his analysis on the practical effects of deciding 
which sovereign was legitimate.472 He observed that if the US Supreme Court could 
decide that the charter government was not legitimate, it could throw Rhode Island 
into legal chaos such as the invalidation of taxes and laws and possibly the nullification 
of its court decisions.473 Taney reasoned that “when the decision of this court might 
lead to such results, it becomes its duty to examine very carefully its own powers 
before it undertakes to exercise jurisdiction.”474 He found that the power to decide 
which Constitution or government was legitimate belonged to state officials, the 
Congress and the President but not in the federal courts.475Further, he reasoned that 
Congress’ decision under article IV of the United States Constitution to recognize a 
state government or its representatives is binding on every other department of 
government and could not be questioned in a judicial tribunal.476  
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In her reaction to the case, Professor Barkow is correct when she argues that Chief 
Justice Taney expansively restated the classical theory of the political question 
doctrine and concluded that: 
 
This tribunal, therefore, should be the last to overstep the boundaries which limit 
its own jurisdiction. And while it should always be ready to meet any question 
confided to it by the Constitution, it is equally its duty not to pass beyond its 
appropriate sphere of action, and to take care not to involve itself in discussions 
which properly belong to other forums. No one, we believe, has ever doubted the 
proposition that...the sovereignty in every state resides in the people of the state, 
and that they may alter and change their form of government at their own 
pleasure.477 
 
The Court in Ex Parte Matovu relied on Luther v Borden to arrive at its decision. 
According to the court, the political question doctrine as articulated in Luther v Borden 
is a sound doctrine, but was not applicable to the circumstances in Ex Parte Matovu.478 
It reasoned that however useful and instructive the observations of the US Supreme 
Court in the several matters discussed in that case may be, the government erred in 
relying on it as supporting the proposition that the validity of the Constitution of 1966 
was a non-justiciable political question.479 Further, the Court found that Luther v 
Borden was irrelevant and distinguishable on the facts of Ex Parte Matovu on the 
following grounds. 
 
Firstly, the Court in Ex Parte Matovu observed that Luther v Borden was a contest 
between two rival groups as to which should control the government of Rhode Island. 
It argued that there was no such contest in Uganda,480and observed that the 
government of Uganda is well established and has no rival. According to the Court, 
unlike in Luther v Borden, the question that was presented to it was not the legality of 
the government but the validity of the Constitution of 1966. While it is correct that 
Luther v Borden dealt with mainly the question of which government was legitimate, it 
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is incorrect to characterize Luther v Borden as not examining the validity of a 
constitution. To the contrary, the question of the validity of a constitution was among 
the questions before the US Supreme Court in Luther v Borden. In his analysis of the 
Dorr Rebellion, which led to the Luther v Borden case, Professor Amar has observed 
that the charterists (one of the rival groups claiming to have established a lawful 
government in Rhode Island) had submitted a Constitution, which had received the 
votes of less than one third of the adult males or less than half of the registered vote.481 
Yet, technically this became the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island, and the 
people's Constitution, which had been submitted by the other group, did not.482 
According to Professor Amar, the valid Constitution received seven thousand votes; 
whereas the people’s Constitution received nearly fourteen thousand.483  
 
Chief Justice Taney considered the question of whether the people’s Constitution as 
opposed to the charterists Constitution, which eventually became the Constitution of 
Rhode Island, was valid, and found that the power to decide which Constitution was 
valid rested in state officials, the President and Congress.484On this point, Savitzky 
has argued that Taney rejected the vote that had been cast on the people’s 
Constitution as proof of its lawful adoption and declared that: 
 
Certainly it is no part of the judicial functions of any court of the United States to 
prescribe the qualification of voters in a State… nor has it the right to determine 
what political privileges the citizens of a State are entitled to, unless there is an 
established constitution or law to govern its decision.485 
 
As argued by Savitzky, the lack of established law or Constitution authorizing popular 
action was at the very core of Taney’s application of the political question doctrine. He 
observed that for Taney there was no rule by which a court could determine the 
qualification of the voters upon the adoption of the proposed Constitution unless there 
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was some previous law of the State to guide it.486 Based on the above analysis, it is 
submitted that Luther v Borden was relevant to the resolution of Ex Parte Matovu to 
the extent that it found the validation of a constitution is a non-justiciable political 
question. And it was incorrec to characterise Luther v Borden as being only concerned 
with the legality of the government of the day and not the Constitution. 
 
Secondly, the Court in Ex Parte Matovu observed that Luther v Borden raised all sorts 
of political questions, including the right to vote and the qualification for such voters. 
Unlike in Ex Parte Matovu, there were two rival governors appointed in Luther v Borden 
and the rivalry between them produced a situation which was tantamount to a state of 
civil war. The Court observed that insurrection had in fact occurred and war was levied 
upon the state. Further, it noted that Luther v Borden also involved the question as to 
whether the government was republican or not, which is a political question reserved 
for the Congress under Article IV of the United States Constitution.487 In the Court’s 
view, these circumstances were not present in Ex Parte Matovu. 
 
While the Court in Ex Parte Matovu acknowledged that Luther v Borden involved 
political questions such as the right to vote, it failed to recognize that this political 
question was considered in the context of deciding the validity of the two rival 
constitutions in Rhode Island. Further, while the political instability in Rhode Island at 
the time when Luther v Borden was decided may not be exactly to that which prevailed 
in Uganda at the time of Ex Parte Matovu, it is misleading for the Court in Ex Parte 
Matovu to paint a rosy picture of the political situation in Uganda at the time. The fact 
is that there was a considerable amount of political instability in Uganda that was 
predicated upon events leading up to Ex Parte Matovu and the surrounding political 
events, which eventually led to the coup d'état of 1971 that brought General Idi Amin 
to power.488 Following Amin’s ascendancy to power Uganda remained relatively 
                                                          
486  Luther v Borden 41; and Savitzky 2011 New York University LR 2040. 
487  See Luther v Borden 42; and Barkow 2002 Columbia LR 256. The Ex Parte Matovu Court also 
discussed Baker v Carr in ways that is not clear whether they considered it controlling in Ex 
Parte Matovu or not. Ex Parte Matovu 533-535. 
488  For some discussion about the political history of Uganda. See, Ingrams H Uganda: A Crisis of 
Nationhood (HM Stationery, London 1960); Mutibwa P Uganda Since Independence: A Story 
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unstable and erupted into a civil war between 1981 and 1986. It was only in 1995, that 
Uganda adopted a democratic Constitution. It could be argued that the period between 
1966 and 1986 can best be characterized as a period of political instability in Uganda.  
 
It is surprising that despite finding that Luther v Borden was distinguishable from Ex-
Parte Matovu, the Court reached a conclusion which is in accord with Taney’s main 
considerations in Luther v Borden.489 The Court held that any decision by the judiciary 
as to the legality of the government could be far reaching, disastrous and wrong 
because the question was a political one to be resolved by the executive and 
legislature, which were accountable to their constituencies.490However, unlike Luther 
v Borden, the Court in Ex Parte Matovu held that a decision on the validity of the 
Constitution 1966 was within the Court’s competence.491 It found that the Constitution 
of 1966 was valid for a number of reasons including the fact that it had been accepted 
by the people of Uganda and the international community, and had been firmly 
established and implemented throughout the country without opposition.492 Hence, the 
Court felt it could not reverse this political reality. There is probably another practical 
consideration that led the Court to legitimize the Constitution of 1966 and that is the 
fear of rendering all past acts and taxes open to legal challenges, including the 
legitimacy of the judges that had been appointed by the Prime Minister Obote under 
the impugned Constitution. Similar prudential considerations were applied in Luther v 
Borden.  
 
                                                          
Of Unfulfilled Hope (African World Press, New Jersey 1992); and Okuku J Ethnicity, State 
Power and The Democratisation Process in Uganda (University Printers, Uppsall 2002). 
489  Luther v Borden 38-39 (noting that “if the court could decide that the charter government was 
not lawful, it could throw Rhode Island into legal chaos-convictions would be reversed, 
compensation revoked and legislation abrogated”). 
490  Ex Parte Matovu 515 and 540. See also, Barkow 2002 Columbia LR 255 (observing that Chief 
Justice Taney was motivated by practical concerns such as the potential legal chaos that would 
ensure if the court had decided one way or another); Savitzky 2011 New York University LR 
(noting that Luther v Borden decided against determining which was the legitimate government 
because this would Rhode Island into legal chaos). Professor Weinberg has argued that the 
duty of courts does not evaporate because there are obstacles to enforcement or threats of 
crisis or chaos, and yet Ex Parte Matovu and Luther v Borden alike seemed to have been 
decided on this basis. See also, Weinberg 1994 University of Colorado LR. 
491  Ex Parte Matovu 515 and 540. 
492 Ex Parte Matovu 539. 
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It is possible to criticize Ex Parte Matovu for misconstruing and misapplying Luther v 
Borden. However, it is submitted that Luther v Borden was persuasive authority in Ex 
Parte Matovu because it teaches that the act of constitutional formation is the province 
of the people alone as popular sovereignty, which proposition was accepted by the 
Court in Ex Parte Matovu. As Justice Woodbury observed, in his concurring opinion in 
Luther v Borden, “our power begins after theirs end.”493 In this regard, the government 
of Uganda correctly relied on Luther v Borden in its proposition that the judiciary had 
no jurisdiction over matters concerning constitutional making. While Ex Parte Matovu 
has been criticized by some commentators,494 it remains good law in Uganda and has 
been cited with approval by judges in Uganda495 and elsewhere.496  Since Ex Parte 
Matovu, the political question doctrine has been the subject of consideration and 
application by the Uganda Court of Appeal in Andrew Kayira v Edward Rugumayo & 
Others497 where the Court relying on Ex Parte Matovu ruled that the removal of 
Professor Lule from the office of President of Uganda was a political question not 
reviewable in the courts of law but reserved to the political organs of the state.498 
Perhaps the most cardinal application of the political question doctrine, in the context 
of the post-1995 Constitution of Uganda, was by the Supreme Court of Uganda in 
Attorney General v Tinyefuza.499 
 
4.3  Are military matters political questions? 
 
4.3.1 Supreme court’s view 
                                                          
493  Luther v Borden 52; and Savitzky2011 New York University LR 2041. 
494  See, Kirya M “The Independence and Accountability of the Judiciary in Uganda: Opportunities 
and Challenges”  
http://www.kituochakatiba.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_details&gid=369&It
emid=36 (Date of use: 20 September 2016) (criticizing Ex Parte Matovu); Kirkby C Exorcising 
Matovu’s Ghost: Legal Positivism, Pluralism and Ideology in Uganda’s Appellate Courts, 12-21 
(LLM Thesis, McGill University 2007); Mkwentla N The Legal Effect of a Coup D’Etat on 
Traditional Constitutional Concept (LLM Thesis, Rhodes University 2001)(discussing Matovu 
and other cases). 
495  Attorney General v Major General David Tinyefuza, Const. Appeal No.1 of 1997 (S.C), 
(unreported); Andrew Kayira v Edward Rugumayo & Others, Constitutional Case no 1 (1979); 
Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General, Constitutional Petition No 16 (2011). 
496  See, Madzimbamuto v Larder Burke (1966) 1 AC 645; R v Ndhlovu 1968 (4) SA 515 
497  Andrew Kayira v Edward Rugumayo & Others, Constitutional Case No 1 (1979). 
498  See also Sekindi A Critical Analysis of the Legal Construction. 
499  Attorney General v Tinyefuza. 
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One of the most significant cases ever decided by the Supreme Court of Uganda is 
Attorney General v Tinyefuza. The case of Attorney General v Tinyefuza arose when 
on 29 November 1996 General Tinyefuza gave evidence before the Parliamentary 
Sessional Committee (Sessional Committee) on Defence and Internal Affairs about 
the insurgency in Northern Uganda. In his testimony, General Tinyefuza made a harsh 
attack on the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Force regarding its conduct generally and in 
particular, it’s handling of the insurgency in Northern Uganda.500 Following his 
testimony, General Tinyefuza then learned from media reports that the military 
authorities thought his evidence before the Sessional Committee “did not conform with 
the military line” and that he should resign from the army and appear before the High 
Command.501 General Tinyefuza did not consider himself a member of the army at the 
time he addressed the Sessional Committee, but to clear the air he resigned by a letter 
sent to the President.502 He received a response from the Minister of Defence rejecting 
his resignation on the basis that it did not comply with the National Resistance Army 
(Conditions of Service)(Officers) Regulations 1993.503 General Tinyefuza perceived 
these events as exposing him to an atmosphere of fear and felt that his rights were 
about to be infringed.  
 
As a consequence, General Tinyefuza petitioned the Constitutional Court seeking a 
declaration that the threats to punish him for his testimony before the Sessional 
Committee would be in conflict with article 87 of the Constitution 1995; that the 
rejection of the resignation letter was unconstitutional and that the army regulations 
were no longer applicable to him because - at the time of his testimony - he had been 
appointed to a post in the public service.504 The Constitutional Court ruled in favor of 
                                                          
500  See Attorney General v Tinyefuz [1997] UGCC 3(Justice Manyido opinion). 
501  Attorney General v Tinyefuza (Wambuzi J opinion) 2. 
502  Attorney General v Tinyefuza 2. 
503  After submitting his resignation, there were media reports quoting the President saying that 
General Tinyefuza would have to sort out his problems with the army before he is allowed to 
resign. Criticisms against General Tinyefuza from other senior army officials were also reported 
in the media. See, Attorney General v Tinyefuza [1997] UGCC 3 (Justice Manyido opinion). 
504  Attorney General v Tinyefuza. 
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General Tinyefuza and the Attorney General appealed to the Supreme Court.505 The 
Supreme Court in a five506 to two507 decision reversed the Constitutional Court 
judgment.  
 
In his opinion in favor of the majority view, Justice Kanyeihamba remarked at the 
outset that in order to dispose of this appeal according to the principles of the 
Constitution and laws of Uganda, it was essential for him to make some preliminary 
observations which he said ought to guide a court in adjudicating constitutional matters 
of this kind and others.508 Justice Kanyeihamba began by examining the political 
question doctrine as applied in the United States and as developed by the courts in 
Uganda.509 He observed that the general rule is that courts have no jurisdiction over 
matters which are within the constitutional and legal powers of the legislative or the 
executive.510 Kanyeihamba went on to observe that even in those cases where courts 
feel obliged to intervene and review legislative or executive acts when challenged on 
the basis that the rights of an individual are infringed, they do so sparingly and with 
great reluctance.511  Further, he re-affirmed the endorsement in Ex Parte Matovu of 
the political question doctrine.512 Constitutional commentators in other jurisdictions 
generally agree with Justice Kanyeihamba’s approach to constitutional adjudication, 
arguing that ‘the political question doctrine requires the judiciary to decide as a 
threshold matter in all cases whether the question before it has been assigned by the 
Constitution to another co-ordinate branch of government.’513 
                                                          
505  For a discussion of the Court of Appeal decision see, Byamugisha C “Administering Justice 
Without Undue Regard to the Technicalities” 2003, A paper presented to Green Watch Uganda. 
See, also Paul Semogerere v Attorney-General, Constitutional Appeal No 1 (2002); and Ellet 
R Emerging Judical Power in Transitional Democracies: Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda 
(Northeastern University, Boston, 2008) 407-498. 
506  Justices Kanyeihamba, Wambuzi, Tsetooko, Karokora and Kekonyo. 
507  Justices Mulenga and Oder. 
508  Attorney General v Tinyefuza 3. 
509 Attorney General v Tinyefuza 11. 
510  Attorney General v Tinyefuza. 
511 Attorney General v Tinyefuza. 
512  Attorney General v Tinyefuza 12. 
513  Barkow 2002 Columbia LR 243-244; Chase 2001 Catholic University LR (noting that the 
political question doctrine limits judicial power by curtailing the ability of courts to adjudicate 
issues best left to the discretion of legislative or the executive branch); Nixon-Graf M “A 
Gathering Storm: Climate Change as Common Nuisance or Political Question?” 2012 New York 
University Environmental Law Journal 353 (discussing that the political question doctrine 
requires courts to make a threshold determination whether a claim is properly within the judicial 
138 
 
 
 
 
Before addressing the merits of the case, Justice Kanyeihamba highlighted some of 
the areas which, in his view, would be appropriate to apply the political question 
doctrine in Uganda.514 He noted that among them is whether or not courts should 
demand proof of whether a statute of the legislature was passed properly or not;515 the 
conduct of foreign relations;516 and the question of when to declare and terminate wars 
and insurgencies.517 Underneath this jurisprudence is a suggestion by Kanyeihamba 
about the areas where the judiciary will likely apply the political question doctrine in 
future cases. It was helpful for Justice Kanyeihamba to make these pronouncements 
in the development of the doctrine. Most commentators acquiesce to Justice 
                                                          
branch of government);  Gouin 1994 Connecticut LR 759 (arguing in favour of the applying the 
political question doctrine in foreign affairs cases); Price 2006 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 331 
(advocating for a reformulated political question doctrine so that it is used  to more carefully 
distinguish between those cases that raise separation of powers concerns and should therefore 
be dismissed, and those which do not.); and Breedon 2008 Ohio Northern University LR 523 
(characterising the political question as a self-imposed restraint mechanism on the judiciary, 
which requires courts to dismiss a case as nonjusticiable if deciding the matter in dispute would 
encroach upon the functions of the electoral branches of government); and Timothy A “The 
Doctrine of Political Question: Is It's Non Justiciability At The Brink of Erosion in the Legal 
Jurisprudence of Uganda?” 2014, available at http://timothyamerit.blogspot.co.za/2014/08/the-
doctrine-of-political-question-is.html (Date of use: 25 December 2016) (critical of the political 
question doctrine inUganda). 
514 Tinyefuza v Attorney General 12. 
515  See, Cooley A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 186-187 (arguing against judicial 
inquiry into the legislative motives and must assume that legislative discretion has been 
properly exercised). See also, People v Draper 15 NY 545 (1857). 
516  Chief Justice Marshall, described questions of foreign policy as belonging more properly to 
those who can place the nation in such a position with respect to foreign powers as to their own 
judgment shall appear wise; to whom are entrusted all its foreign relations. See, United States 
v Palmer 16 US (3 Wheat) 610, 4 L Ed. 471 (1818). See also, Free 2003 Pacific Rim Law 489; 
Gouin 1994 Connecticut LR 763-781; Scharpf 1966 Yale LJ 583-584; Nzelibe J “The 
Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs” 2004 Iowa Law Review 941; Oetjen v Central Leather Co 246 
US 297 (1918) (applying the political question doctrine to the conduct of the foreign affairs); 
United States v Belmont 301 US 324 (1937) (noting that the executive branch has exclusive 
competence in foreign affairs). 
517  Tinyefuza v Attorney General 12. In the United States, courts typically take the same view in 
cases involving military matters. See, Crockett v Reagan 720 F 2d 1355 (DC Cir 1983), cert. 
denied, 467 US 1251 (1984) (finding suit regarding US military activities in El Salvador raised 
nonjusticiable political question); Lowry v Reagan 676 F Supp 333 (D DC 1987) (finding suit to 
compel presidential compliance with War Powers Resolution raised nonjusticiable political 
questions); Chicago & S Air Lines v Waterman SS Corp 333 US 103 (1948); Johnson v. 
Eisentrager 339 US 763 (1950) 789 ( holding that “certainly it is not the function of the Judiciary 
to entertain private litigation--even by a citizen--which challenges the legality, the wisdom, or 
the propriety of the Commander-in-Chief in sending our armed forces abroad or to any 
particular region.”); United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp 299 US 304 (1936) 319 (holding 
that in this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, 
the President alone has the power to speak as a representative of the nation). 
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Kanyeihamba’s suggestion of areas which are most appropriate for the application of 
the political question doctrine.518 Based on his review of the common law authorities, 
Justice Kanyeihamba was convinced that courts should avoid adjudicating upon these 
kinds of questions unless in very clear cases of violation or threatened violation of 
individual liberty are shown.519 He added that the reluctance of courts to enter into the 
arena reserved by the Constitution 1966 to the other arms of government reaches its 
zenith when it comes to the exercise and control of powers relating to the armed 
forces: their structure, organization, deployment and operations.520 In his view, the 
accepted principle is that courts should not substitute their own views of what is in the 
public interest in these matters particularly when the other co-ordinate arms of 
government are acting within the authority granted to them by the constitution.521  
                                                          
518  Gouin 1994 Connecticut LR; Chase 2001 Catholic University LR 1055; Wishik L “Separation of 
Powers and Adjudication of Human Rights Claims Under Alien Tort Claims Act-Hanoch-Tel-
Oren v Libyan Arab Republic 726 F 2D 774 (DC Cir 1984), Cert. denied, 105 SCt 1354 (1985)” 
1985 Washington Law Review 697; Wechsler Principles 11-14. 
519  Tinyefuza v Attorney General 12-13 (where Kanyeihamba stated that the “English case of 
Chandler v DPP (1964) AC 763 Lord Devlin underscored this point when at P 810 he said a 
court will not review the proper exercise of discretionary power but they will only intervene to 
correct excess or abuse.The observation by the American jurist Charles Warren in ‘The 
Supreme Court in United States History’ 748-749 (1935) that courts, and especially the 
Supreme Court are not the only actors on the constitutional stage is equally applicable to 
Uganda.”) 
520 Tinyefuza v Attorney General 12. Under United States law, the greater the degree of control by 
the military the more likely the courts are going to find that challenges involving the military or 
private military contractors present nonjusticiable political questions. See, Martin v Mott, 25 US 
(12 Wheat) 19 (1827)(holding that the President had exclusive power to determine whether the 
militia should be called out); Whitaker v Kellog Brown & Root Inc 444 F Supp 2d 1277 (2006) 
1281 (holding private military contractor was subject to military’s orders, regulations, and 
convoy plan, rendering suit against the private military contractor arising out of convoy accident 
nonjusticiable); Davidson B ”Note, Liability on the Battlefield: Adjudicating Tort Suits Brought 
by Soldiers Against Military Contractors” 2008 Public Contract law Journal 822-34;  Perez-
Montes J “Comment, Justiciability in Modern War Zones: Is the Political Question Doctrine a 
Viable Bar to Tort Claims Against Private Military Contractors?” 2008Tulane Law Review 246. 
521  Most judges agree with this view and have similarly held that the political branches are better 
placed than the judiciary to appreciate what is to the public benefit. Chief Justice Gubbay writing 
for a unanimous Supreme Court of Zimbabwe in the landmark case of Nyambirai v National 
Social Security Authority 1996 1 SA 636 (ZS) 644 explained it convincingly when he upheld a 
legislative policy to compel employees and employers to save for their retirement and said:  “I 
do not doubt that because of their superior knowledge and experience of society and its needs, 
and a familiarity with local conditions, national authorities are, in principle, better placed than 
the Judiciary to appreciate what is to the public benefit. In implementing social and economic 
policies, a government’s assessment as to whether a particular service or programme it intends 
to establish will promote the interest of the public is to be respected by the courts. They will not 
intrude but will allow a wide margin of appreciation, unless convinced that the assessment is 
manifestly without reasonable foundation. The Minister has proclaimed that the Pensions and 
Other Benefits Scheme provides a service in the public interest. That is an assessment which 
this Court should respect.” See also, Apostolou & others v The Republic of Cyprus (1985) LRC 
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Justice Kanyeihamba’s reasoning is that since military matters are within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of both executive and legislature, it is not for the courts to consider whether 
the discretion of the executive has been exercised properly, if at all.522 In his view, it is 
Parliament which has the authority to bring the executive to account in these military 
matters.523 To largely support Justice Kanyeihamba’s view, the United States Court of 
Appeal in Schneider v Kissinger, considered a suit against Henry Kissinger, the 
National Security Advisor to the President and the United States for the wrongful death 
of Chilean General René Schneider. In upholding the lower court decision that the 
political question doctrine applied in this case, it reasoned that “the lack of judicial 
authority to oversee the conduct of the executive branch in political matters does not 
leave the executive power unbounded… the nation has recompense, and the checks 
and balances of the Constitution have not failed. The political branches effectively 
exercise such checks and balances on each other in the area of political questions.”524 
It held that the allocation of political questions to the political branches must not be 
viewed as inconsistent with the constitutional tradition of limited government and 
balance of powers because it is precisely consistent, for it embodies limits and 
balances between the political branches without the intrusion of the judiciary into areas 
beyond its proper authority and expertise.525 Some commentators agree with these 
judicial sentiments. Ibrahim Imam writing with others has made a similar point that “we 
should not be overly concerned that the political question doctrine deprives the courts 
of enforcement power over certain constitutional provisions, because the constitution 
                                                          
(Const) 851(rejecting the argument that the government had no authority to compel a self 
employed individual to pay contributions to the social insurance fund established under the 
Social Insurance Law of 1980; Sechele v Public Officers Defined Contribution Pension Fund 
and Others [2010] LSHC 94 (upholding a compulsory civil service pension fund in Lesotho); 
Steward Machine Company v Davis 301 US 548 (1937)(upholding the provisions of the United 
States Social Security Act of 1935); Schweiker v Wilson 450 US 221 (1981) 230 (reasoning 
that unless a statute employs a classification that is inherently invidious or that impinges on 
fundamental rights, this Court properly exercises only a limited review power over Congress, 
the appropriate representative body through which the public makes democratic choices among 
alternative solutions to social and economic problems). 
522  For a similar reasoning see Corrie v Caterpillar (declining to intrude into the government 
decision to grant military assistance to Israel because this question was committed under the 
Constitution to the legislative and executive branches) 
523  Attorney General v Tinyefuza 12. 
524  Schneider v Kissinger 412 F 3d 190, 200 (2005). 
525 Schneider v Kissinger. 
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and electoral process provides an appropriate substitute.”526 Thus, Justice 
Kanyeihamba cannot be faulted for pointing out that Parliament is the appropriate 
organ of government to check the executive on military questions, and that in the 
context of the political question doctrine, this is a sufficient constitutional check on 
executive power.527 
 
Furthermore, Justice Kanyeihamba then reflected on the principle of separation of 
powers under the Constitution of Uganda and was very clear that in Uganda, as in the 
United States, courts are not the only actors on the constitutional stage.528 
Kanyeihamba correctly observed that the Constitution of Uganda envisages that the 
constitutional platform is to be shared among the three arms of government, being the 
executive, judicial and legislative arms; that courts need to bear in mind the judgments 
of other repositories of constitutional power concerning the scope of their authority and 
the necessity for each to keep within its powers including the courts themselves.529 
Professor Tribe has agreeably observed that “so long as the manner in which the 
Constitution is to be interpreted remains open to question, the meaning of the 
Constitution is subject to legitimate dispute, and the judiciary is not alone in its 
responsibility to interpret.”530 
 
In light of the above views, Justice Kanyeihamba pronounced that the principle of 
separation of powers demands that unless there is the clearest of cases calling for 
intervention for purposes of determining constitutionality of action or the protection of 
                                                          
526  Imam et al 2011 African Journal of Law 51, citing Obi v INEC (2007) 9 MJSC 1. 
527  Olson v Morrison 487 US 654 (1988) (Scalia J dissenting) (arguing that another significant 
check is that people will replace those in the political branches who are guilty of abuse of 
power). 
528  Attorney General v Tinyefuza 13. 
529  Attorney General v Tinyefuza 13. 
530  Tribe American Constitutional Law 34-35. See also United States v Butler 297 US 1 (1936) 87 
(Stone J dissenting) (arguing that courts are not the only agency of government that must be 
assumed to have the capacity to govern); Mulhern University of Pennsylvanis LR  126 (arguing 
that there is no obvious reason why a court’s assertion of judicial power should be any more 
authoritative than a president’s assertion of executive power. Both are part of our constitutional 
tradition and there is no apparent way to establish any priority between them. Courts share 
responsibility for interpreting the Constitution with the political branches); and Seidman 2003 
John Marshall LR 442 (arguing that Constitution vests in the political branches final interpretive 
authority as to the meaning of some constitutional provisions; that in relation to those provisions 
the political branches self-monitor). 
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the liberty which is presently threatened, the courts must refrain from entering arenas 
not assigned to them either by the Constitution or laws of Uganda.531 Moreover, he 
pronounced that it is necessary in a democracy that courts refrain from entering into 
areas of disputes best suited for resolution by other government agents.532 In their 
discussion of the political question doctrine in Canada, Cowper and Sossin have 
similarly observed and argued that “based on the principle of separation of powers, 
the political questions doctrine limits judicial jurisdiction, and therefore power, in a 
number of circumstances where the other branches of government have a stronger 
claim to decide the issue raised.”533 It is submitted that Kanyeihamba’s 
pronouncement reflects the notion that the executive and legislature have a stronger 
claim to decide military questions that emerged in this case. The growth of the political 
question doctrine in Uganda, particularly in military and foreign affairs matters, mirrors 
the growth in the same areas in the United States where courts have frequently applied 
the doctrine.534 
 
In his commentary on Justice Kanyeihamba’s opinion in Attorney General v Tinyefuza, 
Dennison has observed that Kanyeihamba’s treatment of the political question 
doctrine was a clear disdain of the test formulated in Baker v Carr.535 He argues that 
Justice Kanyeihamba was influenced by Chief Marshall’s formulation of the political 
question doctrine in Marbury v Madison as opposed to Justice Brennan’s formulation 
in Baker v Carr.536 To put it in another way, Dennison believes that Kanyeihamba 
identified with the classic political question theory as the most appropriate for Uganda; 
that his lack of reliance on Baker v Carr was reflective of his rejection of prudential 
considerations introduced in that case.537  
 
                                                          
531  Attorney General v Tinyefuza 13. 
532  Attorney General v Tinyefuza 13. 
533  Cowper and Sossin 2002 Supreme Court LR 345. 
534  See, Gilligan v Morgan 413 US 1 (1973). See also, Firmage E “The War Powers and Political 
Question Doctrine” 1977-1978 University of Colorado LR 65; Cole D “Challenging Covert War: 
The Politics of the Political Question Doctrine” 1985 Harvard International Law Journal 155. 
535  Dennison 2014 LDD 272. 
536  Dennison 2014 LDD 284. 
537  Dennison 2014 LDD 284. 
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Further, Dennison supports Kanyeihamba’s characterization of the doctrine as a legal 
mechanism that allows other branches of government to conduct their constitutional 
business without interference.538 He makes another important remark that given 
Justice Kanyeihamba’s national reputation as a champion of the rule of law in Uganda, 
it makes his endorsement and appreciation of the political question doctrine significant 
and displays a strong testimony to the usefulness of the doctrine in Uganda.539 These 
comments by Dennison explain why in his concluding remarks, he prays that the 
judiciary will continue to invoke the principled version of the doctrine as conceived by 
Justices Marshall and Kanyeihamba.540 It is clear from his analysis that by principled 
version, Denison means the classical political question.  
 
It is understandable from Justice Kanyeihamba’s examination above that in Uganda, 
as it is Ghana,541 Nigeria,542 Israel543 and the United States, the political question 
doctrine is recognized as originating from the principle of separation of powers. 
Moreover, it is also understandable that there are potential limits on the application of 
the political question doctrine; that is to say, it may not apply, as Kanyeihamba 
observed, in cases of clear constitutional violations or abuse of human rights. Justice 
Kanyeihamba’s views in this regard are similar to those of Justice Kpegah in Amidu v 
President Kufuor where he explained that despite the Constitution of Ghana being 
expressed as the supreme law “there is inherent or internal evidence in our 
Constitution that the policy which informs or should inform any legislation, and the 
                                                          
538  Dennison 2014 LDD 272. 
539  Dennison 2014 LDD 272. 
540  Dennison 2014 LDD 288. 
541  Ghana Bar Association v Attorney-General 250 (held that the appointment of the chief justice 
was a non-justiciable political question under the Constitution of Ghana). 
542  Balarabe Musa v Auta Hamzat (applying the political question doctrine in Nigeria); Onuoha v 
Okafor (applying the political question doctrine in Nigeria); Edbewole W and Olatunji O 
“Justiciability Theory Versus Political Question Doctrine: Challenges of the Nigerian Judiciary 
In the Determination of Electoral and Other Related Case” 2012 The Journal of Jurisprudence 
117 (arguing that little is now left of the political question doctrine in Nigeria); Nwauche Is the 
End Near 31-60 (discussing the political question doctrine in Nigeria). 
543  For a discussion of the political question doctrine in Israel, see Cohn M “Form, Formula And 
Constitutional Ethos: The Political Question/Justiciability Doctrine in three Common Law 
Systems” 2011 American Journal of Comparative Law 675; and Jabotinsky v Weitzmann HCJ 
65/51 (1951) (where the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice rejected an 
application for an order of mandamus against the President of the State regarding his exercise 
of discretion in entrusting the task of forming a government to a member of the Knesset, Israel's 
parliament). 
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desirability of enacting such a law are matters for the executive and legislature to 
decide.”544 It is evident that the two justices hold similar views on the proper equilibrium 
of powers that should be maintained among the three arms of government by insisting 
on the notion that each arm of government enjoys equal constitutional powers to 
interpret and enforce a constitution.545 Attorney General v Tinyefuza is not the most 
recent application of the political question doctrine in Uganda. The High Court recently 
had a different approach to political questions involving, among other things, military 
matters. 
 
4.3.2 High court’s view 
 
Ugandan courts are not frequented with cases raising the need to apply the political 
question doctrine.546 A few reported cases have been decided by the High Court 
seating as the Constitutional Court or the Supreme Court. However, recently the High 
Court in Ochen & Others v Attorney General547 was presented with four related matters 
for a decision on several preliminary points of law that were raised by the Attorney 
General. One of these points of law was on the grounds of the political question 
doctrine. The facts of each case were different and important to be stated differently.  
 
The first case under consideration was Oluka & 9 Other v Attorney General 548the 
plaintiffs in this case alleged that they lost property including livestock during the war 
in the Teso region. They submitted claims to the Government of Uganda for 
compensation. These claims have yet to be resolved. Yet, they claimed, other similarly 
situated claimants were paid. They alleged this constituted discrimination. 
                                                          
544  Amidu v President Kufuor [2001-2002) 154 (Kpegah dissenting opinion) (arguing that the 
political question doctrine is applicable to Ghana). 
545  See, Mulhern 1988 University of Pennsylvania LR; Cowper and Sossin 2002 Supreme Court 
LR 345; Tribe American Constitutional Law; and Barkow 2002 Columbia LR 239 (arguing that 
the constitutional structure vests some interpretive authority with the political branches); and 
Seidman 2003 John Marshall LR 444 (arguing that political branches have final interpretive 
authority as to the meaning of the Constitution). 
546  But see, Brigadier Tumukunde v Attorney General and Another Supreme Court Constitutional 
Appeal No. 2 of 2006 (considering whether the actions of the Commander in Chief can be 
challenged in a court of law). 
547  Ochen & Others v Attorney General Civil Suit 292/2010. 
548  Oluka & 9 Others v Attorney General Civil Suit 122/2009. 
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The second case, Okupa and 2020 Others v Attorney General 549 involved a claim 
under Article 50 of the Constitution of Uganda. Article 50 provides: 
 
50. Enforcement of rights and freedoms by courts.  
(1) Any person who claims that a fundamental or other right or freedom 
guaranteed under this Constitution has been infringed or threatened is entitled 
to apply to a competent court for redress which may include compensation. 
 (2) Any person or organisation may bring an action against the violation of 
another person’s or group’s human rights.  
(3) Any person aggrieved by any decision of the court may appeal to the 
appropriate court.  
(4) Parliament shall make laws for the enforcement of the rights and freedoms 
under this Chapter. 
 
The plaintiffs’ claim was that government’s ineffective gun ownership policies led to 
Karimojong warriors to use their firearms and breach the fundamental rights of the 
plaintiffs. They claimed that government is liable to compensate the affected persons 
for loss of life, property, dependency, breach of duty and other fundamental rights and 
freedoms. They sought an order for the government to compensate them including 
other affected persons.  
 
The third case, Ochen & Others v Attorney General involved a claim under Article 50 
of the Constitution of 1995. The gist of the plaintiffs’ claim was that between 1986 and 
2006 they suffered human rights abuses including killing, abduction, torture, rape, 
unlawful detention and loss of livestock. Their claim was founded upon the breach of 
their fundamental rights in the 1995 Constitution. They also claimed that the 
government of Uganda failed to protect the citizens of Teso region from the Uganda 
People’s Army, which killed many affected citizens. Further, they claimed that the 
government was in breach of the Firearms Act of 1970 which exposed the plaintiffs to 
brutal acts of the Karimojong cattle rustlers. The plaintiffs sought compensation from 
the government of Uganda.  
 
                                                          
549  Okupa and 2020 Others v Attorney General Civil Suit 0014/2005. 
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The last case, Edimu & 105 Others v Attorney General,550arose from Article 50 of the 
Constitution. The plaintiffs claimed that they lost property at the hands of the National 
Resistance Army during the insurrection of 1985 and 1986 onwards. They submitted 
their claims to the Ministry of Defense. While these claims were admitted by the 
Minister of Defense, the Ministry delayed in forwarding the same to the Attorney 
General for payment. The Ministry of Justice later rejected the claims due to late 
submission. The plaintiffs claim that the President gave direction to the government to 
settle certain claims, and they alleged discrimination on the part of the President and 
Attorney General in handling their claims. They sought a declaration from the court 
that their rights were infringed and that they must be compensated.  
 
In response to these claims, the government raised a preliminary point of law with 
respect to each case. In the main, three arguments were advanced by the government 
relying on the political question doctrine. Firstly, citing Baker v Carr and Attorney 
General v Tinyefuza, the government advanced the argument that issues relating to 
military affairs are the prerogative of the President and that courts should refrain from 
reviewing decision made in that arena. For example, in relation to Ochen & Others v 
Attorney General where the plaintiffs claimed there was a failure to protect them 
against the Lord Resistance Army, the government argued that for the court to 
determine the claim it would require the court to delve into matters of military discretion 
reserved for the executive branch; that matters relating to what or how Ugandan army 
should have gone about to protect people of Teso is not judicially examinable but left 
to the executive under the Uganda Peoples Defense Force Act 2005. To put it 
differently, the argument was that the propriety of what may be done in the exercise 
of military discretion is not subject to judicial inquiry.  
 
It is important to mention that the government’s argument has successfully been used 
in two related American cases. In Corrie v Caterpillar,551 the United States federal 
Court of Appeals rejected to determine a case, which would have required it to 
                                                          
550  Edimu & 105 Others v Attorney General Civil Suit 9/2012. 
551  Corrie v Caterpillar 503 F 3d 974 (9th Cir 2007). 
147 
 
 
 
determine the consequences of the decision by the United States government to grant 
extensive military aid to Israel on the ground that this was a political question.552 The 
court reasoned that it was difficult to see how the court would impose liability on 
Caterpillar (the recipient of the military aid) without implicitly deciding the propriety of 
the United States decision to pay for the bulldozers, which allegedly killed the plaintiff’s 
family members.553 Similarly, in Schneider v Kissinger, the federal Court of Appeals 
dismissed a case against the United States on the basis of the political question 
doctrine arguing that it could not determine plaintiffs’ claims without passing judgments 
on the decision of the executive branch to participate in the alleged covert operations 
against the newly elected Chilean leftist leader Dr. Salvador Allende.554 
 
Secondly, the Uganda government advanced a classical political question doctrine 
based argument that there was no judicially discoverable and manageable standard 
to determine the actions of government vis a vis the Lord Resistance Army, National 
Resistance Movement or Karamojong castle rustlers or other rebels. In the 
government’s view, the High Court was without competence to make these kinds of 
determinations, and that this role was better left to the executive, top military Council, 
Minister of Defense, the Court Marshall and the President as the commander in Chief. 
In relation to Oluka & 9 Other v Attorney General the government noted that a court 
would have to put itself in President Museveni’s shoes and determine how he should 
have applied his discretion. In the end, the government emphasized that the issues 
raised in all four cases should be left to the political branches to resolve.   
 
In responding to these points of law, Judge Nahamya began with analyzing her 
understanding of the political question as formulated in Baker v Carr. She correctly 
noted that the doctrine essentially limits judicial review powers in certain instances.555 
Further, Nahamya recognized that the doctrine had limitations noting that the mere 
fact that a suit seeks protection of a political right does not mean it represents a political 
                                                          
552  Corrie v Caterpillar. (2007). 
553  Corrie v Caterpillar (2007). 
554  Schneider v Kissinger 412 F 3d 190 (2005). 
555  Ochen & Others v Attorney General Civil Suit 292/2010 20. 
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question.556 Nahamya made the observation that unlike in Uganda and other common 
law countries, she was cognizant of the fact that the United Sates practices a strict 
separation of powers. She noted that these countries prefer to have checks and 
balances rather than have water tight compartmentalization. She made these 
observations as a prelude to a further point. In this point, she noted that the political 
question doctrine was neither a product of legislation nor part of the United States 
Constitution, but emanates from the principle of separation of powers. She remarked 
further that while Baker v Carr was cited as Ugandan government’s authority for the 
political question doctrine, the US Supreme Court in Baker v Carr did not ultimately 
support the application of the political question doctrine in that case.  
 
Nahamya’s conclusive statement that the United States practises a strict version of 
separation of powers deserves immediate comment because it is not supported by the 
prevailing case authorities. To the contrary, the jurisprudence of the US Supreme 
Court demonstrates that the principle of separation of powers contemplated under the 
United States Constitution was never meant to be strict or absolute.557In several 
cases, the US Supreme Court has reiterated this view. In United States v Nixon558 a 
broad argument concerning the separation of powers was advanced to oppose a 
subpoena in connection with certain Presidential tapes and documents of value to a 
pending criminal investigation. The US Supreme Court rejected the argument that the 
                                                          
556  Ochen & Others v Attorney General 21. See also, Japan Whaling Ass'n v Am Cetacean Soc'y 
478 US 221, 230, (1986); and Kadic v Karadzic 70 F 3d 232, 249 (2d Cir 1995). 
557  See, Hamilton The Federalist 299 (where James Madison reviewing the origin of the 
separation-of-powers doctrine, remarked that Montesquieu, the "oracle always consulted on 
the subject did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no 
control over the acts of each other. His meaning, as his own words import can amount to no 
more than this, that where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands 
which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free 
constitution, are subverted."); Tully M “The Supreme Court's Pragmatic and Flexible Approach 
to Federal Judicial Separation of Powers Issues: Mistretta v United States” 1990 DePaul Law 
Review 405 (discussing flexible approach to separation of powers by Supreme Court); and 
Story J Commentaries on the Constitution (William S. Hein & Company, New York 1833) 525 
(noting that “when we speak of a separation of the three great departments of government, and 
maintain that that separation is indispensable to public liberty, we are to understand this maxim 
in a limited sense. It is not meant to affirm that they must be kept wholly and entirely separate 
and distinct, and have no common link of connection or dependence, the one upon the other, 
in the slightest degree."). 
558  United States v Nixon 418 US 683 (1974). 
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United States Constitution contemplates a complete separation of powers among the 
three branches. The US Supreme Court held that:  
 
In designing the structure of our Government and dividing and allocating the 
sovereign power among three co-equal branches, the Framers of the 
Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system, but the separate powers 
were not intended to operate with absolute independence.559 
 
Similarly, in Mistretta v United States,560 the US Supreme Court reiterated the view 
that separation of powers under the United States Constitution is not strict. The Court 
reasoned that: 
 
In applying the principle of separated powers in our jurisprudence, we have 
sought to give life to Madison's view of the appropriate relationship among the 
three coequal branches. Accordingly, we have recognized, as Madison 
admonished at the founding, that while our Constitution mandates that each of 
the three general departments of government must remain entirely free from the 
control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others, the Framers 
did not require—and indeed rejected—the notion that the three Branches must 
be entirely separate and distinct.561 
 
The US Supreme Court further explained that: 
 
Madison recognized that our constitutional system imposes upon the Branches 
a degree of overlapping responsibility, a duty of interdependence as well as 
independence the absence of which would preclude the establishment of a 
Nation capable of governing itself effectively.562 
 
Furthermore, Story, in his commentaries, argued with eual force and sagacity that:  
 
when we speak of a separation of the three great departments of government, 
and maintain that that separation is indispensable to public liberty, we are to 
understand this maxim in a limited sense. It is not meant to affirm, that they must 
be kept wholly an entirely separate and distinct, and have no common link of 
connexion or dependence, the one upon the other, in the slightest degree. The 
                                                          
559  United States v Nixon 707. See also Nixon v Administrator of General Services 433 US 425  
(1977)(rejecting as archaic complete division of authority among the three branches); 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v Sawyer 343 US 579 (1952) 635 (Jackson J opinion). 
560  Mistretta v United States 488 US 361 (1989). 
561  Mistretta v United States 380. 
562  Mistretta v United States 381. 
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trust meaning is, that the whole power of one of these departments should not 
be exercised by the same hands.563 
 
Clearly, based on these authorities the observation and proposition by Nahamya 
cannot be legally sustained.  
 
In dismissing the political question doctrine as not applicable to the present case, 
Nahamya offered several reasons. Firstly, she noted that the current position in the 
United States is that the US Supreme Court has embraced the view that it is the only 
one among the three branches which has the power and competence to provide full 
substantive meaning of all constitutional provisions. These views by Nahamya were 
influenced by the views of two prominent academics Chemerinsky and Barkow. The 
problem with Nahamya’s observations is that she takes an absolutist view of judicial 
review powers and selectively cites to Barkow’s research on the subject of the political 
question doctrine. In the article written by Barkow titled More Supreme than Court? 
The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy,564 
which Nahamya relies on, Barkow maintains that the duty to say what the law is, which 
pronouncement institutionalised the power of judicial review, does not necessarily 
imply that a court has monopoly on constitutional interpretation.565 Barkow argued that 
judicial review leaves room for deference to the constitutional interpretation of the 
political branches; that indeed, a constitution may contain provisions that dictate an 
interpretive role for the political branches. Barkow maintained that Marbury v Madison 
itself contains the seeds for the view that the authority to answer some constitutional 
questions rests entirely with the political branches.566 In essence, Barkow understood 
that the power of judicial review was not absolute. Nahamya did not consider these 
views of Barkow.  
 
Besides, Barkow’s views are not binding on Ugandan courts. The other concern is that 
Nahamya ignores local jurisprudence on the subject. As discussed above, in his 
                                                          
563  Story Commentaries 8 and 12-13 (arguing that a rigid separation cannot be maintained). 
564  Barkow 2002 Columbia LR 239. 
565  Barkow 2002 Columbia LR 239. 
566  Barkow 2002 Columbia LR 239. 
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formulation of the political question doctrine for Uganda, Justice Kanyeihamba 
reasoned that the Constitution of Uganda provides that the constitutional platform is 
to be shared among the three arms of government, and that courts need to bear in 
mind the judgments of other repositories of constitutional power concerning the scope 
of their authority and the necessity for each to keep within its powers including the 
courts themselves.567 According to Kanyeihamba, other branches of government are 
capable of providing substantive meaning to constitutional provisions and this has to 
be respected. Instead of relying on relevant local authority, Nahamya focuses on 
American authorities.  
 
Secondly, in support of her decision to dismiss the political question doctrine argument 
in the case, Nahamya made another observation that the current position in the United 
States is that the doctrine is at odds with the US Supreme Court’s view of its place in 
a constitutional order. She cited the case of Bush v Gore568 as an example where the 
US Supreme Court chose not to make mention of the doctrine in support of her view 
about the validity of the doctrine in the United States.  She then posed the question: 
why should a Ugandan court be persuaded to follow a doctrine that is almost being 
phased out from where it originates.  
 
Nahamya’s observations should be rejected on two grounds. (1) Nahamya offered no 
authority for her conclusion that the political question doctrine is disfavored by the US 
Supreme Court or by courts in the United States in general. In fact, two years after 
Nahamya made her statement the US Supreme Court decided Zivotofsky v Clinton in 
which the political question doctrine was upheld by the entire bench. The only 
difference among the Justices was whether the doctrine should continue to incorporate 
prudential considerations or not. The US Supreme Court resolved that going forward 
the political question doctrine will only contain the classical considerations or the first 
two factors in Baker v Carr. It is evident that Nahamya relied heavily and selectively 
on Barkow’s views about the status of the doctrine at the time of her writing. She 
                                                          
567  Attorney General v Tinyefuza 12. 
568  Bush v Gore 531 US 98 (2000). 
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omitted to recognize that Barkow’s article is now irrelevant in light of Zivotofsky v 
Clinton. Furthermore, this study finds the reference to Bush v Gore appeared to be 
misplaced. The fact that Bush v Gore did not invoke the doctrine does not mean the 
doctrine is no longer good law.569 Similarly, Nahamya’s observation that Baker v Carr 
did not find the questions raised in that case to be political does not mean that the 
doctrine is discredited or no longer good law. The fact is that Baker v Carr laid out a 
principle that would be used in all future political questions cases until Zivotofsky v 
Clinton was decided. The application of any legal principle will always dependent on 
facts. Evidently, the facts in Baker v Carr570 did not support the application of the 
doctrine, but undoubtedly the doctrine remains good law. 
 
Before proceeding to the last point, attention should be drawn to Nahamya’s 
dismissiveness of the political question doctrine. As mentioned above, Nahamya 
makes the point that the doctrine has neither legislative source nor constitutional 
source. This is incorrect. If one views, as most academics and US federal courts have 
done,571 the political question as being divided into two versions one being classical 
political question and the other prudential political question, it follows that one should  
have the benefit of the knowledge that the classical political question version views 
the doctrine as a command from the Constitution and focuses on the text of the 
Constitution as its source,572 while as the prudential political question theory focuses 
on the consequences of a court asserting jurisdiction on matters that are inappropriate 
                                                          
569  For a discussion and criticism of Bush v Gore’s failure to apply the political question doctrine 
see, Alton S “From Marbury v Madison to Bush v Gore: 200 Years of Judicial Review in the 
United States” 2001 Texas Wesleyan Law Review 7; Chemerinsky E “Bush v Gore Was Not 
Justiciable 2001 Notre Dame Law Review 1093; and Raskin J “What’s Wrong With Bush v Gore 
And Why We Need to Amend The Constitution to Ensure It Never Happens Again” 2002 61 
Maryland Law Review 652. 
570  As well as in Marbury v Madison and recently in Zivotofsky v Clinton. 
571  Corrie v Caterpillar; Goldwater v Carter 444 US 996 (1979) (Powell J concurring); Nixon v 
United States 506 US 224 (1992) 252-253 (Souter J concurring) (noting that applying the 
political question doctrine requires case-by-case attention to prudential concerns);  Wang v 
Masaitis 416 F 3d 992, 996 (9th Cir.2005) (discussing Powell J's approach); Warth v Seldin, 
422 US 490 (1975); 767 Third Avenue Association v Consulate General of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia 218 F 3d 152 (2d Cir 2000) 164 (noting that although prudential 
considerations may inform a court's justiciability analysis, the political question doctrine is 
essentially a constitutional limitation on the courts.). 
572 See, Wechsler Principles; and Scharpf 1966 Yale LJ; and Weston 1925 Harvard LR. 
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for judicial review.573 Nahamya’s analysis seems to emphasize the prudential political 
question theory, which has been discredited and perhaps even overruled in Zivotofsky 
v Clinton. She ignores the Attorney General’s classical political question based 
argument in favor of the doctrine.  
 
(2) Nahamya’s view should be rejected because there is no legal authority for her 
proposition that the political question is almost phased out. This view ignores the fact 
that federal and state courts in the United States routinely apply the political question 
in the adjudication of constitutional cases. It is unreasonable to make hasty conclusion 
of law based on the limited caseload of the US Supreme Court only. Besides, the 
political question doctrine, as Dennison has argued, is part of Ugandan law. It no 
longer matters where the doctrine was borrowed from because the doctrine has taken 
a life of its own in Uganda. This is why two years after Nahamya’s ruling, the Ugandan 
Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine in that country. Nevertheless, at the end of her 
analysis, judge Nahamya found that the matters before her were not political but 
human rights issues, and as a result dismissed the preliminary points of law.574  
 
Some commentators read Nahamya’s ruling as signaling the potential demise of the 
doctrine in Uganda.575 Amerit Timothy has described Nahamya’s ruling as “worth of 
celebration as it seems to nail the concept of the non-justiciability of the doctrine of 
political question, into the legal coffins of Uganda’s jurisprudence.”576 Further, Timothy 
notes that there was nothing much left of the doctrine in Uganda.577 He argues that 
the political question doctrine has no space in this era of democracy, justice and 
constitutionalism. The views by Timothy are probably redundant given that the 
                                                          
573  Corrie v Caterpillar. 
574 Skinner G “Misunderstood, Misconstrued, and Now Clearly Dead: The Political Question 
Doctrine as a Justiciability Doctrine” 2013-2014 Journal of Law & Politics 479 (arguing that 
federal courts should not rely on the political question doctrine to avoid adjudicating individual 
rights claims). 
575  Timothy http://timothyamerit.blogspot.co.za/2014/08/the-doctrine-of-political-question-is.html 
(Date of use 25 December 2016).  
576  Timothy http://timothyamerit.blogspot.co.za/2014/08/the-doctrine-of-political-question-is.html 
(Date of use 25 December 2016). 
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(Date of use 25 December 2016). 
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Constitutional Court and Supreme Court upheld the doctrine in Centre of Health 
Human Rights v Attorney-General. As early as February 2012, the Constitutional Court 
without mentioning the doctrine by name dismissed a case on the basis of this 
doctrine. 
 
4.4  Internal affairs of parliament 
 
As one commentator has correctly observed, the political question doctrine led a quiet 
life in Uganda since Attorney General v Tinyefuza was decided.578 The political 
question theory and reasoning resurfaced in Severino v Attorney General.579 The case 
of Severino v Attorney General involved a constitutional challenge to the decision of 
Parliament to establish an ad-hoc parliamentary committee to investigate allegations 
of bribery in the oil sector and to report back to Parliament. The question before the 
court was whether Parliament had the authority to establish the ad-hoc committee. 
The Constitutional Court held that despite the political atmosphere the setting up of 
the ad-hoc committee by Parliament was constitutionally permissible under Article 90 
of the Constitution of 1995,580 and that it (the Constitutional Court) cannot interfere 
with Parliament. The court reasoned that any intervention in this matter, as invited to 
do so by the petitioner, would amount to undue meddling with the legitimate internal 
workings of Parliament.  
 
Implicit in the court’s holding and reasoning are theories and considerations that 
underpin the political question doctrine. It is inconsequential that the court did not 
                                                          
578  Dennison 2014 LDD 272. 
579  Severino v Attorney General Constitutional Petition 47 of 2011 (2012). 
580  Article 90 of the Constitution provides “90. Committees of Parliament. (1) Parliament shall 
appoint standing committees and other committees necessary for the efficient discharge of its 
functions.  (2) The committees of Parliament shall include sessional committees and a 
committee of the whole house. (3)Rules of procedure of Parliament shall prescribe the 
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evidence; (b) may co-opt any member of Parliament or employ qualified persons to assist them 
in the discharge of their functions;(c)shall have the powers of the High Court for— 
(i)     enforcing the attendance of witnesses and examining them on oath, affirmation or 
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mention the doctrine by name. Nonetheless, it is clear that the court applied the theory 
of the doctrine when it rejected the invitation by the plaintiff to intervene in the 
parliamentary process reasoning that the issue was assigned, by Article 90 of the 
Constitution 1995, to the legislative branch of government and that it was not 
appropriate for judicial review. The court recognized that to adjudicate the matter 
would amount to an impermissible interference in the affairs of Parliament. These are 
precisely the type of considerations that the political question doctrine is preoccupied 
with in theory and application. Dennison, who has studied the growth and development 
of the political question doctrine in Uganda, has similarly observed that the judgment 
in Severino v Attorney General was decided on political question grounds without 
naming the doctrine. In his analysis, Dennison has commented that “this zone of 
noninterference with the internal workings of another branch of government is one of 
the most common typologies of the political question doctrine.”581 He further observed 
that while the ruling made no mention of the doctrine, there is sufficient evidence in 
the reasoning that the doctrine has retained its currency as an established and binding 
principle in Uganda.582 A few months after Severino v Attorney General was decided, 
the judiciary in Uganda was presented with another task where the political question 
doctrine was expressly considered and applied to dismiss a case.  
 
4.5  Are maternal health matters political questions? 
 
4.5.1 Constitutional court approach to maternal health matters 
 
The Constitutional Court of Uganda recently applied Attorney General v Tinyefuza to 
dismiss a constitutional petition in Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-
General,583 a case challenging government action or inaction on the basis of the 
political question doctrine as articulated in Attorney General v Tinyefuza. In Centre of 
Health Human Rights v Attorney-General, the plaintiffs petitioned the Constitutional 
Court in terms of sections 137(3) and 45 of the Constitution of 1995 challenging the 
                                                          
581  Dennison 2014 LDD 272. 
582  Dennison 2014 LDD 272. 
583  Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General, Constitutional Petition No 16 of (2011). 
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failure of government to provide basic maternal commodities in government health 
facilities. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that acts or omission of government, which 
have led to high maternal deaths in Uganda, were inconsistent with the constitutional 
right to life and health.   
 
At the start of the proceedings, the government raised a preliminary objection to the 
Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction to hear the matter on the basis that the political 
question doctrine prohibits the judiciary from adjudicating cases of this nature.584 At 
least to some extent the government’s preliminary objection in Centre of Health 
Human Rights v Attorney-General is consistent with Justice Kanyeihamba’s 
pronouncement in Attorney General v Tinyefuza “that courts have no jurisdiction over 
matters which are within the constitutional and legal powers of the legislature or the 
executive.”585 What is more, the government can be read to be of the same mind with 
Professor Barkow’s thinking that ‘in all constitutional cases the primary question must 
be whether the question before a court has been committed to another branch of 
government.’586  
 
Relying on Attorney General v Tinyefuza and other foreign authorities, the government 
argued that the way the petition was framed required the court to make a judicial 
decision involving political questions, which the court had to determine at the outset 
whether it had jurisdiction to determine those questions.587 Further, it argued that in 
adjudicating such mattes, the Constitutional Court would in effect be interfering with 
political discretion which by law is a preserve of the executive and legislature.588 Again, 
the government’s view was that the Constitutional Court should not deal directly with 
questions that the Constitution of 1995 has made the sole responsibility of other 
branches of government; that for the Constitutional Court to determine the issues in 
the petition, it would be required to review all the policies of the entire health sector 
                                                          
584  Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General 2011, citing Attorney General v Tinyefuza, 
Baker v Carr; and R v Cambridge Health Authority ex PB [1995] 2 ALL ER 129. 
585  Attorney General v Tinyefuza (Kanyeihamba J) 12-13. 
586  Barkow 2002 Columbia LR 244-244. 
587  Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General 2011 [14]. 
588   Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General 2011 [14]. 
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and make findings on them, and that the implementation of these policies was the sole 
preserve of the executive and legislature.589 To further substantiate its claims, the 
government submitted an affidavit by the Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Health, 
which outlined the efforts and strategies undertaken by the government to improve 
maternal health services and ensure high standards in the health sector.590 It then 
cited sections 111(2)591 and 176(2)(e)592of the Constitution of 1995 that it claimed 
preserved the right of the executive and the legislature to formulate, review and 
implement policies and allocate resources.   
 
In dismissing the petition, the Constitutional Court endorsed, as good law, the political 
question doctrine as pronounced by the Supreme Court in Attorney General v 
Tinyefuza.593 While the Court was correct in stating that that doctrine had been applied 
by the Supreme Court in Attorney General v Tinyefuza, it is important to point out that 
the Constitutional Court first adopted and applied the political question doctrine in Ex 
Parte Matovu and subsequently applied it in Andrew Kayira v Edward Rugumayo.594 
In fact, in Attorney General v Tinyefuza Justice Kanyeihamba acknowledged that Ex 
Parte Matovu had adopted the political question doctrine as a sound principle to be 
applied in Uganda. Perhaps, one of the significance of highlighting Attorney General 
v Tinyefuza’s application of the political question doctrine is that it was the first case 
that applied the political question doctrine after the 1995 Constitution. Prior to Attorney 
General v Tinyefuza, it remained uncertain whether the political question doctrine was 
applicable in Uganda under the 1995 Constitution.  
 
                                                          
589  Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General 2011 [14]. 
590  Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General 2011 [14-15]. 
591  Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General 2011 [14-15], citing section 111(2) which 
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593  Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General 2011 [14-15], citing Attorney General v 
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In justifying the application of the political question doctrine in Centre of Health Human 
Rights v Attorney-General, the Constitutional Court reasoned that the Constitution of 
1995 clearly stipulated the different roles assigned to each of the three organs of 
government.595 According to the Constitutional Court, this implied that the autonomy 
of each organ of government must be immune from undue intrusion from the others.596 
In as much as it may be correct that the government had not allocated sufficient 
resources to the health sectors, the Constitutional Court reasoned that the duty to 
determine such matters was the preserve of the executive and no other organ of 
government.597 For this reason, the Constitutional Court pronounced that it is bound 
to leave certain constitutional questions of a political nature to the executive and 
legislature to determine.598 The Constitutional Court justified its reluctance in 
adjudicating the issues in the petition arguing that in doing so it would be substituting 
its discretion for that of the executive.599 In other words, the Constitutional Court was 
concerned that by adjudicating the issues in the petition, it would intrude into the 
domain of the executive in conflict with the principle of separation of powers.  
 
Therefore, the Constitutional Court sustained the government’s preliminary objections 
and held that it had no power to determine or enforce its jurisdiction on matters that 
required analysis of government health sector policies because the acts or omissions 
complained of were committed to the political branches and thus fell under the political 
question doctrine.600 Professor Wechsler and other commentators characterize the 
judicial thinking reflected in Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General as the 
classical political question doctrine.601 According to Trevor Cutaiar, the classical 
                                                          
595  Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General 2011 [24]. 
596 Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General 2011 [24]. 
597  Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General 2011 [25]. 
598  Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General 2011 [26]. 
599  Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General 2011 [25]. 
600  Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General 2011 [25-26]. 
601  Wechsler Principles 9. Wechsler has been interpreted as stating that the judiciary has no basis, 
and or business, abstaining to hear a case where the Constitution could fairly be interpreted as 
requiring them to abstain. See, Gouin 1994 Connecticut LR 778. See also, Cutaiar 2009 Loyola 
LR. The other political question doctrine version is called the prudential version commonly 
associated from Professor Bickel. The prudential version is a judge-made overlay that courts 
have used at their discretion to protect their legitimacy and to avoid conflict with the other 
political branches. See, Barkow 2002 Columbia LR 253. 
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political question doctrine was recognized in the landmark Supreme Court decision 
Marbury v Madison.602 The basic premise of the classical version is that “the political 
question doctrine is itself a product of constitutional interpretation, rather than of 
judicial discretion.”603 This study agrees with proponents of the classical political 
question doctrine that the only appropriate use of the political question doctrine is to 
jurisprudentially guide the court in determining the circumstances where a constitution 
has committed to another branch of government the determination of a question.604 
 
The Constitutional Court in Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General has 
been criticized by public interest organizations as being unprogressive.605 Most of 
these criticisms are either in favor or against the application of the political question 
doctrine in Uganda.606 Perhaps one of the commentaries has come from Dennison. 
Dennison makes the general point that critics of the political question doctrine must 
                                                          
602  Cutaiar 2009 Loyola LR 398 (arguing that the political question doctrine is a product of 
constitutional interpretation rather than judicial discretion). 
603  Scharpf 1966 Yale LJ 538. 
604  Wechsler Principles 7-8. 
605  See, Francis S “Strict Interpretation of Political Question Doctrine a Challenge to Realizing the 
Right to Health-Human Rights Commission Report” 2013 http://www.cehurd.org/2013/04/strict-
interpretation-of-political-question-doctrine-a-challenge-to-realizing-the-right-to-health-human-
rights-commission-report-2012/ (Date of use: 15 December 2016) (criticizing that the 
Constitutional Court strictly interpreted the separation of powers thereby making it a challenge 
to enforce the right to health including access to quality health care and services as a 
Constitutional right in Uganda), available at http://www.cehurd.org/2013/04/strict-interpretation-
of-political-question-doctrine-a-challenge-to-realizing-the-right-to-health-human-rights-
commission-report-2012/; Initiative For Social Economic Rights, A Political Question? 
Reflecting on the Constitutional Court’s Ruling in the Maternal Mortality Case (CEHURD & 
Others V Attorney General of Uganda (2011) (advocating against the political question doctrine 
in Uganda and the justiciability of social economic rights in Uganda noting that the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has condemned the political question doctrine) at 2, 
available at http://www.iser-
uganda.org/images/downloads/ISER_Commentary_maternal_mortality_case.pdf. See also 
General Comment No. 9, [10] by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
stating “It is sometimes suggested that matters involving the allocation of resources should be 
left to the political authorities rather than the courts. While the respective competences of the 
various branches of government must be respected, it is appropriate to acknowledge that courts 
are generally already involved in a considerable range of matters which have important 
resource implications. The adoption of a rigid classification of economic, social and cultural 
rights which puts them, by definition, beyond the reach of the courts would thus be arbitrary 
and incompatible with the principle that the two sets of human rights are indivisible and 
interdependent. It would also drastically curtail the capacity of the courts to protect the rights of 
the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in society.7 
606  Timothy http://timothyamerit.blogspot.co.za/2014/08/the-doctrine-of-political-question-is.html 
(Date of use 25 December 2016). 
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come to grips with the established power of the political question doctrine.607 He 
makes two important assertions about the source of the doctrine and how it ought to 
be applied. Firstly, he identifies two constitutional provisions that provide the basis for 
the political question doctrine in Uganda. The first provision he identifies is Article 1 of 
the Uganda Constitution, which provides that: 
 
(1) All power belongs to the people who shall exercise their sovereignty in 
accordance with this Constitution. 
(2) Without limiting the effect of clause (1) of this article, all authority in the State 
emanates from the people of Uganda; and the people shall be governed through 
their will and consent. 
(3) All power and authority of Government and its organs derive from this 
Constitution, which in turn derives its authority from the people who consent to 
be governed in accordance with this Constitution. 
(4) The people shall express their will and consent on who shall govern them and 
how they should be governed, through regular, free and fair elections of their 
representatives or through referenda. 
 
Additionally, he claims that the above provisions have to be read together with Article 
126(1) of the Uganda Constitution, which provides that:  
 
(1) Judicial power is derived from the people and shall be exercised by the courts 
established under this Constitution in the name of the people and in conformity 
with law and with the values, norms and aspirations of the people. 
 
In Dennison’s view, the political question doctrine provides the judiciary with a legal 
device to give effect to Articles 1 and 126 and allows the people, through their 
representatives and the courts, to govern themselves.608 
 
Secondly, Dennison strongly believes that there is value in the political question 
doctrine, and maintains that as a general rule, human rights based claims do not bar 
the application of the political question doctrine but requires the judiciary to balance 
the separation of powers considerations demanded by the doctrine against any human 
rights interests.609 He is critical of the way the court applied the doctrine in Centre of 
                                                          
607  Dennison 2014 LDD 279. 
608  Dennison 2014 LDD 281. 
609  Dennison 2014 LDD 265, 273. 
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Health Human Rights v Attorney-General. He argued that while the court had the 
jurisprudential license to evoke the doctrine, it was exceedingly applied.610 In his view, 
the court should not have employed the political question doctrine to avert the 
determination of whether there is a constitutional right to health in Uganda.611 He 
believes that before dismissing a case on the political question grounds, the judiciary 
should know what rights exist or not.612 He claims that this was particularly true in 
Uganda where the existence of the right to health is uncertain. He thus disapproved 
the court’s approach of employing the political question as a way of dealing with the 
complexity of this question and the political fallout that could have ensued from any 
judicial enforcement of the right to health. Essentially, underneath Dennison’s criticism 
is a suggestion that the judiciary in Uganda should not evoke the political question for 
fear of the political ramifications for their intervention. Instead, the focus for the 
application of the doctrine must be based on the principle that the issue is a political 
question, which is constitutionally assigned to another branch.  
 
Whilst the question of whether or not the right to health exists was not to be avoided 
using the political question doctrine, Dennison is prepared to accept that if the right to 
health existed the next related question would be what minimum threshold of health is 
required, and that a court may abstain from the adjudication of that question on the 
basis of the political question doctrine since the question is likely to lead to the intrusion 
into the functions of the political branches. Although this study agrees with Dennison’s 
observations and contentions above, it is submitted that he goes too far when he 
argues that the political question doctrine is a discretionary rule for courts to use or 
not. This study disagrees with this view and submits that if Dennison subscribes to the 
classical political question theory, he should therefore accept the fact that the doctrine 
is an implied command of the constitution. In this regard, the doctrine is not a 
discretionary rule but a constitutional necessity. Courts are required to apply the 
doctrine as part of their compliance to the principle of separation of powers. 
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Despite Dennison’s critical views, it is submitted that Ugandan courts have 
consistently adhered to the classical political question doctrine, and that it does not 
appear that any future application of the political question doctrine will deviate from 
this trend. This is likely the case when one considers the Supreme Court decision in 
the matter. 
 
4.5.2 Supreme court approach to maternal health matters 
 
The decision of the Constitutional Court in Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-
General was taken on appeal to the Supreme Court of Uganda.613 At issue on appeal 
was whether the political question doctrine remained good law in Uganda. The 
appellant’s main submission was that the Ugandan Constitution should not be 
interpreted or held hostage to the 19th century American jurisprudence such as 
Marbury v Madison. The appellants sought to persuade the court to depart from its 
earlier landmark judgment in Attorney-General v Tinyefuza, which endorsed the 
political question doctrine in post 1995 Uganda.614 Further, the appellants sought to 
distinguish the separation of powers principle as conceptualized in the United States 
from Uganda’s own interpretation of separation of powers.615 In their last attempt to 
persuade the Supreme Court, the appellants argued that the political question was not 
applicable where individual rights were at issue. This legal proposition, which seeks to 
define the contours of the doctrine, was well articulated in Marbury v Madison and 
suggested in Attorney-General v Tinyefuza that where individual rights are at issue the 
political question doctrine would not apply.616  
 
Justice Kisaakye, who wrote the main judgment, found that the political question is 
both interpreted and self-imposed by the courts. Classical political question theorists 
                                                          
613  Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General Appeal No 1 of (2013). 
614  Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General 2013 [5]. 
615  Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General 2013 [4]. 
616 For a discussion about individual rights and the political question doctrine see, Chopper J “The 
political question doctrine: suggested criteria” 2005 Duke Law Journal 1469; Dennison 2014 
LDD 275 (arguing that there is a clear correlation between Chopper’s description of the proper 
application of the political question doctrine and Kanyeihamba’s reference to the violation of 
individual liberties as a form of government action that is not protected from judicial review by 
the political question doctrine). 
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like Story, Cooley, Wechsler and Fritz would disagree with the latter part of that 
proposition. For Wechsler, the political question doctrine is not a discretionary tool for 
courts, but must be understood as a command of a constitution.617 Further, Justice 
Kisaakye held that the political question doctrine has limited application in Uganda and 
only extends to shield both the legislature and executive from judicial scrutiny where 
either branch is properly exercising its mandate duly vested in it by a constitution. In 
applying this holding to the case, the Supreme Court reasoned that while the doctrine 
has limited application in Uganda, the Constitutional Court erred when it dismissed the 
case on political question grounds without considering the merits.618  
 
After considering some authorities from the United States and Uganda in his 
concurring opinion, Justice Katureebe summarized his findings and held that 
underneath the political question doctrine is the proposition that “courts will not decide 
on questions that are purely political and which the Constitution has reserved for 
determination by the other branches of government in their constitutionally mandated 
discretion.”619 However, he noted that the authorities recognize that the doctrine would 
not apply where individual rights are implicated.  
 
Further, in his interpretation and construction of Justice Kanyeihamba’s opinion in 
Attorney-General v Tinyefuza, Katureebe J found that the Supreme Court underscored 
that the doctrine did not rule out the judiciary from intervening where the political 
branches acted outside the powers granted to them by the 1995 Constitution.620 In 
other words, like Justice  Fatai-Williams in the Nigerian context (see discussion 
below),621 Justice Katureebe views the political question doctrine as not requiring 
courts to abstain from adjudicating cases in those instances where a constitution 
                                                          
617  Wechsler Principles 1-9; and Scharpf 1966 Yale LJ 518. 
618  Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General 2013 [15]. 
619  Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General 2013 [9-15]. 
620  Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General 2013 [10]. 
621  who holds the view that the political question does not prevent courts from enforcing what the 
law expressly requires any political branch to do, except when the Constitution is silent about 
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interfering because the political branch has discretion in this regard and its actions are only 
politically examinable. AG Bendel v AG Federation 52. 
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specifically prescribes government procedures. He concluded by proclaiming that 
under Uganda’s political question doctrine, courts will only decline to exercise their 
jurisdiction to hear and determine issues whose resolution is committed by law to a 
political branch and the resolution of which would involve intrusion on the executive or 
legislative domain given that those issues are not capable of judicial resolution. 
Despite this declaration, Katureebe concurred with Justice Kisaakye that the political 
question doctrine has limited application in Uganda given the provisions of Uganda’s 
Constitution.622 
 
The decision in Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General is significant 
because it confirmed that the political question doctrine remains good law albeit under 
limited circumstances. While the court held that the doctrine has limited application, it 
did not, perhaps for good reasons, elaborate what those limited circumstances are 
thereby leaving this to be decided in a future case or on a case by case basis. 
However, based on the authorities, such as Marbury v Madison, Luther v Borden and 
Exparte Matovu cited with approval by the Supreme Court, it is reasonable to assume 
that by limited application, the Supreme Court was referring to the classical political 
question doctrine; that the doctrine will apply only where the Constitution of 1995 
expressly delegates to a specific political branch the resolution of an issue, including 
discretion to determine such issue. It is without doubt that the judgment by Kisaakye 
exhibits an endorsement of the classic political question theory in Uganda.  
 
Another significant observation from the Supreme Court ruling in Centre of Health 
Human Rights v Attorney-General is that it mirrors the development of the political 
question jurisprudence in the United States, particularly following the decision in 
Zivotofsky v Clinton. Like Zivotofsky v Clinton, the judgment in Centre of Health Human 
Rights v Attorney-General stands for the proposition that the doctrine is a narrow 
exception to the institution of judicial review, and that the Supreme Court has an 
obligation to decide cases that come before it, unless the Constitution of 1995 has 
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expressly delegated the power to decide the issue to a political branch.623 Following 
Centre of Health Human Rights v Attorney-General it is fair to conclude that the 
political question doctrine will be applied only in its classical form.  
 
4.6  Conclusion 
 
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is plain that the political question doctrine is an 
integral part of Uganda’s constitutional law.624 The courts have consistently applied 
this doctrine to deal with some of the most significant constitutional questions in 
Uganda. A common feature in the application of this doctrine in Uganda is that courts 
place a particular emphasis on the 1995 Constitution’s text and the preservation of the 
separation of powers principle.625 The discussion above demonstrates how Uganda 
has come to grips with the judicial response to political questions. However, while the 
political question doctrine is part of Ugandan constitutional law, it is submitted that 
Ugandan courts are treading carefully by ensuring that the doctrine has limited 
application by balancing the separation of powers considerations and regularly (or 
attempting to) applying the doctrine. It is important to highlight that Uganda had a 
military regime at some point in its recent history from which the political question 
doctrine emerged, and that the doctrine’s continued application may have different 
consequences under democratic dispensation. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that 
the courts will develop the classical political question theory that has consistently been 
applied since Exparte Matovu in many ways that offer lessons for other countries like 
South Africa.626 
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625  See, Baker v Carr; Ghana Bar Association; Onuoha v Okafor (holding that the lack of 
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___________________________________________________________________ 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE APPLICATION OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE IN NIGERIA 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
The political question doctrineen considered by courts in Nigeria since the 1960s. It 
was first considered in Attorney General Eastern Nigeria v Attorney General of the 
Federation,627 where the court held that the determination of the margin of error in 
census figures was a political question.  While using political question terminology, the 
court did not provide any guidance about the scope of the doctrine.628 Given the 
changes of government and constitutions in Nigeria since independence, it took almost 
two decades since Attorney General Eastern Nigeria v Attorney General of the 
Federation was decided for Nigerian courts to develop a full-fledged political question 
doctrine.   
 
According to some commentators, the development of the political question doctrine 
in Nigeria was largely influenced by the constitutional changes in 1979, which 
introduced an American presidential system of government founded on separation of 
powers.629 These changes also precipitated a greater reliance on American case 
law.630 It is evident from the jurisprudence and academic commentaries that Nigerian 
courts imported the political question doctrine as pronounced in the United States, and 
formulated a doctrine for Nigeria. An examination of the Nigerian jurisprudence further 
demonstrates that the doctrine has traditionally been applied in three main areas: 
impeachment proceedings, political parties’ primary elections, and internal affairs of 
parliament cases.  
                                                          
627  Attorney General Eastern Nigeria v. Attorney General of the Federation (1964) ALL NLR 218 
(holding that the determination of the margin of error in a census was a political question). 
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629  Egbewole and Olatunji 2012 Journal Jurisprudence 10. 
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This chapter examines the origins, application and status of the political question 
doctrine in Nigeria. It seeks to pinpoint and examine any unique aspects of the political 
question doctrine as applied by Nigerian courts with a view to draw lessons for South 
Africa. Given the constitutional changes in Nigeria since the political question doctrine 
was first considered, the chapter investigates the attitudes of the courts towards the 
doctrine under the Nigerian constitutional law post the 1999 constitutional reforms. 
Through an analysis of the case law, it also investigates whether the political question 
doctrine remains good law in Nigeria. It considers the attitude of Nigerian courts 
towards the usage of the classical and prudential political question theories, and 
determine the dominant theory. 
 
5.2  Impeachment proceedings  
 
The first Nigerian case to substantively consider and apply the political question 
doctrine is Balarabe Musa v Auta Hamza.631 In this case, the Court of Appeal ruled 
that the impeachment of the governor of Kaduna State was a non-justiciable political 
question. The case arose out of impeachment proceedings by the Kaduna State 
House of Assembly in terms of section 170 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria 1979 (Constitution 1979) against the governor. The governor attacked 
section 170 of the Constitution 1979 on the basis of which the House of Assembly 
sought to carry on with the impeachment proceedings against him. Section 170 
provided in pertinent part as follows: 
 
170- (1) The Governor or Deputy Governor of a State may be removed from 
office in accordance with the provisions of this section. 
(2) Whenever a notice of any allegation in writing signed by not less than one-
third of the members of the House of Assembly- 
           (a) is presented to the Speaker of the House of Assembly of the                
                 State 
           (b) stating that the holder of such office is guilty of gross     
           misconduct in the performance of the functions of his office,    
           detailed particulars of which shall be specified, 
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The Speaker of the House of Assembly shall within 7 days of the receipt of the 
notice cause a copy thereof to be served on the holder of the office and on each 
member of the House of Assembly, and shall also cause any statement made in 
reply to the allegations by the holder of the office to be served on each member 
of the House of Assembly. 
(3) Within 14 days of the presentation of the notice to the Speaker of the House 
of Assembly…the House of Assembly shall resolve by motion without any debate 
whether or not the allegation shall be investigated. 
(4) … 
(5) Within 7 days of the passing of a motion under the foregoing provisions the 
Speaker of the House of Assembly shall cause the allegation to be investigated 
by a Committee of 7 persons who in his opinion are of high integrity, not being 
members of any public service, legislative house or political party, and who shall 
have been nominated and, with approval of the House of Assembly, appointed 
by the Speaker of the House to conduct the investigation. 
(6) … (7) … (8) … (9) … 
(10) No proceedings or determination of the Committee or the House of 
Assembly or any matter relating thereto shall be entertained or questioned in any 
court. 
 
In his attack, the governor contended that the House of Assembly had no jurisdiction 
to impeach him because it failed to comply with section 170(2) and (5) of the 
Constitution 1979. The court construed section 170(10) as a limitation on its powers 
to review any proceedings in the House of Assembly or the Committee or any 
determination by the House of Assembly or Committee. The court went on to say that 
once the legislature commenced proceedings under section 170(2), the jurisdiction of 
the court was limited by section 170(10).632  
 
In addition to the limitation in section 170(10), the court found that judicial intervention 
in impeachment processes was in-appropriate because the matter involved political 
questions. The court, as per Justice Ademola, reasoned that: 
 
...the learned counsel for the appellant has called for the intervention of the 
judiciary in the impeachment proceedings. However, well-meaning the call might 
be, the law of the land… prevents such intervention. More than that, it is a political 
matter; self-restraint should ... be a virtue the court should cultivate. For the court 
to enter into the political thicket as the invitation made to it clearly implies in my 
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view be asking its gates and its walls to be painted with mud; and the throne of 
justice from where its judgments are delivered polished with mire.633 
 
While the court made no specific reference to the political question doctrine, part of its 
rationale in refusing to review the matter was that such a review is productive of 
insoluble conflicts, and the court used political question terminology in deciding the 
case.634 In his study of the political question doctrine in Nigeria, Professor Nwauche 
has argued that Balarabe Musa v Auta Hamza is a significant case because it 
established two important principles.635  Firstly, that a constitutional commitment of a 
function to another branch of government will be approved based on the separation of 
powers principle. Secondly, that certain questions of constitutional law are more 
successfully resolved by the political branches of the state and are therefore 
inappropriate for judicial review.636 
 
While Balarabe Musa v Auta Hamza was welcomed by commentators, the judgment 
raised more questions than answers about the future application of the doctrine. 
However, a few observations could be made about that judgment. While not fully 
ventilated by the court, the judgment in Balarabe Musa v Auta Hamza demonstrated 
the court’s endorsement of both the classical and prudential political question theories. 
The first principle that emerged (which Professor Nwauche highlights above) from 
Balarabe Musa v Auta Hamza represents the classical political question because the 
court viewed the doctrine as emanating from the Constitution itself; that the doctrine 
will apply if the text and Constitution commits a function or an issue, that requires to 
be resolved, to another branch of government and will be approved as a basis of 
requiring courts to abstain from intervening in the matters involving those functions or 
issues. More importantly, this principle is motivated by separation of powers 
considerations. The second principle that emerged from Balarabe Musa v Auta Hamza 
introduced the prudential political question doctrine into Nigerian law. This assertion 
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is predicated on the fact that the court in that case established the principle that certain 
questions are not appropriate for judicial review. However, it was not clear from 
Balarabe Musa v Auta Hamza how future courts would determine what questions are 
inappropriate for judicial review. In spite of this, given the court’s reference to Baker v 
Carr, it was reasonable for every Nigerian practitioner to assume that some of the 
prudential considerations alluded to in that case would apply in Nigeria. These two 
important principles in Balarabe Musa v Auta Hamza were affirmed by the Nigerian 
Supreme Court in Onuoha v Okafor.  
 
5.3      Political party primaries 
 
Onuoha v Okafor637 is probably the case that solidified the establishment of the 
political question in Nigeria by the Supreme Court. In Onuoha v Okafor, the plaintiff 
brought a cause of action to require the National People’s Party to nominate and 
sponsor him for a senatorial district seat and not the defendant. The two potential 
candidates had each contested for the senate seat and the committee set up to select 
a candidate, who would represent the party, chose the plaintiff. As a result, the 
defendant lodged a complaint, which was adjudicated by the State Working Committee 
of the National People’s Party. The State Working Committee nullified the selection of 
the plaintiff and chose the defendant. The plaintiff instituted an action in the High Court, 
which found in his favour. The defendant appealed against this decision. His main 
contention on appeal was that a court of law ought not entertain an action to determine 
whom a political party should or should not sponsor for an elective office. The 
defendant was successful in his appeal and the matter ended up in the Supreme Court.  
 
At the Supreme Court, Justice Obaseki, who delivered the leading judgement in the 
case, dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. He framed the issue 
before the court as an inquiry into whether or not the court ought to make an order 
directing the National People’s Party to sponsor the losing candidate. In his view, the 
answer to this question had to be negative because it was not appropriate for the 
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judiciary to determine such questions. He explained that a positive response would 
instantly drive the court into the area of jurisdiction to run and manage political parties 
and politicians, and in doing so the court would be deciding a political question which 
it is not fitted to do.638 
 
Further, Justice Obaseki reasoned that “implicit in the right to canvass for votes for a 
candidate is the right to sponsor and the right to withhold sponsorship from a candidate 
or not to sponsor a candidate for election.”639 He found that the expressed intention of 
the Constitution 1979 and the Electoral Act of 1982 is to give a political party (such as 
the National People’s Party) the right freely to choose the candidate it will sponsor for 
election to any elective office. According to Justice Obaseki, the exercise of this right 
is the domestic affair of the National People’s Party guided by its constitution. For 
Justice Obaseki, the issue therefore was whether a court can justifiably interfere under 
any guise with the free exercise of this right by a political party. In his view, there was 
no legal basis for such intervention. He reasoned that since there are no judicial criteria 
or yardstick to determine which candidate a political party ought to choose, the 
judiciary is, therefore, unable to exercise any judicial power in the matter. Further, 
Justice Obaseki explained that this is a matter over which the court had no subject 
matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the question of which candidate a political party will 
sponsor is more in the nature of a political question which courts are not qualified to 
deliberate upon and answer. The power to decide such political questions is entrusted 
to the leader of a political party in terms of section 30(4) of the Electoral Act 1982. As 
a result, the court refused to exercise jurisdiction on the basis that to do so would 
project or propel it into the area of jurisdiction to run and manage political parties.   
 
Therefore, the court concluded that the matter in dispute was not justiciable; that a 
non-justiciable dispute is presented to a court when the parties seek adjudication of 
only a political question.640 Justice Obaseki further held, using American political 
question language, that the decision of questions of a political nature is exclusively 
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committeed to the political party, the executive and the legislative branches of the 
government. Relying on Baker v Carr and other American authorities, Justice Obaseki 
formulated a two-part test for the determination of the political question doctrine. He 
declared that:  
 
the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination of a political question 
is one of the dominant considerations in determining whether a question falls 
within the category of political questions. The other is the appropriations of 
attributing finality to the action of the political departments and political parties 
under the Nigerian Constitution and system of government.641 
 
In applying the two-part test to the case, Justice Obaseki found that there were no 
satisfactory judicial criteria that could be employed by the court to adjudicate on the 
matter, and determine the candidate to be elected for office. Lastly, Obaseki observed 
that the jurisdiction conferred on the court by section 236 of the Constitution 1979 is 
to hear and determine any civil proceedings in which the existence or extent of a legal 
right, power, duty, liability, intent, obligation or claim is in issue.642 He found that the 
right to sponsorship by a political party was not vested in the plaintiff. In other words, 
the plaintiff was not vested with the right to be sponsored either under the Constitution 
1979, the Electoral Act, the common law, customary law or any other statute.643  
 
The remaining justices of the court agreed with the proposition in the main judgment 
by Justice Obaseki that the issue before them was not justiciable and the court below 
was correct in denying jurisdiction to determine the matter. In his analysis supportive 
of the main judgment, Justice Aniagolu, who understood as being called upon to 
                                                          
641  Onuoha v Okafor (Obaseki J). 
642  Section 236 of the Constitution 1979 provided: Jurisdiction: general 236. (1) Subject to the 
provisions of this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred 
upon it by law, the High Court of a State shall have unlimited jurisdiction to hear and determine 
any civil proceedings in which the existence or extent of a legal right, power, duty, liability, 
privilege, interest, obligation or claim is in issue or to hear and determine any criminal 
proceedings involving or rrelating to any penalty, forfeiture, punishment or other liability in 
respect of an offence committed by any person. 
 (2) The reference to civil or criminal proceedings in this section includes a reference to the 
proceedings which originate in the High Court of a State and those which are brought before 
the High Court to be dealt with by the court in the exercise of its appellate or supervisory 
jurisdiction. 
643  Onuoha v Okafor. 
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determine the proper candidate for the National People’s Party, posed the following 
questions, which he answered in the negative and said that:  
 
Where the court forces a candidate on a political party, will the court proceed to 
campaign for votes for the candidate of its verdict? If not, in order not to render 
its order nugatory, will the court then proceed to make a further order that the 
political party must campaign for votes for the candidate of its verdict? 
 
Justice Aniagolu observed that the negative answers to these questions demonstrate 
how unreasonable it is for a court to dabble itself in affairs which do not lie within its 
competence;644 that the judiciary in the prevailing constitutional order was not to 
determine candidates for elective office even if it was under the guise of enforcing or 
adjudicating political party constitutions.  
 
Some commentators have criticized the court’s refusal to adjudicate the matter on the 
basis of the political question doctrine by drawing an analogy between intervention by 
courts in disputes over political party primaries and corporate takeover disputes 
between contending director and shareholders.645 They argue that it is devoid of 
judicial logic for courts to abstain from adjudicating the former disputes, on the basis 
that it would drive courts into the jurisdiction to run and manage political parties, than 
to accede the adjudication of corporate takeovers bids without concern of driving 
themselves into the jurisdiction to run and manage corporations.646 They assert that 
this state of affairs is untenable.647 While this study agrees with the relevance of 
drawing the above analogy between political party primaries and corporate takeover, 
it is submitted that the two should be distinguished in favour of sustaining the 
application of the political question doctrine in political party primaries. There are 
prudential and separations of powers considerations involved in the political party 
primary case which are not present in the corporate takeover cases. In the political 
party cases, the executive and legislature are involved at a political level, in ways that 
could distabilise the balance of powers contemplated by the separation of powers, 
                                                          
644 Onuoha v Okafor. 
645  Egbewole and Olatunji 2012 Journal Jurisprudence 17. 
646  Egbewole and Olatunji 2012 Journal Jurisprudence 17. 
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than in corporate takeover cases. As one commentator has correctly observed, 
“political parties are not like other private associations and cannot be treated as if the 
were… political parties affect the political process directly: party nominations is the 
first step in the process of choosing public decision makers… the nomination is as 
much state action as the official election.”648 Given these prudential and separations 
of power considerations, this study is persuaded that the court’s approach in Onuoha 
v Okafor is justified and logical. 
 
It is very clear that the decision in Onuoha v Okafor was heavily influenced by 
authorities from the United States on the political question doctrine. While the court 
formulated a two-part test that is relevant to determine whether a case presents a 
political question, the court did not expressly pinpoint the source of the doctrine. 
Nevertheless, the court in Onuoha v Okafor (and to some extent Balarabe Musa v 
Auta Hamza) has implicitly pigeonholed the doctrine as an aspect of separation of 
powers, but when you consider the two part test adopted in Onuoha v Okafor, it 
remains ambiguous whether the doctrine (at least in the Nigerian context) derives 
exclusively from the Constitution 1979 or whether it also derives from prudential 
considerations about the proper role of the judiciary under Nigeria’s constitutional 
order.649 Jurists and commentators disagree on this question, including how it is 
conceived, its validity and when it ought to apply.650 This debate has centred around 
two theories of the doctrine.  
 
According to one theory, commonly referred to as the classical or textual theory of the 
political question, the doctrine must be understood as a constitutional exigency rather 
than discretion.651 It applies to cases only when the text and structure of a constitution 
commits the resolution of a question to another branch of government.652 According 
                                                          
648  Pietzman 1974 Califonrian LR 1363. 
649  See, Nwauche Is the End Near. See also Oko O “The Problems and Challenges of Lawyering 
in Developing Societies” 2004 Rutgers Law Journal 569. 
650  Bickel The least Dangerous; Wechsler Principles; Scharpf 1966 Yale LJ; Redish 1984 
Northwestern LR; Mhango 2014 AJLS; Onuoha v Okafor (Obaseki J). 
651  Wechsler Principles; and Scharpf 1966 Yale LJ. 
652  Szurkowski 2014 Harvard JLPP 347; Wechsler Principles 6-10; and Story Commentaries 345-
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to Professor Wechsler, who is associated with the classical theory of the doctrine, “all 
the doctrine can defensibly imply is that the courts are called upon to judge whether 
the Constitution has committed to another agency of government the autonomous 
determination of the issue raised, a finding that itself requires an interpretation.”653 
Accordingly, the proposition of the classical political question theory is that the political 
question doctrine is itself a product of constitutional interpretation rather than of judicial 
discretion.654 Hence, when called upon to engage in interpretation, a court does not 
abdicate its duty to interpret a constitution; rather it interprets a constitution as 
assigning discretion over an issue to another branch.655 It is for these reasons that 
early applications of the political question doctrine were grounded firmly on 
constitutional text and structure.656 As pointed out earlier, commentators, in the 
American context, agree that following Zivotofsky v Clinton, the classical political 
question version may be all that is left of the doctrine.657  
 
The last theory, prudential political question doctrine, was well articulated by 
Finklestein when he observed that: 
 
There are certain cases which are completely without the sphere of judicial 
interference. They are called, for historical reasons, political questions. What are 
these political questions? To what matters does the term apply? It applies to all 
those matters of which the court, at a given time, will be of the opinion that it is 
impolitic or inexpedient to take jurisdiction. Sometimes this idea of inexpediency 
will result from the fear of the vastness of the consequences that a decision on 
the merits might entail. Sometimes it will result from the feeling that the court is 
incompetent to deal with the particular type of question involved. Sometimes it 
will be induced by the feeling that the matter is too high for the courts. But always 
there will be a weighing of considerations in the scale of political wisdom.658 
 
                                                          
653  Wechsler Principles 7-9; Scharpf 1966 Yale LJ 518. 
654  Scharpf 1966 Yale LJ 538. 
655  Wechsler Principles 6-10. 
656  Szurkowski 2014 Harvard JLPP 353. See also M’Culloch v Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat) 316, 
325 (1819) (ruled that Congress, rather than the judiciary, determines the limits of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause); Ware v Hylton 3 US (3 Dall) 199 (1796)(held that the Court 
would not pass on whether a treaty had been infringed); and Martin v Mott 25 US (12 Wheat) 
19 (1827)(holding that the President had exclusive power to determine whether the militia 
should be called out). 
657  Szurkowski 2014 Harvard JLPP 361. 
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The prudential political question theory was later made famous by Professor Bickel’s 
pronouncement on the passive virtue of the judiciary in which he asserts that the 
doctrine permits courts to decline to adjudicate cases for prudential reasons as well 
as textual ones.659 Bickel was motivated by the thought that when courts declare 
legislation or executive action to be unconstitutional they frustrate the will of the 
people, which has the potential to dent the judiciary whose power arises from the 
perceived legitimacy in adjudicating cases rather than from passing or enforcing 
laws.660 He points out that at some point, continued invalidation of the public will 
enhances the risks of losing that legitimacy. Accordingly, instead of losing legitimacy 
by invalidating a law or enforcing a poorly imagined policy decision by upholding it, a 
court may exercise the passive virtue by invoking the political question doctrine to 
decline to adjudicate a case.661 Bickel maintains that when this happens, the courts 
facilitate a dialogue with the political branches and the public about the issues under 
dispute.662 
 
The outlines of the prudential political question are embodied in the following famously 
quoted statement by Bickel where he said the following:  
 
Such is the foundation of the political-question doctrine: the Court's sense of lack 
of capacity, compounded in unequal parts of (a) the strangeness of the issue and 
its intractability to principled resolution; (b) the sheer momentousness of it, which 
                                                          
659  See, Kronman A “Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence” 1985 Yale LJ 1567; Bickel A 
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tends to unbalance judicial judgment; (c) the anxiety, not so much that the judicial 
judgment will be ignored, as that perhaps it should but will not be; (d) finally ('in 
a mature democracy'), the inner vulnerability, the self-doubt of an institution 
which is electorally irresponsible and has no earth to draw strength from.663 
 
Bickel’s concerns and thoughts about the proper role of courts are as much relevant 
in the United States as they are in other jurisdictions like Nigeria. As Szurkowski has 
observed, following Marbury v Madison courts applied the classical theory.664 
Prudential considerations began to be intermingled with classical political question 
considerations, particularly after Luther v Borden, where courts started to dismiss 
cases for a combination of classical and prudential considerations.665 For example, 
Szurkowski has noted that in Luther v Borden the court commenced its opinion by 
listing a parade of the horrible that could ensue if the court decided the case on the 
merits.666 Szurkowski emphasizes that while the court decision in Luther v Borden was 
grounded in the text and structure of the Constitution, it mentioned prudential 
considerations to underscore the importance of accurately conducting its constitutional 
interpretation.667 It was Baker v Carr which formally combined classic and prudential 
considerations into a full-fledged doctrine.668 
 
Acting under the above persuasion, Justices Obaseki and Aniagolu adopted the 
political question doctrine. It is not possible to clearly discern which theory of the 
doctrine was adopted or preferred in Onuoha v Okafor. Nevertheless, according to this 
study, when one examines the opinion by Justice Obaseki it appears that he may have 
found favour in the classical political question theory because in his analysis, Justice 
Obaseki makes repeated references to the text of the Constitution as the basis for 
applying the doctrine. Moreover, his two-part test resembles the first two factors in 
Baker v Carr, which as Szurkowski has noted are simply reiterations of the classical 
political question theory.669 What is more, unlike Justice Aniagolu, Justice Obaseki and 
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the other Justices seemed to emphasize constitutionally based delegation of a function 
to the political branches as the basis for the main judgment. 
 
On the other hand, Justice Aniagolu’s view seems to favour the prudential political 
theory. His reasoning in favour of the application of the doctrine was not based on any 
constitutional text but rather the fact or reasoning that the judiciary should be 
restrained from resolving issues that other branches are better suited to resolve. To 
say the least, Justice Aniagolu was more concerned with prudential considerations 
around what he perceived to be the proper role of the judiciary in the matters at issue 
in that case. On the basis of the above analysis, it is fair to say that the political 
question doctrine in Nigeria derives from both the classical (Constitution 1979) and 
prudential considerations. In the discussion that follows, this chapter considers which 
theory of the doctrine is being applied or most preferred for purposes of identifying the 
contours of the doctrine in Nigeria. Commenting on the political question doctrine, 
Nwauche has correctly suggested that the adoption of the political question doctrine 
by Nigerian courts was strengthened by the fact that the Constitution 1979 was 
modelled out of the American presidential system.670 He also observed that prior to 
Onuoha v Okafor, Balarabe Musa v Auta Hamza and the Constitution 1979; Nigerian 
courts had applied a political question terminology without categorizing it as such.671  
 
5.4  Application of the political question doctrine during the second republic 
 1979-1983. 
 
5.4.1 Permissive application of the political question doctrine  
 
This section, considers some of the cases where the political question doctrine was 
applied, whether as part of the classical or prudential political question theory, to give 
the reader a sense of the areas where the doctrine was most susceptible for 
application, and more importantly demonstrate what the approach of the courts has 
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census was a political question). 
179 
 
 
 
been in those instances. Some commentators have observed that the application of 
the doctrine during the Second Republic is characterised by either the permissive or 
restrictive approach to the doctrine and justiciability principles.672 Accordingly, under 
the permissive approach a court often found against the application of the doctrine. 
Whereas under the restrictive approach, a court often found in favour of the application 
of the doctrine.673 The latter approach was prevalent in the Second Republic.674 It is 
submitted in this section that despite these characterisations, the utility of the doctrine 
was reaffirmed by the courts on more than one occasion. Moreover, the approach 
taken by courts at any given point in time was influenced by the facts of the case rather 
than any about turn concerning the utility of the doctrine as some have suggested.675  
 
Since Onuoha v Okafor and Balarabe Musa v Auta Hamza were decided, the courts 
applied the political question doctrine during the Second Republic.676 Despite not 
overruling Onuoha v Okafor, the Supreme Court in Alegbe v Oloyo677considered the 
political question doctrine and made some important pronouncements about its scope 
and future application.  
 
Briefly, the plaintiff in Alegbe v Oloyo was a member of the old Bendel State House of 
Assembly. The respondent, who was the Speaker of that House, had declared the 
plaintiff’s seat in the House vacant on the basis that he was absent from the House’s 
sitting for 94 times, a period more than permitted by the law. The plaintiff’s main 
argument was that it was not within the power of the Speaker to declare his seat vacant 
because only the judiciary exercises that power.  He approached the High Court, which 
found in his favour. However, the Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal.  
 
While the Supreme Court dismissed the Speaker’s appeal, which effectively meant the 
doctrine did not apply, Justice Fatai-Williams clarified the scope of the doctrine in 
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Nigeria, particularly in those areas where the doctrine has traditionally been applied. 
He explained that when the judiciary is presented with a task to interpret or apply any 
of the provisions of the Constitution 1979, this does not mean it is engaged with a 
political question despite the fact that the exercise might have political ramifications.678 
In his view, the judiciary in those instances simply performs its functions as conferred 
in the Constitution 1979.679 Justice Fatai-Williams went further to elucidate that equally 
when the judiciary is solicited to interpret or apply the provisions of a constitution of 
any organisation with regard to civil rights and obligations of organisation’s members, 
the judiciary simply performs a function assigned to it by the Constitution 1979.680 He 
emphasized that the judiciary is duty bound to perform its functions regardless of 
whether the organisation is a political party, cultural, religious or social 
organisations.681 
 
Justice Fatai-Williams pronouncements are important because they clarified the 
distinction between political questions that courts must abstain from deciding on the 
one hand and questions that have political ramifications, and which do not necessarily 
require abstention by the courts, and those political questions on the other which 
require abstention by the courts. This is an important clarification, which courts in all 
countries where the doctrine has been considered and applied have had to make. As 
pointed out elsewhere, in the United States case of Baker v Carr, Justice Brennan 
made a similar point as Fatai-Williams when he emphasized the limited reach of the 
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political question doctrine to ensure that it is employed economically in relation to 
discernible political questions assigned to the elected branches and not merely to 
cases that implicate political rights.682 Decades later, the United States Supreme Court 
in Zivotofsky v Clinton, where the political question doctrine was affirmed, made a 
similar point concerning the role of courts in constitutional adjudication. Chief Justice 
Roberts held that when interpreting the constitutionality of a statute, the court is not 
engaged in a political question because the Constitution does not delegate to the 
political branches “the power to determine the constitutionality of a statute.”683 Instead, 
those categories of questions have always been “emphatically the province and duty 
of the judicial department.”684 While the exercise of that duty may have political 
repercussions, nonetheless the judiciary is duty bound to adjudicate such questions.685 
Essentially, whilst the court in Zivotofsky v Clinton affirmed the political question 
doctrine it sent a clear signal that its future application was narrow. You may recall 
that in the Ghanaian context, in chapter three of this study, Justice Kpegah echoed 
similar sentiments in Amidu v President Kufuor686 that the interpretation and 
enforcement of the law passed by the legislature fall within the functions of the 
judiciary. In his view, the question of whether an Act of Parliament is constitutional is 
not a political question and the judiciary is not restrained from deciding it.687 Justice 
Kpegah explains that when a court examines whether Parliament has breached the 
constitutional limits of its law-making powers it is not engaged in the determination of 
political questions because courts have the authority to make these determinations. 
 
Therefore, Justice Fatai-Williams’s pronouncements may be viewed in the same light 
as Justices Brennan, Roberts, and Kpegah; that the political question doctrine is good 
law but its application may have a narrow application than we think. It was important 
for Justice Fatai-Williams to make these pronouncements in the early development of 
the doctrine in the same way as his counterparts in the United States and Ghana did 
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in the cases above. Some commentators have suggested that the decision in Alegbe 
v Oloyo indirectly recognised that the matter in that case involved internal proceedings 
of the House of Assembly and could have qualified as a political question.688 
 
5.4.2 Restrictive application of the political question doctrine 
 
The Supreme Court took an indifferent attitude to the political question doctrine in AG 
Bendel v AG Federation.689 The case involved the interpretation of the Authentication 
Act. Section 2 of that Act had ousted the jurisdiction of the courts by providing that the 
Bill shall become conclusive for all purposes once passed by the two Houses of the 
National Assembly and upon the signature of the Clerk of the National Assembly. The 
effect of this wording in the Bill is that the signature of the Clerk was all that was needed 
to determine whether the Bill had been properly passed in line with the Constitution. 
In interpreting the impugned Act, Justice Fatai-Williams, CJN held that the court has 
the power to examine the validity of a Bill despite the signature of the Clerk. In the 
course of his judgment, Fatai-Williams explicated that one of the requirements of the 
separation of powers under Nigerian law is that courts should respect the 
independence of the legislature in the employment of its law-making powers.690This, 
he explicated further, required courts to abstain from pontificating on the validity of 
domestic affairs of the legislature, including the method of employment of its law-
making powers.691 On the contrary, Justice Fatai-Williams explained that:  
 
… if the Constitution makes provision as to how the legislature should conduct 
its internal affairs or as to the mode of exercising its legislative powers the Court 
is in duty bound to exercise its jurisdiction to ensure that the legislature complies 
with the constitutional requirements. Sections 52, 54, 55 and 58 of our 
constitution clearly state how the National Assembly should conduct its internal 
affairs in exercise of its legislative powers. That being the case the Court is bound 
to exercise its jurisdiction under section 4(8) of the Constitution to ensure that 
the National Assembly comply with the provisions of the Constitution.692 
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Essentially, in the above pronouncement, Justice Fatai-Williams clarifies that the rule 
of law requires courts to interfere and give effect to the law where the Constitution 
stipulates the procedures that the National Assembly or any other branch of 
government must follow in carrying out its responsibilities. In Justice Fatai-Williams’s 
view, the political question doctrine does not prevent courts from enforcing those 
procedures through the process of judicial review. However, when the Constitution is 
silent about procedural requirements on how the legislature should conduct or manage 
its domestic affairs, the separation of powers and indeed the political question doctrine 
requires courts to abstain from interfering because the legislature has discretion (over 
substantive content on matters within their domain) in this regard and its actions are 
only politically examinable.693 It is settled law and has been so pronounced very often 
that courts will not interfere with discretionary duties of the political branches.694  
 
Therefore, it was an important clarification of the law on the part of Justice Fatai-
Williams because this goes to the heart of the political question theory as articulated 
in other authorities. One such authority is the case of Doctors for Life International v 
Speaker of the National Assembly. There, like Justice Fatai-Williams, Justice Ngcobo 
proclaimed that:  
 
a distinction should be drawn between constitutional provisions that impose 
obligations that are readily ascertainable… on the one hand, and those 
provisions which impose the primary obligation …to determine what is required 
of it, on the other. In the case of the former, a determination whether those 
obligations have been fulfilled does not call upon a court to pronounce upon a 
sensitive aspect of the separation of powers. An example of such a provision that 
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comes to mind is a provision that requires statutes to be passed by a specified 
majority. When a court decides whether these obligations have been complied 
with, it does not infringe upon the principle of the separation of powers. It simply 
decides the formal question whether there was, for example, the two-thirds 
majority required to pass the legislation. By contrast, where the obligation 
requires Parliament to determine in the first place what is necessary to fulfil its 
obligation, a review by a court whether that obligation has been fulfilled, trenches 
on the autonomy of Parliament …and thus the principle of separation of powers. 
This is precisely what the obligation comprehended in section 72(1)(a) does. 
While it imposes a primary obligation on Parliament to facilitate public 
involvement in its legislative and other processes, it does not tell Parliament how 
to facilitate public involvement but leaves it to Parliament to determine what is 
required of it in this regard.695  
 
What is clear from the jurisprudence of Ngcobo and Fatai-Williams is that both have 
an understanding that the power of judicial review is not absolute; that separation of 
powers may, in appropriate circumstances, operate as a mechanism to limit the 
institution of judicial review. Hence, this study disagrees with Professor Nwauche, who 
has commented that the opinion by Fatai-Williams in AG, Bendel v AG Federation 
represents resistance by the court to apply the political question doctrine by holding 
that it had power to determine how (procedurally) the legislature exercised its law-
making powers. Nwauche did not, to the satisfaction of this study, contextualise his 
comments and explain the courts’ attitude to the political question in the case. As 
demonstrated above, Justice Fatai-Williams is clear that courts have jurisdiction only 
if the Constitution provides clear parameters or procedures on how legislative powers 
should be employed. From a rule of law point of view, one cannot fault Fatai-Williams. 
It is submitted that Professor Nwauche is unpersuasive in his suggestion that AG, 
Bendel v AG Federation is the judicial authority for the proposition that judiciary has 
absolute power over the employment of legislative powers. This is not the preferred 
interpretation (by this study) of AG, Bendel v AG Federation and the contours of the 
political question doctrine. This study favours an alternative authority for the view that 
the institution of judicial review is not absolute.696 A number of justiciability canons 
have been developed by courts including ripeness, mootness, avoidance, political 
                                                          
695  Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly [25-26]. 
696  See, Onuoha v Okafor; Balarabe Musa v Autta Hamzat; Waldron J “The Core Case Against 
Judicial Review” 2006 Yale Law Journal 1350, 1426; Kramer The People Themselves; Mark 
Tushnet, Taking the Constitution. 
185 
 
 
 
question doctrine, which provide limits to judicial review. When courts, through any of 
these justiciability canons, decline jurisdiction it is not a resistance to the value and 
utility of any particular canon. Rather, it means that on the facts of a particular case it 
is not appropriate to apply the relevant canon. This does not mean, as Professor 
Nwauche seemed t suggest, the relevant cannon is discredited or in demise. Nigerian 
courts displayed different attitudes to the political question doctrine during the Second 
Republic. Despite these distinct attitudes, the validity of the doctrine was repeatedly 
affirmed.697 The next section, examines the application of the doctrine in the Third 
Republic, particularly in light of the constitutional changes in 1999.  
  
5.5  The political question post 1999 
 
In 1999, Nigeria went through sweeping constitutional and democratic reforms, which 
led to the adoption of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 
(Constitution 1999) that ushered in the third Republic as the supreme law of Nigeria.698 
Additionally, the Constitution 1999 restored democratic rule to Nigeria. As a 
consequence of these reforms, questions arose among Nigerian constitutional 
scholars whether the political question doctrine would be sustained under the new 
dispensation.699 In this section, the study examines a few notable cases where the 
political question was considered and applied in the post 1999 era with a view to 
determine judicial trends, if any, about the doctrine.  
 
5.5.1 The impeachment question 
 
                                                          
697  See, Abubakar Rimi v Aminu Kano (1982) 3 NCLR 478; Asogwa v Chukwu[2004] FWLR (Pt 
189) 1204; Rimi & Musa v PRP (1981)2 NCLR 734; Ekpenkhio v Egadon (1993)7 NWLR (pt. 
308) 717 (sustained the constitutionality of the removal of a deputy speaker); Okoli v Mbadiwe 
(1985)6 NCLR 742; Asogwa v Chukwu (2004) FWLR (pt. 189) 1204 (where court refused to 
intervene in the internal affair of the legislature concerning the removal of the speaker after it 
was alleged that two thirds of members were not present in the legislature when a vote took 
place). 
698  For a discussion of the history of constitutional reforms in Nigeria see Okpanachi E and Garba 
A “Federalism and Constitutional Change in Nigeria” 2010 Federal Governance 1-14. 
699  Nwauche Is the End Near; Imam et al 2011 African Journal of Law; Egbewole and Olatunji 2012 
Journal Jurisprudence. 
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In post 1999 Nigeria, Chief Enyi Abaribe v the Speaker Abia State House of Assembly 
& Ors700 was the first case to consider and apply the political question doctrine. The 
case involved the impeachment of the deputy governor of Abia State where the 
governor sought, among other things, an order to set aside the proceeding in the State 
House of Assembly. The High Court cited Balarabe Musa v Auta Hamza with approval 
as authority for its decision that the matter involved a political question and that it had 
no jurisdiction to entertain it. Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court that 
the question of the impeachment was a political question that was not appropriate for 
judicial review.701 The court, through Justice Pats-Acholonu, observed that: 
 
In so far as it concerns the issue of impeachment it is a political matter. However, 
the court at the same time may not close its eyes to serious injustice relating to 
the manner the impeachment procedure is being carried. That is to say it is within 
the province of the court to ensure strict adherent to the spirit of the Constitution 
for the endurance of a democratic regime. The court should not however attempt 
to assume for itself power it is never given by the Constitution to brazenly enter 
into the miasma of the political cauldron and have itself bloodied and thereby 
losing respect.702 
 
Justice Pats-Acholonu went further to explain why the appeal was directed to a 
wrong forum and what ought to happen in future cases. In this respect, he ruled 
that: 
 
In this situation, as in others of like nature, appeal for relief does not belong here. 
Appeal must be to an informed, civically militant electorate. In a democratic 
society like ours, relief must come through an aroused popular conscience that 
sears the conscience of the people's representatives… Political question 
doctrine relates to those amorphous political issues which generally arise in 
political structure of parties or in the House of Assembly and which no court 
should try to get involved for fear of being smeared or appear to take sides.703 
 
The main issue on appeal came down to the proper interpretation of section 188(10) 
of the Constitution 1999. The relevant parts of section 188 provides that: 
 
                                                          
700  Chief Enyi Abaribe v the Speaker Abia State House of Assembly & Ors, (2003) 14 NWLR 
(pt788) 466; Chief Enyi Abaribe v The Speaker, Abia State House of Assembly & Anor, (2000) 
LPELR-CA/PH/83M/2000. 
701  Chief Enyi Abaribe v the Speaker Abia State House of Assembly. 
702  Chief Enyi Abaribe v the Speaker Abia State House of Assembly (Pats-Acholonu J). 
703  Chief Enyi Abaribe v the Speaker Abia State House of Assembly (Pats-Acholonu J). 
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 188. (1) The Governor or Deputy Governor of a state may be removed from 
office in accordance with the provisions of this section.   
(2) ... (3) ...4) ... 
(5) Within seven days of the passing of a motion under the foregoing provisions 
of this section, the Chief judge of the State shall at the request of the speaker of 
the House of Assembly, appoint a Panel of seven persons who in his opinion are 
of unquestionable integrity, not being members of any public service, legislative 
house or political party, to investigate the allegation as provided in this section.  
(6) ...   
(7) A Panel appointed under this section shall - (a) have such powers and 
exercise its functions in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed 
by the House of Assembly; and (b) within three months of its appointment, report 
its findings to the House of Assembly. 
(8) ... 
(9) Where the report of the Panel is that the allegation against the holder of the 
office has been proved, then within fourteen days of the receipt of the report, the 
house of Assembly shall consider the report, and if by a resolution of the House 
of Assembly supported by not less than two-thirds majority of all its members, 
the report of the Panel is adopted, then the holder of the office shall stand 
removed from office as from the date of the adoption of the report. 
(10) No proceedings or determination of the Panel or of the House of Assembly 
or any matter relating to such proceedings or determination shall be entertained 
or questioned in any court. (emphasis by this study) 
 
The court reasoned that section 188(10) denotes that impeachment is a political 
question, which the Constitution 1999 left to the discretion of the legislature to resolve. 
The provision enables the people to remove from power those elected officials. Hence, 
the court abstained from deciding the merits of the case. In the course of the judgment, 
Justice Ikongbeh made some important statements of law, which highlight the courts 
attitude towards the political question doctrine in post 1999. At the heart of the debate 
was whether section 188(10) amounted to an ouster clause akin to those ouster 
clauses that prevailed during the military decrees of the 1980s. In his view, the 
interpretation of the ouster clause in the military decrees cannot provide a good guide 
to interpret a constitutional provision that limits judicial powers. He further reasoned 
that: 
 
All governmental powers derive from the Constitution in a civilian regime. There 
cannot be any legitimate complaint if the Constitution withdraws a particular 
power from one organ of government in favour of another in the same way that 
one can complain about the way the military brazenly emasculated, especially 
the judiciary, just to pave the way for themselves to do as they pleased with the 
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lives and property of people. This point can be better appreciated if it is realised 
that a Constitution is, at least in theory, the product of the planned and collective 
agreement of the people on how to govern themselves. When, therefore, they 
agree at the outset that a particular matter shall be within the competence of one 
organ and not of the other one cannot properly liken such situation to the situation 
created by ouster clauses in the military decrees.704 
 
In light of the above reasoning, Justice Ikongbeh held that the interpretation of section 
188(10) must be approached distinctly from the past. He averred that the term ouster 
clause was not an appropriate term in the context of the new constitutional 
dispensation. In his view, section 188(10) is not an ouster clause, but a separation of 
powers mechanism in which executive, legislative and judicial powers are allocated to 
the appropriate organs. He noted that each within its powers is master of its own 
affairs. Ikongbeh J further remarked that: 
 
It has been universally recognized that impeachment procedure is pre-eminently 
a political matter and is an affair of the legislature. The people elect officers to 
elective offices. The people can withdraw their mandate. They can do this either 
by the recall procedure or by impeachment. The latter procedure has been 
assigned exclusively to the legislature by the Constitution. I do not, therefore, 
see section 188(10) as an ouster clause. I see it as doing no more than 
underscoring the recognized fact that the impeachment process is a political 
matter that is best left where it best belongs, i.e., with the legislature. It does not, 
in my view, set out to oust the jurisdiction of courts in the same way as the military 
decrees … did. Those decrees expressly set out to put the courts out of 
possession of not just the jurisdiction but, invariably, also the judicial powers 
vested in them by the Constitution. Those were clear cases of ouster.705 
 
There are at least four reasons why the decision in Chief Enyi Abaribe v the Speaker 
Abia State House of Assembly & Ors is important and should be welcomed. Firstly, it 
upheld the principle in Balarabe Musa v Auta Hamza that impeachment is a political 
question that is not justiciable and therefore inappropriate for judicial review. This is a 
welcomed development because it creates consistency in the political question 
jurisprudence. Secondly, it upheld and clarified the application of the classical political 
question theory in Nigeria, particularly in relation to the impeachment of senior elected 
                                                          
704  Chief Enyi Abaribe v the Speaker Abia State House of Assembly & Ors (Ikongbeh, J). 
705  Chief Enyi Abaribe v the Speaker Abia State House of Assembly & Ors (Ikongbeh J). 
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officials. In other words, the absence of any discussion of prudential considerations by 
Justice Ikongbeh suggests a prominent validation of the classical rather than 
prudential political question theory in post 1999. His application of the political question 
doctrine was grounded solely on the text and structure of the Constitution 1999, and 
the theory that where the constitutional structure and text commits an issue to another 
branch of government for resolution, a court should refrain from interfering.  In this 
regard, Justice Ikongbeh is clearly in agreement with commentators, like Wechsler, 
Story, Cooley and Fritz that the political question doctrine called upon him to judge 
whether or not the Constitution had committed to another branch the determination of 
impeachment processes. His finding based on the text and structure of the 
Constitution is evidently that impeachment was committed to the discretion and final 
say by the legislature. This case therefore represents a return to the classical version 
of the political question doctrine, and raises the question about the future of the 
prudential theory of the political question in Nigeria. Thirdly, the Supreme Court 
accepted and clarified that the political question doctrine, and by implication the 
separation of powers, is one of the narrow exceptions to the institution of judicial 
review. This is a well settled principle of law and has been so pronounced very often.706 
Fourth, it explains that section 188(10) of the Constitution 1999 is not an ouster clause, 
but a constitutionally permissible limitation of judicial power. Lastly, academic 
commentators who argue that the political question doctrine is under threat in Nigeria 
are misguided because the doctrine has been endorsed in more than one occasion. It 
is admitted that the doctrine may have a limited application but it is certainly not without 
utility in Nigeria. Therefore, unless section 188(10) is amended, the proposition that 
impeachment is a political question remains true and sound in law. 
 
                                                          
706  Balarabe Musa v Auta Hamza; Marbury v Madison; Szurkowski 2014 Harvard JLPP; Baker v 
Carr; and Nixon v United States; and Zivotofsky v Clinton (Roberts J) (holding that “in general, 
the Judiciary has a responsibility to decide cases properly before it, even those it ‘would gladly 
avoid…Our precedents have identified a narrow exception to that rule, known as the political 
question doctrine. We have explained that a controversy involves a political question where 
there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.”) 
1427. 
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In light of the above analysis, it is evident that one of the debates in Nigeria around 
the political question has centred on the controversy over the legality of the ouster 
clause in section 188 of the Constitution. Chief Enyi Abaribe v the Speaker Abia State 
House of Assembly & Ors explains that ouster clause is not an appropriate word. 
Rather, it is separation of powers at play; that when the Constitution 1999 divides 
functions among departments, it is merely a separation of powers issue at play and 
not an outster clause. 
  
5.5.2 Political party primaries 
 
Despite the above jurisprudence, including the most recent case of Dalhatu v Turaki 
which upheld the political question doctrine, two subsequent decisions in Inakoju v 
Adeleke707 and Ugwu v Ararume,708 have caused commentators to question future 
relevance of the doctrine in Nigeria.709 It is important to briefly discuss these cases in 
order to examine the soundness of these commentaries. Dalhatu v Turaki710 involved 
nomination and primary election of the gubernatorial candidate for Jigawa State. The 
All Nigeria Peoples Party held its primary elections on 3 January 2003. A screening of 
candidates was held in which Mr Turaki did not take part. Only the appellant, Mr 
Dalhutu attended. The latter was declared the winner. However, the All Nigeria 
Peoples Party held another primary election in which Mr Turaki was declared the 
winner and issued with a recognition certificate. The matter ended up in the Supreme 
                                                          
707 Inakoju v Adeleke (2007) ALL FWLR (Pt 353) (which involved the former governor of Oyo 
State’s challenge to the processes employed in the State House of Assembly's impeachment 
proceedings against him. The impeachment proceedings were conducted at a local hotel 
instead of the House of Assembly. Because of this, not all members of the House of Assembly 
participated in the vote which led to the removal of the governor. In reviewing the matter, the 
court noted that it had the power to engage in ordinary constitutional interpretation, and as such 
could determine this matter. According to the court, the Constitution simply requires that only 
the House of Assembly should try a person for the allegations which give rise to the 
impeachment. But this did not insulate the House from conducting the proceedings in 
accordance with the constitutional procedures. The court found that while the case involved 
political question, the issue presented to the court was justiciable because it involved the 
question of whether or not the legislature conducted itself in line with the parameters set in the 
Constitution 1999). 
708  Ugwu v. Ararume (2007) 12 NWLR (pt 1048) 367. 
709  Nwauche Is the End Near; and Egbewole and Olatunji 2012 Journal Jurisprudence. 
710  Dalhutu v Turaki (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt.843) 310. 
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Court where it was dismissed on the basis of the reasoning and holding in Onuoha v 
Okafor. To justify its decision, the court reasoned that: 
 
From the decision of this court in Onuoha's case, it is clear that the right to 
sponsor a candidate by a party is not a legal right but a domestic right of the party 
which cannot be questioned in a court of law. The political party qua political 
organisation has discretion in the matter, a discretion which is unfettered; in the 
sense that a court of law has no jurisdiction to question its exercise one way or 
the other.711  
 
The Supreme Court found that the issue for determination was identical to the one it 
decided in Onuoha v Okafor, and as a consequence, Justice Edozie ruled “it seems 
obvious that the present case is on all fours with the Onuoha’s case and by the doctrine 
of stare decisis … is binding in the present case.”712 Justice Edozie specifically 
addressed the validity of Onuoha v Okafor and its principles and held that “the decision 
of this court in Onuoha’s case is valid today as it was in 1983.”713 A few years later, 
the Supreme Court will re-affirm its holding in Onuoha v Okafor and Dalhutu v Turaki 
in Ugwu v Ararume. 
 
In Ugwu v Ararume, the Supreme Court was called upon to consider the validity of its 
holding in Onuoha v Okafor and Dalhatu v Turaki. The court rejected calls to overrule 
these judgments. Instead, it distinguished the facts in Ugwu v Ararume from those in 
Onuoha v Okafor and Dalhatu v Turaki and held that the latter two judgments were 
good law; that the proposition (that the substitution of candidates for election to political 
office by a political party was not justiciable) enunciated in those two judgments will 
continue to be applied in appropriate cases in the future. The Supreme Court reasoned 
that: 
 
It is settled law that the issue of nomination or sponsorship of an election 
candidate is within the domestic affairs of the political parties and that the courts 
have no jurisdiction to determine who should be sponsored by any political party 
as its candidate for any election. That is the law as reflected in Onuoha v Okafor 
and Dalhatu v Turaki... The question for determination in the instant appeal is 
                                                          
711  Dalhutu v Turaki (Tobi JSC). 
712  Dalhutu v Turaki (Edozie JSC). 
713  Dalhutu v Turaki (Edozie JSC). 
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primarily whether that position still represents the law… Without wasting time, I 
will say emphatically, that Onuoha v Okafor and Dalhatu v Turaki still remain 
good law on the sound principles decided therein.714 
 
Based on the above statement, it is unambiguous that the political question doctrine 
remains good law in Nigeria.715 Furthermore, recently in the case of Alhaji Sanni Aminu 
Dutsima v PDP & Another,716 the Abuja High Court declined to compel the People’s 
Democratic Party to enforce its controversial zoning arrangement and struck out the 
action seeking to stop the incumbent president Mr Goodluck Jonathan from contesting 
for the same position in 2011. The High Court dismissed the case on the grounds that 
the provisions of the party’s constitution sought to be enforced involved a political 
question that was non-justiciable. According to the High Court, the onus was on the 
party to respect the provisions of the party constitution.717  
 
There is another reason that demonstrates that the political question doctrine remains 
part of the constitutional law of Nigeria and that courts will continue to apply it in 
appropriate future cases. Before and after the Constitution 1999, Nigerian courts have 
consistently upheld the notion that the Nigerian Constitution is firmly based on the 
principle of separation of powers. Regarding the scope of this principle under the 
Constitution 1979, the court in Tony Momoh v Senate of the National Assembly718 
eloquently stated that: 
 
The Nigerian Constitution separates the three arms of government- Executive, 
Legislative and Judicial – and each is supreme in its area of authority, but only 
in so far as it confines itself to, and acts within the powers conferred on it.  If it 
exceeds such powers or acts in contravention of or in conflict with the provisions 
                                                          
714  Ugwu v Ararume as per opinion of Justice Walter Samuel Nkanu Onnoghen. 
715  Nwauche Is the End Near 56; Imam et al 2011 African Journal of Law 68-69. See, also Esiaga 
v University of Calabar (2004) All FWLR (Pt 206) 381; Magit v University of Agriculture Makurdi 
(2006) All FWLR (Pt 298) 1313 (held that it will not engage in a review of academic disputes 
relating to examination grades and the award of degrees); Alhaji Atiku Abubakar v. Attorney 
General of the Federal (2007) 6 MJSC 1-137; and Abaribe v. The Speaker Abia State House 
of Assembly & Ors (2003) 14 NWLR 466. 
716  Dutsima v PDP & Another FCT/CV/2425/2010 (2010). 
717  See, Oladele K “Political Questions and Justiciability: Two Sides of a Coin” 2012, available at 
Sahara Reporters http://saharareporters.com/article/political-question-and-justiciablity-two-
sides-coin.(Date of use: 15 January 2017). Egbewole and Olatunji 2012 Journal Jurisprudence. 
718  Tony Momoh v Senate of the National Assembly (1981) 1 NCLR 105. 
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of the Constitution, it would be the duty of the judiciary to put it in check at the 
instance of an aggrieved party.719 
 
Following the adoption of the Constitution 1999, the Supreme Court in Attorney 
General Abia State v Attorney General of the Federation720 reiterated the position in 
Tony Momoh v Senate of the National Assembly and observed that the proper 
constitutional relationship of the executive with the courts is that the courts will respect 
all acts of the executive within its lawful province, and that the executive will respect 
all decisions of the courts as to what is within its lawful province.721 Given that the main 
purpose of the political question doctrine is to preserve the separation of powers and 
operate as an exception to the power of judicial review, it is more likely that Nigerian 
courts will continue to apply the doctrine in all appropriate future cases. In addition, it 
is significant that the Supreme Court chose not to overrule Onuoha v Okafor and 
Dalhatu v Turaki when it had an opportunity to do so. This is significant in two ways: 
(1) it demonstrates the court’s recognition of the utility of the political question doctrine 
in post 1999 Nigeria. (2) it signals that there are some cases where the political 
question doctrine is just not appropriate for application. The above two reasons also 
explain why in Chief Enyi Abaribe v the Speaker Abia State House of Assembly & 
Ors722 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court that questions of 
impeachment involving the Deputy Governor of Abia State was a political question not 
appropriate for judicial review.723  
 
The debate among Nigerian scholars about the political question doctrine and its 
current status has also centred on the key question of whether the doctrine remains 
good law. A number of commentators have interpreted recent jurisprudence as 
signifying the demise of the doctrine or at least its possible limited application.724 
                                                          
719       Tony Momoh v Senate of the National Assembly 105. 
720  Attorney General Abia State v Attorney General of the Federation (2006) 9 MJSC 73. 
721  Attorney General Abia State v Attorney General of the Federation 73. 
722  Chief Enyi Abaribe v. the Speaker Abia State House of Assembly & Ors, (2003) 14 NWLR 
(pt788) 466; Chief Enyi Abaribe v The Speaker, Abia State House of Assembly & Anor, (2000) 
LPELR-CA/PH/83M/2000. 
723  Chief Enyi Abaribe v the Speaker Abia State House of Assembly. 
724 Egbewole and Olatunji 2012 Journal Jurisprudence; Nwauche Is the End Near, citing Ikhariale 
M “Impeachment proceedings and the political question doctrine: The Nigerian experience” 
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Professor Nwauche has vehemently argued that signs are there to show the demise 
of the political question doctrine. Nwauche uses two cases to explain his assertions. 
Firstly, he uses the Supreme Court decision in Attorney General of the Federation v 
Attorney General of Abia State,725 where the court rejected the proposition that the 
determination of the seaward boundary of littoral state within the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria was a political question committed to the legislature.726 Nwauche notes, with 
great emphasis, that only Justice Karibi-Whyte acceded to this proposition, whereas 
the rest of the Justices did not. It is difficult to accept Professor Nwauche’s argument. 
The fact that one case finds no application of the political question doctrine does not 
mean it signals its demise. One way to look it is that it was just not appropriate for the 
Supreme Court to apply the doctrine in that case. Moreover, the fact that in 2007, the 
Supreme Court decided Ugwu v Ararume, in which it upheld the political question 
doctrine further weakens the argument that the political question doctrine is on the 
verge of demise. What may be happen is that fewer cases that ae sutable for the 
application of the political question doctrine are reaching the courts.  
 
Lastly, Professor Nwauche observes the dismissive views by Justice Oguntade in 
Ugwu v Ararume to follow Onuoha v Okafor as further evidence of the demise of the 
political question doctrine. Justice Oguntade reasoned that: 
 
My humble view on the decision in Onuoha v Okafor…is that it has ceased to be 
a guiding light in view of the present state of our political life. I have no doubt that 
the reasoning in the case might have been useful at the time the decision was 
made. It seems to me, however that in view of the contemporary occurrences in 
the political scene, the decision needs to be … modified. If the political parties, 
in their own wisdom had written it into their Constitutions that their candidates for 
election would emerge from their party primaries, it becomes unacceptable that 
the court should run away from their duty to enforce compliance with the parties 
Constitution…An observer of the Nigerian political scene today easily discovers 
that the failure of the parties to ensure intra-party democracy and live by the 
provisions of their constitutions as to the emergence of candidates for elections 
                                                          
1990 LASU Law Journal 45; Nwabueze BO The Presidential Constitution of Nigeria (Nwamife 
Publisher, Enugu 1982) 143. 
725  Attorney General of the Federation v Attorney General of Abia State 2001 FWLR (Pt.64) 202. 
726  Nwauche Is the End Near 15. 
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is one of the major causes of the serious problems  hindering the enthronement 
of a representative government in the country.727 
 
For Nwauche, the above developments signify the demise of the political question 
doctrine. This study disagrees. Justices may differ on the need to apply a legal rule in 
a particular case, but this does not mean the rule is discredited or bad law. The study 
submits that this is not a persuavive argument against the doctrine in Nigeria.  
 
On the other hand, other commentators see no uncertainty or demise of the 
doctrine.728 Egbewole and Olatunji, have argued that there is no doubt the political 
question doctrine remains relevant in some instances, but have cautioned against its 
over application.729 In their concluding remarks, the authors advocate for the classic 
political question without calling it such. Furthermore, in their support for the 
application of the political question doctrine in Nigeria, Imam and others have argued 
that “when political institutions have no judicial remedy for a perceived constitutional 
violation because of the political question doctrine, they can still take to the polls and 
turn offending politicians out of office.” 730 Further, they correctly urged that “we should 
not be overly concerned that the political question doctrine deprives the courts of 
enforcement power over certain constitutional provisions, because a constitution and 
the electoral process provides an appropriate substitute.”731 This study agrees with 
Imam and others to the effect that the political question doctrine is there to stay in 
Nigeria. From the case law analysis, the courts have had several opportunities to 
overrule the doctrine and in more than one occasion the doctrine has been upheld. 
What is evident, however, is that like the developments in Uganda and United States, 
courts in Nigeria are likely to be sensitive to the vital limits of the doctrine’s application. 
It is therefore submitted that while the doctrine remains good law in Nigeria, its 
application is more likely going to be limited as in the other jurisdictions. Another 
                                                          
727  Ugwu v Ararume 461.  
728  See, Ekpu 1996 Arizona JICL (discussing the use of prudential considerations and 
recommending the adoption of the political question doctrine in relation to adjudication of cases 
involving coup d’etat); Sambo A and Aziz S “The Court; Insulating Itself from Politics through 
the Doctrine of Political Questions: A Critical Exposition” 2012 Journal of Law, Policy and 
Globalization 7 (suggesting improvement in the application of the political question doctrine). 
729  Egbewole and Olatunji 2012 Journal Jurisprudence 30. 
730  Imam et al 2011 African Journal of Law 51-52, citing Obi v INEC (2007) 9 MJSC 1. 
731  Imam et al 2011 African Journal of Law 51-52. 
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observation about the future application of the doctrine is that it is likely going to hinge 
on whether Nigerian courts will apply the classical or prudential political question 
theories. If the classical theory becomes the preferred version then its limited 
application is predictable. On the contrary, if courts adhere to the prudential political 
question theory then its application may be wider and unpredictable. It seems clear to 
the author that these are some of the future considerations concerning the political 
question doctrine that Nigeria’s judiciary and scholars will likely debate in the coming 
years. The outcome of these debates provide useful guidance to South Africa.  
 
 
5.6  Conclusion   
 
From the above discussion, it seems that the application of the political question 
doctrine in Nigeria has occurred in three areas of constitutional adjudication, namely 
impeachment cases involving elected representatives, political party primaries and 
domestic affairs of the legislative processes.732 As the doctrine developed, courts 
began to define its contours and clarify its foundation as being both the text and 
structure of the Constitution of 1979 and 1999, respectively, and prudential 
considerations about the proper role of the judiciary under Nigeria’s constitutional 
order. It is significant that even after the constitutional changes in 1999, the courts 
have not overruled the cases that first considered and applied the doctrine, but have 
affirmed or distinguished the cases where the doctrine did not apply. There is an 
unambiguous demonstration from jurisprudence that the political question doctrine 
remains relevant and firmly part of Nigerian constitutional law even though (like in 
Uganda) there may be different consequences, which are beyond this thesis, for its 
continued application in the democratic dispensation.733 
                                                          
732  See, Nwauche Is the End Near 31-32. 
733  See, Oladele http://saharareporters.com/article/political-question-and-justiciablity-two-sides-
coin. (Date of use: 15 January 2017) (discussing the decision of the Abuja high court declining 
to compel the People’s Democratic Party to enforce its controversial zoning arrangement and 
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high court held that the provision of the party’s constitution sought to be enforced dwelt on a 
political question that was non-justiciable). 
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_________________________________________________________________ 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL 
QUESTION DOCTRINE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6.1  Introduction  
 
South Africa went through constitutional changes in the early 1990s.734 These 
changes, negotiated at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), 
culminated into the adoption of the Interim Constitution of Act 200 of 1993. As 
explained earlier, one of the most notable changes introduced by the Interim 
Constitution was the declaration of the supremacy of the Constitution of 1996 and that 
any law or act in conflict with it had no force and effect, which essentially 
constitutionalised judicial review.735 One of the political compromises reached at 
CODESA was that the Interim Constitution would govern South Africa for an interim 
period until the Constitution was adopted and certified by an independent body, being 
the Constitutional Court.736 According to Currie and De Waal, central to the 
implementation of the Interim Constitution was the establishment of a Constitutional 
Court to give effect to the supremacy of the Constitution and the bill of rights.737 
Further, Currie and De Waal correctly observe that the idea of establishing and 
requiring the Constitutional Court to certify the Constitution was motivated by, among 
other things, “fear … amongst member of the liberation movements, that some of the 
old judges would use the powers to undermine the newly created democratic order.”738 
The above political compromise was encapsulated in section 71 of the Interim 
Constitution which provided that: 
 
                                                          
734  For a discussion of the transition to a democratic state, see, Bennun M and Newitt M  
Negotiating Justice: A New Constitution for South Africa (University of Exeter Press, Exeter 
1995)(discussing the democratic transition in South Africa); Klug H Constituting Democracy: 
Law, Globalism and South Africa's Political Reconstruction (Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 2000)(discussing the constitutional changes in the 1990s); Worden N The Making of 
Modern South Africa: Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy (Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford 1994). 
735  Section 4 of the Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993. 
736  Currie & De WaalThe New Constitutional 64-65. 
737  Currie & De WaalThe New Constitutional 65. 
738  Currie & De WaalThe New Constitutional 274. 
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(1) A new constitutional text shall-  
(a) comply with the Constitutional Principles contained in Schedule 4; and  
(b) be passed by the Constitutional Assembly in accordance with this Chapter.  
(2) The new constitutional text passed by the Constitutional Assembly, or any 
provision thereof, shall not be of any force and effect unless the Constitutional 
Court has certified that all the provisions of such text comply with the 
Constitutional Principles referred to in subsection (1) (a).  
(3) A decision of the Constitutional Court in terms of subsection (2) certifying 
that the provisions of the new constitutional text comply with the Constitutional 
Principles, shall be final and binding, and no court of law shall have jurisdiction 
to enquire into or pronounce upon the validity of such text or any provision 
thereof. 
 
Thirty-four principles were agreed upon at CODESA to inform the drafting of the 
Constitution. Two of these principles are most relevant for our purposes, and provided 
as follows: 
 
IV. The Constitution shall be the supreme law of the land. It shall be binding on 
all organs of state at all levels of government. 
 
VI. There shall be a separation of powers between the legislature, executive 
and judiciary, with appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, 
responsiveness and openness.739 
 
Pursuant to section 71 of the Interim Constitution, the Constitutional Court was 
eventually seized with the constitutional task to certify the Constitution after it was 
adopted by Parliament sitting as the Constitutional Assembly. As Professor Okpaluba 
has correctly observed, the Constitutional Court, participated significantly in finalising 
the democratic Constitution of 1996 through the certification process.740 
 
6.2       Effects of constitutional principles iv and vi 
 
                                                          
739  Analogous to the South African situation, Story has observed that “in the convention, which  
framed the constitution of the United States, the first resolution adopted by that body was, that 
a national government ought to be established, consisting of a supreme legislative, judiciary, 
and executive. And from this fundamental proposition sprung the subsequent organisation of 
the whole government of the Unted States.” Story Commentaries 2. 
740  Okpaluba C “Can a Court Review The Internal Affairs and Processes of the Legislature? 
Contemporary Developments in South Africa” 2015 CILSA 206. 
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The effects of constitutional principles IV and VI can be easily ascertained in the 
Constitution and the case law that has developed. Firstly, pursuant to constitutional 
principles IV, sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution were enacted. They provide: 
 
Republic of South Africa  
1. The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on 
the following values:  
 (a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human 
rights and freedoms.  
 (b) Non-racialism and non-sexism.  
 (c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law.  
 (d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections 
and a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, 
responsiveness and openness. (emphasis of this study) 
 
Supremacy of the Constitution  
2. This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct 
inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled. 
 
Since the enactment of these provisions, the judiciary has developed the concept of 
the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law. In Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd 
v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan,741 the plaintiffs challenged various 
resolutions adopted by the Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 
(GJTMC). These resolutions provided for levies within the area of jurisdiction of the 
GJTMC. The plaintiffs’ challenge was based on the theory that the resolutions 
constituted administrative action and hence it became necessary for the Constitutional 
Court to determine the meaning of administrative action. In resolving the dispute, the 
Constitutional Court developed the principle of legality, which it found emanated from 
the principle of rule of law and stands for the proposition that government may only 
act within the powers lawfully conferred on it.742 More pointedly the Constitutional 
Court explained and justified the principle of legality as follows: 
 
It seems central to the conception of our constitutional order that the legislature 
and executive in every sphere are constrained by the principle that they may 
                                                          
741  Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1998 
12 BCLR 1458 (CC). 
742  Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council [56]. 
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exercise no power and perform no function beyond that conferred upon them by 
law. At least in this sense, then, the principle of legality is implied within the terms 
of the interim Constitution. Whether the principle of the rule of law has greater 
content than the principle of legality is not necessary for us to decide here. We 
need merely hold that fundamental to the interim Constitution is a principle of 
legality.743 
 
In essence, the Constitutional Court found that the principle of legality was implicit in 
the Constitution and applied to acts of government including legislative act, executive 
acts and administrative action.744 The Constitutional Court found that it was not 
necessary at the time to define the contours of the newly found legal doctrine, but was 
clear that its proposition is that all exercise of public power is only legitimate where 
lawful.745 In the instant case, the question was whether the GJTMC had acted within 
the powers lawfully conferred to it when it resolved to levy certain rates.746 Since 
Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan 
Council, the Constitutional Court has refined the principle of legality, which has 
become one of the most cited principles of law in South Africa on the basis of which 
the exercise of public power is reviewed.747 Legal commentators have observed that 
the constitutional principle of legality has wider meaning and applies to all exercise of 
                                                          
743  Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council [58]. 
744  Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council [59]. 
745  Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council [56]. 
746   Hoexter C “The Principle of Legality in South African Administrative Law” 2004 Maquarie  
Law Journal 165 (discussing the principle of legality in South Africa). 
747  See, National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v Freedom Under Law 2014 4 SA 298 
(SCA) [28-29] (the legality principle has now become well established in our law as an 
alternative pathway to judicial review where Promotion of Administrative Justice Act finds no 
application); Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex 
Parte President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674; Affordable Medicines Trust v 
Minister of Health 2006 3 SA 247 (CC) [49] (held that “the exercise of public power must … 
comply with the Constitution, which is the supreme law, and the doctrine of legality, which is 
part of that law. The doctrine of legality, which is an incident of the rule of law, is one of the 
constitutional controls through which the exercise of public power is regulated by the 
Constitution. It entails that public functionaries are constrained by the principle that they may 
exercise no power and perform no function beyond that conferred upon them by law.”); 
Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High School 2013 9 BCLR 989 (CC) 
[76] (held that “state functionaries, no matter how well intentioned, may only do what the law 
empowers them to do.  That is the essence of the principle of legality, the bedrock of our 
constitutional dispensation, and has long been enshrined in our law.”); MEC for Health, Eastern 
Cape and Another v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd 2014 3 SA 481 (CC); Merafong City Local 
Municipality v AngloGold Ashanti Limited [2016] ZACC; Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd v 
Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd 2011 4 SA 113 (CC); and City of Cape Town v South African 
National Roads Agency Ltd 2015 6 SA 535 (WCC). 
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public power rather than the narrower meaning in administrative law noting that its 
detailed content continues to be worked out by the judiciary.748 Nevertheless, based 
on the principle of legality, the judiciary has reviewed the exercise of power that 
traditionally could not be reviewed such as prosecutorial decisions,749 or executive 
appointments.750 The principle of legality is one of the most fairly developed rules of 
law in South Africa today, and has been subject of numerous academic 
commentaries.751 
 
Lastly, pursuant to constitutional principle VI, the framers of the Constitution 1996 
structured the South African state into three branches and assigned each branch 
specific functions.752 In Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: in re 
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (hereinafter as 
                                                          
748  Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (Juta, Cape Town 2012) 122, 356 (arguing that 
the beauty of the principle of legality is its generality which can easily encompass the full range 
of administrative law precepts, and that while South African has not reached that stage yet, the 
principle of legality has been crucial in controlling action that administrative law could not 
reach). Courts have held that the principle of legality acts as a safety net for checking all 
exercise of public power, see State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd v Gijima Holdings 
(Pty) Ltd 2017 2 SA 63 (SCA) [38] (held that “the proper place for the principle of legality in our 
law is to act as a safety-net or a measure of last resort when the law allows no other avenues 
to challenge the unlawful exercise of public power. It cannot be the first port of call or an 
alternative path to review, when [Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 2000] applies.”); and 
Public Servants Association of South Africa and Another v Minister of Labour (2016) 37 ILJ 185 
(LC). 
749  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Freedom Under Law. But see, Democratic Alliance 
v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions 2012 3 SA 486 (SCA)(where at [27] Navsa JA 
stated “while there appears to be some justification for the contention that the decision to 
discontinue a prosecution is of the same genus as a decision to institute or continue a 
prosecution, which is excluded from the definition of administrative action in terms of s 1(ff) of 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, it is not necessary to finally decide that question. 
Before us it was conceded on behalf of the first and third respondents that a decision to 
discontinue a prosecution was subject to a rule of law review. That concession in my view was 
rightly made.”). 
750  Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2008 (1) SA 566 (CC). 
751  See, Mathenjwa J “The role of the principle of legality in preserving municipal constitutional 
integrity” 2014 Southern African Public Law 534; Henrico R “Re-visiting the rule of law and 
principle of legality: judicial nuisance or licence?” 2014 TSAR 742;  Mnguni L and Muller J “The 
principle of legality in constitutional matters with reference to Masiya v Director of Public 
Prosecutions and Others 2007 5 SA 30 (CC)” 2009 LDD 112; Jordaan T “ Does the principle of 
legality require statutory crimes to have specific penalty clauses? A critical analysis of the 
decisions of the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal in DPP, Western Cape v Prins” 
2012 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 379. 
752  Klug H “Accountability and the Role of Independent Constitutional Institutions in South Africa's 
Post-Apartheid Constitutions” 2015-2016  New York Law School Law Review 153 (suggesting 
that the institutions established under chapter nine of the Constitution may be the forth branch 
of government). 
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First Certification Judgement), the Constitutional Court made the following 
pronouncement concerning the constitutional principle VI and the separation of powers 
as adopted by the framers of the Constitution:  
 
Within the broad requirement of separation of powers and appropriate checks 
and balances, the [Constitutional Assembly] was afforded a large degree of 
latitude in shaping the independence and interdependence of government 
branches. The model adopted reflects the historical circumstances of our 
constitutional development. We find in the [Constitution] checks and balances 
that evidence a concern for both the over-concentration of power and the 
requirement of an energetic and effective, yet answerable, executive. A strict 
separation of powers has not always been maintained but there is nothing to 
suggest that the [constitutional principles] imposed upon the [Constitutional 
Assembly] an obligation to adopt a particular form of strict separation, such as 
that found in the United States of America, France or the Netherlands. What 
[constitutional principle] VI requires is that there be a separation of powers 
between the legislature, executive and judiciary. It does not prescribe what form 
that separation should take. We have previously said that the [constitutional 
principles] must not be interpreted with technical rigidity. The language of 
[constitutional principle] VI is sufficiently wide to cover the type of separation 
required by the [Constitution] and the objection that [constitutional principle] VI 
has not been complied with must accordingly be rejected.753 
 
Accordingly, the Constitution establishes three great pillars of the State being the 
legislature, executive and judiciary.754 The legislature’s function under chapter 4 of the 
Constitution is to pass legislation, to scrutinize and oversee executive action, including 
the implementation of legislation, and providing a national forum for public 
consideration of issues.755 The allocation of these functions to the legislature is based 
on a constitutional theory that Parliament is a pillar which is representative of the 
numerous different interests of society so that what comes out of there will respect 
and reflect the nation’s distinct interests.756 
                                                          
753  Certification Judgment [132-133]. 
754  See chapters 4, 5 and 8 of the Constitution. 
755  See, sections 42(3) and 55(2) of the Constitution. 
756 See, Democratic Alliance v Masondo 2003 2 SA 413 (CC) (noting that “the open and 
deliberative nature of the process goes further than providing a dignified and meaningful role 
for all participants. It is calculated to produce better outcomes through subjecting laws and 
governmental action to the test of critical debate, rather than basing them on unilateral decision-
making. It should be underlined that the responsibility for serious and meaningful deliberation 
and decision-making rests not only on the majority, but on minority groups as well. In the end, 
the endeavours of both majority and minority parties should be directed not to exercising (or 
blocking the exercise) of power for its own sake, but at achieving a just society”); Neuborne B 
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The Constitution vests executive authority on the President.757 The executive’s 
function under chapter 5 of the Constitution is to implement the laws, develop and 
implement national policy and initiate legislation.758 The allocation of these functions 
to a single President is based on a constitutional theory that the President can act 
quickly without the need to harmonise conflicting interests of society.759 This is why in 
some areas like foreign relations or defence, the President is constitutionally permitted 
to act without the need to get prior Parliamentary approval.760 There are several other 
areas where the President is constitutionally permitted to act without prior approval.761 
 
The judiciary’s function under section 8 of the Constitution is to resolve disputes 
through the application of the law by interpreting and applying the law to a specific set 
of circumstances or controversies involving individuals.762 This explains why courts 
have consistently rejected to engage in an academic exercise by hearing a case that 
no longer presents an existing or live controversy which should exist if a court is to 
avoid giving advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law.763 The allocation of 
                                                          
“The Last Walls,” a paper presented at the Great Hall at The Cooper Union on 13 December 
2012 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ATK7FftBiF4. (Date of use: 15 December 2016). See 
also, Neuborne B “Felix Frankfurter's Revenge: An Accidental Democracy Built by Judges” 
2011 New York University Review of Law and Social Change 602. 
757  Section 85 of the Constitution. See, Mhango M “Constitutional Eighteenth Amendment Bill: An 
Unnecessary Amendment to the South Africa Constitution” 2014 Statute Law Review 19-34 
(arguing that section 85 means that under the South African Constitution, a single President 
possesses the entirety of the executive authority, which he or she exercises together with the 
Cabinet). 
758  See, section 85(1) and (2) of the Constitution. 
759  Neuborne https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ATK7FftBiF4. (Date of use: 15 December 2016). 
760  See, sections 201 and 203 of the Constitution, respectively, which permit the President as head 
of the national executive to authorise the employment of the defence force in defence of the 
republic or the fulfilment of an international obligation, or to declare a state of national defence 
without getting prior approval from Parliament. And see, section 231 of the Constitution which 
entrusts the national executive with the responsibility of negotiating and signing of all 
international agreements; section 231(3) provides that “an international agreement of a 
technical, administrative or executive nature, or an agreement which does not require either 
ratification or accession, entered into by the national executive, binds the Republic without 
approval by the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, but must be tabled 
in the Assembly and the Council within a reasonable time.” 
761  See, section 84 of the Constitution. 
762  See, section 165 of the Constitution. 
763  Legal Aid South Africa v Mzoxolo Magidiwana and Others [2015] ZACC 28; National Coalition 
of Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 1 (CC) [21]; Radio Pretoria 
v Chairman, Independent Communications Authority of SA & Another 2005 1 SA 47 (SCA); 
Rand Water Board v Rotek Industries (Pty) Ltd 2003 4 SA 58 (SCA). But see Okpaluba 2015 
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these tasks to the judiciary is based on a constitutional theory that the judiciary is 
specially trained to carry out these functions and is insulated from the other branches 
that are politically accountable.  
 
Apart from the text itself apportioning various powers and functions between and 
among the three branches of government and the constitutional principle VI, there is 
no constitutional text defining or codifying the principle of separation of powers.764 In 
that sense, the separation of powers is implied. Despite the absence of a clear textual 
authorisation in the Constitution, the South African judiciary has constructed a 
constitutional doctrine defining and protecting the separation of powers.765 A few 
notable foundational cases that come to mind include the following: The case of 
Western Cape Legislature v President of South Africa, which involved the task of the 
transformation of local government during the first local government elections in the 
mid-1990s. At issue in the case was a provision in the Local Government Transition 
Act 209 of 1993. Section 16A of that Act provided that the “President may amend this 
act and any schedule thereto by proclamation in the Gazette.” The Constitutional Court 
enforced separation of powers by overturning a Proclamation of the President on the 
grounds that the impugned provision of the Local Government Transition Act, under 
which the President had acted in promulgating the Proclamation, was inconsistent with 
the separation of powers required by the Constitution and accordingly invalid.766 
 
In South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath, the Constitutional 
Court had to consider whether it was constitutionally appropriate for a judge of the 
High Court to head the Special Investigative Unit within the executive branch 
                                                          
CILSA 206 (noting that since the advent of the 1996 Constitution, the Constitutional Court has 
remained one of the few adjudicative institutions in the Commonwealth vested with the power 
to give advisory opinion to the executive, the President or a provincial premier, on the 
constitutionality of a Bill brought to the President or the premier for assent). 
764  See, Okpaluba C and Mhango 2017 LDD; Hopkins K “Some Thoughts On the Constitutionality 
of Independent Tribunals Established by the State” 2006 Obiter 150. 
765  See, South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath and Others 2001 1 SA 883 
[20] (holding that “I cannot accept that an implicit provision of the Constitution has any less 
force than an express provision.”). 
766  Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature and Others v President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others 1995 4 SA 877 (CC). 
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established in terms of Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act 74 of 
1996. The powers of the Special Investigative Unit involved investigating and litigating 
on behalf of the state to recover monies lost to the state through corruption and 
maladministration. The court held that from a separation of powers point of view, the 
functions of the Special Investigative Unit were inappropriate for a judge to perform. 
Chaskalson P reasoned that: 
 
The functions that the head of the [Special Investigative Unit] is required to 
perform are far removed from the central mission of the judiciary. They are 
determined by the President who formulates and can amend the allegations 
to be investigated. If regard is had to all the circumstances, including the 
intrusive quality of the investigations that are carried out by the [Special 
Investigative Unit], the inextricable link between the [Special Investigative 
Unit] as investigator and the [Special Investigative Unit] as litigator on behalf 
of the State, and the indefinite nature of the appointment which precludes 
the head of the unit from performing his judicial functions, the first 
respondent’s position as head of the [Special Investigative Unit] is … 
incompatible with his judicial office and contrary to the separation of powers 
required by the Constitution.767 
 
Furthermore in S v Dodo,768 the Constitutional Court had to consider whether minimum 
sentencing legislation enacted by the legislature was consistent with the Constitution. 
Section 51 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 introduced minimum 
sentencing guidelines in relation to certain crimes, and require the judiciary to 
sentence an accused person to imprisonment for life unless the judiciary was satisfied 
that substantial reasons exist for the imposition of a lesser sentence. The 
Constitutional Court held that section 51(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act was 
not inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers because both Parliament 
and the Judiciary have obligations in relation to sentencing of convicted offenders.  
Justice Ackerman, who wrote for the majority, reasoned that: 
 
There is under our Constitution no absolute separation of powers between the 
judicial function, on the one hand, and the legislative and executive on the other. 
When the nature and process of punishment is considered in its totality, it is 
                                                          
767  South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2001 1 SA 883 (CC) [45]. 
768   S v Dodo, 2001 5 BCLR 423 (CC). See also, Bernstein v Bester 1996 4 BCLR 449 [105] (where 
the Constitutional Court suggested that an Act of Parliament that sought to bring the judiciary 
under the control of the political branches could be struck down under the principle of separation 
of powers). 
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apparent that all three branches of the state play a functional role and must 
necessarily do so. No judicial punishment can take place unless the person to 
be punished has been convicted of an offence which either under the common 
law or statute carries with it a punishment. It is pre-eminently the function of the 
legislature to determine what conduct should be criminalised and punished… 
Both the legislature and executive share an interest in the punishment to be 
imposed by courts, both in regard to its nature and its severity. They have a 
general interest in sentencing policy, penology and the extent to which 
correctional institutions are used to further the various objectives of punishment. 
The availability and cost of prisons, as well as the views of these arms of 
government on custodial sentences, legitimately inform policy on alternative 
forms of non-custodial sentences and the legislative implementation thereof.769 
 
Lastly, in Magidiwana and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa,770 where 
the applicants sought an order to compel the State and the Minister of Justice to pay 
the legal bills arising from their participation in the Marikana Commission of Inquiry, 
the Constitutional Court refused to grant the interim relief sought based on the principle 
of separation of powers. Clearly, the Constitutional Court rejected to hear the case 
based on the understanding that the issues were not justiciable.771 In light of this brief 
discussion, it is clear-cut that through the institution of judicial review, the judiciary has 
engaged in the development of the law of separation of powers.772 But has this 
development been refined to encompass a clear political question doctrine? 
 
6.3  The emergence of the political question doctrine 
 
During the reign of the Interim Constitution, the Constitutional Court in Ferreira v 
Levin773 had to determine the constitutionality of section 417(2)(b) of the Companies 
Act 61 of 1973.774 It was provided in that subsection that any person summoned for 
an examination into the affairs of a company may be required to answer questions, 
                                                          
769 S v Dodo [22-23]. 
770  Magidiwana and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 11 BCLR 1251 (CC). 
771  For a discussion of Magidiwana and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa. See, 
Okpaluba and Mhango 2017 LDD. 
772  See, Mojapelo P “The doctrine of separation of powers (a South African perspective)” 2013 
Advocate 37; O’Regan K “Checks and Balances Reflections on the Development of the 
Doctrine of Separation of Powers Under the South African Constitution” 2005 Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal 120 (noting how far South Africa has progressed in this task of 
developing a distinctively South African model of the separation of powers). 
773  Ferreira v Levin. 
774  The Companies Act 1973 has since been repealed by the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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and notwithstanding that the answer to such questions might incriminate him, any 
answer could be used in evidence against him. The Constitutional Court ruled that 
section 417(2)(b) was in conflict with the right to freedom and security of the person, 
which included the right not to be detained without trial in section 11(1) of the Interim 
Constitution. In his concurring opinion, Chaskalson P used this case to explain what 
he thought is the constitutionally envisaged relationship between the judiciary and the 
political branches of government in connection to the determination of political 
questions under the new democratic order. He pronounced that:  
 
Implicit in the social welfare state is the acceptance of regulation and 
redistribution in the public interest ... Whether or not there should be regulation 
and redistribution is essentially a political question which falls within the domain 
of the legislature and not the court. It is not for the courts to approve or 
disapprove of such policies. What the courts must ensure is that the 
implementation of any political decision to undertake such policies conforms with 
the Constitution. It should not, however, require the legislature to show that they 
are necessary if the Constitution does not specifically require that this be done.775 
(emphasis by this study) 
 
President Chaskalson made the above remark in support of his view against a broad 
interpretation of section 11(1) of the Interim Constitution. He cautioned against falling 
into the pitfall of Lochner v New York era,776 which gave rise to serious questions about 
judicial review and the relationship between the judiciary and the elected branches of 
government in the United States. In his view, section 11 should not be construed so 
broadly that “we overshoot the mark and trespass upon the terrain that is not rightly 
ours.”777 He further explained that in a democratic society the role of the legislature, 
as a body reflecting the dominant opinion, should be acknowledged. He emphasised 
the need to bear in mind that there are functions that are properly the concern of the 
                                                          
775  Ferreira v Levin [180]. (emphasis added). 
776  Lochner v New York 198 US 45 (1905) (invalidating maximum working hours for bakers). It is 
estimated that almost 200 state laws were declared unconstitutional as violating the due 
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. For a discussion of what has been termed as the 
Lochner era see Wright B “The Growth of American Constitutional Law (Greenwood Press, 
Westport 1942) 154; and Bernstein D “Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy” 2003 Texas Law Review 1 
(arguing that Lochner’s legacy provides a particularly telling example of the danger of applying 
an ideological construct to constitutional history for present purposes, while ignoring or 
neglecting contrary evidence). 
777  Ferreira v Levin 106. 
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political branches; that while these functions may overlap, the terrains are separate 
and should be kept separate.778 
 
Regarding the determination of political questions, President Chaskalson’s 
pronouncement above should be understood in light of what Justice Kpegah said in 
Amidu v President Kufuor.779 There, Kpegah remarked that “there is inherent or 
internal evidence in our Constitution that the policy which informs or should inform any 
legislation... are matters for the executive and legislature.”780 Like Kpegah, 
Chaskalson considers those policy choices to be of no concern to the judiciary and 
notes that it is not for the judiciary to approve or disapprove such choices.781 In his 
pronouncement, Chaskalson’s suggestion is that the Constitution bars the judiciary 
from requiring the political branches of government to demonstrate the necessity 
under the Constitution for the policy choices that inform legislative measures because, 
in his view, the political branches have discretion in this regard.782 In other words, the 
suggestion by Chaskalson, as Redish has agreeably argued elsewhere, is that when 
the Constitution is silent concerning the need for legislation in a particular area, the 
Constitution should be understood as granting the political branches discretion to 
formulate new policies in those areas without judicial interference.783  
 
Evidently, Chaskalson would agree that the determination of whether regulation 28 of 
the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956, which regulates the investment of private pension 
funds in South Africa, should exist or is necessary under the Constitution is a political 
question and the judiciary may not approve or disapprove the response by the political 
branches to that question. The discretion can be sourced from section 85(2) of the 
                                                          
778  Ferreira v Levin 106. 
779         Amidu v President Kufuor 2001-2002 SCGLR 138. 
780 Amidu 154. 
781 Ferreira v Levin [105]. 
782  See, sections 84(2); 85(2); 55; and 44(1) of the Constitution 1996. 
783  Redish 1984 Northwestern LR 5-10 and 24-25. Justice Ngcobo makes a similar suggestion in 
Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly [26] and says when a 
constitutional obligation requires a political branch of government to determine in the first place 
what it necessary to fulfil its obligation by leaving to the political branch to determine what is 
required of it in this regard, a review by a court on whether the obligation has been fulfilled 
intrudes the separation of powers principle. Ngcobo suggest that political branches have 
discretion to determine how to fulfil the obligation in such circumstances. 
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Constitution, which gives the executive power to initiate and develop policy, and 
section 44(1)(a)(ii) of the Constitution which grants the power to the National Assembly 
to pass legislation. While these provisions grant powers to the political branches, the 
same do not require that these powers be exercised. There are only a few provisions 
in the Constitution where the political branches are required to initiate and enact 
legislation.784 In all other areas the decision of whether to develop policy or initiate 
legislation and eventually pass such legislation remains at the discretion of the political 
branches.785 The views by Chaskalson in Ferreira v Levin, which recognise the limits 
of judicial power in determining political questions, were confirmed by the 
Constitutional Court during the certification of the Constitution. 
 
The certification process was the first time the Constitutional Court had the occasion 
to interpret the Constitution before it became enforceable. In the First Certification 
Judgement, the Constitutional Court described its functions and powers in the 
certification process (which are not different from its ordinary powers and functions) 
as follows: 
 
First and foremost it must be emphasised that the Court has a judicial and not a 
political mandate. Its function is clearly spelt out in Interim Constitution 71(2): to 
certify whether all the provisions of the [new text] comply with the [constitutional 
principles]. That is a judicial function, a legal exercise. Admittedly a constitution, 
by its very nature, deals with the extent, limitations and exercise of political power 
as also with the relationship between political entities and with the relationship 
between the state and persons. But this Court has no power, no mandate and 
no right to express any view on the political choices made by the [constitutional 
assembly] in drafting the [new text], save to the extent that such choices may be 
relevant either to compliance or non-compliance with the [constitutional 
                                                          
784  See, section 33 of the Constitution (requiring national legislation to give effect to the right to 
administrative action which was complied with by passing the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act 2000); section 9(4) of the Constitution (requiring national legislation to give effect to 
the right to equality which was complied with by passing  the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, 20000; section 32(2) of the Constitution (requiring 
national legislation to give effect to the right to access to information, which was complied with 
by the passage of the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000). 
785  For authorities on the proposition that where Constitution delegates a power or function to a 
political branch of government without imposing how the power or function delegated should 
be exercised, the political branch of government has discretion on how to execute that power 
see, Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly [93]; Mhango 2014 AJLS; 
Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa [146]; Redish 1984 Northwestern LR; 
Ngcobo 2016 Galagher; Barkow 202 Columbia LR; and Ferreira v Levin [105]. 
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principles]. Subject to that qualification, the wisdom or otherwise of any provision 
of the [new text] is not this Court’s business.786 
 
Despite not citing the doctrine by name, it is submitted that the above statements of 
law in Ferreira v Levin and the First Certification Judgement are judicial authorities for 
the application of the political question doctrine in South Africa. In both cases, the 
Constitutional Court recognised the constitutional limits of the powers of judicial review 
in dealing with political questions. It recognised, without saying more, that these 
questions are reserved for the political branches, and that courts must not intrude in 
them; that political questions present a narrow limitation over the court’s power of 
judicial review. Secondly, the Constitutional Court recognised that this limitation is 
predicated upon respect for separation of powers. As intimated in paragraphs 1.1 and 
1.2.4 of this study, the South African judiciary before and after the new constitutional 
dispensation has always recognised that the institution of judicial review is not 
absolute but has certain narrow limitations to it.787 To this extent, these statements of 
the law can be equated with the famous authoritative words from Marbury v 
                                                          
786  In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 [27]. 
787  See, Brown v Leyds NO (where the Supreme Court of South African acceded to the concept of 
judicial review in Marbury v Madison but like Marbury v Madison it also recognized the limits of 
judicial review); National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 
1 BCLR 54 (incorporating the doctrine of ripeness as applied in the United States into South 
African law); Wiese v Government Employees Pension Fund 2012 6 BCLR 599 (CC) [21-24] 
(holding that the issues between the parties had moot due to recent legislative interventions); 
Currie and de Waal The Bill of Rights 79-96 (discussing the justiciability doctrines of mootness, 
ripeness and other noting that these  now forms part of South African law). 
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Madison,788 Tuffuor v Attorney General,789 Onuoha v Okafor,790 and Ex Parte 
Matovu,791 as legal authorities for the political question doctrine in the United States, 
Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda, respectively.  
 
Clearly, even before the First Certification Judgement, Chaskalson P, motivated by 
separation of powers concerns, was apprehensive about the judiciary not to overreach 
and determine political questions that were the preserve of the political branches in 
the new South Africa. It is apparent from Chaskalson’s pronouncements that certain 
political questions are not appropriate for determination by the courts. The problem 
with Chaskalson’s pronouncement is that he did not give details on how his 
pronouncement would be given effect to. In other words, he did not elaborate how the 
judiciary would identify those political questions that are the preserve of the political 
branches and which courts may not interfere with. These pronouncements by the 
Constitutional Court in Ferreira v Levin and the First Certification Judgement can only 
be explained in the context of the political question doctrine because they advance the 
objectives of the doctrine. In fact, Chaskalson’s views in Ferreira v Levin are 
indistinguishable from the compromised political question doctrine articulated by 
                                                          
788  Marbury v Madison 170 (holding that the province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights 
of individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which 
they have a discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and 
laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court). 
789  Tuffuor v Attorney General 651-652 holding that “there is a longline of authorities which 
establishes two important principles governing the relationship that subsists or should exist 
between Parliament and the courts: (a) that the courts can call in question a decision of 
Parliament; but the courts cannot seek to extend their writs into what happens in Parliament; 
and (b) that the law and custom of Parliament is a distinct body of law and, as constitutional 
experts do put it, unknown to the courts. And therefore the courts take judicial notice of what 
has happened in Parliament. The courts do not, and cannot, inquire into how Parliament went 
about its business. The courts cannot therefore inquire into the legality or illegality of what 
happened in Parliament. In so far as Parliament has acted by virtue of the powers conferred 
upon it by the provisions of article 9(1), its actions within Parliament are a closed book. See 
also Ghana Bar Association; Ex Parte Matovu; Attorney General v Tinyefuza; and Cooley A 
Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 186-187 (arguing against judicial inquiry into the 
legislative motives). 
790  Ouoha v Okafor 507 (holding that the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination of 
a political question is one of the dominant considerations in determining whether a question 
falls within the category of political questions. The other is the appropriations of attributing 
finality to the action of the political departments and political parties under the Nigerian 
Constitution and system of government). 
791 Ex Parte Matovu 531 (holding that the government‘s exposition of political question doctrine as 
elaborated in Luther v Borden cannot be faulted). 
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Justice Acquah in Mensah v Attorney-General. Seedorf & Sibanda have made a 
similar observation that: 
 
Like courts in other jurisdictions, the Constitutional Court of South Africa has on 
frequent occasions employed the idea of judicial restraint, a conscious decision 
based on separation of powers concerns not to interfere with decisions by the 
other branches of government, provided that they are in line with the 
Constitution.792 
 
 In subsequent cases decided after the Interim Constitution, the Constitutional Court 
consistently expressed similar views concerning the role of the judiciary in adjudicating 
certain political questions, and the need not to intrude into the domain of the other 
branches.  
 
6.4  Political question doctrine or mere deference: jurisprudence from the 
 constitutional court 
 
Some of the jurisprudence emerging from the Constitutional Court has pointed to the 
reluctance of the Court to adjudicate on political questions or willingness to exercise 
judicial restraint.793 It is not certain from this jurisprudence whether the Constitutional 
Court is merely exercising deference to the other branches of government or applying 
a political question doctrine. And the courts themselves have frequently failed to clarify 
whether they are truly abstaining or merely giving deference to another branch in the 
resolution of a political question. What explains this confusion? What would prompt a 
court to be less clear about the nature of its rulings when it uses political question 
theory terminology? In all these cases, the Constitutional Court has failed to develop 
a rule for future application. 
                                                          
792  Seedorf & Sibanda Separation 12-55-56. 
793  See, Okpaluba 2003-2004 SAPL 184 (arguing that it is also common knowledge that this 
judicial  restraint stems not only from the courts’ deference to the other arms of government on 
considerations of the separation of powers; it also derives from the doctrine of justiciability 
underlying judicial avoidance of those issues not properly suited for adjudication and which 
rightly belong to the domain of the executive, the legislature, or the political sphere). See also, 
Okpaluba C “Constraints on Judicial Review of Executive Conduct: the Juridical Link Between 
the Marikana Mineworkers’ Imbroglio and the Gauteng E-Tolling Saga” 2015 TSAR 286-287 
(arguing that courts decline to entertain any action the subject matter of which properly resides 
in the political arena); and Okpaluba C “Justiciability and Constitutional adjudication in the 
commonwealth: the Problem of definition (1) and (2)” 2003 THRHR 424 and 610. 
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One of the cases that illustrates this irony is United Democratic Movement v President 
of the Republic of South Africa.794 In United Democratic Movement v President of the 
Republic of South Africa the Constitutional Court upheld three Acts of Parliament -- 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment Act 18 of 2002; the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Act 21 of 2002; and 
the Local Government: Municipal Structures Amendment Act 20 of 2002 -- that allowed 
members of Parliament to cross the floor in Parliament without losing their seats. It 
struck down the Loss or Retention of Membership of National and Provincial 
Legislatures Act 22 of 2002, which had been tabled together with the other three Acts.  
 
The context which led to the case is that the four pieces of legislation were enacted to 
take political profit of the demise of the New National Party from the Democratic 
Alliance in 2001. In terms of the legal framework applicable at the time, candidates 
elected to represent a particular political party could not switch to another party without 
losing their seats in the legislature.795 When the New National Party broke away from 
the Democratic Alliance to join the African National Congress in 2001, the New 
National Party councillors who had won seats in the 2000 elections faced the 
possibility of losing their seats to the Democratic Alliance. In a swift move to prevent 
the loss of political power in the legislature, the African National Congress tabled four 
bills (mentioned above). The common feature in these Bills is that they all sought to 
grant a fifteen-day window period on two occasions every four years during which 
floor-crossing could happen without a member losing their seat. The Bills also granted 
an immediate window period for those wishing to switch political parties. Two of the 
Bills required a constitutional amendment in terms of section 74(3) of the Constitution, 
which stipulates the procedure for amendments to any part of the Constitution. The 
United Democratic Movement challenged the process by which the Bills were passed. 
In describing the issue before it, the Constitutional Court explained that: 
 
                                                          
794  United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of South Africa. 
795  See, section 27of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998. 
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This case is not about the merits or demerits of the provisions of the disputed 
legislation. That is a political question and is of no concern to this Court. What 
has to be decided is not whether the disputed provisions are appropriate or 
inappropriate, but whether they are constitutional or unconstitutional. It ought not 
to have been necessary to say this for that is true of all cases that come before 
this Court. We do so only because of some of the submissions made to us in 
argument, and the tenor of the public debate concerning the case which has 
taken place both before and since the hearing of the matter.796 
 
While the current position in South Africa is that legislators cannot cross the floor in 
the legislature without losing their seats, the outcome in the United Democratic 
Movement v President of the Republic of South Africa signaled the need for the 
Constitutional Court to give absolute deference to the elected branches of government 
in cases involving interpretation of constitutional provisions that assign certain 
questions to the political branches.797 It is important to point out that while United 
Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of South Africa was widely criticized 
by commentators,798 none of the criticisms is developed around the Constitutional 
Court’s acknowledgement and expression of the political question doctrine sentiments 
above. What is evident from United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic 
of South Africa is that the Constitutional Court is silent on what kind of political 
questions it will not entertain and how those questions will be identified. 
 
Another significant case, which demonstrates the reluctance of the Constitutional 
Court to determine political questions, is Kaunda v President of the Republic of South 
Africa.799 This case involved the question of whether the applicants (who were South 
African citizens) were entitled to diplomatic protection under the Constitution and 
international law, when they were arrested on criminal charges in Zimbabwe. The 
Constitutional Court ruled they were not, and explained that while it had jurisdiction to 
decide matters involving diplomatic protection, courts could not command the 
executive how to make diplomatic interventions for the protection of its nationals.800 
                                                          
796  United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of South Africa [11]. 
797  See, Constitution Fourteenth Amendment Act of 2008, General Notice 31791. 
798  See, Devenish G “Political musical chairs - the saga of floor-crossing and the Constitution” 2004 
Stellenbosch Law Review 64. 
799  Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa 2004 1 BCLR 1009 (CC). 
800  Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa 1029. 
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Why? Is it because the executive has discretion in this area? In his concurring opinion 
to the majority judgment, Justice Ngcobo expressed the separation of powers 
imperatives in this way: 
 
The conduct of foreign relations is a matter which is within the domain of the 
executive. The exercise of diplomatic protection has an impact on foreign 
relations. Comity compels states to respect the sovereignty of one another; no 
state wants to interfere in the domestic affairs of another. The exercise of 
diplomatic protection is therefore a sensitive area where both the timing and the 
manner in which the intervention is made are crucial. The state must be left to 
assess foreign policy considerations and it is a better judge of whether, when 
and how to intervene. It is therefore generally accepted that this is a province of 
the executive, the state should generally be afforded a wide discretion in 
deciding whether and in what manner to grant protection in each case and the 
judiciary must generally keep away from this area. That is not to say the judiciary 
has no role in the matter.801 
 
In her dissenting opinion, Justice O’Regan offered the following rationale, which was 
in accord with Justice Ngcobo’s views above: 
 
It is clear …that under our Constitution the conduct of foreign affairs is primarily 
the responsibility of the executive, for the executive is the arm of government best 
placed to conduct foreign affairs… It is clear from the existing jurisprudence of 
this Court that all exercise of public power is to some extent justiciable under our 
Constitution, but the precise scope of the justiciability will depend on a range of 
factors including the nature of the power being exercised.  Given that the duty to 
provide diplomatic protection can only be fulfilled by government in the conduct 
of foreign relations, the executive must be afforded considerable latitude to 
determine how best the duty should be carried out… [In] any proceedings in which 
the exercise of the power is challenged, a court will bear in mind that foreign 
relations is a sphere of government reserved by our Constitution for the executive 
and it will accordingly be careful not to attribute to itself superior wisdom in relation 
to it.802 
 
Short of articulating an intelligible political question doctrine in Kaunda v President of 
the Republic of South Africa, the majority of the Constitutional Court concluded that 
                                                          
801  Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa [172]. 
802  Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa [243-245]. See, Roux T “The constitutional 
framework and deepening democracy in South Africa” 2006 Policy: Issues and Actors 16 
http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0002299/PIA_18-6_Roux_Oct2005.pdf (Date of use: 2016-
10-09) (arguing that O’Regan’s opinion in Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa 
is the most preferred). 
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decisions made by the government in foreign affairs are subject to constitutional 
control.803 It held that whereas courts are required to deal with such matters they will, 
however, give particular weight to the government’s special responsibility for and 
particular expertise in foreign affairs and the wide discretion that it must have in 
determining how best to deal with such matters.804 It is problematic that the 
Constitutional Court did not recognize or consider the possibility of granting absolute 
deference to elected branches on those foreign affairs questions even though it 
recognizes the inability for courts to determine these matters for lack of expertise. By 
failing to grant this absolute deference, the Constitutional Court misses the point that 
the political question doctrine requires more than mere deference in determining 
matters that are committed to the political branches to resolve. Clearly, the 
Constitutional Court is mindful of the limits of its own power and the separation of 
powers concerns in determining foreign affairs. However, the Constitutional Court 
failed to adequately define the boundaries of discretion afforded to the executive or 
the jurisprudential justification for such discretion. 
 
While Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa was clear that executive 
action was subject to constitutional control, presumably as part of the necessary 
checks and balances, it is silent concerning the contours of the limits on judicial 
powers. In other words, the Constitutional Court did not specifically consider or apply 
the political question doctrine, which operates as a limitation on judicial powers even 
though it decided the case based on political question doctrine sentiments.805 What 
                                                          
803  Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa 1045 [172]. 
804  Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa 1045 [144] and [172]. See also, Tushnet 
2002 North Carolina LR 1232 (advocating that the judiciary should be restrained from resolving 
issues that other branches are better suited to resolve such as foreign affairs); Free 2003 Pacific 
Rim Law (arguing that the political question doctrine enjoys special potency in foreign affairs); 
Scharpf 1966 Yale LJ 567, 583-584 (agreeing with the Supreme Court’s approach of treating 
foreign affairs questions as political questions). 
805  See for example, Chase 2001 Catholic University LR (arguing that the political question doctrine 
limits judicial power); Endicott 2010 Berkeley Journal IL 538 (arguing that the political question 
doctrine represents the judicial effort to ensure that courts do not hamper the functioning of the 
political branches of government); Gouin 1994 Connecticut LR  (advocating for the political 
question in foreign affairs); and US Dep't of Commerce v Montana 503 US 442, 458 (1992) 
(noting that the political question doctrine recognizes that a constitutional provision may not be 
judicially enforceable; that a political question doctrine is a restraint mechanism on the 
judiciary); and Baker v Carr 217-18 (stating that particular issues are non-justiciable because 
they fall outside of the province of the judiciary). 
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the Constitutional Court did was to provide some foundation for a potential 
development or application of the doctrine in future cases. The closest it got to 
articulate a political question doctrine is when Justice O’Regan in the quote above 
spoke of the extent to which the exercise of public power is justiciable, but failed to 
take this discussion to its logical conclusion by developing a lucent political question 
doctrine. It is this double speak that you encounter from the justices in cases such as 
United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of South Africa, Kaunda v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and others that makes the case for the 
Constitutional Court to develop a clear-witted political question doctrine that would 
bring certainty in the law. In this regard, this study welcomes the proposition by 
Professor Asare in the Ghanaian context that courts must provide justification when 
they invoke the political question doctrine sentiments because it forces them to clarify 
the doctrine and its application. South African courts have not done this in those cases 
where they have made statements that can only be read as expressions of the political 
question doctrine.806 
 
Perhaps, the most recent expression of the political question doctrine can be found in 
International Trade Administration Commission v Scaw South Africa (Pty) Ltd.807 This 
case arose out of South Africa’s World Trade Organisation obligations on tariffs and 
trade. These obligations are given effect to in terms of a number of domestic legislation 
that governs anti-dumping duties, imports and other trade remedies, including the 
                                                          
806  See, Mazibuko, Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly v Sisulu MP  Speaker of 
 the National Assembly (where based on separation of powers concerns judge Denis 
 Davis refused to intervene in a matter involving political questions pertaining to a  motion of no 
 confidence); United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly [2017] ZACC 
 21 [92-93 and 69] (where the Constitutional Court was asked to order the Speaker of  
Parliament to make all the necessary arrangements to ensure that the motion of no confidence 
is decided by secret ballot. The Court found that no legal basis exists for that radical and 
separation of powers-insensitive move and that to order a secret ballot would trench separation 
of powers. The Court reasoned that our decision that the power to prescribe the voting 
procedure in a motion of no confidence reposes in the Speaker, accords with the dictates of 
separation of powers. It affirms the functional independence of Parliament to freely exercise its 
powers); and Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa [2017] ZAWCHC 
34 (where the court dismissed a political party’s action to review the president’s decision to 
 reshuffle cabinet on the basis that the decision to reshuffle involves a political discretion 
which is not susceptible to judicial review). 
807  International Trade Administration Commission v Scaw South Africa (Pty) Ltd. 
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primary legislation known as the International Trade Administration Act 2002.808 The 
International Trade Administration Act established the International Trade 
Administration Commission (the International Trade Commission) with the authority 
to, among other things, make recommendations to the Minister of Trade and Industry 
(Minister of Trade), who may then request the Minister of Finance  to lift or impose 
anti-dumping duties on goods introduced into South Africa.  
 
In 2002, the Board on Tariffs and Trade, the predecessor to the International Trade 
Commission conducted an investigation into alleged dumping of stranded wire, rope 
and cables of iron streel from several countries including the United Kingdom. 
Following this investigation and the recommendation by the Board on Tariffs and 
Trade to the Minister of Trade, the Minister of Finance imposed five-year anti-dumping 
duties on certain steel products. A few months before these anti-dumping duties were 
to expire, Scaw, South Africa’s largest manufacturer of steel products, requested the 
International Trade Commission to conduct a sunset review. The purpose of this 
request was to persuade the International Trade Commission to extend the life of the 
existing anti-dumping duties.809 Following the sunset review, the International Trade 
Commission concluded that the lifting of existing anti-dumping duties would not result 
in further dumping of steel products from the United Kingdom.810 Hence, in October 
2008, the International Trade Commission decided to recommend to the Minister of 
Trade that the existing anti-dumping duty on imports from the United Kingdom should 
be terminated. This decision led Scaw to lodge an urgent application restraining the 
International Trade Commission, Minister of Trade and Minister of Finance from 
terminating the existing anti-dumping duties. The High Court granted a temporary relief 
to Scaw, pending a review to set aside the International Trade Commission’s decision, 
and later refused the International Trade Commission’s leave to appeal the court 
decision. The International Trade Commission then approached the Supreme Court 
                                                          
808  See, Government Gazette, GG 25684, GN 3197, 14 November 2003; Customs and Excise Act, 
1964; and Board of Tariffs and Trade Act, 1986. 
809  See, Regulation 53.2 provides: “If a sunset review has been initiated prior to the lapse of an 
anti-dumping duty, such anti-dumping duty shall remain in force until the sunset review has 
been finalised.” 
810  International Trade Administration Commission v Scaw South Africa (Pty) Ltd [22]. 
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of Appeal, which also rejected its application for leave to appeal.811 As a last resort, 
the International Trade Commission appealed to the Constitutional Court.  
 
In considering the merits of the appeal in the majority opinion, Justice Moseneke 
began his analysis with a discussion of the emergence of separation of powers 
jurisprudence in South Africa, including his thoughts on what should guide the 
development of this jurisprudence. He reasoned that: 
 
It is now clear from a steady trickle of judgments that the doctrine of separation 
of powers is part of our constitutional architecture. Courts are carving out a 
distinctively South African design of separation of powers. It must be a design 
which in the first instance is authorised by our Constitution itself. In other words 
it must sit comfortably with the democratic system of government we have 
chosen. It must find the careful equilibrium that is imposed on our constitutional 
arrangements by our peculiar history. For instance, it must ensure effective 
executive government to minister to the endemic deprivation of the poor and 
marginalised and yet all public power must be under constitutional control. Our 
system of separation of powers must give due recognition to the popular will as 
expressed legislatively provided that the laws and policies in issue are consistent 
with constitutional dictates.812 (emphasis by this study) 
 
In the above statement of law, Justice Moseneke, despite not being his objective, 
offers useful suggestions on how South Africa can develop a sound political question 
doctrine. It is suggested that Moseneke provided five key requirements that are 
suitable elements for the development and application of a political question doctrine: 
“(1) it must be authorised by our Constitution itself. (2) It must sit comfortably with the 
democratic system of government we have chosen. (3) It must find the careful 
equilibrium that is imposed on constitutional arrangements by our peculiar history. (4) 
It must ensure effective government. (5) It must give due recognition to the popular 
will.”813 These five requirements are a good standing point for the judiciary to finally 
construct a transparent political question doctrine for South Africa. Moreover, these 
requirements favour the classical political question doctrine because of their emphasis 
on authorisation by the Constitution itself. In other words, there has to be a 
                                                          
811  International Trade Administration Commission v Scaw South Africa (Pty) Ltd [24]. 
812  International Trade Administration Commission v Scaw South Africa (Pty) Ltd [91]. 
813  International Trade Administration Commission v Scaw South Africa (Pty) Ltd [91]. 
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constitutional basis for the doctrine, which is a point of emphasis for the classical 
political question doctrine. This point is reverted to later in this chapter.   
 
Further, in explaining the effects of the separation of powers principle, Justice 
Moseneke correctly observed that each branch of state is required to act within the 
domain set for it, but explains that in the end the judiciary must determine whether a 
breach of separation of powers has occurred.814 In this respect, Moseneke noted that 
the courts are likely to question whether to venture into the territory of other branches, 
but even in these circumstances, the Deputy Chief Justice accepts that, courts must 
observe the limits of their own power.815 While Moseneke’s pronouncements are 
persuasive, they are still short of elaborating on how the courts should observe these 
limits. However, his analysis did not end there. He had pronounced further that: 
 
Where the Constitution or valid legislation has entrusted specific powers and 
functions to a particular branch of government, courts may not usurp that power 
or function by making a decision of their preference. That would frustrate the 
balance of power implied in the principle of separation of powers. The primary 
responsibility of a court is not to make decisions reserved for… other branches 
of government… This would especially be so where the decision in issue is 
policy-laden as well as polycentric.816 
 
The pronouncements above came in response to two related arguments advanced by 
the Minister of Trade and the International Trade Commission, respectively, in 
opposition to the restraining order. The Minister of Trade contended that the 
restraining order would hinder the proper administration of economic policy, a matter 
which the Constitution bestows on the national executive.817 In his response to this 
argument, Moseneke observed that the Minister of Trade had wide discretion to accept 
or reject the recommendations made by the International Trade Commission or remit 
them. In other words, a recommendation from the International Trade Commission 
was not the sole predictor of what the Minister of Trade is likely to decide. Instead, the 
Minister of Trade has discretion to weigh a number of considerations, including the 
                                                          
814  International Trade Administration Commission v Scaw South Africa (Pty) Ltd [92]. 
815  International Trade Administration Commission v Scaw South Africa (Pty) Ltd [93]. 
816  International Trade Administration Commission v Scaw South Africa (Pty) Ltd [95]. 
817  International Trade Administration Commission v Scaw South Africa (Pty) Ltd [97]. 
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country’s balance of payments, diplomatic relationships, the regional and global 
trading conditions, goods needed to foster economic growth and other factors. Thus, 
it was a concern to Justice Moseneke that the High Court was silent on these 
separation of powers considerations, especially in relation to the role of the executive 
in policy formulation on matters of national and international trade, when it restrained 
the executive from acting in their terrain.  
 
Secondly, the International Trade Commission advanced the argument that the High 
Court breached separation of powers because a court may not interfere with the 
discretionary and poly-centric discretion bestowed on the International Trade 
Commission and the two Ministers. Moseneke acceded to this argument. He further 
reasoned that “when a court is invited to intrude into the terrain of the executive, 
especially when the executive decision-making process is still uncompleted, it must 
do so only … when irreparable harm is likely to ensue.”818 For Justice Moseneke, a 
court in that situation must accord due weight to findings of fact and policy decisions 
made by those with experience in the field. In any event, Justice Moseneke noted that 
the formulation and implementation of international trade policy lies at the heartland of 
national executive. In the end, he pronounced that courts may not trench upon the 
policy domain of international trade and its associated foreign relations and diplomatic 
considerations reserved by the Constitution for the national executive.819 He eventually 
concluded that the High Court breached the separation of powers. Justice Moseneke’s 
reasoning in International Trade Administration Commission v Scaw was adopted in 
National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance.820  
                                                          
818  International Trade Administration Commission v Scaw South Africa (Pty) Ltd [101]. See, also 
Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2009 2 BCLR 136 (CC). 
819       In the above proclamation, Justice Moseneke offers useful suggestions on how South Africa 
 can develop a sound political question doctrine. In the above suggestion, Moseneke provided 
key requirements for a political question doctrine: “it must be authorised by our Constitution 
itself. It must sit comfortably with the democratic system of government we have chosen. It 
must find the careful equilibrium that is imposed on constitutional arrangements by our peculiar 
history. It must ensure effective government. Finally, it must give due recognition to the popular 
will.” International Trade Administration Commission v Scaw South Africa (Pty) Ltd [104]. 
820  Commenting on the Constitutional Court decision in National Treasury and Others v Opposition 
to Urban Tolling Alliance, one commentator has argued that “this is unquestionably the most 
important judgment because it shows that the South African judiciary is acutely conscious of 
not interfering in core areas of legislative and executive competence”. Serjeant at the Bar “E-
tolling case an opportunity for Concourt to define its ambit” 2012-9-28 Mail & Guardian 
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In National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance, the Constitutional Court 
was seized to determine whether the High Court was correct in granting the temporary 
restraining order against several government departments to prevent them from 
implementing the controversial Gauteng Freeway Improvement Project (GFIP).821 A 
major component of this implementation was a policy decision taken by the national 
executive branch at the Cabinet level that the expenditure related to the GFIP would 
be funded by tolling the roads on a user pay principle.822 The Constitutional Court ruled 
that the High Court did not take sufficient consideration of separation of powers 
concerns when it granted the restraining order. It reasoned that the duty of determining 
how public resources are to be used is delegated to the executive and legislative arms 
of government, and that courts must refrain from entering the exclusive terrain of the 
other arms of government.823 
 
Justice Moseneke, who wrote for the majority in National Treasury v Opposition to 
Urban Tolling Alliance, applied his reasoning in International Trade Administration 
Commission v Scaw (Pty) Ltd and found that the formulation, implementation and 
funding of the GFIP was a matter entrusted to the political branches of the state and 
that the courts may not overthrow that power lest they frustrate the separation of 
powers. According to this study, Justice Moseneke’s finding in National Treasury v 
Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance was an acknowledgement of the political question 
theory that when the Constitution reserves decision making powers or functions to a 
specific arm of government, the other arms may not overthrow that power or 
function.824 It is important to mention that the Constitutional Court, through National 
                                                          
http://mg.co.za/article/2012-09-28-00-e-tolling-case-an-opportunity-for-concourt-to-define-its-
ambit (Date of use: 4 October 2012). 
821  One of South African Roads Agency Limited’s largest projects to date. It comprises different 
phases to upgrade and implement new freeway networks in the Gauteng province. The ultimate 
freeway network will be 560km. See, 
http://www.roadsandtransport.gpg.gov.za/media/Category%20Media/GFIP%20fact%20sheet.
pdf (Date of use: 10 October 2016).  
822  The Cabinet took a decision in 2007 which approved an extensive upgrade of roads in the 
economic hub of the Gauteng province as part of the GFIP. National Treasury v Opposition to 
Urban Tolling Alliance [1]. 
823  National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance [44] and [67]. 
824  See, Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa (Justice O’Regan’s opinion). 
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Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance, endorsed the proposition that the 
Constitution allocated certain matters to specific branches, and that other branches of 
government must abstain from interfering in those matters. In this regard, Justice 
O’Regan in Kaunda v President of the Republic South Africa, once remarked that “a 
variety of constitutional provisions including those that state that the President is 
responsible for receiving and recognising foreign diplomatic and consular 
representatives, appointing ambassadors, plenipotentiaries and diplomatic and 
consular representatives.”825 These provisions suggests that the Constitution commits 
the conduct of a great deal of foreign affairs matters to the executive branch, which 
according to O’Regan J “is hardly surprising”826 presumably because of the expertise 
possessed by the executive in these matters. Similarly, recently in United Democratic 
Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others, the Constitutional Court 
had to determine whethet the Speaker of the National Assembly had constitutional 
discretion to determine the voting procedure in a motion of no confidence in the 
President. The Court held that “how best and in terms of which voting procedure to 
hold the President accountable in a particular instance is a responsibility constitutional 
allocated to the National Assembly”. 827 The Court also found that the National 
Assembly delegated this discretion to the Speaker in terms of rule 104 of the National 
Assembly.828 
 
In articulating a similar view, a former Chief Justice recently commented that “it is 
important, as the decisions of the Constitutional Court indicate, to understand that 
there are matters that, for good reasons, are reserved for political branches of 
government.”829 The question that arises is when should the judiciary intervene and 
when should it not? What sort of justifications should be provided where a court 
                                                          
825  Kaunda and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa [243]. 
826  Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa [243]. See also Harksen v President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2000 5 BCLR 478 (CC) (confirming that matters of foreign affairs are 
committed to the legislative and executive branches); National Treasury v Opposition to Urban 
Tolling Alliance [84] (Justice Froneman held that the formulation and implementation of policy 
is a matter committed to the heartland of national executive function). 
827  United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others [64]. 
828  United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others [64-66]. 
829  Ngcobo 2016 Gallagher. 
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decides not to interfere to preserve the balance of power implied in the principle of 
separation of powers?  
 
6.5  Foreign affairs as non-justiciable questions: a high court perspective 
 
In an earlier case of Kolbatschenko v King,830 the High Court considered what 
Okpaluba calls the American version of the political question doctrine to resolve a 
dispute involving foreign affairs.831 This study will point out later that there is no such 
thing as the American version of the political question doctrine because the doctrine 
can potentially emerge from any constitutional system underpinned by the principle of 
separation of powers.  In Kolbatschenko v King, the second respondent was granted 
permission by means of a court order to request assistance from a foreign state in 
obtaining information for use in an investigation into an alleged offence. This 
permission was granted pursuant to section 2 of the International Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters Act 75 of 1996. Also at issue was a letter of request to the government 
of Liechtenstein for assistance in obtaining certain information relating to three entities 
with which the applicant had nefarious links.832 The letter of request was acted upon 
by the Liechtenstein government, which led the applicant to apply to rescind the order 
granted by the court.  
 
The second respondent defended the application on two grounds. The first ground 
was that the application involved political questions, which were non-justiciable; that 
certain disputes are non-justiciable in that the nature and subject matter are not 
susceptible to the judicial process.833 This argument was enhanced by reliance on the 
wording of section 34 of the Constitution, which provides that: 
 
                                                          
830  Kolbatchenko v King NO [2001] 4 All SA 107 (C). 
831  See, Okpaluba 2003-2004 SAPL 331(discussing that Kolbatchenko v King NO and Another 
standards for the proposition that there are issues of foreign affairs, which are non-justicable 
since courts have no judicial standards by which to judge them). 
832  Kolbatchenko v King 111. 
833  Kolbatchenko v King 120, citing Council of Civil Service Union and Others v Minister for the 
Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935 (HL). 
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everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application 
of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, 
another independent and impartial tribunal or forum. 
 
Based on the above provision, the second respondent submitted that a dispute may 
be regarded as non-justiciable if it cannot be resolved by the application of the law or 
other legal norms;834 that many acts in the realm of foreign affairs are not governed by 
legal norms but involve the consideration of polycentric social, economic and political 
interests. As such, courts should exercise restraint because of the lack of judicially 
manageable standards by which to judge such issues.835 It is important to note that 
the second respondent’s argument was developed from the six factors articulated by 
Justice Brennan in Baker v Carr.836 The High Court dismissed the argument, a point 
that is discussed later in this chapter. 
 
                                                          
834  Kolbatchenko v King 120, citing Mankatshu v Old Apostolic Church of Africa and Others, 1994 
2 SA 458; Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender Equality 
Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA) (where the courts were reluctant to intervene in cases 
involving religious doctrine or dogma). 
835  Many academic commentaries agree with this view. See, Free 2003 Pacific Rim (arguing that 
the political question doctrine enjoys special potency in foreign affairs); Scharpf 1966 Yale LJ 
6 (agreeing with the Supreme Court’s approach of treating foreign affairs questions as political 
questions). See also, Chicago & Southern Air Lines v Waterman SS Corp 333 US 103, 111 
(1948) (reasoning that foreign affairs should be undertaken only by those directly responsible 
to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the 
Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and have long been held to belong in 
the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry); Schiraldi M “Rising 
Temperatures, Political Questions, And Public Nuisances: The Second Circuit Weighs in On 
the Climate Change Debate in Connecticut v American Electricity Power Co” 2011 Villanova 
Environment Law Journal 330-33 (observing that the political question doctrine is raised more 
often in the foreign affairs context than in any other area where cases that directly implicate 
foreign affairs issues are sometimes deemed nonjusticiable because their resolution frequently 
turns on standards that defy judicial application, or involve the exercise of a discretion 
demonstratively committed to the executive or legislature); Atlee v Laird 347 F Supp 689 (DC 
Pa 1972) (where the court found that cases touching on foreign policy suffer from several 
procedural concerns that may give rise to political questions); Watson R and Becker D “Recent 
Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit” 2006 
George Washington Law Review 706 (concluding that foreign affairs issues will often render a 
case nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine); O'Donoghue G “Precatory Executive 
Statements And Permissible Judicial Responses in the Context of Holocaust-Claims Litigation” 
2006 Columbia Law Review 1148 (noting that Some foreign affairs cases may present 
nonjusticiable political questions); Noyes G “Cutting the President Off From Tin Cup Diplomacy” 
1991 University California Davis Law Review 864 (observing that some courts avoid 
adjudication by finding that foreign affairs cases present non-justiciable political questions); 
Coleman v Miller 307 US 433, 454 (1939). 
836  Baker v Carr 217. 
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An argument similar to the one in Kolbatschenko v King was advanced in National 
Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance. However, unlike in Kolbatschenko v 
King, the argument was raised in National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling 
Alliance to achieve the opposite result, namely to prevent the application of the political 
question doctrine in the case. The respondents in National Treasury and Others v 
Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance argued that the policy decision of government to 
implement the GFIP was not so political, economic or policy laden to warrant judicial 
deference (or in the language of this study to warrant the application of the political 
question doctrine); that the impugned decision is not of the executive and polycentric 
character as was the case in United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic 
of South Africa and other cases.837 It is important to emphasize that at the heart of this 
argument is an acknowledgement by the respondent that had the case involved certain 
types of political or policy-laden questions;838 the Constitutional Court would be 
expected to abstain from adjudicating the matter on separation of powers grounds. 
The Constitutional Court rejected the respondent’s argument because it found that the 
impugned decision was political or policy-laden in nature, and hence was outside the 
scrutiny of the courts because of separation of powers concerns.839  
 
The second ground of defence by the second respondent in Kolbatschenko v King 
was that the request for international assistance was a political act in the realm of 
foreign affairs and thus non-justiciable. What is the basis for this argument? Matters 
involving foreign affairs are routinely considered to be within the competence of the 
                                                          
837  National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance [39], citing Glenister v President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others 2009 2 BCLR 136 (CC) and International Trade 
Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Limited. 
838  This is just another word to describe political questions or non-justiciable questions. 
839  National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance [39]. 
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political branches and constitutionally reserved for those branches.840 Even at the 
time of Marbury v Madison where Chief Justice Marshall conceptualised the political 
question doctrine, the little detail that he was able to provide was that the doctrine 
would apply in matters involving foreign affairs and the president’s power to 
nominate persons to the Senate.841 Thus, it is not surprising that the respondent in 
Kolbatschenko v King advanced this argument to try and prevent the High Court 
from adjudicating the merits of the case which were political.  To support its 
argument, the second respondent relied on some South African authorities where 
                                                          
840  See, International Trade Administration Commission v Scaw South Africa (Pty) Ltd; Kaunda v 
President of the Republic of South Africa; Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 
[89-90] (where Justice Ngcobo made a profound statement about emphasizing this point. In 
explaining the place of international law in South Africa’s legal framework, Ngcobo reasoned 
the constitutional scheme of section 231 [of the Constitution] is deeply rooted in the separation 
of powers, in particular the checks and balances between the executive and the legislature. It 
contemplates three legal steps that may be taken in relation to an international agreement, with 
each step producing different legal consequences. First, it assigns to the national executive the 
authority to negotiate and sign international agreements. But an international agreement signed 
by the executive does not automatically bind the Republic unless it is an agreement of a 
technical, administrative or executive nature. To produce that result, it requires, second, the 
approval by resolution of Parliament. The approval of an agreement by Parliament does not, 
however, make it law in the Republic unless it is a self-executing agreement that has been 
approved by Parliament, which becomes law in the Republic upon such. Otherwise, and third, 
an international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law by national 
legislation). See, also, Bradley C “Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs” 2000 Virginia Law 
Review 661-62; Goldsmith J “The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law” 
1999 University of Colorado LR 1401-02; Ketchel A “Deriving Lessons for the Alien Tort Claims 
Act from the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act” 2007 Yale Journal of International Law 201 
(noting that while past administrations have invoked the political question doctrine in cases that 
implicate treaties signed by the United States, the Bush Administration has invoked 
the political question doctrine in ATCA cases where treaties are not implicated and only a 
general foreign policy interest exists);  Chaser Shipping Corp v United States 649 F Supp 736 
(SDNY 1986) (dismissing damages action in connection with mining of Nicaraguan harbors 
as political question); Khulumani v Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd 504 F 3d 254, 263 (2d Cir 2007) (per 
curiam) (reiterating that in evaluating executive statements, courts are guided by our application 
of the political question doctrine);  First Nat'l City Bank v Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 US 759, 
767 (1972) (ruling that this court has recognized the primacy of the Executive in the conduct 
of foreign relations);  Sutcliffe T “The Nile Reconstituted: Executive Statements, International 
Human Rights Litigation and the Political Question Doctrine” 2009 Boston University LR 295 
(encouraging courts to reconceptualise the political question doctrine, at least with respect 
of foreign affairs, by incorporating a multi-factored balancing test into 
the political question framework. Such a balancing test could draw from the balancing tests 
already contained in the act of state and international comity doctrines.); and Glennon M 
“Foreign Affairs and the Political Question Doctrine” 1989 American Journal of International 
Law 814. 
841  Marbury v Madison 166-167. See also, Ware v Hylton. 
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courts had refused to evaluate decisions in the realm of foreign affairs involving 
issues of high executive nature.842  
 
In dismissing the argument, the High Court observed that the decision to request 
international assistance did not involve the evaluation of social and economic policy 
among competing claims. Rather, it implicated legal questions such as the 
interpretation of the International Cooperation in Criminal Matters Act and the 
requirements for judicial review of administrative decision-making encapsulated in the 
Constitution and case law.843 Further, the High Court rejected the view that the case 
involved matters of high executive nature directly impacting upon the relationship 
between South Africa and a foreign state as was the case in Swissbourgh Diamond 
Mines (Pty) Ltd v Government of the Republic of South Africa.844 Instead, the High 
Court found that the case involved the relationship between South Africa and an 
individual, the applicant, as a person who is suspected of having committed various 
offences in South Africa. In addition, the High Court dismissed the argument 
developed from Baker v Carr that in assessing the legality of the requests, it (the High 
                                                          
842  Kolbatschenko 123-124, citing Inter-Science Research and Development Services (Pty) Ltd v 
Republica Popular de Mocambique 1980 2 SA 111 (T). See also, Swissbourgh Diamond Mines 
(Pty) Ltd and others v Government of the Republic of South Africa and others 1999 2 SA 279 
(T); 1998 JOL 4144 (T) at 108-109 (where the court held that “the basis of the application of 
the act of State doctrine or that of judicial restraint is just as applicable to South Africa as it is 
to the USA and England… The judicial branch of government ought to be astute in not venturing 
into areas where it would be in a judicial no-man's land. It would appear that in an appropriate 
case, as an exercise of the court's inherent jurisdiction to regulate its own procedure, the court 
could determine to exercise judicial restraint and refuse to entertain a matter, notwithstanding 
it having jurisdiction to do so, in view of the involvement of foreign States therein. In the present 
matter, it is apparent that decisions have to be made in regard to the alleged unlawful conduct 
of [government of Lesotho] in Lesotho and the control of [government of Lesotho] and its 
relationship with [South Africa]. As far as the latter is concerned there can be little doubt that 
this is not an area for the judicial branch of government. It belongs to international law…. The 
Court would be in judicial no-man's land. It would have no judicial or manageable standards by 
which to judge the issue. It clearly is a matter in respect of which this Court should exercise 
judicial restraint”). See also, Van Zyl v Government of the Republic of South Africa 2008 (3) SA 
294 (SCA) [5] (discussing the judgment in Swissbourgh Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd v Government 
of the Republic of South Africa with approval). 
843  Kolbatchenko v King 124. 
844  Chase 2001 Catholic University LR 1046 (arguing that the recognition of a foreign state or 
nation is a political question committed to the political branches of government). 
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Court) would lack a judicially manageable standard by which to judge the issues 
involved.845 It found that the subject-matter of the case was justiciable.  
 
Despite the outcome in Kolbatchenko v King, it seems evident from the arguments 
and holding in the case, including the authorities cited in it, that the High Court 
accepted the plausibility of the political question doctrine as being applicable to 
constitutional adjudication in South Africa but found it inapplicable to the facts of the 
case. In other words, while rejecting the application of the political question doctrine, 
the High Court in Kolbatchenko v King can be credited with finding the basis for a 
potential application of the political question doctrine in a future case. Nevertheless, 
there are problems with the case law development involving the political question in 
South Africa, the subject of the following discussion. 
 
6.6  Challenges with the implementation of the political question doctrine  
 
There are three main challenges with the current implementation of the political 
question doctrine. Firstly, the case law developments demonstrate that an 
incomprehensive political question doctrine exists in South Africa. In the same way 
that Cowper and Sossin have observed in the Canadian context, in South Africa the 
political question doctrine has been advanced and considered, but in a gradual 
manner without being recognised as an element of a lucid doctrine.846 There are a 
number of cases in which South African courts have acknowledged the necessity of 
abstaining from deciding certain political questions.847 While the Constitutional Court 
                                                          
845  This argument was accepted as a basis for declining to hear the merits of a case. See, 
Swissbourgh Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd and others v Government of the Republic of South Africa 
[334]. 
846  Cowper and Sossin 2002 Supreme Court LR 347. 
847  Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa; Ferreira v Levin; Mazibuko, Leader of the 
Opposition in the National Assembly v Sisulu MP Speaker of the National Assembly and Others; 
Mazibuko v Sisulu (Jafta J minority opinion); United Democratic Movement v. President of the 
Republic of South Africa; Economic Freedom of Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 
and others; National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance; MEC: Social 
Development, Western Cape v The Justice Alliance of South Africa [2016] ZASCA 88 [19] 
(holding that “in view of the above, orders (iii) – (v) clearly trench on the decision-making powers 
of the executive. The decisions as to the establishment, appropriate spread and conduct of 
child and youth care centres in terms of the Children’s Act, are ones (to borrow a phrase from 
Moseneke DCJ in International Trade Administration Commission v Scaw South Africa (Pty) 
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has frequently held that “courts must be conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority 
and the Constitution’s design to leave certain matters to other branches of 
government,” no rule has been developed to give effect to this profound statement of 
law. What is missing is a clearly stated and acceptable rule of law to guide courts when 
similar questions arise in the future. Seedorf and Sibanda appear to agree with this 
assessment in their study of separation of powers and the political question doctrine 
in South Africa.848 While reflecting on the opinion of Chaskalson P in Ferreira v Levin, 
they remarked that the Constitutional Court has followed the United States model in 
so far as it has accepted its power to decide a case may be limited by a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards.849 Further, they argue that the South African 
case law also validates the view that there are some questions which courts cannot 
decide, such as political or moral questions, but the Constitutional Court has not 
abstained from deciding these questions as would be the case in other jurisdictions.850 
Seedorf and Sibanda observe that while the:  
 
the Constitutional Court of South Africa has on frequent occasions employed the 
idea of judicial restraint, a conscious decision based on separation of powers 
concerns not to interfere with decisions by the other branches of government, 
provided that they are in line with the Constitution … it is necessary that the 
courts themselves formulate, articulate and apply principles for guiding the limits 
of their own powers and preventing their abuse. The formulation and application 
of these principles is important for the actual self-constraint which the courts 
exhibit. “851 
 
                                                          
Ltd [44) that reside in the heartland of the exercise of national and provincial executive authority. 
The separation of powers doctrine requires a court to refrain from intervening in decisions of 
this nature, particularly as they are polycentric and policy-laden in nature. The appellants 
correctly submitted that the granting of orders (iii) – (v) clearly impinge on the function of the 
executive by effectively determining where and how public funds and resources should be 
deployed.”). 
848  Seedorf and Sibanda Separation 12-52. 
849  Seedorf and Sibanda Separation 12-53. See also, Swissbourgh Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd and 
others v Government of the Republic of South Africa; Kolbatchenko v King; and Mazibuko v 
Sisulu (Jafta J dissenting). 
850  Seedorf and Sibanda Separation 12-52-53, citing the example of Minister of Home Affairs & 
Another v Fourie & Others; Lesbian & Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs & Others 
2006 3 BCLR 355 (CC) 390 (involving same sex marriage in South Africa). 
851  Seedorf and Sibanda Separation 12-54-55. 
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In the main, Seedorf and Sibanda accept that while some elements of the political 
question theory exist in South African jurisprudence, there is a need for the 
development of clear principles for guiding the limits of judicial authority.852 This study 
shares the views of Seedorf and Sibanda that the problem lies with the judiciary, which 
has failed to articulate and apply a coherent political question doctrine and its 
purpose.853 It is not clear from the case law whether and when the judiciary will hear 
or dismiss a matter involving political questions, and what jurisprudential justifications 
can be offered. The uncertainty in South Africa is exacerbated by the fact that the 
Constitution expressly granted the courts the power of judicial review as opposed to 
courts organically developing it over time like in other jurisdictions. The effect of this is 
that the judiciary has been disinclined to organically develop the institution of judicial 
review, including its limitations, like in other jurisdictions.  
 
While the judiciary has recognized the limits of the power of judicial review in the 
context of separation of powers cases such as the landmark case of Doctors for Life 
International v Speaker and Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National 
Assembly,854 it has failed to devise a rule of law to be applied in future cases to give 
effect to this recognition. Professor Okpaluba also believes in the benefits of 
developing a limpid political question doctrine for South Africa. In one of the first 
studies about the political question doctrine in South Africa, Okpaluba suggested that 
for a matter raising a purely political question to emerge, it must be clear that judicial 
intervention lacks constitutional foundation,855 and that “that is a political question over 
which a court cannot assume jurisdiction, entertain its cause of complaint or grant any 
relief in any exercise of judicial authority.”856 He concluded by suggesting that “such a 
matter, whether it is expressed in the language of the political question doctrine of 
American vintage, or simply dismissed for being unamenable to the judicial process 
                                                          
852  Seedorf and Sibanda Separation 12-54-55. 
853  Seedorf and Sibanda Separation 12-55.  
854  Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others; Democratic 
Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2016 5 BCLR 618 (CC). 
855  Okpaluba 2003-2004 SAPL 331. 
856  Okpaluba 2003-2004 SAPL 331. 
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as the common law courts would put it, is non-justiciable in a South African court as it 
is in the courts of the United States, Australia, Canada, England and Nigeria.”857   
 
Secondly, and more recently, former Chief Justice Ngcobo has remarked that the 
challenge facing South African courts arises from the need to develop a coherent 
theory of judicial review, which is rooted in the principle of separation of powers, and 
that will guide the courts on whether to accept or reject disputes that often appear to 
have heavy political lifting brought before them.858 Ngcobo is emphatic in his 
suggestion that in the development of such a theory, the following propositions of law 
should be accepted:  
 
First, our Constitution contemplates three co-equal branches of government; an 
all too powerful judiciary is a threat to our constitutional democracy in which 
government is based on the will of the people just as an all too powerful executive 
or legislature is a threat to our democracy;  
 
Second, the very principle of separation of powers which forms part of our 
Constitution, presupposes that there are limitations on the exercise of the power 
of judicial review and requires the judiciary to observe the vital limits on the 
exercise of this power;  
 
Third, limitations must be sought in, and be derived from the Constitution; and 
 
Fourth, while concepts such as the principle of deference or margin of 
appreciation or political question doctrine provide a useful starting point in 
considering limits on the power of judicial review, it is important to bear in mind 
that the principle to be developed must be informed by our Constitution and be 
anchored in our constitutional democracy which gives courts the central role in 
upholding and protecting the Constitution. 
 
Fifth, as the Constitutional Court has recently emphasized, it must be informed 
by the need to allow space to the political branches of government to discharge 
their constitutional obligations unimpeded by the judiciary save where the 
Constitution permits it.859  
 
                                                          
857  Okpaluba 2003-2004 SAPL 131. 
858  Ngcobo 2016 Galagher 22. 
859  Ngcobo 2016 Galagher 22-23. 
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Thirdly, more than a decade ago Professor Motala and Ramaphosa860 advocated for 
the application of the political question doctrine in a number of areas.861 They identified 
the following areas as being suitable for the application of the political question 
doctrine: (a), the removal of a president or cabinet through a motion of no confidence 
because it is not appropriate for a court to render a decision on the conditions for the 
validity of such an action;862 (b), the finding by the Judicial Service Commission to 
remove a judge from office supported by a two thirds majority vote of the National 
Assembly; (c),  the internal arrangements, proceedings and procedures of Parliament; 
and (d), cases involving matters of foreign affairs because a country needs to speak 
with one voice and the other branches of government are better fortified to make 
decisions in this area.863 
 
Lastly, while the courts, particularly the Constitutional Court, have recognised in a 
number of cases the limits of judicial power in general and in relation to the 
adjudication of political questions, they have failed to explain this in the context of the 
political question doctrine, which is predicated upon the principle of separation of 
powers, the text and structure of the Constitution. Although the political question 
doctrine was not the substance of the case, Justice Ngcobo in Doctors for Life 
International v Speaker of the National Assembly864 identified an important 
characteristic of the political question doctrine that is missing in South African case 
law, which can be used to develop the doctrine in South Africa when he said that: 
 
Courts must be conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority and the 
Constitution’s design to leave certain matters to other branches of government. 
They too must observe the constitutional limits of their authority. This means that 
the judiciary should not interfere in the processes of other branches of 
government unless to do so is mandated by the Constitution.865 
 
                                                          
860  At the time of this writing Mr Ramaphosa is serving as the Deputy President of South Africa. 
861  Motala and Ramaphosa Constitutional Law 123. 
862  Motala and Ramaphosa Constitutional Law 123. 
863  Motala and Ramaphosa Constitutional Law 124. 
864  Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly [37]. 
865  Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly [37]. 
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The Constitutional Court has failed to give effect to the obligations in the above 
pronouncement. In order to give effect to this pronouncement, the Constitutional Court 
would need to link separation of powers concerns, similar to the ones identified by 
Ngcobo above, with the limits on judicial powers, particularly in relation to political 
questions constitutionally allocated to other branches of government. Consequently, 
this has led to the failure of the Constitutional Court to develop a clear political question 
doctrine that would be used to dispose of such questions in the future.866 To put it 
differently, there is a disjuncture between the Constitutional Court’s rationale and 
recognition of its limits in the adjudication of certain political questions in the cases 
discussed above with the principle of separation of powers. In its proper application, 
the effect of the political question doctrine requires courts to abstain from hearing a 
matter due to separation of powers concerns, and based on the Constitution’s text and 
structure requires that the issue at hand be deferred to the relevant political branch.867 
However, what the case law in South Africa demonstrates is that courts recognise or 
acknowledge political questions in cases brought before them and the limits of the 
courts’ power to deal with those questions but at the same time take a flexible 
approach, as Seedorf and Sibanda observed, and proceed to adjudicate those cases 
instead of abstaining and allowing them to be resolved in the political process.868 This 
is a major challenge to the development and implementation of the political question 
doctrine in South Africa.  
                                                          
866  The failure to develop a political question doctrine has on occasion prevented government from 
taking timely measures to transform society. See SARIPA v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development 2015 2 SA 430 (WCC) (overturning affirmative action measure 
involving insolvency practitioners); Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance v South African 
National Roads Agency Ltd [2012] ZAGPPHC 323 (where an interdict was issued against the 
implementation of the e-tolling in the province of Gauteng); National Treasury v Opposition to 
Urban Tolling Alliance 2012 6 SA 223 (CC) (overturning the interdict of the High Court); 
O’Regan K 2012 SAJHR 129 (arguing that the role of the Constitutional Court is not to thwart 
or frustrate the democratic arms of government, but is rather to hold them accountable for the 
manner in which they exercise public power); Glenister v President of the Republic of South 
Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) (where the court invalidated an Act of Parliament that frustrated the 
crime-fighting efforts of government). 
867  See, US Department of Commerce v Montana 458 (noting that the political question doctrine 
restrains judicial authority); Chase 2001 Catholic University LR (noting that political question 
doctrine limits judicial authority). 
868  See, Endicott 2010 Berkeley Journal IL 538 (emphasizing that as a procedural mechanism, the 
political question doctrine mandates dismissal of a claim if adjudication revolves around policy 
choices constitutionally committed for resolution to the political branches). See also, Seedorf 
and Sibanda Separation 12-52. 
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6.7  The limits of the political question doctrine 
 
It is important to mention that the application of the political question doctrine does not 
entail that every political question is immune from judicial review.869 As indicated 
earlier, courts that have applied this doctrine expressly recognise the limits of its reach, 
and apply it only in those cases that raise the political questions and where the 
Constitution has committed the determination of the question to another branch of 
government or when no judicial standard exists to determine the question.870  Writing 
in the American context, Jared Cole once remarked that as an initial matter, it is 
significant to distinguish the political question doctrine from cases that involve political 
issues.871 He noted that courts repeatedly determine cases with political 
consequences or implications.872 On the other hand, the doctrine applies to issues that 
the Constitution determines are dedicated to the political branches or cannot be 
resolved through the application of the law.873 
 
In Baker v Carr, the case that has influenced the application of the political question 
doctrine in many countries, Justice Brennan makes it evident that the doctrine should 
be applied cautiously to political questions committed to the elected branches and not 
simply cases that have political consequences.874 His Ghanaian counterpart, Justice 
Kpegah in Ghana Bar Association v Attorney General subscribes to this view and 
recognises the limited reach of the doctrine when he observed that “it is… legitimate 
                                                          
869  See, Immigration and Naturalization Serv v Chadha 462 US 919 (1982) (stating that the 
presence of constitutional issues with significant political overtones does not automatically 
invoke the political question doctrine); and 2006 Harvard LR 2292 (observing that the US 
Supreme Court has not closed its doors to cases touching on foreign affairs; after all, separation 
of powers dictates that courts avoid political questions, not political cases); Chase 2001 
Catholic University LR 1055. 
870  See, Wechsler Principles 7-8. 
871  Cole https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43834.pdf (Date of use: 15 January 2017) 2. 
872  Cole https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43834.pdf (Date of use: 15 January 2017) 2, citing 
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
873  Cole https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43834.pdf (Date of use: 15 January 2017) 2. 
874  Baker v Carr 217. See also, Zivotofsky v Clinton (noting that courts cannot avoid their 
responsibility merely because the issue have political implications) (Roberts J opinion); and 
Justice Sotomoyor (noting that a court may not refuse to adjudicate a dispute merely because 
a decision may have significant political overtones); and Gil 2014 BU Pub Int LJ 253 (noting 
that where there is no legal question, there should be no judicial review.). 
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to say that the mere fact that a suit seeks the protection of a political right does not 
mean that it presents a political question and therefore non-justiciable.”875 
Furthermore, Ugandan Supreme Court Justice Kanyeihamba in Attorney General v 
Tinyefuza expresses a similar view and argues that courts should avoid adjudicating 
upon political questions unless in very clear cases of violation or threatened violations 
of individual liberty.876 In the South African context these limitations will have to be 
recognised in the development and application of a clear doctrine for South Africa. 
This is important in light of what the Constitutional Court has said about the political 
consequences of its functions.877  
 
In Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly, Justice Ngcobo 
made an important observation that it was envisaged that this [Constitutional Court] 
would be called upon to adjudicate finally in respect of issues which could inevitably 
have important political consequences. Consistent with this role, he noted, section 
167(4) confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Constitutional Court in a number of crucial 
political areas.878 He explained that the purpose of giving the Constitutional Court 
                                                          
875  Ghana Bar Association v Attorney General 295. 
876  Attorney General v. Major General David Tinyefuza [12]. 
877  See, President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union 
1999 7 BCLR 725, 762-763 (CC) (explaining that “one of the functions of the Constitutional 
Court is to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in a number of crucial political areas in respect of 
issues which would inevitably have important political consequences”). Similarly, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal has ruled that the invalidation of an Act of Parliament for breach of the 
constitutional duty to facilitate public involvement in its processes would be pre-eminently a 
crucial political question, which the Constitution reserved for the Constitutional Court to decide. 
See, King and Others v Attorneys Fidelity Fund Board of Control and Another, 2006 4 BCLR 
462 (SCA). See, also Premier of the Province of Mpumalanga v Executive Committee of the 
Association of Governing Bodies of State-aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal, 1999 2 BCLR 151, 
171 (CC) (Justice O’Regan holding that just because a decision has political implications does 
not necessarily mean it is not an administrative decision with the context of section 33 of the 
Constitution). Another case which I believe involved a political question but which would not fall 
within the political question doctrine is Khosa and Others v Min of Social Development and 
Others; Mahlaule and Another v Min of Social Development and Others, 2004 6 BCLR 569 
(CC) (dealing with the question of whether permanent residents should have access to social 
welfare grants). 
878  Section 167(4) provides: 
 (4) Only the Constitutional Court may— 
 (a) decide disputes between organs of state in the national or provincial sphere concerning the 
constitutional status, powers or functions of any of those organs of state; 
 (b) decide on the constitutionality of any parliamentary or provincial Bill, but may do so only in 
the circumstances anticipated in section 79 or 121; 
 (c) decide applications envisaged in section 80 or 122; 
 (d) decide on the constitutionality of any amendment to the Constitution; 
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exclusive jurisdiction to decide issues that have important political consequences is to 
preserve the comity between the judicial branch of government and the other branches 
of government by ensuring that only the highest court may intrude into the domain of 
other branches of government.879  Recognizing the political consequences of a broad 
construction of section 167(4), Justice Ngcobo held that the section should be given a 
narrow meaning.880 Ngcobo’s explanation is very key. It recognizes the distinction 
between political questions cases and cases with political consequences. The latter 
does not attract the need to invoke the political question doctrine, while the former 
does.  
 
Thus, if anything is to be learned from the analysis of the countries discussed in this 
study it is that the political question doctrine is not absolute in its application because 
it only applies where the Constitution itself commits a question to other branches of 
government or when there is no judicial standard to decide a case.881 Courts will 
inevitably adjudicate cases that have political implications and may even be required 
to give some deference to the political branches, but these cases must be 
distinguished from those cases involving political questions in which absolute 
deference is required.882 
 
6.8  Justifying the necessity of a political question doctrine 
                                                          
 (e) decide that Parliament or the President has failed to fulfil a constitutional obligation; or 
 (f) certify a provincial constitution in terms of section 144. 
879  In terms of the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act of 2012 the Constitutional Court is no 
longer the highest court on constitutional matters. It is the apex court. 
880  Doctors for Life International 1403; and Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National 
Assembly. 
881  See, Pappalardo V “Isolationism or Deference? The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Separation 
of Powers” 1989 Michigan Journal of International Law 901-901 (arguing that while the political 
question doctrine may stand as a hurdle to adjudication of issues touching on foreign policy, it 
clearly does not represent an absolute bar to their judicial resolution); and Kelly M “Revisiting 
and Revising the Political Question: Lane v Halliburton and the Need to Adopt a Case-Specific 
Political Question Analysis for Private Military  Contractor Cases” 2010 Mississippi Law Review 
224 (suggesting that not every political question invokes the political question doctrine). 
882  Barkow 2002 Columbia LR 243-244 (arguing that absolute deference is expected in cases 
involving political questions). See also, Doctors for Life International 1414(noting that the 
Constitution envisaged the Constitutional Court would decide cases with important political 
consequences); President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby 
Football Union 762 (noting that Section 167(4) confers exclusive jurisdiction to this Court in a 
number of crucial political areas). 
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In a constitutional democracy with a supreme constitution like South Africa, every 
principle, rule or doctrine of law has to have an express or implied constitutional basis. 
The judiciary has consistently applied this notion. In Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v 
Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council, the Constitutional Court 
found that the principle of legality is implied from section 1 of the Constitution. Similarly, 
in Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa, the Constitutional Court found 
that section 7 of the Constitution implicitly requires the state to establish an 
independent corruption fighting body, and in South African Association of Personal 
Injury Lawyers v Heath the Constitutional Court found that separation of powers is 
implied in the Constitution.  
 
Similarly, for the political question doctrine to be constitutionally sustained there is a 
need to identify a constitutional basis for it. In the South African context, there are at 
least three constitutional provisions that form the basis for the political question 
doctrine. These are: 
 
PREAMBLE 
We, the people of South Africa,  
Recognise the injustices of our past;  
Honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land;  
Respect those who have worked to build and develop our country; and 
Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity.  
We therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt this Constitution 
as the supreme law of the Republic so as to 
 - Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic 
values, social justice and fundamental human rights;  
Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is 
based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law; 
 
34 Access to Courts 
Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the 
application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where 
appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum 
 
167 Constitutional Court 
(3) The Constitutional Court—  
(a) is the highest court of the Republic; and  
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(b) may decide— 
 (i) constitutional matters; and  
 (ii) any other matter, if the Constitutional Court grants leave to appeal on the 
 grounds that the matter raises an arguable point of law of general public 
 importance which ought to be considered by that Court, and  
(c) makes the final decision whether a matter is within its jurisdiction. 
 
The political question doctrine provides the judiciary with a legal mechanism to give 
effect to the above constitutional imperatives. The reasons for this conclusion, include: 
firstly, the preamble to the Constitution entrenches the notion that the government that 
is envisioned in South Africa is based on the will of the people. When the political 
question doctrine is invoked, it allows the people, who are represented by members 
of the political branches, to govern themselves by determining and resolving the issues 
at play thereby reinforcing the notion that government is based on the will of the 
people. Hence, it was significant for Justice Moseneke to have pronounced in 
International Trade Administration Commission v Scaw South Africa (Pty) Ltd the five 
requirements that were highlighted in paragraph 6.4 above. His second and fifth 
requirements are motivated by the imperative to reinforce the values in the preamble 
to the Constitution.  
 
It is submitted that the second and fifth requirements are useful elements in the 
development of the political question doctrine in South Africa. This study employs them 
to advance the objectives of the doctrine by ensuring that the doctrine “must sit 
comfortably with the democratic system of government we have chosen” and “must 
give due recognition to the popular will.” Whilst Moseneke developed these 
requirements as part of his contribution to the development of the separation of powers 
principle and did not envisage that the requirements would be applied in this manner, 
it is not difficult to imagine the relevance and usefulness of this application on account 
of the intimate relationship between separation of powers and the political question 
doctrine.  Similarly, Zuma’s pronouncements cited in chapter one of this study were 
predicated upon his desire to reinforce the language and values in the preamble.  
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Further, as Professor Bickel once pointed out, when the judiciary invalidate acts of the 
politically accountable branches of government they frustrate the will of the people.883 
This has never been disputed. Instead, in the South African context it is justified on 
the basis that that frustration is mandated by the Constitution.884 Ngcobo has 
explained this justification by noting that, similarly, “when the president declines to 
assent to a Bill passed by Parliament… this interferes with Parliament’s law making 
powers.”885 He notes that in the same way the President interferes with the judicial 
powers when he pardons convicted offenders or when Parliament passes legislation 
to prescribe minimum sentencing guidelines thereby interfering with the court’s power 
to impose a sentence.886 Ngcobo claims that all these interferences are mandated by 
the constitutional principle of separation of powers.887  However, when the political 
question doctrine is applied it allows the judiciary to reinforce the notion that 
government is based on the will of the people who get to decide how the issues should 
be resolved.   
 
Secondly, section 34 of the Constitution provides us with a basis for the political 
question doctrine. The section enjoins the judiciary to entertain disputes that can be 
resolved through the application of the law. Implicit in this provision is the notion that 
if a dispute brought before the judiciary is not capable of being resolved through the 
application of the law, the judiciary would not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear 
                                                          
883  Bickel The Least Dangerous 16-17. For a discussion of judicial confidence, see Mahomed I 
“The role of the judiciary in a constitutional state” 1999 South African Law Journal 111 (noting 
that unlike Parliament or the executive, the court does not have the power of the purse or the 
army or the police to execute its will. The superior courts and the Constitutional Court do not 
have a single soldier. They would be impotent to protect the Constitution if the agencies of the 
state which control the mighty physical and financial resources of the state refused to command 
those resources to enforce the orders of the courts. The courts could be reduced to paper tigers 
with a ferocious capacity to roar and to snarl but no teeth to bite and no sinews to execute what 
may then become a piece of sterile scholarship. Its ultimate power must therefore rest on the 
esteem in which the judiciary is held within the psyche and soul of a nation); and Ngcobo S 
“Sustaining Public Confidence in the Judiciary: An Essential Condition for Realising the Judicial 
Role” 2011 SALJ 11 (noting that without public confidence in the judiciary, its ability to do justice 
is lost. Where people do not trust courts, they will resort to other means to resolve matters that 
properly belong to the realm of the judiciary). 
884  Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly; Doctors for Life International 
v Speaker of the National Assembly. 
885  Ngcobo 2011 SALJ 20. 
886  Ngcobo 2011 SALJ 20. 
887  Ngcobo 2011 SALJ 20. 
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the dispute.888 For example, consider the recent decision by the South African 
government to withdraw from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
1998, which established the International Criminal Court. Recently, the High Court 
ruled that it was procedurally defective for the government to give notice of its intention 
to withdraw from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.889  
 
Assume for a moment that there are no procedural problems arising from the 
Constitution against the decision to withdraw. If the matter were to be heard by the 
Constitutional Court would it be able to resolve the dispute through the application of 
the law? Is there a legal standard that governs what should inform a sovereign state’s 
decision to enter or withdraw from a treaty on the basis on which a court can assess 
the merits or demerits of the decision? Would the judiciary have a judicially 
manageable norm to determine the dispute? If the judiciary were to decide to hear the 
dispute would it not impermissibly interfere with the functioning of the executive and 
legislature who are constitutionally entrusted with the powers concerning treaty 
making? Wouldn’t allowing this action to proceed necessarily require the judicial 
branch of government to question the propriety of South Africa’s decision to withdraw 
from the Rome Statute which is a political question allocated to the political branches?  
In the main, is a decision to substantively withdraw from the Rome Statute justiciable 
under section 34? This study submits that it is not. 
 
Section 34 implicitly recognises that disputes incapable of resolution through the 
application of the law are not justiciable. A dispute is nonjusticiable if there is no 
judicially discoverable standard to determine the dispute, if it has been constitutionally 
committed for resolution to the elected branches, or if it cannot be resolved through 
the application of the law.890 In other words, the converse of the jurisdictional facts for 
                                                          
888  See, Mazibuko, Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly v Sisulu MP Speaker of the 
National Assembly 33 (declining subject matter jurisdiction to hear political question cases that 
have been deliberately and carefully been constructed legally to ensure they fall within the 
court’s jurisdiction). 
889  Democratic Alliance v Minister of International Relations and Cooperation [2017] ZAGPPHC 
53. 
890  Kolbatschenko V King and Swissbourgh Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd and others v Government of 
the Republic of South Africa. See also, State of Rajasthan v Union of India 1977 3 SCC 590 
[149] (holding that if a question brought before the court is purely a political question not 
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invoking section 34 is what provides the basis for the political question doctrine. In 
Kolbatschenko v King and Swissbourgh Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd v Government of the 
Republic of South Africa the High Court accepted the proposition that if there is no 
judicially discoverable method to resolve a dispute, a court should exercise restraint 
and not determine the merits of the dispute because it is not capable of judicial 
resolution as contemplated in section 34. The question remains: in a system governed 
by the rule of law, how does the judiciary exercise such restraint without developing a 
rule of law that governs how to identify those non-justiciable questions? Implicit in 
section 34 is an obligation on the judiciary to develop a legal mechanism or rule to 
assist it in identifying those non-justiciable political questions because the provision 
imposes limits on the jurisdiction of the judiciary. The political question doctrine is that 
legal mechanism.  
 
Thirdly, section 167 of the Constitution as amended provides a further basis for the 
political question doctrine. Section 167(b) widely defines the jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court. By prefacing its sentence with the word “may”, section 167(b) 
gives the Constitutional Court wide discretion to decide constitutional matters and any 
other matter of public importance. Additionally, section 167(c) provides discretion on 
the Constitutional Court by giving it final say on whether a matter falls within its defined 
jurisdiction. When one reads the two provisions together, it is clear that within this 
newly formulated jurisdiction, the Constitutional Court can formulate a political 
question doctrine which it could use to abstain from deciding cases either because the 
issues presented are not constitutional matters, but political questions, or lack public 
importance. It may be difficult to dismiss a political question for lacking public 
importance because by definition political questions have public importance and the 
reason for requiring abstention is to allow the political process, which involves the 
public, to resolve them. This highlights the need for a rational doctrine. Unlike the other 
constitutional basis for the political question doctrine, section 167 is significant 
                                                          
involving determination of any legal or constitutional right or obligation, the court would not 
entertain it, since the court is concerned only with adjudication of legal rights and liabilities.). 
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because of the discretion it provides the Constitutional Court in formulating the 
doctrine.891  
 
The above provisions are deeply rooted in separation of powers and function as the 
constitutional basis for developing a political question doctrine. Their content is closely 
associated with the political question doctrine. What is more, these provisions are 
reinforced by case law discussed earlier and other constitutional provisions where 
political accountability is envisioned.  
 
6.9  Reinforcement of the political question doctrine: political accountability 
 provisions 
 
In addition to the analysis concerning the constitutional basis for the political question 
doctrine, there are a number of provisions in the text of the Constitution which 
contemplates political (and not judicial accountability) thereby emphasizing the need 
for a coherent doctrine in South Africa. The text of the Constitution envisages political 
accountability in relation to certain constitutional questions as a mechanism to 
preserve separation of powers and promote the will of the people.892 In other words, 
these provisions give discretion to the political branches, which are not judiciary 
examinable. Justice Froneman endorses the latter proposition. In his concurring 
opinion in National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance, Froneman J found 
that it is a breach of separation of powers for a court to intrude, by granting an interdict 
against government, upon the formulation and implementation of policy, a matter that 
                                                          
891  For cases where the Constitutional Court widely interpreted what constitutes a constitutional 
matter, see, S v Boesack 2000 1 SA 912 (CC); National Education Health & Allied Workers 
Union (NEHAWU) v University of Cape Town and Others 2003 3 SA 1 (CC); Ingledew v 
Financial Services Board 2003 4 SA 584 (CC); Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 4 SA 490 (CC). 
892  See, Moseneke D “Shades of the Rule of Law and Social Justice” 2016 Annual Helen Suzman 
Memorial Lecture 11 http://hsf.org.za/media/documents/2016-helen-suzman-memorial-lecture-
transcript (Date of use: 1 December 2016) (where after cautioning against using courts to 
resolve political disputes observes that the highest form of public accountability is not in the 
courts, or in the work of the Public Protector or of the Auditor General, but it is electoral 
accountability which would be useful only when communities understand and embrace what is 
truly in their interest.). 
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resides in the heartland of national executive function.893 The learned Justice went on 
to declare that “courts of this country do not determine what kind of funding should be 
used for infrastructural funding of roads and who should bear the brunt for that cost. 
The remedy in that regard lies in the political process.”894  
 
Justice Froneman’s opinion is a confirmation that the text of the Constitution envisages 
political rather than judicial accountability when it comes to certain political or policy 
questions, and is another reminder of the need for the judiciary to develop a coherent 
theory to implement its constitutional obligation to ensure courts are conscious of their 
vital limits.895 More than three hundred years ago Chief Justice Marshall (while 
                                                          
893  National Treasury v. Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance [84]. There are other matters in the 
Constitution that are committed to the elected branches of government. See, President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo 1997 6 BCLR 708 (CC) (recognizing that the 
exercise of pardon powers is committed to the executive branch). In addition, sections 206(1) 
and 207(2) of the Constitution commit policing matters to the executive branch such that it is 
free to structure the South African Police without substantive judicial scrutiny. See, Glenister v 
President of the Republic of South Africa (holding that the elected branches of government are 
free to decide where to locate a specialized corruption-fighting unit. In this case the elected 
branches had decided to locate such unit within and not without the South African Police 
Service as previously was the case). See also, Betsy v Bank of Mauritius 1993 3 LRC 75 (Mar 
SC) (where the court rejected to interfere with a decision by the prime minister acting in his 
capacity as finance minister to issue a new bank note bearing the portrait of the wife of the 
prime minister. In rejecting to entertain the matter, the court reasoned that the prime minister 
would be accountable to parliament and perhaps the general public opinion and scrutiny for 
what was essentially an act of political decision and it would be wrong for a court to intervene 
by way of judicial review). 
894  National Treasury v. Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance [95]. See also Chief Enyi Abaribe v. 
the Speaker Abia State House of Assembly (explaining that “in cases involving political 
questions appeal for relief does not belong here. Appeal must be to an informed, civically 
militant electorate. In a democratic society like ours, relief must come through an aroused 
popular conscience that sears the conscience of the people's representatives”); Schneider v 
Kissinger 412 F 3d 190 (2005) (In addressing concern about the effects of leaving political 
questions to the political process, the court reasoned that the lack of judicial authority to oversee 
the conduct of the executive branch in political matters did not leave executive power 
unchecked because political branches effectively exercise checks and balances on each other 
in the area of political questions); and Story Commentaries 346-347 (arguing that in cases 
involving questions exclusively of political character, the supreme authority as to these 
questions belongs to the political branches of government and that the remedy in such cases 
is solely by an appeal to people at the elections). 
895  See also, Okpaluba 2015 CILSA 195 discussing that it was held in Oosthuizen v Lur, Plaaslike 
Regering en Behuising, en ’n Ander, 2004 1 SA 492 (O) that it was not open to a member of 
any of the legislative chambers to compel a cabinet minister to account in court for the 
performance of his or her duties where a legislator has failed to secure such accountability in 
the legislature. The high court rejected to issue orders that would compel the executive to 
provide answer to a question posed by the legislator under the standing orders of the provincial 
legislature. It was held that sections 57 and 116 of the Constitution authorise the National 
Assembly and the provincial legislatures to be masters of their internal arrangements and 
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formulating the political question doctrine in the context of the United States) explained 
that when “the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be 
more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable.”896 Former 
Chief Justice Ngcobo agrees with this view. He recently remarked that:  
 
It is important also to understand that having regard to their proper role on judicial 
review, courts cannot provide solutions to all political, economic and social 
problems that afflict societies in modern times…the appropriate solution to most 
political, economic or social problems can only be found through the political 
process. These problems are usually complex and they involve many conflicting 
interests and may involve the use and allocation of limited resources... It is to the 
political process that the citizen must look for an appropriate resolution of these 
problems. The responsibility for the proper and effective functioning of the 
political process in the interests of the community rests of course with the 
executive and the legislature. Judicial review ensures that the political branches 
of government perform their constitutional obligations and do so in accordance 
with and within the limits of their constitutional authority and obligations.897 
 
To add to the Ngcobo J and Froneman J’s observations above, the following 
constitutional provisions give authority to the proposition that the Constitution 
contemplates political accountability by committing issues arising from those 
provisions to the discretion of the relevant political branch: 
 
55 Powers of National Assembly 
(1) In exercising its legislative power, the National Assembly may—  
(a) consider, pass, amend or reject any legislation before the Assembly; and 
(b) initiate or prepare legislation, except money Bills.  
(2) The National Assembly must provide for mechanisms—  
(a) to ensure that all executive organs of state in the national sphere of 
government are accountable to it; and  
(b) to maintain oversight of— 
(i)the exercise of national executive authority, including the implementation of 
legislation; and  
(ii) any organ of state. 
 
                                                          
proceedings, and that this prevents the courts from enquiring into due compliance with the rules 
of the legislature. Given that what had occurred in the legislature in this case had taken place 
during the course of its internal proceedings, and issuing the order sought would clearly amount 
to inappropriate interference in such proceedings. The question posed in the legislature, and 
the failure to answer it appropriately, would fall within the accountability clause of section 133(2) 
of the Constitution. The court was consequently not empowered to interfere). 
896  Marbury v Madison 166. 
897  Ngcobo 2016 Galagher 24. 
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57. (1) The National Assembly may— 
(a) determine and control its internal arrangements, proceedings and 
procedures; and  
(b) make rules and orders concerning its business, with due regard to 
representative and participatory democracy, accountability, transparency and 
public involvement.898 
 
84 Powers and functions of President 
(1) The President has the powers entrusted by the Constitution and legislation, 
including those necessary to perform the functions of Head of State and head 
of the national executive.  
(2) The President is responsible for—  
 …(i) appointing ambassadors, plenipotentiaries, and diplomatic and consular 
representatives;  
(j) pardoning or reprieving offenders and remitting any fines, penalties or 
forfeitures; and  
(k) conferring honours. 
 
85 Executive authority of the Republic 
(1) The executive authority of the Republic is vested in the President.  
(2) The President exercises the executive authority, together with the other 
members of the Cabinet, by—  
(b) developing and implementing national policy; 
(c) …. 
(d) preparing and initiating legislation;  
(e)…. 
 
  91 Cabinet  
(1) The Cabinet consists of the President, as head of the Cabinet, a Deputy    
President and Ministers.  
   (2) The President appoints the Deputy President and Ministers, assigns their 
 powers and functions, and may dismiss them;899 
                                                          
898  See, United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2017 (5)  
SA 300 (CC) [64] (where interpreting section 57 of the Constitution held that “it bears emphasis 
that the absence of a prior determination of the voting procedure by our Constitution for a motion 
of no confidence means that it neither prohibits nor prescribes an open ballot or a secret 
ballot.  The effect of this is to leave it open to the National Assembly, when the time comes to 
vote on that motion, to decide on the appropriate voting procedure.  This can only reinforce the 
conclusion that the Assembly has the power to make that determination.  It is for it to decide on 
the voting procedure necessary for the efficiency and effectiveness of the institution in holding 
the Executive accountable.  In sum, how best and in terms of which voting procedure to hold 
the President accountable in the particular instance is the responsibility constitutionally-
allocated to the National Assembly”). See also, Maloy v Marietta, 11 Ohio, NS 639 (holding that 
the judiciary cannot interfere with legislative discretion). 
899  See, Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another [2017]  
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231 International Agreements900 
(1) The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the 
responsibility of the national executive.  
(2) An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been 
approved by resolution in both the National Assembly and the National Council 
of Provinces, unless it is an agreement referred to in subsection (3).  
(3) An international agreement of a technical, administrative or executive 
nature, or an agreement which does not require either ratification or accession, 
entered into by the national executive, binds the Republic without approval by 
the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, but must be 
tabled in the Assembly and the Council within a reasonable time.  
(4) Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is 
enacted into law by national legislation; but a self-executing provision of an 
agreement that has been approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless 
it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.  
(5) The Republic is bound by international agreements which were binding on 
the Republic when this Constitution took effect. 
 
The above provisions are a strong basis for the political question doctrine because the 
content of these provisions envisage political accountability, which can only be 
achieved through a court invoking the doctrine when presented with a substantive 
dispute or questions arising from those provisions. The provisions confer authority and 
obligations on the political branches of government, and place no substantive 
parameters in the text or define the strictures within which the National Assembly and 
the President, respectively, is to operate in their efforts to fulfil their respective 
functions and obligations therein.  The mechanics of how best to go about fulfilling 
these constitutional functions and obligations is a discretionary matter left to the 
National Assembly and the President in a given situation.901 The latter proposition of 
                                                          
ZAWCHC 34 [7] (reasoned that “it is difficult to imagine a power closer to the heartland of the 
President’s personal preferences than the power to appoint and dismiss ministers and deputy 
ministers; it is by its nature highly discretionary… In general, though, I think it can be said that 
the primary consequence of decisions to appoint and fire cabinet ministers which the public or 
sectors of it regard as bad decisions, is political rather than legal.”). 
900  See, Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) [98]   
 (held that “the constitutional scheme of section 231 is deeply rooted in the separation of 
powers, in particular the checks and balances between the executive and the legislature).  
 
901  Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly [93] (holding that the  
National Assembly has discretion on how to hold the executive to account); , Democratic 
Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another [2017] ZAWCHC 34 (held that 
“the power to appoint and dismiss ministers and deputy ministers; it is by its nature highly 
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the law is an integral part of the political question doctrine to the extent that it 
recognizes constitutional discretion on the part of the political branches, which is not 
susceptible to judicial review. This proposition was first articulated by Justice Ngcobo 
in Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly in the context of 
Parliament’s obligations to facilitate public involvement where he held that: 
 
where the obligation requires Parliament to determine in the first place what is 
necessary to fulfil its obligation, a review by a court whether that obligation has 
been fulfilled, trenches on the autonomy of Parliament …and thus the principle 
of separation of powers. This is precisely what the obligation comprehended in 
section 72(1)(a) does. While it imposes a primary obligation on Parliament to 
facilitate public involvement in its legislative and other processes, it does not tell 
Parliament how to facilitate public involvement but leaves it to Parliament to 
determine what is required of it in this regard.902  
 
Ngcobo revisited this proposition in his minority judgment in Glenister v President of 
the Republic of South Africa,903 where the Constitutional Court had to consider the 
constitutionality of the decision to establish the Directorate for Priority Crime 
Investigation (DPCI) and locate it within the South African Police Service (SAPS) as 
opposed to the National Prosecuting Authority as was the case previously. Both the 
minority and majority held that: 
 
section 179 of the Constitution does not oblige Parliament to locate a 
specialised corruption-fighting unit within the National Prosecuting Authority 
(NPA) and nowhere else. The creation of a separate corruption-fighting unit 
                                                          
discretionary”); United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 
2017 (5) SA 300 (CC) [64] (held that “it how best and in terms of which voting procedure to hold 
the President accountable in the particular instance is the responsibility constitutionally-
allocated to the National Assembly.”); Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa [67] 
(holding that when making laws Parliament will exercise its judgment as to the appropriate 
policy to address the situation. This judgment is political and may not always coincide with 
views of social scientists or other experts. It is not for the court to disturb political judgments); 
General Council of the Bar and Another v Mansingh and Others [28] (holding that the wording 
of section 84(2) is both permissive and broad, affording a wide discretion to the President); 
Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2009 1 SA 287 (CC) (rejecting 
an application to intervene in the initiation of legislation); and Amidu 154 (holding that the 
intrinsic proposition in the Constitution is that the policy which should inform any legislation are 
matters for the political branches to decide). 
902  Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2006 12 BCLR 
1399 (CC) [25-26]. 
903  Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC). 
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within the SAPS was not in itself unconstitutional and thus the DPCI legislation 
cannot be invalidated on that ground alone. Similarly, the legislative choice to 
abolish the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) and to create the DPCI did 
not in itself offend the Constitution.904 
 
In a minority judgement delivered by Justice Ngcobo, he reasoned that:  
 
The decision to disband the DSO and establish the DPCI and locate it within the 
SAPS must be understood in the context of the Constitution. Section 179 of the 
Constitution makes provision for a single national prosecuting authority... On the 
other hand, section 205 makes provision for the national police service... It is 
therefore within the power of Parliament to establish an anti-corruption unit and 
to locate it within the SAPS. The Constitution does not prescribe to Parliament 
where to locate the anti-corruption unit. It leaves it up to the executive, which 
initiates legislation under section 85(2)(d), and ultimately to Parliament to make 
a policy choice.905 
 
Ngcobo dismissed the argument that the impugned legislation in that case was 
unconstitutional because it sought to implement a political resolution adopted by 
the ruling political party, the African National Congress at its 52nd national 
conference in Polokwane in December 2007. The resolution called for a single 
police service and the dissolution of the DSO. In dismissing the argument, Ngcobo 
reasoned that: 
 
Assume, for the moment, that the impugned laws were in fact motivated by the 
Polokwane Resolution. This does not render the scheme unconstitutional... 
Indeed, it may well be the central role of a political party to formulate policy 
recommendations with the intention that they be implemented, and there is 
nothing untoward in the Cabinet taking up such recommendations… these 
recommendations become law only if the executive embodies them into 
legislation which it initiates, Parliament passes the legislation, and the President 
signs the legislation.906 
 
Ngcobo found that it was a policy decision by the government to transfer this 
investigative component of the NPA to the SAPS, and the suggestion is that such 
policy choices are within the political branches’ discretion to make. He reasoned 
further that: 
                                                          
904  Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa [162]; See also, Helen Suzman Foundation 
v President of the Republic of South Africa 2015 1 BCLR 1 (CC). 
905  Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa [64-65]. 
906  Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa [62]. 
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Under our constitutional scheme it is the responsibility of the executive to develop 
and implement policy. It is also the responsibility of the executive to initiate 
legislation in order to implement policy. And it is the responsibility of Parliament 
to make laws. When making laws Parliament will exercise its judgment as to the 
appropriate policy to address the situation. This judgment is political and may not 
always coincide with views of social scientists or other experts.907 
 
Ultimately, Ngcobo J held:  
 
What must be stressed here is that it is not the judicial role to dictate to other 
branches what is the most appropriate way to secure the independence of an 
anti-corruption agency. The judicial role is limited to determining whether the 
agency under consideration complies with the Constitution. Indeed the 
legislature here had to exercise a political judgment. That there is more than one 
permissible way of securing the structural and operational autonomy of the DPCI 
does not make the choice of one rather than the other unconstitutional.908 
 
The principle that emerged from Justice Ngcobo’s jurisprudence in Glenister v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Doctors for Life International v Speaker 
of the National Assembly is this where the text of the Constitution grants a power to a 
public functionary without prescribing or indicating the parameters on how such power 
should be exercised, the public functionary is deemed to have discretion in exercising 
that power.909 
 
The Constitutional Court in Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National 
Assembly910 endorsed, without overruling the majority in Glenister v President of the 
Republic of South Africa, the above proposition of law in relation to its determination 
of whether the National Assembly breached its constitutional obligation to hold the 
President to account in relation to his conduct involving upgrades at his private 
residence. In addressing this question, a unanimous court observed that the 
Constitution neither gives details on how the National Assembly is to discharge the 
duty to hold the executive to account nor are the mechanisms for doing so outlined in 
                                                          
907  Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa [67]. 
908  Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa [146]. 
909  See, Ngcobo 2016 Galagher 22-23 (discussing this principle of law). 
910  Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly. 
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the Constitution.911 As a consequence, the court reasoned, the National Assembly 
must be construed as having “been given the leeway to determine how best to carry 
out its constitutional mandate.”912 The Constitutional Court explicated that:  
 
It falls outside the parameters of judicial authority to prescribe to the 
National Assembly how to scrutinise executive action, what mechanisms to 
establish and which mandate to give them, for the purpose of holding the 
Executive accountable and fulfilling its oversight role of the executive or organs 
of State in general.  The mechanics of how to go about fulfilling these 
constitutional obligations is a discretionary matter best left to the National 
Assembly.  Ours is a much broader and less intrusive role.… these are some of 
the vital limits on judicial authority and the Constitution’s design to leave certain 
matters to other branches of government.913 
 
It is submitted that the Constitution carves out, as seen in the above cases, certain 
categories of constitutional questions that may only be resolved as a matter of 
legislative or executive discretion, and that in this context, judicial abstinence is 
constitutionally required. 
 
In light of the uncertainties in the constitutional law of South Africa identified in this 
study, commentators agree that what needs to transform in South Africa is for the 
courts, particularly the Constitutional Court, to develop the political question doctrine 
and clarify its purpose, when it applies and how.914 The starting point in this 
development should be in line with Justice Moseneke’s suggestions in International 
Trade Administration Commission v Scaw South Africa (Pty) Ltd where he advocated 
for the adoption of distinctively South African separation of powers and suggested five 
critical requirements, which would assist the development of a lucid political question 
doctrine. Also relevant are Ngcobo’s suggestions that he made above around the 
development of what he calls a coherent theory of judicial review.  
 
                                                          
911  Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly [43]. 
912  Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly [87]. 
913  Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly [93]. 
914  See, Seedorf and Sibanda Separation 12-54-55; and Okpaluba 2003-2004 SAPL. 
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In addition to the South African constitutional basis for the doctrine, the body of case 
law from Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda and United States are valuable as examples of how 
other judiciaries have come to constrain judicial reactions to political questions. This 
body of law demonstrates the notion that old and recent constitutional democracies 
have jurisprudentially defined and developed, within their constitutional histories and 
designs, some constitutional mechanism for dealing with political questions that 
threaten or implicate the equilibrium of power among the three arms of government 
while at the same time giving effect to constitutional provisions that assign certain 
questions for resolution to the political branches. South Africa is lagging behind in this 
regard and, this study submits, the Constitutional Court should resolve this uncertainty 
in the law. Any blanket rejection of the political question doctrine, as Justice Kpegah 
warned over a decade ago in the context of Ghana, will create judicial letigimacy, 
jurisdictional and separation of powers problems for South Africa in the future,915due 
to, at least, three reasons.  
 
Firstly, this study subscribes to Justice Moseneke’s recent cautionary statement on 
one of the local radio stations Power FM’s Breakfast Show concerning the current 
state of affairs where courts are routinely drawn in to resolve political disputes.916 In 
his statement, Moseneke explained that this practice is straining the judicial system 
enormously. He noted that presently all disputes, including political ones, end up in 
court. He cited examples of student protests, battles within the cabinet, battles among 
members of Parliament, battles involving agencies constitutionally entrusted with 
policing in South Africa. He correctly observed that in a normal constitutional system, 
these disputes should ideally be resolved at the sites where they emerge before they 
reach the judiciary. In the case of Parliament, for example, he noted that Parliament 
                                                          
915  Amidu 159. 
916  See, Moseneke D “On Using The Courts For Political Point Scoring” 
http://www.powerfm.co.za/news/news/dikgang-moseneke-using-courts-political-point-scoring-
fees-must-fall/ (Date of use: 18 October 2016). Moseneke is not the only retired judge who has 
responded to the concerns about the proper role of the judiciary in a democracy. Justice 
Ngcobo recently remarked that some are concerned that issues that should be resolved through 
the ballot box are increasingly being resolved in Bloemfontein and in Braamfontein. See, 
Ngcobo 2016 Galagher 18. See also, Editorial 2016-07-07 BusinessDay (arguing that 
parliament is notionally the institution that should be holding the executive to account … 
because courts are strictly speaking not designed to solve these kinds of [political] problems). 
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should have an efficient dispute resolution system to resolve any differences in ways 
that are acceptable to all members, who will not rush to court. He was emphatic that 
currently there is a huge burden that South Africa is placing on judges arguing that if 
a conflict has underlying political questions courts are obliged under section 34 of the 
Constitution to hear the dispute so long as the claim is couched in such a way that law 
is applicable.917 It is worth noting that Justice Moseneke did not address (as he should 
have) the question of how the judiciary should determine political disputes that are not 
capable of being resolved through the application of the law. He, however, cautioned 
that “we need to rethink if our democracy is working properly because one day the wall 
containing the volume of water that is ever increasing may just burst and we may get 
flooded.”918 Justice Moseneke subsequently reiterated his views at the Annual Helen 
Suzman Lecture where he stated that:  
 
Plainly, courts have become sites of resolving disputes on political power and 
rivalry absent other credible sites for mediating political strive. A properly 
functioning democracy should eschew lumbering its courts with so much that 
properly belong at other democratic sites or the streets. We will over time over-
politicise the courts and thereby tarnish their standing and effectiveness. That is 
true also of manifold and costly commissions of enquiry headed by judges only 
to give respite to dithering political or state functionaries.919 
 
It is significant to note that Justice Moseneke did not suggest a political question 
doctrine as the solution to this well-articulated problem. While he prefers to see courts 
get less involved in dealing with cases that are openly political or economic in nature, 
his suggested solution is to encourage disputants to try and resolve these types of 
cases before they go to court. This is not enough. South Africa requires a rule of law 
based response to this problem. 
 
Similarly, in addressing the Cape Town Press Club on 25 October 2017, Chief Justice 
Mogoeng Mogoeng correctly warned that:  
                                                          
917  Moseneke http://www.powerfm.co.za/news/news/dikgang-moseneke-using-courts-political-
point-scoring-fees-must-fall/ (Date of use: 18 October 2016).  
918 Moseneke http://www.powerfm.co.za/news/news/dikgang-moseneke-using-courts-political-
point-scoring-fees-must-fall/ (Date of use: 18 October 2016).  
919  Moseneke http://hsf.org.za/media/documents/2016-helen-suzman-memorial-lecture-transcript 
(Date of use: 1 December 2016) 10. 
254 
 
 
 
 
“those of us who are inclined to litigate as we should… make sure that we are 
careful about the responsibilities that we impose on our courts to deal with ... 
because if we push our courts to the point where they literally become raw 
political players we are exposing them to criticism that could have been 
avoided… We are putting them in a space that could easily cause people to 
delegitimize the crucial role that we play in our constitutional democracy. We owe 
it to prosperity to challenge every wrong doing but let us be very careful in our 
choices … sometimes almost refusing to deal as we should with challenges of a 
political nature than be quick to have courts deal with them. This applies to 
different political parties. Shouldn’t you as a political family go out of your way to 
resolve your internal problems ... before you go to court and only go to court if 
you are left with no choice... this extends to every dispute that different political 
parties might have … but it also extends to disputes different political parties 
might have in parliament or any other setting... let us treasure the role of our 
courts that we do not inadvertently place courts in an unenviable position where 
it has to deal with matters of a nature that it ought not ordinarily have to deal 
with.”920 
 
 
 
Mogoeng’s warning should be welcomed. Like Moseneke, the problem with 
Mogoeng’s caution is that he neglects to recognise that the judiciary is capable of 
solving the problem than relying solely on litigants to avoid bringing disputes of a 
political nature to court. By way of explanation, it is submitted that the judiciary has the 
responsibility to come up with a remedy to the problem identified by both Moseneke 
and Moegoeng and others instead of surrendering that responsibility to litigants.  
 
Secondly, this study subscribes to another cautionary statement made by Judge Davis 
in Mazibuko, Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly v Sisulu MP Speaker 
of the National Assembly about the threat to judicial independence when the judiciary 
is drawn in to resolve political questions that are beyond its competence or jurisdiction. 
Judge Davis had this to say:  
                                                          
920  Mogoeng M “Judicial Overreach” a speech presented at the Cape Town Press Club on 25           
October 2017 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xGAe_zHg9dw (Date of use: 29 October 
2017) at 14:18-17:08. Mogoeng made this speech two months before he would pen a strong 
dissenting opinion against what he termed as “textbook case of judicial overreach” in reffering 
ot the majority judgment. In his dissent he would repeat these cautionary statements and 
criticize the majority’s failure to apply the principle adopted in two previous case. See, Economic 
Freedom Fighters and Others v Speaker of the National Assembly and Another 2018 (3) BCLR 
259 (CC) [235, 252-255]. 
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It is necessary to say something … about this particular application. Courts do 
not run the country, nor were they intended to govern the country. Courts exists 
to police the constitutional boundaries, as I have sketched them. Where the 
constitutional boundaries are breached or transgressed, courts have a clear and 
express role. And must then act without fear or favour. There is a danger in South 
Africa however of the politicisation of the judiciary, drawing the judiciary into 
every and all political disputes, as if there is no other forum to deal with a political 
impasse relating to policy, or disputes which clearly carry polycentric 
consequences beyond the scope of adjudication. In the context of this dispute, 
judges cannot be expected to dictate to Parliament when and how they should 
arrange its precise order of business, matters. What courts can do, however, is 
to say to Parliament: you must operate within a constitutionally compatible 
framework; you must give content to section 102 of the Constitution; you cannot 
subvert this expressly formulated idea of a motion of no confidence. However, 
how you allow that right to be vindicated, is for you to do, not for the courts to so 
determine. I regret the need to emphasise this point, but it appears to me to be 
vital to the future integrity of the judicial institution. An overreach of the powers 
of judges, their intrusion into issues which are beyond their competence or 
intended jurisdiction or which have been deliberately and carefully constructed 
legally so as to ensure that the other arms of the state to deal with these matters, 
can only result in jeopardy for our constitutional democracy. In this dispute, I am 
not prepared to create a juristocracy and thus do more than that which I am 
mandated to do in terms of our constitutional model.921  
 
The above observation is yet another acknowledgement by a South African court that 
a political question doctrine is indispensable to preserve South African constitutional 
democracy. On appeal to the Constitutional Court, Justice Jafta, in the opening 
paragraph of his dissenting opinion, echoed Judge Davis’s concerns and said that:  
 
Political issues must be resolved at a political level. Our courts should not be 
drawn into political disputes, the resolution of which falls appropriately within the 
domain of other fora established in terms of the Constitution. A timely warning 
was issued in this case by Davis J in a judgment delivered by the High Court 
 
Lastly, there is a tendency by detractors to reject the political question doctrine as an 
American concept. It is hereby argued that this rejection is unfounded and simplistic 
at best.922  The political question doctrine, as Justice Kpegah puts it, is not developed 
                                                          
921  Mazibuko, Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly v Sisulu MP Speaker of the 
National Assembly and Others 32-33. 
922  See, Rautenbach 2012 TSAR; Asare November 2006; Ghana Bar Association 294-295; and 
Roux T “Baker v Carr in South Africa, or How Political Questions Become Legal Questions” 
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from any specific provision of the United States Constitution.923 Instead, he correctly 
says it is a necessary derivative of the concept of separation of powers, which concept 
underpins the South African Constitution.924 Justice Kpegah teaches us the “fact that 
it was developed and so named within the American jurisprudence should not give us 
goose pimples and make us averse to its application to our constitutional adjudication. 
After all, what is in a name? A rose will always smell sweet even if it is called 
ammonia.”925  
 
Justice Kpegah’s observations are applicable to South Africa. It should not matter that 
the political question doctrine is associated with or gained prominence in the United 
States’ jurisprudence. The focus of any examination of this doctrine should be on the 
text of each constitution, its usefulness and what it is designed to achieve, which is to 
preserve the separation of powers and advance the will of the people. What is more, 
the Constitution of 1996 is underpinned by the concept of separation of powers, which 
suggests that South Africa is not immune from experiencing similar separation of 
powers concerns and challenges as the other countries discussed above that have 
already developed a political question doctrine as a legal mechanism to define the 
contours of judicial authority.926 Even though the Constitutional Court has correctly 
said “no separation of powers is absolute,”927 it has emphasised that “pursuant to 
constitutional principle VI the Constitution provides for a system of separation of 
powers among the three co-equal branches of government, in which checks and 
balances result in the imposition of restraints by one branch of government upon 
                                                          
2006 Address at the Conference on Law, Language and Politics in South Africa: The Impact of 
the Constitution. 
923  Amidu 159. 
924  Amidu 159. 
925  Amidu 159. 
926  See, South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath (holding that there can be 
no doubt that our Constitution provides for such a separation, and that laws inconsistent with 
what the Constitution requires in that regard, are invalid); Certification Judgment 1298-1300; 
Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature v President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others 1995 10 BCLR 1289 (CC); De Lange v Smuts 1998 7 BCLR 779 (CC); Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others 2000 3 BCLR 241,260 (CC); and Bernstein and Others v Bester 1996 4 BCLR 449, 499 
(CC). 
927  Certification Judgement 1298-1300. See also, De Lange v Smuts 804. 
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another.”928 The Constitutional Court has also imposed an obligation on itself to 
respect the vital limits of its judicial power.929 Further, the Constitutional Court has 
invalidated acts of the State on the basis of their conflict with the separation of powers 
imperatives in the Constitution;930 and as a result it can be argued that the Constitution 
does not contemplate the taking by one branch of government functions which in 
essence belong or are constitutionally assigned to another branch. Hence, South 
Africa’s constitutional order is not uniquely designed from those countries like Ghana, 
Uganda, Nigeria and the United States that have developed and applied the political 
question doctrine. 
 
6.10 Responding to opponents of the political question doctrine 
 
There is existing literature in which arguments have been made against the adoption 
of the political question doctrine in South Africa.931 It is submitted that the arguments 
advanced in this literature are misplaced because the doctrine already exists, but 
requires clarity and comprehensiveness. For the reasons already articulated, this 
study submits that it is also a misplaced view to suggest that this doctrine is an 
American concept. In his critical discussion of the application of the political question 
doctrine in South Africa, Rautenbach describes it as an American concept.932 In his 
attempt to convince the readers to disfavour the doctrine, he observes that “in its land 
of origin it is highly controversial and has after more than two hundred years not 
produced clear guidelines on how it must be applied.”933 The fact that that doctrine is 
controversial in the United States is not a rational basis for South African courts not to 
consider it and adapt it to the South African context. There are many legal doctrines 
                                                          
928  Certification Judgment 1299. See also, South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v 
Heath 85-86 (confirming the separation of powers concept in the South African Constitution). 
929 See, Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly; Economic Freedom 
Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly. 
930  See, Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature v President of the Republic of South Africa 
(invalidating the Local Government Transition Act 209 of 1993 on separation of powers 
grounds). 
931  Rautenbach 2012 TSAR 28. 
932  Rautenbach 2012 TSAR 28. 
933  Rautenbach 2012 TSAR 28. 
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that South African courts have borrowed from abroad.934 In justifying the concept of 
legal borrowing, Wiktor has noted that since there are no sufficient legal doctrines, 
legal borrowing has become an acceptable practice. Certainly, there is no other 
doctrine that seeks to address the problems associated with courts adjudicating 
political questions than the political question doctrine. Further, the fact that courts in 
the United States have not produced clear guidelines on how it ought to be applied is 
also not a good reason to discard any consideration of United States authorities on 
the subject. In fact, this state of affairs presents an opportunity for South African courts 
to learn from the experiences in the United States and other countries that have 
applied it.935 As mentioned above, it is submitted that the doctrine or some elements 
of it already form part of South African law, and thus examining at the experiences in 
other countries allows South African courts to develop it further as contemplated by 
Justice Ackerman in De Lange v Smuts where he said that: 
 
                                                          
934  For a discussion of some of the justiciability doctrines that have been borrowed from abroad 
see National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home Affairs 
(incorporating the doctrine of ripeness as applied in the United States into South African law); 
Ferreira v Levin 98 (discussing other justiciability doctrines like standing requirement from the 
United States perspective noting that it is important for courts not to be required to deal with 
abstract or hypothetical issues); Currie and De Waal The Bill of Rights 79-96 (discussing the 
justiciability doctrines of mootness, ripeness and other noting that these  now forms part of 
South African law); R v Garnsworthy and Others 1923 WLD 17 (importing the English doctrine 
of common purpose into South African criminal law); See, also S v Mgedezi 1989 1 SA 687 (A) 
(applying the doctrine of common purpose); Thebus and Another v S 2003 10 BCLR 1100 (CC) 
(the constitutional court upholding the validity of the doctrine of common purpose under the 
Constitution); and see Swissbourgh Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd and others v Government of the 
Republic of South Africa and others [1998] JOL 4144 (T) (holding that the act of state doctrine 
is applicable to South Africa as it is to the United States; and that the judicial branch of 
government ought to be astute in not venturing into areas where it would be in a judicial no 
man's land. It would appear that in an appropriate case, as an exercise of the court's inherent 
jurisdiction to regulate its own procedure, the court could determine to exercise judicial restraint 
and refuse to entertain a matter, notwithstanding it having jurisdiction to do so, in view of the 
involvement of foreign states therein). See, also Wishik Washington LR 698 (discussing that 
Judge Bork has used the political question and act of state doctrines as evidence of underlying 
separation of powers issues that in his view justify judicial abstention on a broad range of foreign 
relations issues). 
935  For a discussion of the political question doctrine in Israel, see Cohn M “Form, Formula And 
Constitutional Ethos: The Political Question/Justiciability Doctrine in three Common Law 
Systems” 2011 American Journal of Comparative Law 675; and Jabotinsky v. Weitzmann, HCJ 
65/51 (1951) (where the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice rejected an 
application for an order of mandamus against the President of the State regarding his exercise 
of discretion in entrusting the task of forming a government to a member of the Knesset, Israel's 
parliament). 
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I have no doubt that over time our courts will develop a distinctively South African 
model of separation of powers, one that fits the particular system of government 
provided for in the Constitution and that reflects a delicate balancing, informed 
both by South Africa’s history and its new dispensation, between the need, on 
the one hand, to control government by separating powers and enforcing checks 
and balances and, on the other, to avoid diffusing power so completely that the 
government is unable to take timely measures in the public interest.936 
 
If courts were to adhere to Rautenbach’s suggestion, they would miss the opportunity 
to develop a clear political question doctrine from the principle of separation of powers 
as suggested by Justice Ackerman. Such development should require a 
straightforward and acceptable principle to guide courts to determine whether to hear 
cases involving political questions. Further, it is submitted that an examination of the 
constitutional experiences in the United States, Ghana, Nigeria, and Uganda offers 
South Africa an opportunity to confront once and for all the political question doctrine 
as developed and applied by courts in those countries and determine how relevant it 
might be to the South African circumstance instead of the current selective application 
of other American doctrines.937 As seen in this study, this approach has worked well 
in Uganda, Israel, Nigeria and Ghana where the courts have adopted and modified the 
political question doctrine to fit the system of government contemplated in their 
supreme constitutions.   
 
Another of Rautenbach’s main objections to the political question doctrine is that its 
application in South Africa would be in conflict with the supremacy of the Constitution, 
as contemplated by section 2 of the Constitution.938 He argues that the supremacy 
clause does not permit the exclusion of any action from judicial review.939 This 
argument is misplaced based on at least two grounds.  
                                                          
936  De Lange v Smuts NO 1998 7 BCLR 779 (CC) [60]. 
937  See for example, Swissbourgh Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd 108 (adopting the act of state doctrine 
from the United States Supreme Court). There are other justiciability doctrines such as 
ripeness, advisory opinion mootness that have been discussed and applied in South Africa. 
Free, 2003 Pacific Rim Law; Yoshino 2009 WillametteLR; Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights 
79-96. 
938  Section 2 of the South African Constitution provides that “this Constitution is the supreme law 
of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it 
must be fulfilled”. 
939  Rautenbach 2012 TSAR 28. 
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Firstly, the problem with Rautenbach’s argument is that it is premised on an incorrect 
assumption that the power of judicial review is absolute. This is further from the truth. 
The Constitutional Court has conceded to the fact that the power of judicial review is 
not absolute. In Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly,940 
it held that “courts must be conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority and the 
constitution’s design to leave certain matters to other branches of government.”941 
Lately, in Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly, the 
Constitutional Court restated this view holding that the judiciary “does not have 
unlimited powers and must always be sensitive to the need to refrain from undue 
interference with the functional independence of other branches of government.”942   
 
Further, even Marbury v Madison, which is revered for institutionalising the power of 
judicial review recognised that that power has limitations. Similarly, earlier cases in 
South Africa such as Brown v Leyds NO also recognised the inherent limitation of the 
power of judicial review. However, even if Rautenbach was correct in his assertion, 
how does he explain the Constitutional Court’s endorsement of other justiciability 
doctrines such as mootness, ripeness and standing all, which seek to limit the power 
of judicial review?943 Are those doctrines in conflict with section 2 of the Constitution 
as well to the extent that they limit the power of judicial review? These other 
                                                          
940  Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (12) BCLR 1399; 2006  
(6) SA 416 (CC). 
941 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly [37]. 
942  Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly [92]. 
943  See, National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs (discussing the 
doctrine of ripeness in South Africa); Ferreira v Levin; Van Huysteen NO Minister 1996 1 SA 
283 (CC); Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 293 (CC); 
Port Elizabeth Municipality v Prut NO 1996 4 SA 318 (E); New Party of South Africa v 
Government of the Republic of South Africa 1999 3 SA 191 (CC); Kruger v President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2009 1 SA 417 (CC); Bio Energy Afrika Free State v Freedom Front 
Plus 2012 2 SA 88 (FB); JT Publishing v Minister of Safety and Security; National Coalition of 
Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 1 (CC) [21]; S v Dlamini 1999 
4 SA 623 (CC) Janse van Rensburg NO v Minister of Trade and Industry 2001 1 SA 29 (CC); 
President of the Ordinary Court Martial v Freedom of Expression Institute 1999 4 SA 682 (CC); 
Chairman, State Tender Board v Digital Voice Processing (Pty) Ltd 2012 2 SA 16 (SCA); 
Ritcher v Minister of Home Affairs 2009 3 SA 615 (CC); S v Friedland 1996 8 BCLR 1049 (W); 
Transvaal Agricultural Union v Minister of Land Affairs 1997 2 SA 621 (CC); Minister of 
Education v Harris 2001 4 SA 1297 (CC); Legal Aid South Africa v Magidiwana (2) 2014 4 All 
SA 570 (SCA).  
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justiciability doctrines have been applied by the Constitutional Court since the 
Constitution was adopted. There is, therefore, no conflict between the political 
question doctrine and the section 2 of the Constitution.  
 
Secondly, if section 2 read with section 167(3) of the Constitution is seen as implying 
that the Constitutional Court has a special guardianship role in constitutional 
interpretation and enforcement, then it could equally be said that it (the Constitutional 
Court) alone must have the final say in all constitutional questions in South Africa. This 
is hardly a true reflection of the South African constitutional scheme. This submission 
is advanced with a clear benefit in mind of section 167(3) of the Constitution, which 
entrusts the Constitutional Court as the highest court on all matters and the power to 
finally decide whether a matter is within its jurisdiction. This is not the entire picture of 
the envisaged constitutional scheme.  
 
Based on the doctrine of coordinate construction, Fisher and Devins have convincingly 
argued that the elected branches have both the authority and the competence to 
engage in constitutional interpretation.944 According to this view, “the elected branches 
participate before the courts decide and they participate afterwards as well . . . the 
process is circular, turning back on itself again and again until society is satisfied with 
the outcome.”945 Justice Kanyeihamba of the Uganda Supreme Court shared this view 
when he declared in the landmark case of Attorney General v Tinyefuza that the 
constitutional platform is to be shared among the three arms of government, and that 
courts need to bear in mind the judgments of other repositories of constitutional power 
concerning the scope of their authority and the necessity for each to keep within its 
powers, including the courts themselves.946  
 
                                                          
944 Fisher and Devins Political Dynamics 10. For further discussion about the doctrine of coordinate 
construction see, Neuman G “Variations for Mixed Voices” 1989 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 1851. 
945  Fisher and Devins Political Dynamics 10. 
946  Attorney General v Tinyefuza 13. See also, Mhango M “Transformation and the Judiciary” in 
Hoexter and Olivier (eds) The Judiciary in South Africa (Juta, Cape Town 2014) 95-96. 
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South African academics such as Currie and de Waal agree with Fisher and Devins 
and Justice Kanyeihamba. They observe that “while the courts have the final word 
they are by no means solely responsible for interpreting the Constitution.”947 Similarly, 
former Chief Justice Ngcobo agrees that the South African constitutional design 
contemplates interaction among the three branches of government when he spoke of 
the notion of “constitutional dialogue” and dismissed the perceived notion that when 
courts “strike down unconstitutional action or legislation … it is perceived as the end 
of the matter.”948 To the contrary, he argued that a “dialogic theory appreciates that a 
judicial finding of constitutional invalidity is more often than not merely the 
beginning”949 of a dialogue among the three branches of government. Justice Ngcobo 
advocates that “this dialogue must be rooted in the shared obligation among all 
branches of government to uphold the Constitution.”950 
 
What is more, it is suggested that Ngcobo’s concept of a constitutional dialogue was 
influenced by Professor Bickel’s notion of the passive virtue.951 As noted earlier, Bickel 
advocated for courts to abstain from determining cases that raise political questions 
to prevent them from losing their legitimacy. He advocated that instead of losing this 
legitimacy by invalidating acts of the political branches, courts should exercise the 
passive virtue by invoking the political question doctrine to decline to adjudicate a 
                                                          
947  See, Currie and de Waal The Bill of Rights 394 fn 184 (commenting on the comments by Justice 
Chalskalson in Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature v President of the Republic of 
South Africa. 
948  Ngcobo S “South Africa’s Transformative Constitution: Towards an Appropriate Doctrine of 
Separation of Powers” 2011 Stellenbosch Law Review 37-48 (arguing that the constitutional 
dialogue is the underpinning and defining feature of South African separation of powers). 
949  Ngcobo 2011 Stellenbosch LR 38-48. 
950  Ngcobo 2011 Stellenbosch LR 38-48. See also Story Commentaries 346 (arguing that “it may 
arise in the course of the discharge of the functions of any one, or of all, of the great 
departments of government, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. The officers of each 
of these departments are eually bound by their oaths of office to support the constitution of the 
United States, and are therefore conscientiously bound to abstain from all acts, which are 
inconsistent with it. Whenever, therefore, they are required to act in a case, not hitherto settled 
by any proper authority, these functionaries must, in the first instance, decide, each for himself, 
whether, consistently with the constitution, the act can be done. If, for instance, the president 
is required to do any act, he is not only authorized, but required, to decide for himself, whether, 
consistently with his constitutionl duties, he can do the act.”) 
951  See, Ngcobo 2016 Galagher 19 (noting that Bickel’s argument against judicial review because 
“it thwarts the will of the representatives of the actual people). 
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case.952 In Professor Bickel’s view, which ties in with Justice Ngcobo’s, invoking the 
political question doctrine in these circumstances enables a constitutional dialogue 
between the people and the political branches, and society at large about the issues 
under dispute. While Justice Ngcobo does not mention the term political question 
doctrine in his articulation of the notion of a constitutional dialogue, his objectives for 
advocating for such dialogue are similar to Bickel’s, which is to ensure that political 
questions are resolved in the political process without court interference. Justice 
Ngcobo recently crystalized his views. In his examination of the arguments for and 
against judicial review he argues that “at the core of these arguments and counter-
arguments is the doctrine of separation of powers and the limits of the power of judicial 
review.”953 Other scholars like Professor Devenish observe that the “Constitutional 
Court is not the ultimate protector of democracy.”954 Clearly, for these academics and 
jurist, the South African judiciary share responsibility for interpreting the Constitution 
with the elected branches of government. 
 
Therefore, contrary to Rautenbach, it is submitted that the preferred interpretation of 
section 2 read with section 167 of the Constitution is that the Constitutional Court has 
authority to adjudicate constitutional issues only when they are properly within its 
jurisdiction and that it shares the responsibility for interpreting the Constitution with 
other branches of government.955 It is proposed that section 2 does not bar courts from 
applying the political question doctrine just like it does not under the supremacy 
                                                          
952 Scharpf 1966 Yale LR 537-39 (expressing agreement with Bickel’s basic theory but critical of 
the political question doctrine as a means to achieving the end of legitimacy). 
953  Ngcobo 2016 Galagher 19. 
954  Devenish 2004 Stellenbosch LR 64. 
955  Moreover, the jurisdiction of court in section 34 of the Constitution is implicitly limited to those 
disputes that can be resolved by the application of legal principles. See, Kolbatschenko v King 
1399 (discussing the threshold question of whether the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction to 
interfere during the legislative but before process a legislative bill is signed into law, thereby 
confirming the proposition that the Constitutional Court has authority to adjudicator 
constitutional issues that are properly within its jurisdiction). 
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clauses in the constitutions of Uganda,956 Ghana,957 Nigeria and the United States.958 
The common feature in these constitutional provisions is that they all declare their 
constitutions supreme law, and yet the highest courts in those countries have ruled 
that the political question doctrine is applicable. What is more, these constitutions 
(unlike the United States) are fairly new having been adopted in the 1990s like the 
Constitution. Thus, it is difficult to understand the uniqueness, which seems to be 
suggested by Rautenbach, of the supremacy of the Constitution that would prevent 
the application of the political question doctrine.  
  
It is clear from the discussions of the case law from Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda and the 
United States that courts frequently apply the political question without compromising 
the supremacy clause in the constitutions of those countries. To reject the political 
question doctrine as being contrary to section 2 of the South African Constitution is 
tantamount to suggesting that section 2 conflicts with the principle of separation of 
powers, which is the genesis of the political question doctrine. This is legally unsound 
because the two principles co-exist, and there is no reason why the political question 
doctrine, as articulated in the countries discussed, cannot be applied in harmony with 
the supremacy clause in South Africa. Notwithstanding the supremacy clause, the 
study concurs with Justice Kpegah that there is an inherent suggestion in modern 
constitutions (including the South African Constitution) that the policy which should 
inform any legislation and desire to enact such legislation are discretionary matters for 
the elected branches to decide.959 This study submits that those policy decisions 
should not concern the judiciary because the elected branches have discretion and 
                                                          
956  Section 2 of the Uganda Constitution provides: 2. (1) This Constitution is the supreme law of 
Uganda and shall have binding force all authorities and persons throughout Uganda. (2) If any 
other law or any custom is inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Constitution, the 
Constitution shall prevail, and that other law or custom shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, 
be void. 
957  Article 1(2) of the Constitution of Ghana provides that: (2) This Constitution shall be the 
supreme law of Ghana and any other law found to be inconsistent with any provision of this 
Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void. 
958  Article VI(2) of the United States Constitution provides that: “This Constitution, and the Laws of 
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; 
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of 
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
959  See, Amidu 154. 
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the “province of the [judiciary]… is not to inquire how the executive or executive officers 
perform duties in which they have discretion.”960 
 
Finally, Rautenbach maintains that it would make no sense to adopt the political 
question doctrine in South Africa because of the critical remarks of Professor Henkin 
in an article published in 1976.961 In this article, Henkin contends that the political 
question doctrine does not exist.962 He reasoned that the political question doctrine is 
an unnecessary packaging of several established doctrines, but is no more than the 
sum of its parts and courts should do away with them.963 The problem with 
Rautenbach’s reliance on Henkin is that he fails to acknowledge that many other 
prominent legal scholars support the application of the political question doctrine and 
have discredited Professor Henkin’s views.964 Clearly, it would be irrational to abandon 
an important legal principle like the political question doctrine solely on the basis that 
one prominent academic is critical of it. Moreover, Rautenbach fails to recognise that 
even after Henkin’s article was published, a plurality of the US Supreme Court in 
Goldwater v Carter965expressly invoked the doctrine to avoid adjudicating a 
constitutional challenge by several members of Congress to the President's unilateral 
notice of termination of a mutual defence treaty with the Republic of China.966 
 
                                                          
960  Marbury v Madison 170. 
961  Henkin 1976 Yale LJ 597. 
962  Henkin 1976 Yale LJ 598-599. 
963  Henkin 1976 Yale LJ 622. 
964 See, Redish 1984 Northwestern LR (generally arguing that the political question doctrine does 
exist and is critical of Henkin’s views but suggests that the doctrine should not exist); Tushnet 
2002 North Carolina LR 1203-1208; Wechsler H “Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional 
Law” 1959 Harvard Law Review 6-9; and Field O “The Doctrine of Political Questions in the 
Federal Courts” 1924 Minnesota Law Review 512 (recognizing the formulation of the political 
question doctrine); Mulhern 1988 University of Pennsylvanis LR 104-124, and Seidman 2003 
John Marshall LR 449 (arguing that the political question doctrine is an important tool to modern 
constitutional adjudication, and that it manifests itself in three strands); Barkow 2002 Columbia 
LR 242-244, 301-336 (arguing that the political question doctrine forces the Court to confront 
the institutional strengths of the political branches--and the Court's weaknesses--in resolving 
some constitutional questions); and Carter C “Halliburton Hears A Who? Political Question 
Doctrine Developments in the Global War on Terror and Their Impact on Government 
Contigency Contracting” 2009 Mil LR 86 (discussing the importance of the political question 
doctrine in modern contingency environment). 
965  444 US 996 (1979). 
966  Redish 1984 Northwestern LR 1032. 
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Another critic of the political question doctrine is former Deputy Chief Justice 
Moseneke. In a public lecture at the Georgetown Law Center in 2013,967 Justice 
Moseneke discussed his views about the political question doctrine as applied in the 
United States, and noted that the judiciary in South Africa has not adopted such a 
doctrine. He explained that in the South African context, if a dispute is properly raised 
as a constitutional question, the Constitutional Court is not free to take refuge in the 
political question doctrine despite the political implications arising from the dispute.968 
In explaining why the political question doctrine is not suitable in South Africa, Justice 
Moseneke maintains that it is because the Constitutional Court has a duty to resolve 
disputes despite the potential political implications; that the Constitution has installed 
the Constitutional Court as the final arbiter that will give full voice to our constitutional 
norms.  
 
It is difficult to agree with Moseneke to the extent he seems to suggest that the political 
question doctrine applies to disputes that have political implications hence the doctrine 
gains no favor in South Africa because Constitutional Court is permitted to decide 
these types of cases.969 In fact, in many jurisdictions where some version of the 
political question doctrine is applied, courts have made clear that the political question 
doctrine does not apply to any question that has political implications. In Baker v Carr, 
Justice Brennan considered the scope of the political question doctrine and 
pronounced that it has limited reach so that it applies to political questions “not simply 
to cases that involve political issues.”970 This view was recently endorsed by the US 
                                                          
967  Moseneke D “A Journey from the Heart of Apartheid Darkness Towards a Just Society: Salient 
Features of the Budding Constitutionalism and Jurisprudence of South Africa” 2013 
Georgetown Law Journal 749. 
968 There is nothing that stops South African courts from applying the political question doctrine in 
some limited areas. See, Motala and Ramaphosa Constitutional Law 123-124 (where in arguing 
in favor of the application of the political question doctrine, they observed that “even though the 
German Constitution, like the South African Constitution, requires the Constitutional Court to 
adjudicate cases rightly brought before it, the German Constitutional Court in Pershing 2 and 
Cruise Missile 1 case (1983) 66 BVerfGe 39 held that foreign affairs is an area where it lacks 
manageable judicial standards and should be treated as a political question better left to be 
decided by the other branches of government.). 
969  President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union 
1999 4 SA 147 (CC) [72] (holding that it was envisaged that this Constitutional Court would be 
called upon to adjudicate finally in respect of issues which would inevitably have important 
political consequences). 
970  Baker v Carr 217. 
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Supreme Court in Zitovsky v Clinton where the court upheld the political question 
doctrine but found that “the political question doctrine does not apply to the 
interpretation of a federal statute passed by Congress and signed by the President.”971 
Similarly, in Ghana Justice Kpegah in Ghana Bar Association v Attorney-General,972 
held that the mere fact that a lawsuit seeks the protection of a political right does not 
mean that it presents a non-justiciable political question.973 
 
Therefore, it is submitted that Justice Moseneke’s understanding of the political 
question doctrine is not consistent with the application of the doctrine in the countries 
where it is applied. It is wrong to consider, as Justice Moseneke does, the political 
question doctrine as a doctrine that requires courts to abstain from deciding a question 
that has political implications. Instead, the doctrine applies to those political questions 
that are either constitutionally delegated to the discretion of the political branches for 
resolution or those where there is no judicial norm or standard to resolve them.974 In 
short, a distinction has to be drawn, which Justice Moseneke omits to do, between 
questions that have political implications, which courts may resolve and questions 
themselves political that courts should abstain from deciding.975  
 
By his own admission, Justice Moseneke accepts that the Constitutional Court has 
stepped aside in matters that affect the political branches when the Constitution 
requires it. He cited cases such as Ferreira v Levin,976 United Democractic Movement 
v President of the Republic of South Africa,977 and this study adds International Trade 
Administration Commission v Scaw and National Treasury v Opposition to Urban 
Tolling Alliance to the list of cases. While it is true that the Constitutional Court has 
stepped aside, the problem is that the Constitutional Court has not provided a coherent 
principle or theory that explains how and when the Constitutional Court will step aside 
                                                          
971  Zivotofsky v. Clinton 1425; Michel C “There’s No Such Thing as a Political Question of Statutory 
Interpretation: The Implications of Zivotofsky v. Clinton” 2013 Yale Law Journal 253; and 
Shemtob 2016 The Georgetown LJ 1001. 
972  Ghana Bar Association v Attorney General 250 
973  Ghana Bar Association v Attorney General 295. 
974  Zivotofsky v Clinton. And see the reasoning in Betsy v Bank Mauritius. 
975  Mhango 2014 AJLS 464. 
976  Ferreira v Levin NO. 
977  United Democratic Movement v President of South Africa. 
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in any given case. Therefore, while the study accepts Justice Moseneke’s basic 
proposition that the Constitutional Court “has attempted to explain the separation of 
powers, abide by its precepts and defer to the other branches of government when 
appropriate,”978 the problem, which the study suspects has caused the judiciary to be 
repeatedly accused of overstepping its boundaries, is that a coherent theory of 
separation of powers that incorporates a political question doctrine has not been 
developed in South Africa. The judiciary has not created a sufficient principle on how 
separation of powers will be adhered to when faced with (political) questions that are 
textually allocated to the heartland of the national executive or legislature. Instead, the 
courts have opted to deal with these questions on an ad hoc manner. If the courts 
developed a coherent separation of powers (which it is submitted by this study should 
incorporate a political question doctrine for South Africa) that, as Justice Moseneke 
has suggested, should be distinctly South African in design; authorised by the 
Constitution and sit comfortably with our democratic system, less attacks from other 
branches or interests will be had because courts will be required to give the political 
process a chance, and the circumstances underwhich the courts may intervene will 
become clear.   
 
Other opponents of the political question have dismissed the application of the doctrine 
in South Africa on the basis that the Constitution does not assign any issue of 
constitutional interpretation to a coordinate branch of government for final decision.979 
This argument is not valid. The fact that the Constitution is underpinned by the concept 
of separation of powers means that the Constitution assigns particular matters to the 
discretion of specific branches of government. Recently, in United Democratic 
Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others, Chief Justice Mogoeng 
reiterated this principle when it held that the determination of the best “voting 
procedure to hold the President accountable … is the responsibility constitutionally-
allocated to the National Assembly.”980 Further, in Kaunda v President of the Republic 
                                                          
978  Moseneke D “Separation of Powers: Have the Courts Crossed the Line?”  
http://www.groundup.org.za/article/separation-powers-have-courts-crossed-line_3152/ (Date 
of use: 15 December 2016) 10. 
979  Roux 2006 Baker v Carr in South Africa, or How Political Questions. 
980  2017 (8) BCLR 1061 (CC) [64]. 
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of South Africa, Justice O’Regan seem to agree that the Constitution committed the 
conduct of foreign affairs to the executive branch. O’Regan held “it is clear, though 
perhaps not explicit, that under our Constitution the conduct of foreign affairs is 
primarily the responsibility of the executive.”981 She observed that “a variety of 
constitutional provisions including those that state that the President is responsible for 
receiving and recognising foreign diplomatic and consular 
representatives,982appointing ambassadors, plenipotentiaries and diplomatic and 
consular representatives,”983 suggests that the Constitution commits the conduct of 
foreign affairs to the executive branch.984   Justice O’Regan correctly asserts that “this 
is hardly surprising [because] under most, if not all constitutional democracies, the 
power to conduct foreign affairs is one that is appropriately and ordinarily conferred 
upon the executive, for the executive is the arm of government best placed to conduct 
foreign affairs.”985 Justice Moseneke in National Treasury v Opposition to Urban 
Tolling Alliance agreed with O’Regan and said the following:  
 
Where the Constitution or valid legislation has entrusted specific powers and 
functions to a particular branch of government, courts may not usurp that power 
or function by making a decision of their preference.  That would frustrate the 
balance of power implied in the principle of separation of powers.  The primary 
responsibility of a court is not to make decisions reserved for or within the domain 
of other branches of government, but rather to ensure that the concerned 
branches of government exercise their authority within the bounds of the 
Constitution.  This would especially be so where the decision in issue is policy-
laden as well as polycentric.986  
 
Justices Mogoeng, O’Regan and Moseneke’s pronouncements above are an 
acknowledgement that the Constitution commits certain provisions, and the questions 
arising from those provisions, to the other arms of government.987  
                                                          
981  Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa [243]. 
982  See section 84(2)(h) of the Constitution. 
983  See, section 84(2)(i) of the Constitution. 
984  Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africap [243]. 
985  Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africap [243]. See also Harksen v President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 5 BCLR 478 (CC) (confirming that matters of foreign 
affairs are committed to the legislative and executive branches). 
986  National Treasury v. Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance [63]. 
987  See, National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance 84 (Froneman J concurring 
holding that “it is a breach of separation of powers for a court to intrude, by granting an interdict 
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6.11 Conclusion 
 
Since its emergence in Marbury v Madison, the political question doctrine has been 
applied in the United States. Due to its prominence, the doctrine has been adopted 
and applied in various forms in African countries such as Nigeria, Uganda and Ghana. 
In South Africa, its consideration or application has been problematic. The problem is 
that the Constitutional Court has failed to articulate and develop a comprehensive 
doctrine to adjudicate political questions. It is submitted that just as the Constitutional 
Court in Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan 
Council988 created and articulated the doctrine of legality as an incident of the principle 
of rule of law contained in section 1 of the Constitution, the same must happen in 
relation to the political question doctrine as an incident of the principle of separation of 
powers. In the same way that the doctrine of legality has been clarified over the years 
since it was first articulated, the Constitutional Court must develop and clarify the 
political question doctrine, which as this study has maintained, is already part of South 
African constitutional law. The Constitutional Court must do this to prevent 
jurisdictional problems affecting the three arms of government that are bound to 
emerge in the future. More importantly, the Constitutional Court must do this because 
                                                          
against government, upon the formulation and implementation of policy, a matter that resides 
in the heartland of national executive function.”); President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Another v Hugo 1997 6 BCLR 708 (CC) (recognizing that the exercise of pardon powers is 
committed to the executive branch). In addition, sections 206(1) and 207(2) of the Constitution 
commit policing matters to the executive branch such that it is free to structure the South African 
Police without judicial scrutiny. See, Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa [162] 
(holding that the elected branches of government are at liberty to decide where to locate a 
specialized corruption-fighting unit. In this case the elected branches had decided to locate 
such unit within and not without the South African Police Service as previously was the case. 
The court also noted that international law matters are committed to the political branches of 
the state); South African Reserve Bank v Public Protector and Others [2017] ZAGPPHC 443 
[43-44] (held that the power to amend the Constitution is constitutionally assigned to 
Parliament); and United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 
2017 (5) SA 300 (CC) [64] (confirming that the determination “of which voting procedure to hold 
the President accountable in the particular instance is the responsibility constitutionally-
allocated to the National Assembly.”) 
988  Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1998 
12 BCLR 1458, 1482 (CC). See also, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA; In Re: 
Ex Parte Application of President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 3 BCLR 241 (CC). 
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the framers of the Constitution did not intend to ordain the judiciary with unlimited 
powers. 
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___________________________________________________________________ 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
7.1  Concluding remarks  
 
The arguments advanced during the course of this study are the following: Firstly, this 
study has argued that the existence of the political question doctrine in South Africa 
can be discerned from existing jurisprudence that has emerged over the years. In other 
words, through constitutional adjudication, the judiciary has developed an 
incomprehensive political question doctrine jurisprudence, which remains to be fully 
developed into a lucid doctrine. In developing this argument, this study has considered 
notable cases by the judiciary such as Ferreira v Levin, Doctors for Life International 
v Speaker of the National Assembly and Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the 
National Assembly, National Treasury v. Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance, 
Kolbatschenko v King NO and Another and Swissbourgh Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd v 
Government of the Republic of South Africa and others where the judiciary decided 
the issues using political question doctrine arguments or terminology without referring 
to the doctrine by name. It has been contended throughout this study that Ferreira v 
Levin and First Certification Judgement provide the legal basis for the political question 
doctrine in South Africa. In these cases, the Constitutional Court emphatically 
accepted the proposition that political questions fall within the domain of the political 
branches and outside the judicial boundaries; that the democratic role of the political 
branches as reflecting the dominant opinion of the people of South Africa should be 
acknowledged and respected. The submission in this study is enhanced by the views 
of Moseneke expressed in International Trade Administration Commission v Scaw 
South Africa that in developing separation of powers for South Africa (which 
incorporates a political question doctrine) we must adopt “a design which in the first 
instance is authorised by our Constitution itself … [and] must give due recognition to 
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the popular will.”989 In this proposition, Justice Moseneke should be seen as giving 
credence to the classical political question doctrine.  
 
Secondly, this study has argued that the judiciary has a constitutional obligation to 
develop a rule of law that will give effect to its most cited pronouncement on separation 
of powers that “courts must be conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority and the 
Constitution’s design to leave certain matters to other branches of government.”990 It 
has been argued that the judiciary has not given effect to this rule of law and that in 
order to do so the judiciary is obliged to develop a comprehensive political question 
doctrine. In this regard, the political question doctrine must be seen as a constitutional 
requirement. The point is that Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National 
Assembly requires the judiciary to develop a rule, and according to this study the 
political question doctrine is that rule, which will permit the judiciary to observe the 
constitutional limits of their authority vis-à-vis the political branches in relation to 
political questions constitutionally assigned to these branches.  
 
Thirdly, this study has argued that there are at least three constitutional provisions that 
provide the basis for the political question doctrine. It has been noted that one of the 
values, upon which South Africa was founded, is that government is based on the will 
of the people; and that this value provides the constitutional basis for the political 
question doctrine. It has been pointed out that when the political question doctrine is 
correctly invoked it reinforces this constitutional value of self-governance because it 
ensures that issues in dispute are left to be decided by the people through their elected 
representatives. Similarly, this study has argued that section 34 of the Constitution 
provides another basis for the political question doctrine. The argument is that while 
section 34 gives everyone the right to have their dispute that can be resolved by the 
application of the law decided by the judiciary, the converse is true. A dispute that may 
not be resolved through the application of the law is necessarily non-justiciable, and 
the judiciary has no subject matter jurisdiction over such dispute. An example would 
                                                          
989  International Trade Administration Commission v Scaw South Africa (Pty) Ltd [91]. 
990  Doctors for Life International v Speaker of National Assembly [37]. 
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be a dispute that raises a political question (not a question that has political 
implications). Therefore, it is the view of this study that the section enjoins the judiciary 
to develop a mechanism to determine or identify those non-justiciable disputes that 
fall outside the section, namely those that cannot be resolved through the application 
of the law. It is submitted that political questions fall within these non-justiciable 
disputes because they are not capable of resolution through the application of the law. 
Political questions can only be resolved in the political process. Lastly, it has been 
argued that section 167 of the Constitution gives the Constitutional Court discretion to 
decide constitutional or any other matters of public importance. This discretion could 
be employed as an additional basis for developing a political question doctrine.  
 
Fourthly, it has been argued that based on existing case law as well as the plain 
reading of relevant constitutional provisions, the Constitution envisages political 
accountability (and not judicial accountability) in relation to certain constitutional 
questions. Political accountability is envisaged when the Constitution delegates a 
power or function to a political branch of government without imposing principles or 
restrictions (in the text) on how the power or function should be exercised. In those 
instances, the political branch of government has discretion on how to execute that 
power.991 For example, the Constitutional Court has ruled that whether or not the 
National Assembly should hold the executive to account is a discretionary power 
constitutionally assigned to the National Assembly and thus political and not judicial 
accountability is envisaged.992 In other words, the judiciary cannot provide substantive 
content on how the National Assembly should hold the executive to account. In the 
same way, the question of what kind of funding models should be employed for 
national infrastructure projects and who should pay for that cost has been found to be 
                                                          
991  See, Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly [93]; Mhango 2014 
 AJLS; Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa [146]; South African Reserve 
 Bank v Public Protector and Others [2017] ZAGPPHC 443 [43-44] (finding that the Public 
 Protector does not have the power to prescribe to Parliament how to exercise its discretionary 
 legislative power; and that an order directed at Parliament to amend the Constitution offends 
 the separation of powers by seeking too fetter in advance the legislative discretion vested in 
Parliament and the independent judgment vested in members of Parliament); Redish 1984 
Northwestern LR; Ngcobo 2016 Galagher; and Barkow 2002 Columbia LR. 
992  See, Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly. 
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a political question whose resolution of any dispute arising therefrom lies in the political 
process.993  A number of constitutional provisions, including sections 85, 84 and 55, 
support this proposition. The fact that the Constitution contemplates political 
accountability in relation to certain questions bolsters the argument that there is a need 
for a political question doctrine to apply in certain disputes arising from those 
constitutional provisions.  
 
Lastly, it is argued that case law developments in Ghana, United States, Nigeria and 
Uganda are useful to South Africa’s own process of developing a comprehensive 
political question doctrine. It is also suggested that Justice Acquah’s views in Mensah 
v Attorney-General on the doctrine might particularly be useful as it resembles the 
reasoning that was shared by the President of the Constitutional Court in Ferreira v 
Levin.  
 
7.2  Recommendations  
 
Based on the above arguments, the following recommendations are put forward. (1) 
in recognition of South Africa’s constitutional history and current dispensation, it is 
recommended that a political question doctrine should be developed based on a 
classical political question theory. Parts of what should be considered in this 
development are the suggestions by Justice Moseneke in International Trade 
Administration Commission v Scaw South Africa (Pty) Ltd994 and Justice Ngcobo.995 
Chief Justice Ngcobo identified the lack of a coherent theory of judicial review as a 
major problem in South Africa and suggested its development by taking into account 
a number of factors discussed in chapter six.996 The suggestions by both jurists are 
relevant and support the recommendation for the development of the classical political 
question theory. They both emphasize the need to identify a constitutional basis for a 
rule that develops either the separation of powers or judicial review. The two 
                                                          
993  National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance [95]. 
994  See, International Trade Administration Commission v Scaw South Africa (Pty) Ltd [91] and see 
discussion in chapter 6. 
995  Ngcobo 2016 Galagher 22-23. 
996  See discussions in chapter 6. 
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suggestions are linked. In a greater scheme of things, Ngcobo’s suggestions are in 
fact linked to the development of a political question doctrine although he does not use 
that term. In any event, the practical effects of this recommendation are that when 
presented with an issue a court must ask, as a threshold question, whether the issue 
has been constitutionally assigned to the discretion of a political branch. In the event 
that an issue is constitutionally assigned for resolution to a political branch, the court 
should refrain from determining the issue and allow the issue to be resolved in the 
political process.  
 
Secondly, a court presented with an issue should, as threshold question, inquire 
whether there is a judicially ascertainable standard by which the issue can be resolved, 
that is to say whether the issue can be resolved through the application of the law. If 
a court is called upon to serve as a forum for re-examining the wisdom of discretionary 
decisions made by the political branches then the political question doctrine should 
apply and the courts should abstain from proceeding in such an exercise. For example, 
the doctrine should apply to the substantive issue over the policy decision of South 
Africa to withdraw from the Rome Statute because that question is constitutionally 
assigned to the discretion of the political branches. Moreover, there is no judicially 
ascertainable standard for a court to substantively evaluate the decision to withdraw 
from the Rome Statute without delving into political and international relations matters 
that are outside the domain of the judiciary.997 In Democratic Alliance v Minister of 
International Relations and Cooperation,998 the High Court held that the delivery of the 
notice of withdraw from the Rome Statute to the Secretary General of the United 
Nations was procedurally flawed and invalid. However, when requested to determine 
the substantive aspects of the decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute, the High 
Court correctly abstained from expressing any view on the substantive question. It 
offered two reasons for this abstention: (1) that the “decision to withdraw from the 
Rome Statute is policy-laden and one residing in the heartland of the national 
                                                          
997  See, Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [89-90] (Ngcobo 
discussing that international law matters are assigned to the political branches as part of 
separation of powers principle). 
998  Democratic Alliance v Minister of International Relations and Cooperation [71]. 
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executive in the exercise of foreign policy, international relations and treaty making.”999 
This is another way of saying the decision involves non-justiciable questions or political 
questions that are not appropriate for judicial determination or resolution through the 
application of the law.  (2) the court found that “there is nothing patently 
unconstitutional … about the national executive’s policy decision to withdraw from the 
Rome Statute, because it is within its powers and competence to make such a 
decision.”1000 
 
The same applies to the decision of South Africa to join the BRICS. If this decision 
were to be challenged in court as well as a dispute as to whether the National 
Assembly breached its constitutional obligations when it failed to remove, through a 
vote of no confidence, the President following accusations of mismanaging the 
country’s affairs. These would be political questions under this study’s 
recommendation because the question of whether or not to enter into a treaty with 
other sovereign states or how to hold the executive to account are within the discretion 
of the political branches and thus the judiciary cannot examine those discretionary 
powers.1001 Underneath the High Court decision in Democratic Alliance v Minister of 
International Relations and Cooperation is an acknowledgment that the judiciary may 
intervene in the procedural aspects relating to the policy decision to withdraw from the 
Rome Statute (given the elaborate procedures in the Constitution concerning how 
these decisions may be carried out), but it may not intervene substantively in the 
matter for obvious separation of powers considerations.1002  
 
Lastly, in light of the above recommendations, it is further recommended that South 
Africa’s political question doctrine should be developed and applied to the following 
areas: policy formulation, development and implementation; foreign affairs matters; 
                                                          
999  Democratic Alliance v Minister of International Relations and Cooperation [77]. 
1000  Democratic Alliance v Minister of International Relations and Cooperation [81]. 
1001 Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly. 
1002  In his commentaries on the United States Constitution, Story made a convincing argument,  
which is applicable to the South African context when he said “So the power to make treaties 
being confided to the president and senate, when a treaty is properly ratified, it becomes the 
law of the land, and no other tribunal can gainsay its stipulations”. Story Commentaries 346. 
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internal political party rivalries;1003 internal affairs of Parliament except where individual 
rights are involved;1004 and perhaps other areas such as those involving some head 
of state powers.1005 More than a decade ago, Motala and Ramaphosa made a similar 
suggestion concerning the application of the political question doctrine in South 
                                                          
1003  See, Ramakatsa and Others v Magashule and Others 2013 (2) BCLR 202 (CC); and  
Dube and Others v Zikalala and Others [2017] ZAKZPHC 36 [159] (held that “as 
in Ramakatsa this court should be disinclined to determine how the [African National Congress] 
should regulate its internal processes, given the powers in rules 11.3 and 12.2.4 of the [African 
National Congress] constitution providing for continuity. Consequences will follow from the 
declaration of invalidity which, going forward, are best dealt with by the ANC itself in regulating 
its internal processes”). See also, O'Brien v Brown 409 US 1 (1972) (where the US Supreme 
invoked the political uestion doctrine to find that federal courts had no authority over national 
political conventions as long as the convention itself could resolve the disputes. The large public 
interest was best served by allowing the political process to function instead of judicial 
supervision); and Pietzman 1974 Califonrian LR.  
1004  See, Mazibuko v Speaker of the National Assembly; Lekota v Speaker 2015 4 SA     
    133 (WCC); De Lille v Speaker 1998 3 SA 430 (C); and Okpaluba 2015 CILSA 287-290. For 
cases dealing with individuals rights violations in Parliament see, Chairperson of the Nation 
Council of Provinces v Malema 2016 5 SA 335 (SCA) (where Supreme Court of Appeal found 
that a member of parliament was protected when he said the following in Parliament “The ANC 
government massacred the people in Marikana”); Primedia Broadcasting (a division of Primedia 
(Pty) Ltd) and Others v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2017 1 SA 572 (SCA) 
(where the Supreme Court of Appeal ruled that the manner in which the State of the Nation 
proceedings in February 2015 was broadcast was unconstitutional and unlawful, and that the 
use of a telecommunication signal jamming device in Parliament, without the permission of the 
Speaker of the National of Assembly and the Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces, 
was contrary to section 4(1) of the Powers,  Privileges and Immunities of Parliament and 
Provincial Legislatures Act 4 of 2004 and is unlawful.); Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the 
National Assembly and Others 2016 3 SA 487 (CC)(where the Constitutional Court upheld the 
constitutional validity of a provision of a law that permits the arrest of members of parliament 
for causing disturbance in Parliament); Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly 
and Others  2015 4 SA 351 (WCC). For a case dealing with internal affairs of Parliament, see, 
United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others [2017] ZACC 21 
(where the court held that it has no authority to order the Speaker to determine the voting 
procedure on a motion of no confidence, and that the speaker has the authority to determine 
such voting procedure). 
1005  President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 1999 2 BCLR 
175 (CC) [146] (held that section 84(2) [of the Constitution] powers are discretionary powers 
conferred upon the President which are not constrained in any express manner by the 
provisions of the Constitution. Their scope is narrow: the conferral of honours; the appointment 
of ambassadors; the reception and recognition of foreign diplomatic representatives; the calling 
of referenda; the appointment of commissions of inquiry and the pardoning of offenders. They 
are closely related to policy; none of them is concerned with the implementation of legislation. 
Several of them are decisions which result in little or no further action by the government: the 
conferral of honours, the appointment of ambassadors or the reception of foreign diplomats, for 
example. In the case of the appointment of commissions of inquiry, it is well-established that 
the functions of a commission of inquiry are to determine facts and to advise the President 
through the making of recommendations. The President is bound neither to accept the 
commission’s factual findings nor is he or she bound to follow its recommendations.) 
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Africa.1006 They suggested that the doctrine should be applied in relation to cases 
arising out of a motion of no confidence in the President or the cabinet because there 
are no judicial standards for establishing what is appropriate for purposes of 
determining the lack of confidence.1007 Further, for prudential reasons, they suggested 
that the political question doctrine should apply to cases involving the removal of a 
judge by the Judicial Service Commission supported by a two thirds majority vote by 
the National Assembly; internal arrangements, proceedings and procedures of 
Parliament which are entrusted to Parliament; and foreign affairs because it is an area 
where the country needs to speak with one voice and the other branches of 
government are better placed to make decisions in this area.1008 This study agrees 
with their suggestions.  
 
The rationale behind these recommendations is that the Constitution grants discretion 
to the political actors in the above areas and that it envisages these actors will be held 
politically accountable in the performance of their discretionary functions in the 
respective areas. Moreover, there are no judicial standards for determining answers 
to these questions. In relation to political party rivalries, the fact that the Constitution 
does not regulate political parties means that discretion is afforded to political parties’ 
functionaries where the electorate hold the power of accountability.1009 To put it 
                                                          
1006  Motala and Ramaphosa Constitutional Law 122-126. 
1007  Motala and Ramaphosa Constitutional Law 123. 
1008  Motala and Ramaphosa Constitutional Law 123-124 (noting that even though the German 
Constitution, like the South African Constitution, requires the Constitutional Court to adjudicate 
cases rightly brought before it, the German Constitutional Court in Pershing 2 and Cruise 
Missile 1 case (1983) 66 BVerfGe 39 held that foreign affairs is an area where it lacks 
manageable judicial standards and should be treated as a political question better left to be 
decided by the other branches of government). 
1009  Recent jurisprudence confirms that the framers of the Constitution deliberately chose not to 
 regulate political parties in favour of a system where parties will govern their own internal 
 affairs. In this regard, the courts have extended discretion to political parties. See, Ramakatsa 
 and Others v Magashule and Others 2013 (2) BCLR 202 (CC) [125] (where after invalidating 
 a provincial election of the African National Congress (ANC), the court held that "we are 
 disinclined to determine how the political party concerned should regulate its internal process 
 in the light of the declaration made by this Court. We are satisfied that the ANC’s constitution 
 confers on the [National Executive Committee] or the National Conference adequate authority 
 to regulate its affairs in the light of the decision of this Court); and Dube and Others v Zikalala 
 and Others [2017] ZAKZPHC 3 [159] (where after invalidating a recent provincial election of 
 a political party, the court ruled that "as in Ramakatsa this court should be disinclined to 
 determine how the ANC should regulate its internal processes, given the powers in rules 11.3 
 and 12.2.4 of the ANC constitution providing for continuity. Consequences will follow from the 
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differently, the principle articulated in Glenister v President of the Republic of South 
Africa, Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Doctors 
for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly that where the Constitution 
grants power to a functionary without prescribing or imposing limitations on how such 
power should be exercised, such functionary is deemed to have discretion in 
exercising that power, applies forcefully to political parties in South Africa and hence 
the political question doctrine should be extended to political party rivalries. The 
Nigerian judiciary also applies the doctrine to political party rivalries focusing more on 
prudential considerations. However, the recommendation is that South Africa’s 
political question doctrine should be predicated upon the classical political question 
theory. While prudential considerations should not be precluded from being 
considered in the political question doctrine analysis, South Africa’s doctrine should, 
in the first instance, be expressly authorised by the Constitution. In other words, 
regardless of the merits of any prudential considerations, without a classical political 
question theory based argument, no case should be dismissed on political question 
grounds. Finally, given South Africa’s constitutional history and jurisprudence that has 
emphasized constitutional control of all exercise of public power, the political question 
doctrine should be narrowly applied in the same way that the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the Constitutional Court over the political branches is narrowly applied.1010  
 
There are certain assumptions that have to be made concerning the above 
recommendations. Given that the political question doctrine advocates leaving certain 
questions to be resolved in the political process, there is an assumption that the 
political process is functioning properly. Again, there is an assumption that political 
leaders will take their constitutional obligations seriously and believe in the 
constitutional values for which they have taken an oath to defend and uphold. If these 
                                                          
 declaration of invalidity which, going forward, are best dealt with by the ANC itself in 
 regulating its internal processes"). 
1010 See, Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly [19-20] (held that the 
phrase fulfil a constitutional obligation in section 167(4)(e) of the Constitution should be given 
a narrow meaning); President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby 
Football Union 1999 2 BCLR 175 (CC) (held that in the context of the conduct of the President, 
expressed the view that the words fulfil a constitutional obligation in section 167(4)(e) should 
be given a narrow meaning). See also, Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa [78] 
(hold that the exercise of all public power is subject to constitutional control). 
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assumptions are not manifested on the ground, it may be difficult to justify invoking the 
political question doctrine and ensure effective government. 
 
7.3  Effects of failure to implement recommendations  
 
It is submitted that the failure to develop a separation of powers principle that is 
underpinned by a political question doctrine is problematic and may lead to, inter alia, 
the following problems: Firstly, the potential for producing court orders that are 
ineffective or unenforceable. To put this into context, one should be reminded of what 
the Constitutional Court said in S v Mamabolo concerning the role of the judiciary and 
its enforcement powers in our constitutional order. It said that:  
 
Under the doctrine of separation of powers it stands on an equal footing with the 
executive and the legislative pillars of state; but in terms of political, financial or 
military power it cannot hope to compete. It is in these terms by far the weakest 
of the three pillars; yet its manifest independence and authority are essential. 
Having no constituency, no purse and no sword, the judiciary must rely on moral 
authority. Without such authority it cannot perform its vital function as the 
interpreter of the Constitution, the arbiter in disputes between organs of state 
and, ultimately, as the watchdog over the Constitution and its Bill of Rights — 
even against the state.1011 
 
It has been said by an eminent jurist that: 
 
“.. the judiciary is naturally, and almost necessarily … the weakest department. 
Its powers can never be wielded for itself. It has no command over the purse or 
the sword of the nation. It can neither lay taxes, nor appropriate money, nor 
command armies, appoint to offices. It is never brought into contact with the 
people by the constant appeals and solicitations, and private intercourse, 
which belong to all the other departments.”1012 
 
Given these weaknesses of the judiciary, particularly the fact that the judiciary has no 
military to enforce its orders and rely on the executive to enforce them, if South Africa’s 
                                                          
1011  S v Mamabolo 2001 3 SA 409 (CC) [16]. 
1012  Story Commentaries 17 and 23. (remarking further the following as other weaknesses that   
    characterise the judiciary “cannot punish without law. It cannot create controversies to act  
upon. It can decide only upon rights and cases, as they are brought by others before it. It can  
do nothing for itself. It must do everything for others. It must obey the laws; and if it corruptly 
administers them, it is subjected to the power of impeachment”). 
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separation of powers is continuously developed without a coherent political question 
doctrine, the political branches, especially the executive could ignore court orders. A 
recent example is the case of Southern Africa Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development.1013 This case involved the invitation by the South 
African government of President of the Republic of Sudan Omar Al Bashir to attend 
the African Union Summit in South Africa. It is common knowledge that President Al 
Bashir has an outstanding warrant of arrest against him issued by the International 
Criminal Court for, among other things, crimes against humanity. Upon his arrival in 
South Africa, the Southern Africa Litigation Centre sought to enforce this warrant in 
terms of the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
Act, 27 of 2002. The Southern Africa Litigation Centre obtained a court order against 
the government of South Africa ordering it to take steps and arrest President Al Bashir 
while in South Africa. The order could not be enforced because President Al Bashir 
managed to surreptitiously depart from South Africa.1014  
 
The point is that aside from the law which formed the basis of the High Court order to 
arrest President Al Bashir, the High Court should have known that it was unlikely that 
the government was going to enforce the order particularly after it had invited 
President Al Bashir with full knowledge of the legal consequences of his visit and 
without doubt made certain assurances to him regarding his visit. Courts must be 
mindful of their limits and context when crafting court orders so as not to make a 
mockery of the judicial system. If this (the blatant disregard of court order) were to 
become a trend, the public trust in the judiciary could be severely compromised.  
 
Moreover, the Constitutional Court has pronounced itself concerning what 
considerations to make when determining an appropriate remedy. It has noted that in 
terms of section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution, the judiciary is granted authority and 
                                                          
1013  Southern Africa Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice And Constitutional Development 2015 5 
SA 1 (GP).  
1014  For a discussion of the implications and dilemma of South Africa’s decision not to arrest 
President Al-Bashir see Dyani-Mhango N “South Africa’s Dilemma: Immunity Laws, 
International Obligations and the Visit by Sudan’s President Omar Al Bashir 2017 Washington 
International Law Journal 535. 
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may “make any order that is just and equitable” as part of a relief.1015 In Masetlha v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Another,1016 Justice Ngcobo held that 
“the requirement of just and equitable means that the remedy must be fair and just in 
the circumstances of the particular case.”1017 He noted that “what is required is a 
careful balancing of … various interests.”1018 Justice Ngcobo further cited with 
approval the Constitutional Court decision in Hoffman v South African Airways1019 
where the Constitutional Court elaborated on the type of considerations to be 
undertaken when determining a fair and equitable remedy. In Hoffman v South African 
Airways, the Court pronounced that: 
 
The determination of appropriate relief, therefore, calls for the balancing of the 
various interests that might be affected by the remedy. The balancing process 
must at least be guided by the objective, first, to address the wrong occasioned 
by the infringement of the constitutional right; second, to deter future violations; 
third, to make an order that can be complied with; and fourth, of fairness to all 
those who might be affected by the relief. Invariably, the nature of the right 
infringed and the nature of the infringement will provide guidance as to the 
appropriate relief in the particular case. Therefore, in determining appropriate 
relief, we must carefully analyse the nature of the constitutional infringement, and 
strike effectively at its source.1020(emphasis by this study) 
 
In the Ghanaian case of New Patriotic Party v Attorney-General,1021 Chief Justice 
Archer made a similar observation concerning the order sought by the applicant in that 
case. He reasoned that: 
 
I have always held the view that this court like equity must not act in vain. 
In other words, it should not make orders that could be lawfully and 
legitimately circumvented so as to make the court a laughing stock. Under 
the Constitution, 1992 the President is the commander-in-chief of the Ghana 
Armed Forces. Suppose he accepts the declaration sought and confers 
                                                          
1015  Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2008 1 SA 566 (CC); and 
Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 1 SA 1 (CC). 
1016  Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2008 1 SA 566 (CC); [212]. 
1017  Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 1 SA 566 (CC); [212]. See also 
Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 1 SA 1 (CC) [42]. 
1018  Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa [212]. See also, Hoffmann v South African 
Airways [45]. 
1019  Hoffmann v South African Airways [42]. 
1020  Hoffmann v South African Airways [45]. 
1021  New Patriotic Party v Attorney-General. For a discussion of the case and subsequent 
developments, See Mhango M “Separation of Powers in Ghana: The Evolution of the Political 
Question Doctrine” 2014 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 2706-2746. 
284 
 
 
 
with his commanders and service chiefs not to hold any route marches on 
31 December 1993, yet the non-commissioned officers who were 
instrumental in staging the 31 December 1981 coup d’etat choose to parade 
through the streets of Accra, who can stop them? Is this court going to 
send judges, magistrates, registrars, court bailiffs and ushers to erect 
barricades in the paths of the marchers? Again suppose notwithstanding the 
orders of this court, the members of the governing party, and their allies 
choose to celebrate 31 December with picnics, processions and dances, who 
can stop them? I must confess that the more I ponder over the reliefs sought, 
the more I become convinced of the futility of the orders being sought. I think 
this is a case which requires realism, pragmatism and foresight on the part of 
this court.1022 
 
This study agrees with Chief Justice Archer’s reasoning. While the justices in the New 
Patriotic Party v Attorney-General disagreed over whether the political question 
doctrine applied or not, it is submitted that any constitutional system without a political 
question doctrine coupled with perceived breaches of separation of powers is likely to 
witness an increase in the frequency of ineffective or un-enforceable court orders. In 
the South African context, the development of a coherent political question doctrine 
could assist in preventing this risk from materialising. 
 
Secondly, the absence of an intelligible political question doctrine enhances the 
likelihood that jurisdictional problems will emerge and impede the achievements of 
transformation objectives in South Africa. There are a number of cases that illustrate 
this point, including the case involving GFIP, street name change cases across the 
country, and affirmative action measure involving insolvency practitioners, cabinet 
appointments and others.1023 
 
Lastly, as was said in S v Mamabolo, the judiciary’s legitimacy and powerful tool is its 
public trust. The absence of a rational political question doctrine increases the risk of 
                                                          
1022  New Patriotic Party v Attorney-General 50-51. 
1023  See example, SARIPA v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2015 2 SA 430 
(WCC) (overturning affirmative action measures involving insolvency practitioners); Opposition 
to Urban Tolling Alliance v South African National Roads Agency Ltd (where an interdict was 
issued against the implementation of the e-tolling in the province of Gauteng); O’Regan 2012 
SAJHR 129 (arguing that the role of the Constitutional Court is not to thwart or frustrate the 
democratic arms of government, but is rather to hold them accountable for the manner in which 
they exercise public power); Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa (where the 
court invalidated an Act of Parliament that frustrated the crime-fighting efforts of government). 
285 
 
 
 
court orders, which are deemed to be a result of breaches of the separation of powers, 
being ineffective against the political branches. The frequency of this occurring will 
more likely dent the letigimacy of and public trust in the judiciary, and as Chief Justice 
Archer warned, turn the judiciary into a laughing stock.  
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